

Diversity in donorship

Field lessons

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the wide range of organisations and individuals that assisted and supported this study. We owe particular thanks to the many interviewees and organisations in the countries visited for their time and generosity in providing valuable information and insights on non-DAC humanitarian donorship. Special thanks are due to the staff of the Turkish Embassy in Islamabad for their assistance in arranging interviews for the study on Pakistan; to Ismael al-Fadl of the University of Khartoum; Alison Hayes and Jamie Balfour-Paul, Oxfam-GB, as well as Francesca Caponera, WFP, for their support for the study on Darfur; and to Karin von Hippel and Jeremy Benthall for their comments on the Lebanon study. Thanks are also due to Carin Lenngren Martin for her help with the analysis of FTS data, and to our financing peer reviewers Kerry Smith, Development Initiatives, and Christina Jespersen. We would also like to thank Katherine Haver for her work on setting up the framework for the study. Finally, we would like to extend our thanks to our peer reviewers and colleagues in HPG for critical comments on drafts of the report, and to our editor, Matthew Foley.

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ISBN: 978 1 907288 16 6

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This report was commissioned by HPG. The opinions expressed herein are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or of the Overseas Development Institute.

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List of acronyms

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMCU	Aid Management and Coordination Unit, Ministry of International Cooperation
AU	African Union
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
EPI	Expanded Programme of Immunisation
ERRA	Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority
FRC	Federal Relief Commission
FTS	Financial Tracking System
G77	Group of 77 developing countries
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICD	International Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Finance and National Economy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDP	internally displaced person
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organisation
LAS	League of Arab States
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHA	Official Humanitarian Assistance
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
QCF	Qatar Charitable Foundation
PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
RCS	Red Cross/Crescent Society
RMB	Renminbi
SRCS	Sudanese Red Crescent Society
TDRA	Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
UNAMID	UN–AU Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSC	UN Security Council
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Chapter 1

Introduction and background

In 2005, a study by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), entitled *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid*, documented the growing diversity of donors responding to humanitarian crises.¹ From as few as a dozen government financiers just over a decade ago, it is now commonplace to see 50 or 60 donor governments supporting a humanitarian response. This increased engagement reflects growing ambition on the part of a wide range of governments to assist others in times of need. It also reflects the fact that humanitarian action is not the preserve of the rich, industrialised West, but a common pursuit amongst nations, rich and poor. Diverse images – a Chinese envoy promoting China’s humanitarian response to the protracted conflict in Darfur, or Kuwaiti assistance to the American Red Cross to support its annual responses to hurricanes, for instance – have become less the exception, and more a reflection of modern assistance patterns.

Through membership of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Western governments have tended to dominate public debates about the direction, purpose, principles and methodology of relief. *Diversity in Donorship* noted that countries with DAC membership do not, however, represent the totality of aid, nor are the DAC’s members all necessarily the most significant aid-givers. The report found that non-DAC donors, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, accounted for up to 12% of official humanitarian financing in any given year between 1999 and 2004. It also found that resources were being concentrated in a few specific countries, including Afghanistan, North Korea and the occupied Palestinian territories, where these countries have more significant policy influence than in other contexts. The study also remarked upon the overwhelming preference among these states for bilateral aid over multilateral routes, particularly government-to-government assistance, as well as through national operational agencies like Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This preference for bilateral assistance is seen as a means to increase the visibility of these countries’ contributions, as well as reflecting one of the principles of non-DAC aid donorship, namely supporting the primary role of the recipient state in the coordination and management of international assistance. At the inter-governmental and inter-agency level, the study found that organisations such as the UN, the DAC and the European Union (EU) recognise the contribution of these donors, and acknowledge the need to broaden dialogue about international humanitarian action to make it more geographically, politically and culturally representative.

In late 2007, HPG embarked on the next phase of the study, examining non-DAC donorship at the field level. The findings from the 2005 report demonstrated that there was a large gap in knowledge regarding the nature of non-DAC engagement in response to specific crises. This included understanding how non-DAC donors work with affected states, their implementing partners and the rest of the international community, how their engagement is coordinated and how decisions are made regarding the nature of their support, and the means to measure its impact.

The study examined three emergency responses: the South Asian earthquake of 2005 and floods in June 2007 in Balochistan and Sindh provinces; the response to the Israeli offensive in Lebanon in 2006; and the ongoing response to the protracted conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Specifically, each case study examined how foreign policy and strategic interests affected aid donorship, and how interventions were determined and projects prioritised, including the extent to which funding was given according to assessed need. The studies reviewed non-DAC response planning with the affected state and partner organisations, and the mechanisms through which aid was channelled, both bilateral and multilateral, and the means of disbursement. They considered whether and how non-DAC donors participated in wider coordination efforts, and the extent to which implementing partners were encouraged to be active in field and sector coordination exercises, such as the cluster approach. Finally, the case studies examined approaches to measuring impact, including the impact of non-DAC donor assistance within the wider humanitarian response, as well as how activities were monitored and evaluated.

1.1 Key findings

The study found that non-DAC donors do not comprise a homogenous group at the field level. They have diverse policy approaches, and define humanitarian aid in diverse ways. That said, some general trends emerge. Overall, and in contrast to DAC donors, most non-DAC governments prefer to channel humanitarian assistance through host-state mechanisms, and do not necessarily differentiate between providing support to the host state in response to a natural disaster and doing so in response to conflict, even if the authorities are party to that conflict. This reflects a general emphasis on ensuring that the affected state has the primary role in managing the humanitarian response on its territory. However, there are exceptions to this rule, and in the case of Lebanon some non-DAC donors opted to support non-state implementers at the local level.

¹ Adele Harmer and Lin Cotterrell, *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid*, HPG Report 20 (London: ODI, 2005).

humanitarian aid, to \$1,181 million, from \$391m the previous year. Several important contributions from the Gulf States, including a \$500m allocation from Saudi Arabia to the World Food Programme (WFP) food price crisis appeal, account for this increase in total aid. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar together accounted for 64% of overall non-DAC aid in the period 2000–2008. Despite the increase in total humanitarian aid, non-DAC donors continue to provide only a small percentage of reported humanitarian flows from official donors. As a percentage, non-DAC contributions in 2008 accounted for 12% of total official humanitarian aid. This comparatively minor financial weight does not necessarily result in a lack of influence over the course of the humanitarian response. In Darfur, for example, where China (a non-DAC donor) has made a very small financial contribution, its political influence, both bilaterally and over actions taken by the international community in the UN Security Council, has been considerable. In Lebanon, both the political influence and, according to reported figures, the financial weight of non-DAC donors was significant.

Non-DAC donors pride themselves on speedy, timely response, often being the first on the ground with in-kind relief supplies or technical assistance teams. Humanitarian allocations from non-DAC governments could, however, be criticised for being supply-driven – providing the affected state with immediately available in-kind goods or technical assistance, rather than offering support based on an assessment of the needs of the affected population.² This is tempered by a perception among some non-DAC donors that part of the purpose of humanitarian aid is to demonstrate solidarity. Non-DAC donors rely on recipient governments' requests and advice on humanitarian needs or on their own available warehoused supplies, and are less likely to be involved in supporting independent needs assessments. There is also a broader understanding of humanitarian assistance than that held by most DAC donor governments and international aid agencies, with non-DAC governments labelling development assistance, and in some cases economic investments, as 'humanitarian' if they are allocated during a time of crisis. Non-DAC donors also place great importance on rapidly shifting from emergency relief to transition, reconstruction and development programmes.

Non-DAC relations with the rest of the international assistance community (and the international community's awareness of the role non-DAC donors are playing) is generally limited. There was little evidence that DAC donors and the rest of the international community had much knowledge of non-DAC contributions. In addition, non-DAC donors did not seek to coordinate their support through formal coordination mechanisms, either with non-DAC or DAC donors. This was particularly evident in the sudden-onset cases, such as the responses in Lebanon and Pakistan. In contrast, there

was evidence of coordination efforts in Sudan, both among non-DAC donors and between them and the international community. In all cases, national Red Cross/Red Crescent responses were more effectively coordinated through the wider Red Cross movement.

Partly due to a strong adherence to bilateral partnership with and support for the affected state in the allocation of non-DAC support, monitoring and evaluation exercises are not a regular feature of non-DAC donor approaches (unless the interventions were led by the more technically oriented Red Cross or Red Crescent national societies). Perhaps because of this, non-DAC donors have had limited opportunities to learn and improve response approaches over time. Overall, analysis of these countries' humanitarian response is inadequate compared to the responses of Western states and organisations and the UN. Despite often significant contributions to a crisis, non-DAC donors are virtually invisible to international evaluations. This is in contrast to a growing body of knowledge of these same donors in development policy circles, and a greater investment in research and development policy dialogue. Initiatives include the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Development Cooperation Forum, the European Commission's EU–China–Africa initiative on trilateral dialogue and cooperation and the European Development Cooperation to 2020 project (EDC2020) on New Actors in International Development.³

At the global level, however, there is increased emphasis by DAC governments, the UN and some NGOs on the need to engage with non-DAC donors. The drivers for this are multiple. For the DAC donors, there is a convergence between promoting Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles to non-DAC donors and improving overall donor behaviour.⁴ Both DAC donors and the UN also recognise the growing political influence non-DAC donors can have in some contexts, and the urgent need to address the perception that the international humanitarian system is dominated by the West. It is also recognised that some non-DAC donors, such as those from the Gulf, can have a significant impact in addressing strategic gaps in humanitarian funding. Resulting efforts to engage non-DAC donors range from fundraising strategies by the UN and NGOs to the promotion of multilateral financing mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and high-level collaboration and dialogue initiatives. That said, there are no formal fora for discussions between DAC and non-DAC donors outside of ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly.

A final aspect of the findings is that, while financial comparisons can be made at the global level between DAC and non-DAC donors, and within the group of non-DAC donors, there is considerable disparity between internationally recorded contributions from non-DAC donors and those recorded at the

³ See www.un.org/ecosoc/newfuncnt/develop.shtml; www.brusselsbrifeings.net; and www.edc2020.eu.

⁴ The GHD initiative seeks to improve and bring greater uniformity to donor practices in financing and supporting humanitarian action. See www.goodhumanitariananddonorship.org for further details.

national level by affected states, reports from non-DAC donors themselves and, at times, reports from recipient agencies. Reasons for this discrepancy include the fact that non-DAC reporting to OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS) is ad hoc, whereas country-level reporting systems can be more comprehensive given the emphasis on bilateral channels, in particular government-to-government transfers. In the case of Pakistan, for example, nationally recorded allocations for non-DAC donors were four times higher than those recorded by FTS. The findings from this study suggest that real levels of non-DAC allocations are not adequately reflected at the global level (primarily due to substantial under-reporting), although in some cases information at the country level is equally sparse and/or inaccessible. This is particularly the case for the response to the conflict in Darfur.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology for this study involved analysis of relevant primary and secondary literature, collection and analysis of financing data from online tracking systems, field missions to three affected states to analyse non-DAC donor engagement in crisis response and approximately 120 interviews with officials from the UN, international organisations and donor governments and the host state.

1.2.1 Case study selection

The field work involved examining responses to three crises:

- The South Asian earthquake of 8 October 2005 and floods in June 2007 in Balochistan and Sindh provinces in Pakistan, by Barnaby Willitts-King (Chapter 4 of this report).
- The crisis in Lebanon in 2006, by Roger Mac Ginty and Christine Sylva Hamieh (Chapter 5).
- The ongoing response to the conflict in Darfur, by Jago Salmon and Daniel Large (Chapter 6).

In all three case studies, a sizeable number and diverse range of non-DAC donors contributed to the relief effort. The three cases also offered different types of situation, to compare non-DAC behaviour in complex emergency, natural disaster and protracted crisis settings. Pakistan constituted a 'classic' large-scale natural disaster, affecting millions of people and causing widespread damage. There was a strong state-led response, with an emphasis on the role of the military. Non-DAC donors played a major role in responding to the earthquake, accounting for almost half of the relief response, according to the Pakistani government. The Lebanon crisis was classified as a sudden-onset disaster; the humanitarian phase was very short-lived, and most aid was provided for reconstruction purposes. This enabled an examination of non-DAC reconstruction approaches and capacities. In Lebanon, the non-DAC donors played a major role in the response effort, both financially and policy-wise. Setting Lebanon apart from the other two emergency contexts was the presence of a very capable indigenous civil society and other important non-state actors, such as Jihad al Bina, the

social and reconstruction arm of Hizbollah. The final study, in Darfur, offered an opportunity to examine non-DAC engagement in a protracted crisis, in which the affected state is a party to the conflict. Overall, although the volumes of financing to Darfur from the non-DAC community were comparatively low, at least in terms of reported aid allocations, the case study highlights the political and strategic influence non-DAC donors can bring to bear.

1.2.2 Financial analysis

The financial analysis in this report is based on FTS, as well as country-specific datasets. The FTS database, hosted by OCHA, records donor contributions to humanitarian assistance, including multilateral, bilateral and in-kind aid, as well as contributions from the private sector. Contributions are reported to OCHA by donor governments and recipient agencies, and information is also collected by OCHA from other sources, such as donor websites and pledging conferences. FTS divides funding data into three categories: pledges, commitments and contributions. Pledges are defined as a 'non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor'. Commitments refer to 'the creation of a contractual obligation regarding funding between the donor and appealing agency', and contributions are defined as 'the payment or transfer of funds or in-kind goods from the donor towards the appealing agency, resulting from a commitment' (OCHA, 2005). The financial analysis for this report is therefore based on commitments and contributions only.

Because it relies on voluntary reporting, FTS often underestimates total humanitarian assistance, as some contributions are not reported for a given year or emergency. Non-DAC donors in particular are less likely to report to FTS, either because they do not have incentives to do so, or because they are unfamiliar with the mechanism. Under-reporting may be particularly common among non-DAC donor governments because spending is spread across different ministries and budgets and consolidated reports are not produced (whereas DAC donor governments are required to produce centralised reports). The fact that non-DAC donors channel a significant amount of aid bilaterally might also lead to under-representation, as donors and recipient governments frequently lack the incentive or capacity to report these funds. FTS can also produce overestimates, when donors provide inflated valuations of in-kind contributions.

For humanitarian assistance channelled outside Consolidated Appeals, FTS allows donors and agencies reporting contributions to define humanitarian activities and contributions themselves. Humanitarian assistance may not be captured by FTS where this aid constitutes an integral part of other activities, such as reconstruction, security-related work, loans to governments or spending on social assistance. Some contributions to multilateral funds, such as the African Development Bank, the IMF emergency fund and the OPEC Fund, are also recognised by FTS as official contributions.

When analysing expenditures in recipient countries, donors' unearmarked allocations to UN agencies and NGOs may also not be counted if the agency fails to report to FTS the country in which the contribution was spent.

Despite these caveats, FTS is the only global data source available that allows for comparative analysis. It also has the added benefit of being produced in real time, and allows detailed disaggregation by aid type, channel and recipient country. Although its weaknesses are acknowledged, it is still an important tool to identify broad trends over time and between donors.

Chapter 3 examines all non-DAC aid flows, but focuses particularly on eight of the more significant financial contributors: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, South Korea, India and China. In addition to being among the top ten largest non-DAC donors, the international visibility of these countries has increased over the past decade, and some, in particular the Gulf States, are exerting increasing influence in both financial and policy terms. The majority of these donors were also significant actors in the non-DAC responses examined in the case studies. Other non-DAC donors, including South Africa, some new EU states such as the Czech Republic, and Russia are also discussed. The financial analysis undertaken in each of the three case studies, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, is reliant on FTS data as well as domestic data sources.

The findings from the three case studies reveal significant disparities between nationally recorded contributions from non-DAC donors and those reported to the FTS. There are a number of reasons for this. First, no existing dataset at the country level reliably or fully captures flows of humanitarian assistance, albeit these systems may register more of the non-DAC contribution given the emphasis these donors place on funding affected governments directly. Second, many non-DAC donors do not declare aid contributions reliably or fully to FTS. China, for example, only began reporting to OCHA in 2007 (and does not do so systematically), and Middle Eastern assistance, including aid channelled through national Red

Crescent societies, is only sporadically reported to OCHA. In comparison, Eastern European donors like Poland and the Czech Republic are more consistent reporters, reflecting the significant emphasis placed on publicly reporting allocations by EU Member States and ECHO. As a result, these countries may appear to be more significant donors than is in fact the case.

Other factors may also account for these discrepancies, including different definitions of what constitutes emergency expenditure, inconsistent reporting and valuing of in-kind contributions, the inclusion of loans for reconstruction, which are often for much larger amounts than relief spending, differences in the way different databases list indirect contributions and problems with data quality and updating. In addition, public access to information on the quantities and channels of aid delivery by non-DAC donors is often restricted by both donor and recipient countries. China, for example, still considers this issue a state secret. On the recipient side, Sudan is very reluctant to provide such information.

1.3 Parameters and definitions

Like the 2005 publication, the term 'non-DAC' is used to describe the donors examined in this report. Although this disguises a diverse range of institutions, policies and capacities within this group, terms like 'new' and 'emerging' do not reflect the long histories and established programmes of aid donorship non-DAC governments have in many affected states. While non-DAC donors represent an extremely diverse group, they have in common the fact that they remain largely (although not entirely) outside the OECD DAC and other key fora where international humanitarian aid policy and practice are discussed and debated.⁵ However, it is recognised that the term 'non-DAC' is not always utilised in the humanitarian community, especially within the UN. Some UN agencies and NGOs have made considerable efforts to remove the distinctions between their more established donors and this grouping, and refer to all donors as 'partners'.

⁵ In November 2009, South Korea became the twenty-fourth member of the OECD DAC.

Chapter 2

Lessons from the field

Adele Harmer

This chapter documents changes in the aid architecture and aid policy of non-DAC donors at the global level, highlights the key financing trends in relation to the broader policy environment, and analyses the findings of the three case studies – Pakistan, Lebanon and Darfur.

2.1 Trends in non-DAC humanitarian financing, aid architecture and policy

In terms of overall financing, humanitarian aid contributions from non-DAC donors appear to be growing and diversifying. As Martin highlights in Chapter 3, 2008 saw a new high of \$1,181m in non-DAC humanitarian assistance, much of it accounted for by allocations from the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia reported the largest contributions to FTS over the whole period, and in 2008 ranked as the third-largest donor overall, behind the United States and the European Commission. Even if Saudi Arabia's contributions are excluded, the upward trend remains.

There are two anticipated policy effects from this growth in the aid budgets of non-DAC donors. The first is the need to create institutions to manage increasing and increasingly diverse bilateral aid flows. The second effect is that, in this scaling-up process, multilateral organisations might begin to play a more important role (OECD, 2009). The 2005 study documented a highly fragmented aid architecture among non-DAC donors, whereby a multitude of departments often controlled small amounts of 'ODA' expenditure, including departments of the interior, customs, health, industry, trade, commerce and information and communications, as well as defence and the military. This highly diffuse decision-making structure affected the coordination, efficiency and accountability of assistance, and made it more difficult to trace and assess trends in aid flows. There is, however, a discernible recent trend towards centralising coordination and decision-making in aid policy and allocations. A number of non-DAC donors have established, or are considering establishing, dedicated, specialist agencies in charge of aid allocations, including China, Brazil, the Czech Republic and Turkey. This is a positive step, in that it increases the likelihood that responsibilities for financial reporting will be centralised and therefore more easily and more rigorously undertaken. There are, however, also challenges for humanitarian policy; in particular, while aid programmes are becoming more centralised, humanitarian policy often remains attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as indeed it does in many DAC governments), and allocations often reflect historical, strategic and commercial relations rather than a clear analysis of need.

The other policy effect, namely shifting towards greater support to the multilateral system, is less discernible. The balance between bilateral and multilateral funding is still heavily skewed towards the former. This is primarily a matter of principle. Government-to-government assistance is a reflection of non-DAC donors' view of the state as the primary actor in coordinating and managing external assistance, and of aid-giving as a mutually beneficial relationship. The ten largest non-DAC donors channelled an average of 38% of their humanitarian assistance directly to the recipient government in the period 2000–2008. This compares to 2.5% for the top ten DAC donors. For Russia the figure was 65%, for Qatar 64%, for India 57% and for Saudi Arabia 51%. That said, there is now greater dialogue with and acknowledgement of the role multilateral agencies play in humanitarian response, particularly at the global level.

The 2005 report found that non-DAC donors made only limited reference to the role and purpose of humanitarian assistance. With the exception of a handful of non-DAC donors, this remains the case. For the most part, non-DAC donors define the types of emergency assistance they seek to provide, but not necessarily the parameters and purposes of that aid. Encouraged by the EU, policy development has however advanced within the Eastern European countries, and in countries such as Turkey, which is working towards DAC membership, and is thus attempting to reflect DAC norms.

The field studies found that most non-DAC humanitarian aid was not governed by formal aid policy frameworks. Overall, there is a greater emphasis on the provision of assistance as a reflection of 'solidarity' and 'partnership' with the affected state. The distinctions between development and humanitarian aid are also not as clearly drawn in terms of the purpose of aid or the way it should be channelled. Non-DAC donors emphasise the relationship between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development, and see 'emergency' measures as a step towards long-term development. This is in contrast to the principles and definition of humanitarian action used by DAC donors under the GHD, which identifies a very narrow set of activities as humanitarian (saving lives, relieving suffering and providing protection) (GHD, 2003). This is not to suggest, however, that DAC donors maintain a narrow approach to their humanitarian allocations. There are many examples of humanitarian aid being instrumentalised by broader political or security objectives.⁶

⁶ For example, the US Department of Defense provides substantial humanitarian assistance in conflict contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily to support strategic objectives such as 'winning hearts and minds' rather than on the basis of assessed needs.

At the inter-governmental level, non-DAC donors highlight a commitment to the ‘Guiding Principles’ developed in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991. In particular, paragraphs 3 and 4 call for respect for ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States’; humanitarian assistance ‘should be provided with the consent of the affected country’, and ‘the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory’. In contrast, DAC donors stress those elements of Resolution 46/182 that relate to the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence, and highlight the need to ensure ‘safe and unhindered access’ (HPG interviews, 2008 and 2009).

There have been few opportunities for DAC and non-DAC donors to discuss these definitional issues outside of UN fora. The GHD remains a small, primarily Western-based initiative, and few efforts have been made to widen dialogue, with the exception of the accession states of Eastern Europe. Arguably, for DAC donors there is a growing convergence between promoting GHD principles to non-DAC donors and improving overall donor behaviour, and this has resulted in some quiet efforts on the part of some DAC donors to initiate a policy dialogue with a range of non-DAC and affected state countries, as well as with the G77.⁷

2.1.1 Regional developments

In the Middle East there has been significant growth in non-DAC humanitarian aid, particularly from the Gulf States. As Martin documents in Chapter 3, four of the top ten non-DAC humanitarian donors are Gulf States: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. Together, they account for 60% of overall non-DAC aid in the period 2000–2008. In 2008, Saudi Arabia ranked as the third-largest donor overall, after the US and ECHO. This was due partly to a significant contribution to WFP’s food crisis appeal. Aid recipients are also diversifying, and support for the multilateral system is growing, including efforts to secure a greater say in Western-dominated discussions of humanitarian aid. In addition to the Gulf States, some new donors have emerged in the region. Over the last decade, Turkey has become an active donor country; although contributions remain comparatively small, the growing diversification of Turkey’s aid programme to areas beyond its region and its engagement in aid policy fora both suggest growing ambition. The Turkish government has established the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) to centralise development cooperation responsibilities.⁸ Turkey was the first non-DAC country to host an OCHA Donor Support Group meeting, in

Istanbul in 2006. In addition, the government has taken an active role in other humanitarian fora, particularly regarding disaster risk reduction. As Willitts-King documents, Turkey is a particularly keen respondent to natural disasters given its own experiences. The country was the largest non-DAC contributor to the Pakistan earthquake response and to the Iranian earthquake response in 2003. Turkey’s motives for increasing its aid-giving include strengthening its case for EU membership, as well as foreign policy and strategic aims, including military and trade cooperation with Pakistan.

In the EU, the European Commission has been an important facilitator of dialogue and awareness-raising on the responsibilities of these new donors. In particular, the Commission promotes policy articulation and the adoption of GHD, of which the Czech Republic and Poland were early implementers, as well as the separation of budget lines between development and humanitarian aid, an area which the Czech Republic has made a policy priority. The European Commission (in the Consensus and elsewhere⁹) also promotes humanitarian aid *financing* rather than in-kind aid, and proportionate funding via NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross/Red Crescent (HPG interviews, 2008). Overall, while Eastern European donor funding is still very small, some member states have moved ahead of the rest, in particular the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia. The Czech Republic established the Czech Development Agency (CDA) in 2007, to be responsible for supporting implementation of Czech development cooperation. Like the Gulf States, some Eastern European countries are also moving away from so-called ‘neighbourhood’ assistance. In 2006, for example, 66% of the Czech Republic’s aid was channelled to Afghanistan and Lebanon. For Estonia, major recipients included countries as far away as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Indonesia.

In Asia, China has perhaps received the greatest attention as an aid donor, particularly around its aid to Africa. Much of this attention has focused on the relationship between China’s trade and development activities. There are a number of policy priorities for China’s aid programme. First, officials are seeking to clarify how China situates itself within the global aid community, and in relation to Western governments, which on the whole have negative perceptions of Chinese aid. This requires dialogue, not only with recipient states but also with civil society. Second, and in common with other non-DAC donors, Chinese aid officials are keen to examine how the aid architecture is configured, in particular the possibility of establishing a sole agency to be responsible for China’s international aid allocations. This involves bringing together responsibilities in the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a specialised agency. Lastly, China is looking at developing a better-articulated aid policy framework and a better empirical picture of its aid allocations. The country is reluctant to give up the long-established principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that underpin

⁹ European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 18 December 2007.

⁷ A number of donor governments launched a Geneva-based dialogue with affected states in 2008 on issues of shared interest, including support to IDP communities and the role regional organisations play in facilitating access and response efforts, but it is unclear if the initiative will be an annual event, or if it will be taken forward in other contexts.

⁸ With the establishment of TIKA, Turkey’s reported ODA nearly doubled, to \$601m, partly reflecting wider coverage following the transfer of administrative responsibility for data collection to the new agency.

its aid giving, but as Salmon and Large document in Chapter 6, these principles are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as China becomes a more active international political and commercial actor and a supplier of aid and peacekeeping forces in contested environments. The other significant influencing factor in Chinese thinking is the aid competition with Taiwan, whose so-called ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ has induced Beijing to develop an extended programme in support of ‘friendly’ countries which recognise its ‘One China’ policy, which regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. As a result, over 120 countries receive aid from China each year. These are all long-term challenges for China’s aid programme, and are unlikely to be addressed in the near future.

2.2 The politics of engagement

As the 2005 study explained, a range of political, economic, strategic and religious factors underpin aid-giving among non-DAC countries, just as they do for their DAC counterparts. For many, aid donorship reflects wider political and ideological interests or concerns. The three case studies, Pakistan, Lebanon and Sudan, are no exception.

The response to the Pakistan earthquake was perhaps the most clear-cut of the three. In all, 58 non-DAC donors responded to the disaster. As Willitts-King shows, half of the non-DAC commitments were for \$100,000 or less, suggesting that even a symbolic contribution was important. Close to half of the non-DAC donors were Islamic countries, reflecting the fact that religion remains a powerful motivator amongst Islamic states (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005). Strategic alliances also played a part.

The Lebanon response was much more politicised. As argued by Mac Ginty and Hamieh, Lebanon became the site of a development and reconstruction ‘proxy war’ by donor governments. The political motivations of donors were reflected in the timing, sectoral prioritisation and methods of aid disbursement. Saudi Arabia (and the United States) used assistance as a means to bolster the government and counter the increasing influence in the region of Hizbollah and Iran. These donors each pledged assistance to the government worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran, by contrast, used its resources to support non-governmental (and at times anti- or alternative-governmental) actors, and stressed the importance of standing up for ‘the disenfranchised’. The Iranian intervention in Lebanon worked directly with beneficiaries, rather than operating through official channels. As a result of these factors, southern Lebanon became an arena for competing regional influence among a range of entities, including the Lebanese government, regional bodies, Hizbollah-affiliated organisations, Iran, Arab states and Western donor governments, as well as the UN and NGOs. Historical, geographical and cultural ties also meant that non-DAC donors were well-placed to respond to the needs of the Lebanese. Kuwait’s assistance to Lebanon, for example, dates

back to 1966, with the founding of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). Many Western donors, by contrast, were supporting Lebanon for the very first time.

The case of Darfur highlights that non-DAC aid giving is becoming a more complex endeavour than it was a decade ago. Driven by the imperative to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs, non-DAC donors have primarily supported the Sudanese government’s efforts to respond to the crisis in Darfur, both in terms of assistance and with political backing, bilaterally and internationally. China, for example, has steadfastly supported Sudan’s sovereignty and has opposed non-consensual intervention in the form of a peacekeeping force. India too offered political support to Khartoum, maintaining that Darfur was an internal problem for the Sudanese government to resolve. Non-DAC donors have also been reluctant to participate in what they perceive to be a Western-dominated relief effort. As Salmon and Large document, OCHA-recorded non-DAC funding between 2003 and 2007 amounted to 2% of total humanitarian aid contributions to Sudan during that period. In 2003 and 2004, the only non-DAC countries that reported pledges to the crises in Darfur and Chad were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, making up 2.5% of the total. This compares to over 55% for the US and the European Commission combined.

In some contexts, particularly in Darfur, non-DAC donors have had to juggle the pressures to respond to the impacts of conflict with a continuing commitment to uphold historical principles rooted in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), principles which remain the bedrock of their international position on humanitarian issues, particularly regarding respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁰ There has however been a shift in language and emphasis on the part of some non-DAC donors, reflecting a recognition of their growing commitment to providing aid to needy populations. For some governments, and also the African Union, this has led to the dual recognition of the conflicting principles of ‘non-intervention’ in the internal politics of another state and ‘non-indifference’ when it comes to civilians in dire need of protection and assistance (Williams, 2007).

2.3 Aiding the affected state

For non-DAC donors, aid is a regular component of bilateral diplomacy, and as such channelling aid directly to affected states remains the most important approach for non-DAC assistance. As Martin highlights in Chapter 3, the ten largest non-DAC donors channelled an average of 38% of their humanitarian assistance directly to the recipient government

¹⁰ The principles of the NAM – in particular respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity – remain important today, and inform criticism of Western governments’ adoption of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a way of furthering broader political ambitions. The roots of the NAM have also informed the wider pursuit of South–South (or East–East) cooperation, which has been (and remains) a key leitmotif of non-DAC aid.

in the period 2000–2008. In some cases, the proportion was over 50%.

This pattern is clear in both natural disasters and conflict contexts, and stands in important contrast to the trend among DAC donors, whose support to affected states tends to be very different. Non-DAC donors for the most part maintain that the state should play a central role in coordinating and directing the humanitarian response effort. DAC donors are more wary of this approach, particularly in conflict contexts, and state a preference for funding international partners such as the UN and international NGOs (Harmer and Basuray, 2009). Some DAC donors also cite administrative difficulties in providing direct support.¹¹ The non-DAC preference for bilateral contributions also represents a desire to maximise the visibility and impact of aid, and the fact that delivery options are limited. Technical expertise in international aid management and the apparatus to mobilise international humanitarian assistance are both lacking. This is in contrast to an often impressive ability to mobilise domestic humanitarian action, as demonstrated by the Chinese government's response to the Sichuan earthquake in 2008.

Arguably, the tendency of non-DAC donors to provide funds through the affected state, at least in natural disaster responses where the government has the capability and means to manage the response effort, has the effect of supporting and building domestic capacity, rather than circumventing it. This approach has also proved important in allowing non-DAC donors to successfully negotiate access. In the response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, for example, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)'s long-standing policies of 'non-interference' and 'constructive engagement' with the authorities in Myanmar made it an acceptable interlocutor, and the Association was the driving force behind the overall intervention, especially in its early phases (Creac'h and Fan, 2008). In Pakistan, as Willitts-King demonstrates, bilateral government-to-government assistance was key. FTS reports that 66% of non-DAC contributions were channelled to the government, primarily through the Ministry of Finance or the President's Relief Fund. This compares to 21% for all donors in the earthquake response. In the case of Darfur, and in direct contrast to DAC donors, non-DAC governments worked actively through and with the Sudanese authorities. As Salmon and Large note, 'rather than holding the state as primarily accountable for conflict in Darfur, like the US or EU ... non-DAC donors have tended to uphold the supremacy of state sovereignty and non-intervention (unless sanctioned by the UN Charter)'.

In the case of Lebanon, many non-DAC governments worked outside the government. Many dealt directly with municipi-

¹¹ There is evidence that some DAC donors have made funding available through budget support for recovery. For example, in Pakistan the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) provided 50% of its funding directly to the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA) as part of its commitment to un-earmarked sector budget support. This was the first time DFID had used sector budget support to fund a post-disaster reconstruction programme (Harvey, 2009).

palities, thus bypassing central government, or they established and used national reconstruction vehicles, such as the Iranian Contributory Organisation for Reconstructing Lebanon (ICORL) or KFAED. The Iranians were probably the most autonomous of the non-DAC donors through their use of the ICORL and their funding of Jihad al Bina. The Kuwaiti experience is noteworthy in that, in early 2007, it replaced its initial bilateral disbursement route and began directly engaging with municipalities and other 'frontline' service providers. It is thought that the change in strategy (away from direct contact with the government) reflected dissatisfaction with government disbursement mechanisms. Qatar had a dual strategy of direct funding for the government for housing compensation, whilst dealing directly with municipalities for reconstruction projects. Interviews undertaken by Mac Ginty and Hamieh suggest that this desire for independence reflected a fear of corruption, distrust of the government and frustration at government inefficiency. The case of Lebanon demonstrates that state-based assistance is not always the preference (or an obligation) for these donors, especially when effective alternative indigenous or international channels are available.

2.3.1 Other bilateral channels: the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

After the affected state, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies constitute the second most important channels for non-DAC donors. This preference can partly be explained by the fact that Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are seen as trusted partners through their role as an auxiliary to the public authorities (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005). This is particularly so for the Gulf States, where the lines between official and private contributions to the national societies are blurred. As illustrated by Martin in Chapter 3, in 2004 more than 70% of total UAE humanitarian aid to the occupied Palestinian territories was channelled through its national Red Crescent Society.

The national societies rely on the Red Cross/Crescent network to increase access and are often the earliest responders to a crisis. In Lebanon, the Lebanese Red Cross, for example, was one of the first to respond. Early assistance also came from the ICRC and the Turkish and Gulf States Red Crescent Societies. In Pakistan, over 20 National Societies were operating at the height of the response.¹² The Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) also played an important role. Some National Societies worked with the PRCS (e.g. Kuwait), whereas others, such as the Iranian Red Crescent, worked more unilaterally, following their government's lead. Red Crescent Societies from the region are reportedly also more effective in working with local

¹² Despite the number of national societies in operation, non-DAC donors did not report any significant contributions through the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. According to Willitts-King, this might reflect the fact that in some non-DAC countries a high level of Red Cross/Red Crescent funding comes from private donations. In Turkey, for example, the Red Crescent Society raised huge amounts from private donations but did not receive government funds. In other cases, the semi-governmental nature of some National Societies, as in many Gulf States, reduces the likelihood of reporting through FTS. The high level of in-kind contributions made by or through the Movement is also an under-recorded area on FTS.

communities, partly for cultural reasons, for example relating to the medical care of women. In Darfur, non-DAC Red Crescent Societies are seeking to fill the significant gap created by the expulsion in March 2009 of 13 aid agencies accused of providing information to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Applicants included the Red Crescent Societies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

2.3.2 Non-governmental organisations

National NGOs and charities from non-DAC countries are more active in international humanitarian response than reporting would suggest. In particular, Islamic charitable organisations from the Gulf States have significant capacity and are active in international relief operations. These organisations received support from non-DAC donors for responses in all three case studies. However, their contributions are seldom reported to FTS. In addition, since 9/11 Gulf governments have sought to exert tighter control over national charitable organisations in response to accusations that Islamic charities were funding terrorist and militant activities (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005). At the official level, this has resulted in a number of measures to tighten up the regulation and oversight of these charities' overseas activities, accompanied by cuts in funding. In the case of Eastern European donors, contributions to national NGOs have grown over the past few years, from around 5% in 2000–2005 to over 15% in 2006 and 2007.

2.4 A growing recognition of multilateralism?

The share of non-DAC contributions going through multilateral channels shows considerable variation in the period 2000–2008. On average, the UN's share of the major non-DAC donors' funding is 55%, although if one omits Saudi Arabia's contribution to WFP in 2008 this falls to 37%. There is however evidence that some non-DAC donors have increased their contributions in the past few years, including Turkey and the Gulf States. Martin suggests that the CERF has succeeded in attracting a highly diverse DAC and non-DAC donor base. In total, 92 non-DAC donors have funded the CERF, or over half of all non-DAC countries worldwide. This has not, however, translated into significant volumes of financial support, and overall non-DAC contributions to the CERF have declined over the last three years.

At the individual level, some non-DAC donors show signs of steady engagement with the multilateral humanitarian system, although different incentives are driving these countries' efforts to promote themselves at the international level. South Korea and Turkey, for example, are working towards OECD-DAC membership. Both South Korea and the UAE are members of the OCHA Donor Support Group, and there is a growing non-DAC donor presence at international pledging conferences, such as in Lebanon and Myanmar.

There has also been greater recognition of the importance of the UN in international assistance efforts. This may partly have

been driven by the UN itself. Like his predecessor, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes, has stressed the importance of non-DAC and G77 engagement in humanitarian assistance efforts (Holmes, 2008). Efforts to engage non-DAC donors range from fundraising strategies by individual UN agencies to the promotion of multilateral financing mechanisms such as the CERF, and high-level collaboration and dialogue initiatives. In particular, the UN has been promoting the development of stronger relations with the Gulf States. The appointment of a new Special Humanitarian Envoy, Abdulaziz bin Mohamed Arrukban from Saudi Arabia, is a reflection of this commitment. In seeking to increase their donor base, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF, together with NGOs such as Oxfam, have sought to develop closer ties with non-DAC donors, which go beyond fundraising to include a more collaborative dialogue. Strategies have included increasing regional representation, seeking engagement in crises where there is non-DAC interest and giving visibility to non-DAC contributions.

WFP has benefited significantly from its efforts to improve dialogue with its non-DAC partners. As we have seen, the Saudi government gave a landmark contribution of \$500m to WFP in 2008, allowing the agency to hit its appeal target of \$755m in response to the global fuel and food price crisis. This made Saudi Arabia the second largest donor to WFP in 2008. In 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao urged countries to double donations to WFP over the coming five years. Overall, non-DAC contributions to WFP have gone to traditional regions of interest, such as North Korea and the occupied Palestinian territories. More recently, however, assistance has diversified to include a much wider range of countries.

At the field level, however, non-DAC support for multilateral humanitarian agencies and coordinating bodies is notable by its absence. In Darfur, for example, total non-DAC contributions through UN agencies and the UN Work Plan in 2007 were smaller than donations from private bodies and individuals. In the case of Lebanon, as Mac Ginty and Hamieh illustrate, only a very small portion of non-DAC funding was allocated to projects listed in the UN Flash Appeal (5.7% of the appeal), and over 95% of non-DAC allocations went to activities that were not put forward as a priority intervention by the UN. For example, even though Saudi Arabia was the second largest donor overall to the response, it contributed just 3.8% of the Flash Appeal. In comparison, DAC donors contributed 83.5%. In Pakistan the response was similar, although there were some notable non-DAC contributions. For example, Turkey and Kuwait provided a total of \$3m each to a number of UN agencies, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE gave significant contributions to WFP and UNICEF and China provided relief items to UNDP.

The overall lack of support for UN agencies in the field reflects a lack of familiarity with multilateral and inter-donor processes. For example, as Salmon and Large highlight, there is little awareness of the pooled humanitarian funding

mechanisms available in Sudan. There were no non-DAC contributions to the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), and with the exception of a single grant to Islamic Relief of \$100,000 no Islamic, Asian or other non-DAC national NGOs were listed as recipients of CHF allocations.¹³ It is also the case, however, that non-DAC donors are careful about the contexts in which they will support the multilateral system. As Salmon and Large show, according to WFP's contributions database Saudi Arabia provided over \$50m of cash and in-kind support earmarked for WFP emergency operations in specific countries between 2003 and 2007, while contributing nothing towards emergency operations in Darfur. This pattern is repeated for other key non-DAC countries. China, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia and Qatar all contributed to WFP operations in various theatres, but did not support operations in Darfur between 2003 and 2007, focusing instead on the delivery of aid either bilaterally or through the Red Crescent network. In the case of CERF allocations, non-DAC donors are more inclined to earmark funds than their DAC counterparts. This suggests that non-DAC donors are more cautious in their engagement with multilateral humanitarian agencies.

2.5 Allocating aid on the basis of need?

Given the emphasis on government-to-government funding, many of the priorities for aid allocations in the three case studies were set by the requesting governments, and were rarely independently verified by non-DAC donors themselves or their partners. There was little evidence of community/beneficiary involvement in the design or assessment of projects.¹⁴ In most cases, and similar to many DAC donors, non-DAC governments did not have the capacity or access to undertake their own needs assessments. Most non-DAC donors rely on diplomatic staff from their embassies (who combine political representation roles with donor responsibilities) to agree the terms of support, and administrative processes and management are therefore less formal than is usually required by DAC donors. Decision-making concerning needs and aid design is opaque, but appears to be linked to priorities identified by the recipient state. In Pakistan, for example, non-DAC donors relied mainly on assessments by the government or the Pakistani military, rather than UN and NGO needs assessments (though this is not to suggest that DAC donors always base their decisions on needs). Localised assessments were possible where Red Crescent societies or international NGOs such as Islamic Relief were established in an area.

In Darfur, as Salmon and Large argue, the pattern of aid by the main non-DAC donors did not follow the course of the conflict and the increasing humanitarian caseload. Sizeable donations

¹³ See Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan, 2007 *First Allocation Round: CHF Allocations Details by Region*, http://www.unsudanig.org/workplan/chf/2007/docs/round1/CHF2007_First_Round_Allocations_by_Region.pdf.

¹⁴ This was not the case in Lebanon, where indigenous civil society (and within this beneficiaries) were actively involved in shaping the response effort.

were directed elsewhere in Sudan, with only limited assistance to Darfur, where the need was greatest. That said, DAC donors have been criticised for focusing disproportionately on Darfur and neglecting other increasingly insecure parts of Sudan. As in Pakistan, many non-DAC donors coordinated directly with the Sudanese government, and humanitarian aid was confined to government-held areas, and channelled through the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). In addition, much of the support in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan from non-DAC donors was for developmental aid programmes. For many (and in contrast to the approach of DAC donors) operations did not change despite the conflict in Darfur. This policy reflects an understanding of the Darfur crisis on the part of non-DAC donors as primarily developmental. Developmental aid, wherein humanitarian aid is a sub-category, is framed in terms of 'solidarity' or 'partnership' with Khartoum. Whilst DAC-funded humanitarian operations have expanded in Darfur since 2006, the Sudanese government has increasingly and successfully approached non-DAC donors to support recovery activities. In 2009, Saudi Arabia provided a grant of \$18m for 'developmental and humanitarian projects' in Darfur. The majority of non-DAC donors have not distinguished between humanitarian, early recovery or development assistance in their aid planning, coordination or disbursement in Darfur. Indeed, the 'flexibility' of non-DAC aid, and the reluctance of DAC donors to fund recovery projects in Darfur, means that non-DAC assistance is seen as an important alternative to DAC aid, with all the conditions that attach to it. This preference for less conditional non-DAC aid was also evident in Lebanon.

2.6 Timing

Non-DAC donors often stress the rapidity of their response as being a key point of distinction with their DAC counterparts. In many cases, this emphasis on early intervention reflects their own practice in response to natural disasters on their own soil. There are examples of extremely rapid response in the two sudden-onset case studies. As Willitts-King notes, some non-DAC organisations involved in the earthquake response in Pakistan reached affected areas before the Pakistani authorities or the Pakistani military. The Turkish and Iranian Red Crescent Societies reportedly arrived in Muzaffarabad the day after the earthquake – before the damaged and already under-capacity roads became blocked with traffic. In the Lebanon response, the Qatari and Iranian reconstruction organisations had emergency response teams on the ground during the war or just days after the cessation of hostilities. In addition, Jihad al Bina's fast and effective logistical and coordination capacities reportedly allowed it to store, transport and distribute \$180m in cash compensation within hours of the end of hostilities (Fisk, 2006). Speed does not, however, always result in a timely response: in Pakistan, as Willitts-King highlights, one non-DAC Red Crescent Society arrived quickly but had no equipment or medicines – when these eventually arrived, the Society had to rely on the UN's assistance to manage customs formalities.

While non-DAC donors emphasised the need to rapidly deploy goods and personnel, their financial contributions were less rapidly executed. Specific data on the timelines of pledge to commitment to disbursement are not available from domestic databases, nor were individual donors able to provide this information. However, analysis of FTS data suggests that, in the case of Pakistan, non-DAC donors have been slow in realising pledges. Mac Ginty and Hamieh identified the same challenge for some non-DAC donors in Lebanon. Timeliness was, however, not always the objective. This was especially the case in the response to Darfur, where non-DAC donors promoted recovery and development initiatives over emergency relief. According to a representative from the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, justifying the slow pace of Kuwaiti interventions in Lebanon: ‘fast recovery is not always long-lasting’.

2.7 Forms of aid

Non-DAC donors tend to vary the forms of assistance they provide between gifts-in-kind and cash assistance (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005). In-kind assistance includes food aid and other commodities, transport, logistics and technical support. At the global level, cash contributions are estimated to account for just over 77% of non-DAC contributions, with the remainder in kind. This might not be entirely accurate however as in-kind contributions are less likely to be reported to FTS, given that this form of support is more difficult to quantify.

The emphasis on cash or in-kind aid varied between the case studies and between non-DAC donors. In the Lebanon response, as Mac Ginty and Hamieh detail, the non-DAC donors tended to provide assistance mainly through cash grants (directly to central government, ministries and municipalities or to their own assistance organisations). According to FTS, cash grants from non-DAC donors accounted for over 95% of their allocation. In-kind assistance from both DAC and non-DAC donors was limited, and mainly took the form of the distribution of generators or water in the emergency phase. Cash handouts were an important component of the response – and an area that DAC donors were not keen to support. In Sudan, FTS reports that over 95% of aid was provided as cash grants. The limited percentage of in-kind support captured by FTS may be a result of poor reporting. Salmon and Large report an interest in capacity-building, with Malaysia and Egypt providing Darfuran students with scholarships to study at national universities, and India opening a Centre for Vocational Excellence in Darfur. In Pakistan, non-DAC donors tended to favour in-kind giving, mainly personnel and items such as blankets, medical supplies and clothing. Field hospitals were also important. Delivery of in-kind contributions was often through or in coordination with national Red Crescent Societies, with logistics support from the government and the military. This finding is supported by FTS reporting, which suggests that over 65% of non-DAC assistance was in the form of

in-kind support. It is however difficult to assess how far such contributions are made on the basis of needs and in response to needs assessment.

It is very difficult to determine the sectoral preferences of non-DAC donors. Some concentrate on just one sector, while others offer a more comprehensive suite of assistance. Overall, however, a large proportion of assistance is found in the broad ‘multi-sector’ or ‘sector not yet specified’ category (nearly 70% in the case of Lebanon).

2.8 Coordination with state and international actors

In the 2005 report, we highlighted the coordination difficulties facing non-DAC humanitarian assistance stemming from the diffusion of responsibilities at headquarters between different ministries and departments. With the introduction of centralised aid agencies within some governments, the coordination of the overall response effort and the tracking and reporting of humanitarian spending should begin to improve, in turn improving the coordination of support on the ground. In July 2008, the UAE announced the establishment of an External Aid Liaison Bureau to coordinate humanitarian assistance from charitable bodies and to liaise with OCHA and other UN agencies. In the meantime, however, non-DAC contributions are primarily coordinated by recipient state ministries.

As we have seen, in some cases, such as Sudan, this emphasis on state-based assistance has been in direct contrast with the practice of DAC donors, which have generally preferred to steer clear of state mechanisms. Even in non-conflict contexts, though, relying on the coordination capacity of the affected government can cause problems. In Pakistan, for instance, bilateral contributions were coordinated through the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, which found it very difficult to direct the 50-plus non-DAC donor allocations. In Lebanon, the Prime Minister’s Office (the hub of much reconstruction planning) had no contact with Jihad al Bina, the largest indigenous reconstruction body. In addition, because non-DAC aid is primarily coordinated by government bodies, non-DAC donors also have limited opportunity to learn ‘from the ground’ and assess the impact of their assistance measures.

The field studies revealed structural differences inhibiting coordination among non-DAC donors, between non-DAC and DAC donors and between non-DAC donors and the rest of the international humanitarian response effort. In Lebanon, for example, there was no coordination forum where non-DAC donors and their partners could regularly meet the major DAC donors and their humanitarian agency partners. Distrust between non-DAC donors also inhibited coordination at that level. Iran, for example, cooperated with Qatar and the UAE, sharing information and coordinating activities at the local level, but the same was not the case with Saudi Arabia. Qatar cooperated with Iran, the UAE and Kuwait, but had no contact with Saudi Arabia. Of the major non-DAC donors, Kuwait

seemed the most integrated into the international coordination network, through, for example, KFAED's attendance at cluster meetings. In Darfur, the primary donor coordination forum, the Darfur International Partners Group, had no regular non-DAC attendance, despite invitations. This lack of engagement with multilateral coordination mechanisms means that non-DAC aid is not reflected in multilateral planning processes such as the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). There is however an acute awareness of the differing approaches in Darfur, and this has resulted in DAC governments and UN representatives seeking more effective communication with non-DAC donors, although dialogue remains primarily diplomatic and not specifically related to aid coordination.

Although the cluster system (used in both Pakistan and Lebanon) was important in coordinating the activities of many UN agencies and INGOs (through which the vast majority of DAC support flowed), it had little effect on the activities of non-DAC donors and Lebanese and non-DAC NGOs. In Lebanon, the media was the primary source of information on aid activity for some non-DAC donors.¹⁵

2.8.1 Coordination with the Red Cross and NGOs

Whilst programmatic coordination by non-DAC actors was generally absent in the three field cases examined, coordination among national Red Cross/Crescent Societies and with the ICRC was more common, particularly in Darfur and Pakistan. Coordination between the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS), the IFRC and ICRC was considered effective in Darfur, with weekly meetings between SRCS and the ICRC. However, coordination between the SRCS and Red Crescent Societies operating in Sudan was in practice weak. The Saudi RCS, in particular, was criticised for its refusal to share resources, participate in national coordination meetings led by the Sudanese or integrate activities into strategic planning.

In several cases, civil society initiatives in non-DAC countries have worked closely with Western NGOs, particularly in Sudan. As Salmon and Jago explain, the 'Darfur Consortium' (a network of African and Arab NGOs) attempted to unify African civil society action on Darfur, particularly through engagement with the AU. In addition, the national chapter of the 'Humanitarian Forum', launched by Islamic Relief worldwide after 9/11, attempts to 'facilitate coordination of the activities of stakeholders present in humanitarian relief' and 'to promote and enforce existing best practices in NGO management and project implementation'.¹⁶ The forum has however had little impact on humanitarian delivery in Darfur.

¹⁵ Interview with senior representative of the Qatari Overseas Assistance Organisation.

¹⁶ 'National Chapters of the Humanitarian Forum Are Now Formed in Sudan, Yemen and Indonesia', *Humanitarian Forum Website*, http://www.humanitarianforum.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=1.

2.8.2 Regional coordination

Coordination efforts among non-DAC donors have arguably been more effective at the regional level than at the national level. The League of Arab States, for example, has emerged as a new dynamic in the coordination of Middle Eastern aid to some recipient states, though it lacks dedicated expertise in humanitarian affairs. This was particularly evident in the response to Darfur. Similarly, eight governments formed the 'Asian Ambassadors Group', an informal diplomatic meeting in Sudan whose members conduct visits to areas outside of Khartoum.¹⁷ Although not a formal coordination mechanism as such, the exchange of information on aid allocations and intentions that it makes possible could at least serve an awareness-raising function. In Myanmar, as we have seen, ASEAN played a vital role in facilitating assistance after Cyclone Nargis, as part of a tripartite structure also involving Myanmar and the UN. This may well be a model for other regional organisations, particularly the multi-stakeholder joint assessment carried out under its auspices, and its monitoring and review role (Creac'h and Fan, 2008).

2.9 Measuring impact: the role of monitoring and evaluation

The question of impact does not receive a great deal of attention from non-DAC donors, although the basic output, such as number of houses built and medical teams and equipment delivered, is important (Hofmann, 2004). In all three of the contexts examined, monitoring and evaluation was informal, comprising visits to verify construction; such visits also act as a means of publicity, but they do not constitute a technical assessment. The exception is where stronger Red Crescent Societies were involved – for example the Turkish and Qatar Red Crescents, which focused on meeting agreed international standards in service delivery, as well as undertaking monitoring and evaluation exercises. As Mac Ginty and Hamieh note, some Gulf States are also keen to monitor their own indigenous charitable organisations lest they support out-of-favour political causes (Kroessin, 2004; Levitt, 2004).

2.10 Conclusion

The field studies suggest that the international community has only a partial understanding of the humanitarian assistance efforts being conducted by non-DAC donors. Non-DAC donors are for the most part absent from Western perspectives as to how the aid effort is being carried out, and who the main assistance actors are. Coordination efforts largely do not involve non-DAC donors, and yet these donors are becoming more significant in international humanitarian assistance – both in terms of the volume of financing they provide, and in their policy ambitions. In 2005, HPG argued that non-DAC donors needed to be more formally involved in discussions of humanitarian issues, beyond the protracted and sometimes

¹⁷ The participants are China, Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan.

difficult debates in the General Assembly and ECOSOC. Such a process would both encourage a greater appreciation amongst all donors of the differing drivers and incentives involved in aid efforts, and the need for constructive dialogue to manage these interests, as well as promoting a greater focus on the core objectives of saving lives, relieving suffering and providing protection. While some small steps have been taken in this direction, there remains an opportunity for deeper engagement with non-DAC donors. Much more could be done to identify and develop shared interests, and a commitment to work together in headquarters fora and coordinate more effectively at the field level. As Kroessin (2008) argues:

more needs to be done to bridge the real and imagined gap between the West and non-traditional donors. Questions need to be asked as to why we have a parallel international aid system. Fears about the politicisation of aid or proselytising need to be addressed and the debate about universal humanitarian values ought to be renewed... more must be done to ensure all forms of official development assistance are recognised and coordinated. We need a broader humanitarian reform process than the one currently being discussed in order to help forge a more honest and open partnership.

The 2005 study put forward 26 recommendations. Some addressed non-DAC donors specifically, calling on them to formulate explicit humanitarian policies, give greater consideration to the balance between and incentives for bilateral and multilateral channels, consider options for centralising responsibility for official assistance within one ministry and explore ways of increasing aid coordination and enhancing the transparency and reporting of official aid flows. The findings from this report suggest that important progress towards those goals has been made, particularly in centralising responsibility

for official assistance. Regarding DAC donors, the 2005 report called for increased dialogue with non-DAC governments on aid policy and humanitarian principles, both at headquarters and at regional level, the provision of technical assistance in humanitarian aid management and monitoring and evaluation and support for measures such as disaster risk reduction, which non-DAC donors (themselves often affected by disaster) regard as vital elements in any assistance package. These issues continue to merit attention.

Many of the recommendations for international organisations are or have been addressed, including investing in strategic and policy-based approaches to relations with non-DAC donors, not just seeing them as new funding opportunities. This is an important achievement, and for agencies such as WFP it has ultimately been reflected in increased financial support.

In addition to the outstanding recommendations from the previous report, this study suggests that greater efforts should be made to invest in and support national reporting systems, and for greater consideration to be given to how these systems might better relate to FTS. Second, there is a need to move beyond the annual debates between the G77 and the West on humanitarian issues in ECOSOC and the General Assembly. A more strategic and constructive dialogue is required between interested donors (both DAC and non-DAC) and recipient countries. Current fora such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative might not be appropriate, given the perception of GHD as a Western, closed club. That said, the same kind of urgency that led to the creation of the GHD should be applied to finding a forum for this new grouping. This would provide an opportunity to consider the high politics of humanitarian action and the points of contact between DAC and non-DAC donors in this area. Such a forum would also be a more accurate reflection of the reality of aid operations on the ground.

Chapter 3

Financing trends in non-DAC donorship

Ellen Martin

Analysing the aid expenditure of non-DAC donors is a difficult business. The two major sources of data on global international humanitarian assistance, the DAC and the FTS, each has advantages and limitations, and neither provides a fully accurate picture. The data collected by the DAC is guided by agreed definitions and common criteria, meaning that it is more reliable and comparable over time. But while the DAC collects data on the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of its 22 members and eight observer and other non-DAC countries, it does not record the contributions of all non-DAC countries.¹⁸ As FTS collects and records the contributions of all donor governments, it constitutes the only meaningful source of data on trends in the humanitarian financing of non-DAC states.

The initial analysis of non-DAC humanitarian financing in the 2005 report identified several important trends. Reported non-DAC humanitarian assistance accounted for between 1% and 12% of total humanitarian aid, with Saudi Arabia and South Korea the two leading contributors. Aid was underpinned by a range of political, economic, strategic and religious factors, and assistance was concentrated on one or two major crises each year. There was an emphasis on bilateral assistance. Contributions to multilateral mechanisms were relatively low, although there were tentative signs that support for international organisations might increase as a way of promoting the international visibility of non-DAC contributions.

As we have seen, total non-DAC humanitarian aid still forms a small proportion of overall humanitarian assistance, and the drivers and channels of aid have remained largely the same. That said, the financial analysis carried out for this report suggests that non-DAC donors are becoming more significant humanitarian actors. There have been important changes in the volumes of aid being disbursed, the geographical scope of non-DAC humanitarian action has expanded and non-DAC donors have become more engaged in multilateral financing mechanisms. At the same time, this analysis highlights important differences between national-level reporting and global data sources. Evidence also suggests that FTS differs from other official sources, such as the annual reports issued by humanitarian agencies. Thus, despite the importance of FTS in providing a viable analysis of individual financing flows and enabling comparisons among non-DAC donors, and

¹⁸ The number of non-DAC donors reporting to the DAC has increased significantly since the 2005 study. Reporting governments include Taiwan, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey and the UAE. (South Korea attained OECD-DAC membership at the end of 2009. However, this chapter examines trends in humanitarian financing until the end of 2008, and so South Korea is included in this analysis as a non-DAC donor.)

between them and their DAC counterparts, calculating actual levels of funding remains difficult.

3.1 Overview of non-DAC financing, 2000–2008¹⁹

Non-DAC aid reported to FTS has accounted for a small though not insignificant portion of overall official humanitarian aid in recent years. From 2000 to 2008, non-DAC contributions made up 14% of the total government contributions reported to FTS.

As Table 1 (page 16) shows, DAC members formed the majority of the top humanitarian donors in the period 2000–2008. Several non-DAC countries are also part of this group, and four DAC members – New Zealand, Austria, Greece and Portugal – do not rank amongst the top 25 donors. Looking at 2008 figures only (Table 2, page 16), Saudi Arabia has emerged as a key humanitarian donor, ranking third largest overall.

The number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS has continued to rise, even if one omits the sharp increase in 2005 as a result of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. Despite a stable trend in the number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS each year from 2000 to 2004 (an average of 42, with a range of 37 to 45), the number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS in 2007 (59) and particularly in 2008 (84) was substantially higher than the 2000–2004 average. The tsunami response accounted for the majority of new donors in 2005, and some of these have continued to contribute, with donations to the CERF as well as to a number of individual emergencies including in the DRC, Sudan and Lebanon in 2006. This trend is probably a result of the increased profile of the international humanitarian system post tsunami, and the establishment of the CERF in March 2006 (Haver, 2007).

3.2 Major non-DAC donors and funding patterns

Figure 2 (page 17) shows that, between 2000 and 2008, the largest humanitarian contributions reported to FTS from non-DAC states were from, in order, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the UAE, Kuwait, Russia, Turkey, China, Qatar, South Africa and India.²⁰

¹⁹ The data analysis in this chapter is based on commitments and contributions reported to FTS up to 25 February 2009.

²⁰ FTS data on non-DAC financing trends for the period 2000–2006 shows that China had contributed more than Kuwait during that period. However, a \$10m contribution to the response to Cyclone Sidr in 2007 has meant that Kuwait is now the larger donor. While India's contributions were higher than South Africa's, additional reporting to FTS by South Africa after 2006 (on contributions made in the period 2000–2006) shows that South Africa also contributed more than India over this period.


Table 1: Humanitarian aid from donor states plus the European Commission, 2000–2008

Donor (*indicates non-DAC donor)	Amount (US\$m)
United States	17,099
European Commission	6,840
United Kingdom	3,353
Japan	2,710
Netherlands	2,275
Norway	2,184
Sweden	2,115
*Saudi Arabia	1,976
Germany	1,783
Canada	1,742
Switzerland	1,400
Denmark	1,286
Italy	948
Ireland	778
France	719
Australia	656
Finland	580
Spain	539
Belgium	480
*South Korea	445
*United Arab Emirates	399
Luxembourg	199
*Kuwait	186
*Russia	133
*Turkey	129

Table 2: Humanitarian aid from donor states plus the European Commission, 2008

Donor (*indicates non-DAC donor)	Amount (US\$m)
United States	2,995
European Commission	1,275
*Saudi Arabia	727
United Kingdom	678
Norway	507
Netherlands	471
Sweden	435
Canada	427
Germany	346
Japan	317
Italy	247
Denmark	230
Ireland	196
France	151
Switzerland	148
Spain	134
Australia	129
Finland	113
*United Arab Emirates	106
*Kuwait	96
Belgium	91
Luxembourg	56
New Zealand	36
*Russia	35
*South Korea	31


Figure 1: Number of non-DAC donors reporting to FTS, 2000–2008



Four of the top ten non-DAC humanitarian donors are Gulf States: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. Together, this quartet accounted for 64% of overall non-DAC aid in the period 2000–2008. Since 2002 contributions have steadily increased, although there was a slight fall in 2006 after the tsunami. Turkey

became an important aid actor as a result of its contributions to the earthquakes in Iran in 2003 and Pakistan in 2005, where it was respectively the largest non-DAC donor and the third largest donor overall. In 2006 and 2007, Turkey continued to contribute, while widening its responses to include protracted crises.

Figure 2: Total humanitarian aid of top ten non-DAC donors, 2000–2008



As Figure 3 shows, non-DAC contributions represented a large proportion of overall contributions in 2001 – 14%. Approximately 81% of these non-DAC contributions (\$407m out of \$502m) were from Saudi Arabia. These figures omit a 2001 contribution by Saudi Arabia to the occupied Palestinian territories of approximately \$250m, which appears to have been reported twice to FTS.

Although Saudi Arabia’s contributions are the largest reported to FTS over the whole period, even when all its contributions for the years 2000–2008 are excluded (including the 2001 anomaly) the overall upward trend in the proportion of non-DAC aid is still evident, as shown in Figure 4 (page 18).

In Figure 5 (page 18), we can see that 2006 saw a substantial decrease in the overall percentage of non-DAC humanitarian aid. This is most likely the result of the unprecedented and one-off surge in humanitarian aid in the tsunami response, a trend that was also noted with regard to DAC donors. In 2008 there was another marked increase in non-DAC humanitarian aid, from \$391m to \$1,181m. Several important contributions from the Gulf States in that year account for this increase.

3.3 The Gulf States

Examining the financing trends of the Gulf States as a separate group is useful since there are broad political and cultural

Figure 3: Non-DAC government contributions as a percentage of all government contributions




Figure 4: Non-DAC contributions, minus Saudi Arabia, as a percentage of all government contributions, 2000–2008





Figure 5: Non-DAC donor contributions 2000–2008




similarities between these countries, and four of them are major donors. These countries have also become more consistent in their reporting to FTS in the past three to four years. Overall, in that same period Gulf States’ humanitarian aid has accounted for an average of 64% of total non-DAC aid and 4% of total humanitarian aid.

Figure 6 shows that Gulf States’ humanitarian aid increased from 2002 to 2007, on average by \$44m a year. In 2008 humanitarian aid more than tripled, mainly due to Saudi Arabia’s response to the earthquake in China (\$50m), floods in Yemen (\$100m) and the WFP food price crisis appeal (\$500m). In addition, Kuwait contributed \$80m towards the occupied Palestinian territories through the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

3.4 Other major non-DAC donors

Turkey has continued to grow as a non-DAC donor, with contributions amounting to 0.2% of total humanitarian aid from 2000 to 2008, and 3.2% of total non-DAC aid. In 2005, humanitarian assistance accounted for 61% of Turkey’s total contributions between 2000 and 2008. Contributions fell slightly in 2008 for the first time since 2003, from \$11m in 2007 to \$9.5m. South Korea contributed 11% of non-DAC aid and 0.7% of overall humanitarian aid in the period 2000–2008. However, since 2005 humanitarian aid has markedly decreased. Contributions in the tsunami year amounted to \$3.8m, a very small sum in comparison to other non-DAC donors.

Figure 6: Gulf States' humanitarian aid 2000–2008

Russia accounted for 3.2% of total non-DAC aid in the period 2000–2007 and 0.2% of overall humanitarian aid. While contributions decreased from an average of \$18m a year from 2000–2006 to \$3m in 2007, Russia disbursed \$35m in humanitarian aid in 2008. This was mainly in response to the earthquake in China (\$20m), as well as contributions towards WFP's operations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, contributions from EU accession states such as Slovenia or Estonia are not statistically significant. Two countries, the Czech Republic and Poland, together contributed over half of Eastern European aid from 2000 to 2008. The Czech Republic is the larger donor, accounting for a third of all Eastern European aid giving. Overall, these countries provide 1.8% of total non-DAC humanitarian aid. In line with their entry into the EU in 2004 (except for Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007), volumes of humanitarian aid increased from just under \$10m in 2000–2003 to over \$60m between 2004 and 2008.

A great deal of attention has been given to Chinese and Indian foreign economic policy in Africa (Muller-Kraenner, 2008), the securing of new markets and the strengthening of these countries' negotiating positions in international fora. However, while the interplay between their economic interests and development cooperation strategies is of considerable interest to the international community, China and India's growing international roles have yet to be reflected in the volumes of humanitarian assistance they report to FTS. According to FTS, they provided an average of just under 0.3% of total international humanitarian assistance in the period 2000–2008, representing 2.4% of non-DAC aid for China, and 1.3% for India.

3.5 Main recipients

Most non-DAC donors provide humanitarian aid to states within their region, and tend to focus on one or two high-

profile crises per year (see Figure 7; Figure 8 shows the pattern for DAC donors).

The largest reported recipients of Gulf State humanitarian aid in the period 2000–2008 were, in order, the occupied Palestinian territories, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan and Sudan. In line with the general tendency to contribute to a small number of crises each year, major contributions from the Gulf States were channelled to Iraq in 2003, the occupied Palestinian territories in 2004, the tsunami and Pakistan in 2005, Lebanon in 2006 and Bangladesh in 2007.

Gulf States are beginning to channel greater funding outside of traditional regions. In 2005, for example, 40% of reported humanitarian aid went to the tsunami response. As shown in Figure 10, humanitarian aid to countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa increased from less than \$10m in 2000 to over \$50m in 2007. There is also evidence that contributions to the UN are increasing. In 2005, for example, the Gulf States channelled \$20m to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for the occupied Palestinian territories, and made similarly large contributions to UNICEF in 2005 and to WFP in 2006 and 2008, when Saudi Arabia contributed its landmark \$500m. Available data from 2009 shows that, in response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Kuwait has channelled almost \$34m to UNRWA, the third largest contribution to date after the United States and ECHO.

Saudi Arabia's contribution to Bangladesh in response to Cyclone Sidr and floods in 2007 provides another illustration of the growing financial influence of the Gulf States in humanitarian donorship. It was by far the most important donor, accounting for over 55% of the total response and contributing more than eight times as much as ECHO or the United States, the second and third largest donors respectively.

Figure 7: Top ten destinations for non-DAC donor humanitarian aid, 2000–2008




Figure 8: Top ten destinations for DAC donor humanitarian aid, 2000–2008






Figure 9: Top ten destinations for Gulf States' humanitarian aid, 2000–2008



Turkey, though itself a secular state, retains close ties with the Islamic world, and is a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). This is reflected in the distribution of its aid, with contributions concentrated in Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and the occupied Palestinian territories. In addition, Turkey gave substantially to the Iran earthquake response in 2003, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005 and the China earthquake in 2008. In 2007 and 2008, humanitarian aid expanded to encompass 26 countries, including Kenya, Chad, Ethiopia and the DRC, while the high-profile cases of Iraq and Lebanon were the main recipients. Turkey's status as a non-DAC OECD observer member and its move towards channelling aid according to DAC norms will have influenced this diversification and increase in overall allocations.

In contrast, although South Korea has channelled 90% of its aid to neighbouring North Korea, the volume of humanitarian aid going to other, more high-profile emergencies has been small, especially in recent years. That said, Seoul has greatly diversified its geographic reach. In 2008, contributions were channelled to 28 countries, compared to an average of five in the years 2000–2006. South Korea was also the largest non-DAC donor to the CERF in 2006–2008. The DAC undertook a special review of South Korea's aid programme as part of its progress towards membership in 2010 (Republic of Korea, 2009).

Figure 10: Humanitarian aid from Gulf States to Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 2000–2008

In the case of Eastern European countries, larger donors such as the Czech Republic and Poland are broadening their reach and moving beyond regionally-centred humanitarian aid. The Czech Republic was the first non-DAC OECD member to complete a review of its ODA programme, and is seeking to develop a separate budget line for humanitarian aid. By signing the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in December 2007, all EU member states, including Eastern European donors, have endorsed the GHD principles. Efforts are also under way to create an action plan for the practical implementation of the Consensus, including facilitating the participation of new members (EU, 2007; interview with ECHO official).

India's humanitarian aid continues to be channelled towards one or two high-profile emergencies per year. In 2006 and 2007, however, all reported contributions went to the CERF. India's decision not to accept any humanitarian aid after the tsunami was in part a reflection of its desire to demonstrate its regional pre-eminence and growing global economic standing. Humanitarian contributions in that year to affected countries amounted to \$25m, compared to \$12m in 2003 and \$1m in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, almost all humanitarian aid, over \$5m, went towards the earthquake response in China. According to WFP data, India also makes substantial contributions to that organisation (\$7m in 2006, \$9m in 2007 and over \$17m in 2008, for WFP operations in India, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran) (WFP, 2006–09; annual data accessible at <http://www.wfp.org/about/donors/wfp-donors>).

China, though an emerging and much-discussed donor, is perhaps the most difficult to track as budgetary issues remain, for the most part, a state secret. China has also focused its aid on a small number of countries. Prior to 2005, humanitarian


assistance was influenced by China's historical and political ties with countries such as Mozambique and North Korea. However, in response to the tsunami China made a considerable contribution of \$62m, amounting to 63% of the country's total humanitarian aid in the period 2000–2008. More recently, China's donor profile has been defined by its engagement in Sudan, which in 2007 was its largest recipient, and where political and economic interests are a driving force. Other areas of strategic and regional significance are also important, including assistance to Myanmar in response to Cyclone Nargis. China's contribution of \$5.3m was significant in that it was the second largest non-DAC donor to the response after Saudi Arabia. China retains strong geopolitical and economic ties with the military government in Myanmar, and China and the ASEAN countries were the first to be granted access to the country in the aftermath of the cyclone (Reuters, May 2008).

3.6 Channels

As discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of non-DAC donors show a preference for providing humanitarian aid as bilateral, government-to-government assistance. Figure 11 shows that, in the period 2000–2008, the ten largest non-DAC donors channelled an average of 38% of their humanitarian assistance directly to the recipient government, compared to 2.5% for the top ten DAC donors.

This preference for government-to-government assistance is clearly evident in the Gulf States, where Saudi Arabia channelled 51% and Qatar 64% of their humanitarian aid directly to governments in the years 2000–2008. For Russia, government-to-government aid accounts for 65% of the total, for India 57%, Turkey 41% and South Korea 39%. Similar

Figure 11: Bilateral aid from top ten non-DAC donors, 2000–2008



patterns were found in the field studies, albeit accessing reliable information on bilateral volumes at this level was exceedingly difficult, particularly in Darfur. In Pakistan, FTS reports that 66% of non-DAC aid was channelled to the government, compared to 21% for all donors.

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also important channels, particularly for the Gulf States. In 2004, more than 70% of the UAE’s total humanitarian aid for the occupied Palestinian territories went through its national Red Crescent Society, and both the Kuwaiti and Saudi societies consistently receive significant contributions from their governments. In India and China, national Red Cross Societies, while playing important roles domestically, have yet to develop significant international capacity.

On average, the UN’s share of the major non-DAC donors’ funding is 55%, although if one omits 2008 and Saudi Arabia’s contribution to WFP this falls to 37%. China has the lowest average at 12%, followed by Russia at 21% and Turkey at 22%. South Korea shows the highest proportion of funding to the UN amongst non-DAC donors, with just over 50% in 2000–2008. India and South Africa both contribute an average of over 40%. FTS data shows that Turkey channelled an average of 33% of aid through the UN from 2005 to 2008, against 22% for 2000–2004. Similarly, while South Korea channelled 32% of its total humanitarian aid to UN agencies in 2000–2004, this increased to 73% in the period 2005–2008 – a significant change as humanitarian aid to North Korea has tended to be bilateral. In the Gulf States, contributions to the UN have increased from an average of 13% to 28%.

Figure 12 shows that non-DAC funding to WFP noticeably increased in 2002–2003, mainly through contributions from

South Korea, and again in 2006 and 2007, thanks to Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. The majority of these contributions have gone to traditional regions of interest such as North Korea and the occupied Palestinian territories. More recently, however, assistance has diversified to include a much wider range of countries, many of them in Africa. South Korea, for example, has funded WFP operations in Sudan and the DRC, Russia has funded WFP operations in Somalia and Saudi Arabia has funded WFP in Ethiopia and Kenya. Meanwhile, the CERF has attracted a highly diverse donor base: in total, 92 non-DAC donors have funded the CERF, or over half of all non-DAC countries worldwide. The actual volumes being contributed are, however, small; overall, non-DAC countries have contributed \$18m, compared to \$166m from DAC states for 2006, 2007 and 2008. Some major non-DAC donors such as the Russian Federation have yet to make a first contribution.

3.7 Tracking non-DAC humanitarian financing

FTS is an important tool in identifying trends in non-DAC financing. However, while non-DAC reporting to FTS has become much more frequent since 2003, the disparities in data compared to other official sources suggest that real levels of non-DAC humanitarian financing may be higher than previously thought. To illustrate this, the following section discusses other sources of data used in this study and contrasts some of the key findings generated from both domestic as well as recipient agency sources. WFP donor reports, for instance, reveal significant differences in levels of non-DAC contributions compared to FTS. WFP data from the period 2003–2008 shows that, on average, non-DAC donors contributed over 60% more than is shown on FTS. Total non-DAC contributions in this period amounted to almost \$1.3 billion, compared to the \$790m reported to FTS.

Figure 12: Overall non-DAC contributions to WFP, 2000–2008






Figure 13: Top ten non-DAC donors to the CERF, 2006–2008



These disparities stem partly from the fact that FTS does not include contributions by India towards domestic operations. However, some more significant differences are evident. Thus, while FTS reports contributions from Russia amounting to just under \$18m between 2003 and 2008 (and \$12m in pledges), WFP data shows contributions at \$53m. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s contributions amount to \$551m, according to WFP data, yet FTS gives \$534m.

Domestic data sources used in the field studies indicate that the financial role of non-DAC donors in the responses to both the Pakistan and Lebanon crises was far more significant than is portrayed in FTS. In the Pakistan earthquake response, FTS

gives a figure of 16%, whereas Pakistan’s Donor Assistance Database (DAD) puts the non-DAC contribution at 48% of the total. (Part of this disparity is due to the fact that FTS only records emergency relief expenditures, whereas the DAD lists many contributions jointly as ‘relief and reconstruction’, and also includes reconstruction loans.) In Lebanon, the government’s list of donations shows that the Gulf States were the largest donors, with Saudi Arabia accounting for 40% of the response, compared to just 13% for the US and ECHO. Conversely, FTS indicates that the US was the largest donor, accounting for 21% of the response, ahead of Saudi Arabia at 12% and ECHO at 11%. In this instance, the short duration of the war meant that emergency relief needs were rapidly replaced by reconstruction

Figure 14: Overall non-DAC contributions to WFP, 2003–2008

needs, in which phase the Gulf States were the major donors. In Darfur, volumes of humanitarian assistance as defined by FTS only show a relatively small part of the non-DAC response to the crisis, which has focused on concessional loans, technical assistance and recovery programmes.

3.8 Conclusion

Non-DAC humanitarian financing accounts for a small proportion of overall humanitarian aid. However, the donor base is widening and becoming increasingly diverse. A record number of non-DAC donors reported to FTS in 2008, and volumes of humanitarian assistance have increased substantially. Yet at the same time it is difficult to judge whether this is a

sustainable increase, since the majority of this growth was a result of Saudi Arabia's large-scale responses. While moves by Turkey, South Korea, India and some Eastern European donors towards greater engagement with UN financing mechanisms are important, this trend remains dwarfed by the overall financial volumes channelled bilaterally – as government-to-government contributions and through national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Overall, non-DAC contributions remain small in comparison to DAC donors, though responses in Bangladesh in 2007 and in Myanmar in 2008 suggest that non-DAC donors can exert significant influence, both in humanitarian policy and in financial terms, through relations at the regional level and in the field.

Chapter 4

Pakistan case study

Barnaby Willitts-King

This case study explores the response of key non-DAC donors to recent humanitarian crises in Pakistan. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the earthquake of 8 October 2005, which affected the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the disputed territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and floods in June 2007 in Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Pakistan has a complex range of strategic alliances and political and economic relationships with neighbouring countries, the Islamic world and the West. The response of non-DAC donors to the earthquake and floods therefore provides an important insight into their activities, priorities and policies as donors. Overall, non-DAC donors in Pakistan contributed significantly to the earthquake response, but the findings of this study suggest that greater efforts are required to improve coordination between all donors and to harness their significant financial and technical capacity more rigorously.

4.1 Background

4.1.1 *The humanitarian context in Pakistan*

Pakistan is a disaster-prone country, suffering from frequent floods, droughts and small earthquakes. It has also hosted several million Afghan refugees for decades in NWFP and Balochistan.

The earthquake of 8 October 2005 killed an estimated 70,000 people. It caused mass destruction of roads, housing and public infrastructure, and affected over 4m people in all. The initial response was coordinated by the Pakistani military, the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) and the ERRA (Ahmed and Macleod, 2007). International assistance amounting to over \$6bn was pledged from over 50 countries at an international donor conference in Islamabad. Overall pledges surpassed the requirements laid out in the damage assessment produced jointly by the World Bank and the government of Pakistan. ERRA announced the end of the relief phase in March 2006, and rehabilitation/reconstruction work continues in the affected areas.

The floods in June 2007 hit Sindh and Balochistan provinces in the south of the country. They caused destruction over a wide area, killing over 400 people and affecting around 2.5m. The government, through the recently established National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), was reluctant to appeal for international assistance and allow access. This position is linked to the ongoing conflict with Balochi nationalists. The UN launched a \$43m Flash Appeal in July 2007, which generated a modest response from donors.

Pakistan is currently one of the eight countries piloting the ‘Delivering as One UN’ approach, which aims to strengthen field-level coordination between UN agencies. The earthquake response was the first crisis in which the cluster approach was piloted. The approach was subsequently used to a more limited extent during the floods.

4.1.2 *Pakistan’s foreign relations*


Pakistan was created in 1947, when India was partitioned as part of the process of independence from the British Empire. As a young country it has had a turbulent history, with shifting alliances and support from external powers relating to its status as a Muslim state bordering India, Iran, China and Afghanistan.

India and Pakistan have had troubled relations since Partition, and the two countries’ armies still maintain a standoff in the disputed region of Kashmir. Both are declared nuclear powers, and tensions regularly flare up, although since 2002 there has been slow but gradual progress towards a resolution of the Kashmir conflict. China and Pakistan are major trading partners, China investing significant amounts in infrastructure projects such as the Karakoram Highway linking the two countries through the Himalayas. In 2005, trade volumes were \$5.5bn. Pakistan is also a key recipient of Chinese development assistance.

Pakistan and the Middle East have close religious, defence and security and economic relations, with Saudi financial support helping Pakistan after the United States and other countries imposed economic sanctions in the wake of Pakistan’s test of a nuclear weapon in 1998. In Pakistan’s domestic politics, Saudi Arabia has also played a facilitating role between competing factions. An estimated three million Pakistanis work in the Gulf States, and Gulf funding for religious schools, or *madrassas*, in Pakistan forms a significant part of aid relations. Another dimension is the link with extremist groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which have historically received funding from the Arab Gulf. Turkey has longstanding links, including cultural and economic ties. The US and UK remain major aid donors, though Pakistan’s close alignment with Washington in the ‘war on terror’ has created tension with its traditional allies in the Islamic world.

4.2 Financing trends

This section analyses the available data on the financing aspects of non-DAC responses to humanitarian crises in Pakistan, looking at volumes of official humanitarian assistance, channels,

Figure 15: Humanitarian assistance to Pakistan 2000–2007

types and timeliness. While the vast majority of humanitarian assistance in recent years was provided in response to the 2005 earthquake, the response to the 2007 floods will also be analysed to provide a more recent comparison.

Financial data for non-DAC contributions was obtained from FTS and Pakistan's Donor Assistance Database (DAD).²¹ These sources were cross-referenced with media reports and official press releases. The DAD is a country-level database owned by the Pakistani government. It was set up with UNDP technical support in response to the earthquake, and was expanded to cover all development assistance to Pakistan in 2007. It is situated in the Economic Affairs Division (EAD), which coordinates foreign assistance. It covers both humanitarian and development expenditure, but it is not as well-established as FTS and there are issues of data quality. EAD is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, formerly part of the Ministry of Finance. It is the channel through which bilateral contributions are coordinated. While it is responsible for aid effectiveness and coordinating donor contributions, its strength lies in its bilateral links. ERRA compiles its own lists of data for specific sectors, but relies on the DAD for donor information.

These two data sources give divergent pictures of the response to crises since 2005 as relates to the role of non-DAC donors. According to FTS, non-DAC commitments to date amount to \$183m, or 16% of the overall response, while DAD lists non-DAC relief commitments as \$425m, or 48% of the overall response. There are a number of reasons for these different figures, including discrepancies in the definition of emergency expenditure, inconsistent reporting of in-kind contributions, the inclusion on the DAD database of loans for reconstruction, which are often for much larger amounts than relief spending,
²¹ See www.dadpak.org.

differences in the way different databases list indirect contributions, problems with data quality and updating.

Given the historical preference of non-DAC donors for bilateral channels rather than the UN, we would expect them to be more likely to report to the government-led DAD compared to the UN-led FTS. FTS data, while incomplete, is however probably more reliable as there is an explicit attempt to cross-check the data submitted. It is also better coded in terms of disaggregating sectoral data, for example, and is comparable between donors. This study will refer to both datasets, acknowledging they are not directly comparable, but that they have different strengths. DAD does not contain much data on actual contributions, as opposed to commitments, while FTS has clearer data on both, and the FTS definition of 'commitment' is more rigorous than DAD's (implying confirmation of a written agreement), which uses commitment in the sense of a non-binding pledge as well as a written agreement. This study therefore uses data on both commitments and contributions. This is not ideal as funds that have been committed may not have been received by the government or agency, but given the challenges of using two databases, this is the best pragmatic approach.

4.2.1 Volumes of Official Humanitarian Assistance²²

The 2005 earthquake elicited by far the largest response from donors in Pakistan's recent history, as Figure 15 shows.

Tables 3 and 4 show the headline figures from FTS and DAD for the earthquake response, broken down by Non-DAC, DAC and Other (including IFIs and private contributions). This shows a

²² Data was downloaded on 1 March 2008. Non-DAC figures include data from individual non-DAC countries. Figures for other organisations, including the Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Fund, are included in the IFI/UN/Other category.

Table 3: Earthquake response commitments/pledges (FTS) (US\$)

	Commitments	% share	Pledges	% share
Non-DAC	183,451,911	16%	372,931,247	36%
DAC	693,212,347	59%	148,170,065	14%
IFIs/UN/Private	286,248,440	25%	516,836,580	50%
TOTAL	1,162,912,698		1,037,937,892	

Source: FTS

Table 4: Earthquake response commitments (DAD)²³

	Relief	% share of relief	Reconstruction	Relief and reconstruction	Total
Non-DAC	425,108,812	48%	570,850,000	548,281,803	1,544,240,615
DAC	385,443,923	43%	325,700,673	794,146,693	1,505,291,289
IFIs/UN/Private	83,965,733	9%	404,905,000	2,354,439,858	2,843,310,591
Total	894,518,468		1,301,455,673	3,696,868,354	5,892,842,495

Source: DAD

response of between \$895m and \$1,163m. These overall totals for relief commitments/contributions differ by around \$250m, but this may be partly explained by the inclusion of some relief expenditure in the undisaggregated ‘relief and reconstruction’ category of the DAD.

The FTS and DAD data tell different stories, as illustrated in Figures 16 and 17. FTS suggests that non-DAC donors accounted for 16% of the response to the relief phase in terms of firm commitments, and have not delivered on pledges. DAD figures, by contrast, show commitments exceeding

Figure 16: Commitments to Pakistan earthquake (from FTS)





Figure 17: Commitments to Pakistan earthquake (from FTS)



²³ DAD has three categories for earthquake response commitments – relief, reconstruction and a combined relief/reconstruction category for donors which do not disaggregate their commitments.

the amounts pledged as recorded on FTS, with non-DAC commitments exceeding those of DAC countries, at 48% of total contributions for the relief/recovery phase, compared to 43% for DAC donors. The differences in data suggest that we should be cautious about drawing firm conclusions based on top-line figures, particularly on the level of delivery against pledges. Nonetheless, it is clear from both datasets that the contribution by non-DAC donors to the Pakistan earthquake response is above the 12% figure derived by the *Diversity in Donorship* report for the upper limit of non-DAC contributions to global official humanitarian assistance (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005). This points to a particular conjunction of factors influencing the response of non-DAC donors. These are discussed below.

4.2.2 Number of donors

FTS lists commitments from 22 out of the 23 DAC donors (all but Portugal), and pledges from 58 non-DAC donors. Table 5 lists the top non-DAC donors, according to FTS.

Table 5: Top Non-DAC donors by volume (excluding Pakistan)

Donor	US\$ committed/contributed
Turkey	66,114,459
Saudi Arabia	29,884,439
Kyrgyzstan	27,093,596 ²⁴
Qatar	20,598,573
Poland	4,603,515
Czech Republic	4,412,303
United Arab Emirates	4,392,194
Kuwait	3,000,000
Russia	3,000,000
Malaysia	2,380,000

Source: FTS

Notable absences from this list are China and India, both of which made large pledges (\$343m and \$25m respectively), but activities were either not reported to FTS or were more focused on reconstruction. Table 6 from DAD shows the non-DAC donors highlighted within a complete listing of all donor commitments for both relief and reconstruction. This shows that the level of response by many non-DAC governments exceeds that of DAC donors. The table also includes a number of donors not listed on FTS, such as China and Iran.

4.2.3 Channels for earthquake contributions

FTS provides the clearest dataset on the channels assistance was delivered through – whether bilaterally, through NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, the UN or other channels – as illustrated in Figures 18 and 19.

²⁴ While FTS lists this commitment as a bilateral in-kind contribution, no further information could be obtained.

Figure 18: All donor contributions to earthquake by recipient




Figure 19: Non-DAC contributions to earthquake by recipient




Table 6: Top donors to the earthquake response

Funding agency	Committed (US\$)			
	Grand total	Relief & Recovery	Reconstruction/ Rehabilitation	Relief and Reconstruction/ Rehabilitation ²⁵
World Bank	998,000,000			998,000,000
ADB	962,685,805		404,905,000	557,780,805
Saudi Fund for Development	576,222,986	123,222,986	453,000,000	
IDB	501,600,000			501,600,000
China	343,000,000			343,000,000
US	293,764,305	2,196,219		291,568,086
Japan	203,549,626	2,001,087	10,897,235	190,651,304
UAE	200,000,000			200,000,000
UK	185,383,893	7,207,867	72,011,841	106,164,185
Turkey	172,350,000	129,900,000	41,850,000	600,000
France	113,552,486	10,618,067	96,428,571	6,505,848
Volunteers Don Bosco	108,000,000			108,000,000
UNICEF	106,949,722	49,364,106		57,585,616
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development	100,500,000	49,500,000	50,000,000	1,000,000
Netherlands	90,000,000	85,330,000		4,670,000
Germany	85,805,567	6,219,668	67,080,067	12,505,832
Norway	77,781,698	42,791,152	2,508,112	32,482,434
Canada	76,858,863	45,094,806	27,776,463	3,987,594
ECHO	68,784,017	53,730,022		15,053,996
Sweden	58,781,607	22,699,585	26,491,712	9,590,310
IFAD	56,500,000			56,500,000
Aga Khan Foundation	53,500,000			53,500,000
Iran	50,100,000	50,100,000		
EC	46,535,631	12,811,303	11,973,180	21,751,148
Australia	32,339,000	439,001		31,899,999
Qatar	30,000,000	30,000,000		
India	25,030,000	30,000	25,000,000	
Grand total	5,892,842,494	894,518,468	1,301,455,674	3,696,868,352

Source: DAD

This corresponds to evidence on the channels preferred by non-DAC donors – i.e. the preference for government-to-government: 66% of contributions reported to FTS by non-DAC donors were committed this way, compared to 21% for all donors (Harmer and Cotterell, 2005). Similarly, the level of commitments to the UN and NGOs is significantly lower than for the entire donor dataset. The only surprising finding is that non-DAC donors did not report any significant contributions through the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. This might

reflect the fact that a high level of Red Cross/Red Crescent funding comes from private donations in some non-DAC countries, including Turkey, or that the semi-governmental nature of some National Societies, as in many Gulf States, reduces the likelihood of reporting through FTS. In addition, the high level of in-kind contributions made by or through the Movement is also an under-recorded area on FTS.

²⁵ DAD permits commitments to be reported in a category including both Relief and Reconstruction – i.e. not disaggregated.

Table 7: Appealing organisation type

Organisation type	Commitments (all) (US\$)	%	Commitments (non-DAC) (US\$)	%
Government	238,537,133	21%	112,711,099	66%
Inter-governmental orgs.	28,943,648	2%	100,000	0%
NGOs	208,506,344	18%	234,676	0%
Other	188,532,735	16%	39,844,062	24%
Private orgs. & Foundations	3,099,832	0%	0	0%
Red Cross/Red Crescent	150,498,445	13%	4,623,204	3%
UN agencies	344,794,561	30%	11,124,267	7%
Total	1,162,912,698		168,637,308	

Source: FTS

4.2.4 Type of assistance: cash, in-kind, loans

The split between cash and in-kind contributions shows how important in-kind assistance is to non-DAC donors, as illustrated in Figures 20 and 21.

The data indicates that non-DAC in-kind contributions were significant, accounting for as much as half of all in-kind contributions. Given that FTS tends to under-record such

contributions in terms of value, we might expect the actual non-DAC in-kind contribution to be even higher. DAD data supports this, for example with Saudi Arabia listing \$120m of in-kind relief. Delivery of in-kind contributions was often through or in coordination with national Red Crescent Societies, with logistics support from government or military aircraft. It is difficult to assess how much such contributions were made on the basis of needs and in response to needs assessment.

Figure 20: All donor contributions by type




Figure 21: Non-DAC donor contributions by type




Table 8: Contribution type

	Committed (all) (US\$)	%	Committed (top 21 non-DAC) (US\$)	%
Cash	818,246,653	70	52,723,898	30
In-kind	344,666,045	30	119,525,618	70
Total	1,162,912,698		172,249,516	

Source: FTS

One example concerns a Cuban offer to send equipment for floods but not personnel: this was rejected by the UN health cluster lead as not being sustainable (WHO/PAHO guidelines, 2003).

In terms of the drivers for this emphasis on in-kind contributions, one Turkish interviewee commented that sending personnel was a greater show of solidarity than simply sending money. However, an economic analysis would consider that, as a general rule, the cost of human resources compared to materials is lower in non-DAC countries than in DAC countries. This would tend to make sending in-kind contributions, in the shape of human resources, more appealing to poorer non-DAC countries. The Gulf countries made large cash contributions, with greater in-kind support from Turkey and Cuba, where discretionary resources are limited. Another related feature of non-DAC assistance to the earthquake is a tendency to use more national assets, such as military aircraft, rather than privately chartered transport.

4.2.5 Sectoral allocations

Analysis of the breakdown by sector in Table 9 shows that non-DAC donors have tended to prefer the food and health sectors over coordination activities, compared to the total donor effort. This corresponds to sectoral preferences discussed in inter-views. However, as almost half of the listed non-DAC contributions are in the broad ‘multi-sector’ or ‘sector not yet specified’ category, we should be cautious about drawing too many firm conclusions on sectoral allocations. This may reflect a tendency of those entering data not to enter codes consistently, as well as for interventions to be multi-sector, in the sense of organisations bringing a range of relief items – food, medicine, shelter – and the projects not being disaggregated.

4.2.6 Geographical allocations

The earthquake struck two areas of Pakistan: NWFP and AJK. The overall breakdown of needs and response from all donors was fairly equal between the two areas, according to DAD. While it was not possible to analyse the breakdown for all non-DAC donors, there is some evidence of a preference for NWFP among Gulf donors. One non-Gulf donor interviewee speculated that this might be due to longstanding relationships dating back to the Afghan war, when Gulf states sponsored jihadi groups based in NWFP, but there is no strong evidence to support this. It could equally be because China channelled its assistance to AJK, or the result of skewing due to a large Saudi pledge to Balakot.

4.2.7 Timeliness

In the relief phase, there are examples of extremely rapid response – some non-DAC organisations reached affected areas before the Pakistani authorities or the military. This

Table 9: Sectoral allocations

Sector	All contributions	%	Top 21 non-DAC donors excluding Pakistan	%
Agriculture	7,243,295	1%	0	0%
Coordination and Support Services	158,545,527	14%	920,192	0.5%
Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	24,541,921	2%	0	0%
Education	33,004,232	3%	500,000	0.2%
Food	87,223,073	8%	30,052,863	17%
Health	129,815,591	11%	24,977,043	14%
Mine Action	423,729	0%	0	0%
Multi-Sector	358,615,675	31%	52,939,580	31%
Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law	6,638,997	1%	0	0.0%
Safety and Security of Staff and Operations	264,550	0%	0	0%
Sector Not Yet Specified	185,879,180	16%	44,799,430	26%
Shelter and Non-Food Items	112,856,261	10%	18,060,408	10%
Water and Sanitation	57,860,667	5%	0	0%
Total	1,162,912,698		172,249,516	

Source: FTS²⁶

²⁶ FTS limitations mean that data was selected only for the main non-DAC donors making up the majority of commitments/contributions.

Table 10: DAD data by area for relief and reconstruction

Area	Gulf State commitments (US\$)	All donors
AJK	329m (37%)	2.3bn (46%)
NWFP	572m (63%)	2.7bn (54%)

included the Turkish and Iranian Red Crescents, for example, which were reported to have arrived in Muzaffarabad the day after the earthquake – before the damaged and already under-capacity roads became blocked with traffic.

Specific data on the timelines of pledge to commitment to disbursement are not available from databases, nor were individual donors able to provide this information. The FTS data discussed at the beginning of this section suggests that non-DAC donors have been slow in realising pledges, but the dataset underlying FTS is insufficient to make this a robust conclusion (for example, non-DAC donors may be under-reporting to FTS to a much greater extent than DAC donors).

Interviews suggest the main challenge in the relief phase was not the availability of funding, but coordinating the different aspects of the relief response. One non-DAC Red Crescent society arrived quickly but had no equipment or medicines – when these eventually arrived at Islamabad airport, the Society was not able to manage customs formalities without help from the UN health cluster.

The situation as relates to reconstruction is different. While the DAD probably paints a worse picture than reality due to under-reporting, many pledges still remain unfulfilled. In some cases this is due to sequencing and the need for planning – for example a Chinese pledge to reconstruct Muzaffarabad awaits the finalisation of the Muzaffarabad masterplan. Where specific donors committed to work in a particular sector and location but did not deliver, this created frustration among other donors. For example, Saudi Arabia was identified by many interviewees as having been slow to follow through on its pledges for transitional housing (no interviews with Saudi representatives were possible so the reasons for this are unclear).

4.3 Policy and practice

This section looks in detail at the policy and practice of aid donorship among non-DAC states, with a particular focus on Turkey, China, India, Cuba and the Gulf States.

4.3.1 Political and strategic drivers for response

Drivers for the scale and type of response towards the earthquake remain underpinned by bilateral relations, but other factors include:

- the enormous scale of the disaster;
- strategic considerations in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and regional issues; and

Box 1: The 2007 floods in southern Pakistan

The floods which struck southern Pakistan in June 2007 caused significant damage, death and displacement (over 400 people killed, thousands displaced and around 2.5m affected through damage to land, property and belongings).


The international response to the floods totalled \$33m, according to FTS. DAD does not list any specific flood response projects. From the FTS data, the non-DAC contribution amounts to 5% of the response, or just under \$2m. Even bearing in mind the tendency of FTS to underestimate non-DAC contributions, the non-DAC role here is clearly much smaller than in the earthquake. Of the 23 donors to the floods, 15 were DAC governments and eight non-DAC, a reversal of the proportions for the earthquake response.

Where contributions are listed on FTS, there is a clear preference for in-kind and bilateral aid to the government from non-DAC donors, matching the earthquake response. For example, Iran responded to the floods through the Iranian Red Crescent with in-kind relief goods valued at \$217,400 (FTS). Other contributions came from the ‘non-DAC multilaterals’ – the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) responded to the 2007 floods, and the OPEC Fund contributed \$300,000 for floods, both to the government of Pakistan.

Commitments to the 2007 floods (FTS) (US\$)

	Commitment	% share
DAC	22,650,783	68
Non DAC	1,945,493	5
IFI/UN/Private	8,731,705	26
Total	33,327,981	

Response to the 2007 floods by donor type



- solidarity in various forms – Muslim, neighbour, South–South and ‘earthquake’ solidarity.

Bilateral relationships are key for non-DAC donors: FTS reports 66% of non-DAC contributions as being channelled from government to government, against 21% for all donors in the earthquake response. The predominant stated driver for the level and nature of the response by non-DAC countries was almost exclusively the existing bilateral relationship with Pakistan. The motivation for responding was to demonstrate solidarity in the context of that relationship – whether as a fellow Muslim country or a strategic ally (e.g. China).

Visibility and recognition are important considerations for the way non-DAC donors identify projects and implement them. While this is not an end in itself, visibility is a crucial consideration – to be doing something to help, but also to be seen by important constituencies to be doing something to help. Visibility considerations did not necessarily drive the need to respond or the scale, but they did influence how the money was spent – high-profile teams, in-kind contributions and medical units (e.g. Cuban medical teams) are the norm, as well as prestige buildings for reconstruction (e.g. a Kuwaiti hospital in Ghari Habibullah), rather than less visible contributions through the UN, for example. This may also be driven by what means are available, such as military teams, Red Crescents that are geared up for this kind of work and large amounts of soft loan money for construction. There is also the perception among some non-DAC donors that this is what is needed rather than cash, and is also a better show of solidarity.

For some donors, the audience of the international community was also perceived by some interviewees to have driven contributions to UN agencies. For example, both Turkey and Kuwait contributed to all of the key UN humanitarian agencies, to the tune of around \$500,000 per agency, totalling \$3m from each country. This reflects a recognition that supporting multilateral channels is an international norm among DAC donors. In many non-DAC countries, however, the UN is not a trusted organisation and its perceived political failures and Western domination are a barrier to significant engagement or financial contributions.

In terms of funding channels, non-DAC donors use several different routes.

Government to government

Non-DAC donors traditionally remit contributions to the Pakistani Ministry of Finance, and many contributions were made in this way in response to the earthquake. According to the ministry, \$274m in grant assistance were committed in the FY05–06, of which \$189m was from non-DAC countries, while from July 2006 to March 2007 \$211m was committed, of which \$143.5m was non-DAC (Ministry of Finance, 2007).²⁷

²⁷ These figures do not exactly tally with other figures such as from DAD, in part due to the difference in calendar year versus financial year accounting (Pakistan’s financial year runs from July to June).

Another route for bilateral contributions is the President’s Relief Fund, which is used as a channel both for state to state and individual contributions.²⁸ For example, Turkey contributed at least \$30m to the Fund. It is also used to collect individual cash contributions in Pakistan and via Pakistan’s overseas embassies. No specific reports could be obtained on the contributions to and disbursements from the President’s Relief Fund. The Fund is managed by the Cabinet Secretariat.

Via the Red Crescent or NGOs

For Gulf States, the lines between official and private contributions are blurred, and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs may be an extension of government. In Turkey, by contrast, the Red Crescent Society raised huge amounts from private donations but does not receive government funds. Some interviewees differentiated between the role of faith-based organisations and secular ones – the former also receiving funds from non-DAC donors. Analysis of this category is hampered by the lack of differentiated data on FTS/DAD.

4.3.2 Drivers for Gulf donors

Motivations for the contributions of Gulf donors include religious obligation, solidarity, bilateral relations and regional rivalries.

As outlined in the original HPG report (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005), many contributions, particularly from the Gulf countries, are not clearly official government contributions, but are channelled from individuals via a number of non-official or semi-official channels. These are often *zakat* (religious) contributions. This operates differently in different countries and with differing degrees of encouragement or compulsion from the government. In some, *zakat* is collected compulsorily and channelled through state-linked foundations or NGOs. In others the Red Crescent Society plays a leading role (e.g. Kuwait). In both situations, the ruling family has a significant role to play as sponsors, donors and governors of such organisations, blurring the line between government and private donations.

Another complicating factor is the issue that the concept of *zakat* may work counter to questions of accountability and transparency, since publishing or advertising the level of contribution through *zakat* is seen by some to diminish its value – in effect deriving credit in this life for something which is a religious duty.

Particularly after 9/11, many Gulf governments increased regulation of private donations to reduce the channels through which jihadi organisations could be funded. While this has clearly had an effect, literature on the role that Pakistani jihadi organisations played in responding to the earthquake (Wilder, 2008) and interviews suggest that their funding came not only from inside Pakistan. This is an area not amenable to straightforward research, but represents an important route

²⁸ OPEC members are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Venezuela.

for private and possibly some governmental funding from some Islamic countries.

Another issue concerns the specific regional tensions and rivalries between, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have long competed for influence in Pakistan. This would have driven a degree of competition in levels of funding, and potentially the use of that funding in ways that supported these countries' political ambitions.

4.3.3 Drivers for non-Gulf donors

The key non-Gulf, non-DAC donors to the Pakistan earthquake were Turkey, China, India, Poland, the Czech Republic, and, for in-kind contributions, Cuba. As with the whole non-DAC 'group', their motivations are different.

Turkey

Turkey's pledge of \$150m was the largest single one it has made, representing 15% of its 2005 development assistance (by its own definitions), and 25% of its ODA (Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2005). There are a combination of factors driving Turkey's interest. While officially a secular state, it has a majority Muslim population, is a member of the OIC and has strong links to the Islamic world. It has historical links to Pakistan as well as trade and economic ties. Turkey is a non-DAC OECD member, and since 2004 has been moving towards harmonising its reporting with DAC standards – its adherence to DAC norms as a donor is therefore an important part of the way it is beginning to position itself as a donor. Turkey's own experience with an earthquake in 1999 was a strong factor in the scale of its response, as well as the expertise it brought. Then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's particular links to Turkey – as a Turkish speaker who spent much of his childhood in Turkey, who likens himself to Atatürk, the founder of modern secular Turkey – may also have driven the large contribution from Turkey to the President's Relief Fund.

Eastern European donors

Poland and the Czech Republic were also among the top ten contributors. This may reflect their emerging role as donors – particularly as new EU members – but the profile of their assistance is in fact more in line with other non-DAC donors. Their commitments mainly consist of in-kind contributions of medical teams and military assets, with smaller contributions to UN agencies. The difference may be that their familiarity with FTS as a reporting system makes it more likely that their contributions will be reported with an estimated value, raising their profile.

China

China is Pakistan's largest neighbour and has major economic and military relationships – trade volumes between the two countries reached \$5.5bn in 2005, and China has been closely linked to the development of Pakistan's nuclear and long-range missile capability, as well as through military training and joint exercises. China's earthquake response can be

seen as flowing primarily from the two countries' bilateral relationship, but is also related to considerations of China's role in the 'war on terror' and geopolitical concerns (China's offer to reconstruct Muzaffarabad in AJK may be related to the long-standing dispute between China and India over the region north of Kashmir). China also has technical expertise in search and rescue and seismic risk assessment/construction.

India

India pledged \$25m in assistance for the earthquake, mainly for reconstruction, its first such pledge to Pakistan for 25 years (FTS, Indian High Commission). Many observers held out hope that this would mark a turning-point in Indo-Pakistani relations, and the pledge was probably made with an improvement in relations at least partly in mind.

Cuba

Cuba's contribution of 2,200 medical personnel in 32 field hospitals merits mention given their high profile and the positive reports received about them from ERRA and agencies working in the medical field. Cuba and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 2006, and there are the beginnings of a military relationship between the two countries.

In 2006, up to 20,000 Cuban doctors were working internationally in 68 countries (Fawthrop, 2006). While the stated aims are humanitarian, this effort should also be seen in the context of Cuban efforts to build international support and South–South solidarity in the face of the US embargo, and particularly Cuba's growing regional links with Pakistan's neighbour, China.

4.3.4 Multilateral donors linked to non-DAC countries

Two important multilateral donors comprising mainly or solely non-DAC countries are the IDB and the OPEC Fund. The OPEC Fund donated \$1m to the IFRC for the earthquake (OPEC Fund, 2006). The OPEC Fund is a charitable foundation disbursing grants for relief and development, funded by OPEC countries.²⁹

The IDB is based in Jeddah and has 57 Muslim member countries. The bulk of IDB commitments are in the form of loans, for which it has pledged \$300m – mainly for ERRA to make cash grants to owners to rebuild their houses in rural areas. There is also a facility for special assistance for emergency relief from the IDB Waqf fund (trust fund) (IDB, 2006a), which totalled \$1.6m for the Pakistan earthquake. This is a fund for assisting Muslims affected by natural disasters in both member and non-member families, disbursing normally \$10–20m in grants per annum.

4.3.5 The role of the Red Crescent/Red Cross Movement

FTS data suggests a low level of response to the earthquake through the Movement, which is surprising given the visibility of mobile hospitals provided by Red Cross and Red Crescent

²⁹ OPEC members are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Venezuela.

Societies. This may be in part due to the high level of in-kind contributions delivered through this channel but not recorded on databases. Notable non-DAC contributions include:

- The Kuwaiti government put \$48.4m through the Kuwait Red Crescent.
- The Qatar Red Crescent funded Islamic Relief for health centre rehabilitation.
- The UAE government put about \$4.3m through the UAE Red Crescent.
- The Turkish Red Crescent provided public donations of \$40m, and worked closely with the Turkish government on airlifts and coordinating Turkish Ministry of Health medical staff.

Over 20 National Societies were working in Pakistan at the height of the response. IFRC took the lead in coordinating National Societies in NWFP, while ICRC did the same for AJK, based on its prior experience in the conflict zone. The Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) did not have sufficient coordination capacity to take on these roles, but nonetheless played a very important part in the response. Some National Societies worked bilaterally with the PRCS (e.g. Kuwait), whereas some, such as the Iranian Red Crescent, worked more unilaterally. Red Crescent societies ‘from the region’ – i.e. Muslim National Societies – were reportedly more comfortable working with locals, and vice-versa, partly for cultural reasons relating to the medical care of women, for example. As discussed above, some Red Crescent Societies from the Gulf were very close to their governments in terms of planning and delivering the response.

4.3.6 The role of the UN

Non-DAC donors did not make extensive use of the UN as a funding channel. This is consistent with the suspicion of much of the Arab world of the motives of the UN and its perceived political failures. However, there were some notable non-DAC contributions, often unearmarked. For example:

- Turkey – \$500,000 to a number of UN agencies, totalling \$3m.
- UAE – funded UNICEF’s Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI).
- Kuwait – \$3m to UN agencies.
- China – contribution to UNDP of relief items.
- Saudi and Qatar – \$3.6m and \$100,000 contributions to WFP respectively.

While the motivations for these contributions were not clear from interviews, we might speculate that the advocacy efforts made by UN agencies to engage non-DAC donors have borne some fruit. In such a large response, the UN agencies might have been seen as a useful channel in terms of delivering capacity or supporting the international dimension of the response.

4.3.7 The role of NGOs and Islamic charitable organisations

Contributions to NGOs and Islamic charitable organisations

from non-DAC sources were very low, according to FTS and DAD, but some examples were described by interviewees, and anecdotally contributions from faith-based organisations were significant. Established international NGOs with long track records working with DAC donors expressed some reluctance to engage with non-DAC donors, given the uncertainties over their needs and working style, although acknowledging that they might be more flexible donors than ECHO, for example. Notable examples are:

- Saudi Public Assistance for Pakistani Earthquake Victims (SPAPEV), a major channel for public as well as government donations from Saudi Arabia (see Box 2), which has funded the government of Pakistan, UNICEF, WFP, the Saudi NGO International Islamic Relief Organisation, provincial governments, ERRA and housing construction in Balakot.
- The Qatar Red Crescent has funded Islamic Relief.
- Qatar Charity, funded by a mix of public and private funding from Qatar.

The way in which these organisations work varies. Qatar Charity engages with the UN cluster system and has a profile within the international aid architecture. SPAPEV, by contrast, operates more in isolation from such coordination mechanisms, in part due to its dual role as both a donor and an implementer. Where NGOs have been funded, they tend to be national (e.g. SPAPEV funding the Saudi NGO IIRO), or a particular relationship exists (e.g. between senior figures in the Qatar Red Crescent and Islamic Relief).

Mention should be made of the role of organisations which have been proscribed as terrorist organisations by the West, such as the Al Rashid Trust. These carried out significant work in earthquake-affected areas, setting up camps and distributing large amounts of relief materials, reportedly in a well-organised and committed way. Some Western donors and NGOs were concerned about the security threat they posed given their role in the Kashmir conflict, but in the early phases they were generally regarded as working positively (Wilder, 2008).

4.3.8 Approaches to reconstruction

Most non-DAC donors have focused on high-profile infrastructure construction. Non-DAC donors have followed ERRA guidelines on construction and have been subject to the same rules as other donors. However, where ERRA policy has been at odds with non-DAC donor approaches this has led to some tension. For example, many Gulf states were keen to construct houses but were not prepared to provide funds for owners to build in line with World Bank/ERRA/UN Habitat principles. Their preference was to build prestige model settlements without community involvement in their design. In the housing sector this has meant that non-DAC donors have ended up building transitional housing, whereas the ERRA approach is more flexible.

Box 2: Saudi Public Assistance for Pakistani Earthquake Victims (SPAPEV)

SPAPEV is a Saudi-based relief organisation funded by Saudi public donations specifically to help earthquake-affected people in Pakistan. The General Supervisor of SPAPEV is Interior Minister Prince Naif Bin Abdul Aziz, and SPAPEV works 'under the direction' of King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz.

SPAPEV is both an implementing agency and a funding source: it has distributed considerable quantities of relief items, including 12,500 tents, 100,000 stoves and 230,000 blankets. On the reconstruction side, SPAPEV has signed a contract of \$16.7m for the construction of 4,000 houses for displaced and homeless families in Balakot. It also provided funding to various organisations including the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organisation, the Al-Hubaib Foundation, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, the Read Foundation, ERRA, the National Volunteer Movement (NVM), the governments of AJK and NWFP, the Ministry of Health and many other local and international organisations. SPAPEV has also provided \$2m to UNICEF for the construction of eight health facilities, and \$2m to WFP.

SPAPEV was involved in the flood response in Balochistan, providing tents, mats, tarpaulins, quilts and food packages worth 1,500,000 Saudi Riyals in November 2007.

Material obtained from www.SPAPEV.org, supplemented by email interview.

As noted, China has pledged \$300m towards rebuilding Muzaffarabad. Turkey has played an important role in reconstructing some key buildings through the Turkish Red Crescent and Turkish contractors such as AREAA (AREAA, 2007). Turkey has a reputation for fast and high-quality construction, using Pakistani labourers with Turkish oversight.

A criticism of some non-DAC reconstruction approaches is that they gave insufficient regard to community consultation and sustainability. For example, the Kuwaiti-built hospital in Ghari Habibullah, NWFP, is cited as a white elephant, with insufficient staff and overly complex equipment that can neither be operated or maintained with local resources.

4.3.9 Approaches to needs assessment

Non-DAC donors mainly relied on assessments made by the government of Pakistan or the Pakistani military, rather than UN and NGO needs assessments. Although non-DAC governments did not have the capacity or access to undertake their own needs assessments, localised assessments were possible where Red Crescent Societies or INGOs such as Islamic Relief were established in an area. The Cuban medical contribution was particularly noted for its outreach work, including towards women.

4.3.10 Commitment to principles and standards

Non-DAC donors made no explicit reference to International Humanitarian Law, the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, humanitarian principles or operational standards such as SPHERE. All Red Crescent Societies theoretically work according to the Movement's principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality. However, as noted in practice some Societies have a very close relationship with their national governments, which could compromise their ability to follow through on these principles consistently. Many Islamic donor countries make reference to the humanitarian nature of Islam, and there are clearly major overlaps in terms of the values of Islam and the universality of the humanitarian imperative. In practice, however, there are still many challenges in bridging the conceptual gaps.

4.3.11 Role of the military

Many non-DAC donors despatched military contingents to assist in search and rescue and emergency field hospital capacities, as did DAC donors. While many Western Red Cross Societies were cautious about perceptions of working too closely with the military, and had no specific working relationships with their corresponding national forces, some non-DAC teams worked in a joint civil-military manner – for example the UAE Red Crescent and UAE military had a very close working relationship, and there was no apparent unease among civilian agencies in working alongside the military.

4.4 Coordination

Coordination and information-sharing between non-DAC donors, their implementing partners and other actors was mixed. The main focus of coordination for non-DAC donors was through the government of Pakistan, initially through the Pakistani military, then via the various civil-military structures, such as the Federal Relief Commission and ERRA. This contrasted with the DAC focus on coordinating through the UN. Initially coordination was chaotic, as the government struggled to cope with the magnitude of the crisis. Within a few days, however, the military showed reasonable capacity to coordinate the international response (Wilder, 2008).

4.4.1 The cluster approach

The cluster approach was first piloted as part of the response to the Pakistan earthquake, and there was a degree to which it was being fleshed out as the response unfolded. It was generally regarded to have added some value in terms of clarity of leadership, although this took time to emerge and much effort was put into explaining what the clusters were and how (if at all) they differed from the familiar sectoral working approaches that most actors were used to. In comparison to DAC donors, non-DAC donors and their implementing agencies tended not to work through the clusters. Some Red Crescent Societies were involved in coordination with the UN via the cluster approach, for example in the shelter cluster, but interviews gave the sense of two or more parallel coordination structures – clusters, Red Crescent/Cross and ERRA – reducing the efficiency of the response.

4.4.2 Coordination among donors

Donor coordination as a whole was relatively narrow during the earthquake response and this continued for the flood response. The G7 group of donors became a focus for coordination during the earthquake response, but this exclusivity was criticised by smaller donors for limiting their ability to engage and obtain information. The argument put forward by the G7 was that a larger group would be more difficult to manage and less productive as a coordination mechanism. This structure would have further exacerbated the division between DAC and non-DAC donors, although it is questionable how much even a larger group of DAC donors would have coordinated directly with their non-DAC counterparts, given the lack of capacity to coordinate among the latter and the lack of priority given to engaging among the former.

For the reconstruction phase of the earthquake response, many donor teams from capitals were reduced in size and decision-making in Pakistan was diminished. For example, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments sent large coordination teams that set up separate offices in Islamabad outside the diplomatic enclave. Interviews were not able to establish how long these teams stayed in Islamabad, but while they remained they appear to have had significant delegated authority from headquarters. By contrast, many respondents were clear that decisions on reconstruction projects were taken by delegations visiting from headquarters. In other words, mechanisms exist for rapid response in some non-DAC donors, but slower processes are in place for longer-term reconstruction activities.

4.5 Impact

As this report has shown, the overall impact of non-DAC donors was significant both in relief and reconstruction, but evidence for this does not come from the non-DAC donors themselves, as questions of impact and evaluation are not common in their discourse.

The research found little evidence that considerations of aid impact are explicitly important for non-DAC donors: it appears that political, religious, economic and solidarity factors play a greater role. The research found little evidence of discussion of key indicators such as mortality or malnutrition as triggers for response. On the one hand, non-DAC donors are focused on delivering visible results in the form of 'hardware' (i.e. buildings), while on the other there appeared to be minimal engagement with wider issues of impact in terms of achievements in service delivery and the sustainability of staffing, training and capacity-building.

Informal monitoring and evaluation took place, in the form of visits to verify construction, which also served to generate publicity for that particular donor, but there is little evidence of much technical monitoring and evaluation. A donor coordination conference convened by ERRA in October 2006 had no non-DAC

participation. This may partly be related to the drawing down of personnel back to headquarters, for example in Kuwait and South Korea. However, it is not uncommon for smaller DAC donors to have limited direct monitoring and evaluation capacity, and to rely on trusted partners to implement projects. The difference here is that, as we have seen, non-DAC donors tend to prefer government-to-government channels, so we could conclude either that this implies a level of trust in terms of how the government of Pakistan implements projects or spends funds, or limited interest or capacity from the point of view of the non-DAC donor. Irrespective of the reasoning, this serves to distance non-DAC donors from the outcomes of the projects they support.

In terms of evaluation, while a number of DAC donors have evaluated their earthquake response (e.g. Norway and ECHO), the research found no evidence of systematic published evaluations by any non-DAC donors, beyond those undertaken by individual implementing agencies.

The exception to the conclusions that impact is not an explicit factor would be where the relevant Red Crescent Society was involved. For example, the Turkish and Qatar Red Crescents discuss their approaches in a relatively technical way, using the language of impact.

4.6 Conclusion

This case study has identified a number of key findings and trends among non-DAC donors in responding to humanitarian crises in Pakistan. While most of the evidence derives from the 2005 earthquake, the limited data available from the 2007 floods supports the findings.

Non-DAC donors were a significant part of the Pakistan earthquake response, contributing almost 50% of the relief effort. Key donors for the earthquake response were the Gulf States, Turkey, China, India and some Eastern European countries. The emphasis of non-DAC support was government-to-government and through the delivery of in-kind relief. Important factors in influencing the response included bilateral relations with Pakistan, solidarity on the basis of religion, South-South ties and 'disaster' solidarity. For most non-DAC donors the drivers were multiple, reflecting the complexity of their international relations.

While there is a major emphasis on traditional government-to-government channels, there are interesting examples of the use of UN channels by some Gulf States and Turkey, and the use of NGOs/Red Crescent Societies as both implementing and funding channels. It is not clear whether this marks a trend towards greater engagement with the international aid architecture, but it does suggest an opportunity to build on such experiences to strengthen future responses. This could be both in the form of financing and engagement on a technical level.

As an artificial 'group', the non-DAC donors also show significant diversity among themselves in terms of approaches. Some such as Iran operate in a highly unilateral way, while others such as Turkey are more closely linked to DAC-type approaches. A key area of difference between DAC and non-DAC donors is the preponderance of in-kind relief contributed by non-DAC donors. This may be partly cultural, with a gift-in-kind being perceived by some as a greater gift

than money, but the evidence is not clear for this; and partly economic, with gifts-in-kind being more readily available than cash, particularly for the poorer non-DAC members. There is also a lack of attention on needs assessment, standards and principles, project design, monitoring and evaluation. Coordination tends to be through the government of Pakistan rather than through UN-led systems such as the cluster approach.

Chapter 5

Lebanon case study

Roger Mac Ginty and Christine Sylva Hamieh

The conflict in Lebanon, dubbed the ‘summer war’, took place in July–August 2006. It lasted just 34 days. Most people displaced by the fighting returned home within hours of the ceasefire, and local communities were most instrumental in the provision of emergency relief. External actors, including non-DAC donors, became more prominent in the reconstruction phase. The main focus of this chapter is therefore on post-war reconstruction, rather than emergency relief. It seeks to illustrate the scale, priorities and motivations of non-DAC donors’ operations in Lebanon, with particular attention to the role of Iran, Kuwait and Qatar. Non-DAC donors (which included states as far-flung as Indonesia and as hard-pressed as Iraq and Yemen) are also analysed in the context of a wider suite of donors and assistance agencies. A full complement of UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were present in Lebanon, as well as major Western donors including the US, the UK and ECHO.

This chapter also outlines the labyrinthine donor assistance and reconstruction structures established by the Lebanese government. Politics is never far away in Lebanon, and it is very difficult to separate ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ interventions from wider political dynamics in Lebanon or the wider region. This applies to the motivations and actions of DAC and non-DAC donors alike. Politics undoubtedly was also a factor in the perceptions of ‘recipients’, ‘beneficiaries’ and local observers. According to many respondents, non-DAC interventions were more significant than those from DAC sources. Much of this perception was due to the type and visibility of intervention strategies adopted by DAC and non-DAC donors. The perception that non-DAC donors were more significant and useful than DAC donors comes despite evidence in this research that some non-DAC donors strayed from what is often considered ‘best practice’ in humanitarianism and development.

5.1 Background

On 12 July 2006, a Hizbollah raid into Israel killed eight Israeli troops and led to the capture of two others. Israel’s military response lasted 34 days, killing about 1,200 Lebanese civilians, displacing one million people and causing widespread damage, mainly in southern Lebanon, Bekaa, Beirut’s southern suburbs and selected infrastructural targets (El-Khadem, 2007; Ruys, 2007: 265–71; Mac Ginty, 2007: 459–61). Israel lost 117 soldiers in the war, while Hizbollah rocket attacks on Israel killed 43 civilians and prompted mass displacement in northern areas. The war ended with UN Resolution 1701, which came into effect on 14 August 2006. Under the resolution,

15,000 UN troops were introduced into southern Lebanon. Direct war damage in Lebanon was estimated at \$4bn, with an additional \$6bn-worth of indirect damage. Many commentators noted that the short war was more damaging than the 21-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The apparently indiscriminate use of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon caused particular destruction and consequent reconstruction challenges.

Lebanon was no stranger to violent conflict. The 1975–91 civil war (71,000 dead), 1982–83 Israeli invasion, the Israeli occupation of a southern ‘security zone’ until 2000 and the presence of the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) from 1978 meant that Lebanese institutions and society had substantial experience of post-war reconstruction and official development assistance (Fisk, 1990; Traboulsi, 2007). Significantly for the focus of this chapter, much of this assistance came from Arab states and Iran, meaning that Lebanon had experience of non-DAC donors prior to 2006. As the deputy mayor of one Beirut municipality noted, ‘The Kuwaitis have been helping since 1975. They didn’t come here in 2006 with white hands’. Moreover, Lebanese communities were accustomed to being ‘reconstructors of first resort’, as the Lebanese state’s capacities are limited by deep sectarian divisions, clientelist politics and chronic economic problems (Hamieh, 2007). Low public confidence in the state means that citizens routinely turn to better organised and funded NGOs and overseas donors for social provision. The most prominent of these in the aftermath of the July 2006 war has been Jihad al Bina, the reconstruction wing of Hizbollah, which – to some extent – has become a parallel government offering social services, development loans and reconstruction assistance. A full discussion of Hizbollah is not possible here, but it should be noted that caricatures of the organisation as merely military or political risk overlooking its highly sophisticated role as a provider of social services. The ideological aspect of its activities, and especially the emphasis on self-reliance and community cooperation, should also be borne in mind. Other indigenous, mainly confessional, NGOs were active as well, such as the Shiite organisations Imam Musa Sadr Foundation and AlKayan, and the Maronite Frem Foundation.

In the aftermath of the civil war, Lebanon was presented as a positive example of power-sharing in a deeply divided society (Reilly, 2002). By the time of the 2006 conflict, however, the power-sharing consensus that had eased Lebanese society out of civil war had evaporated. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 crystallised deep pre-existing strains between a loose anti-Syrian coalition of

Sunni, Christian and Druze parties and a coalition of anti-US Shiite and Christian parties, led by Hizbollah. Lebanon's power-sharing arrangement means that the prime minister must be a Sunni, the parliamentary speaker a Shiite and the president a Maronite, but in late 2006 the parties failed to agree on a new president, precipitating a constitutional crisis. Hizbollah and other parties quit the power-sharing government, leaving Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to run a caretaker government.

In early 2008, outgoing US Ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman observed (apparently without irony) that 'Foreign interference in Lebanon's internal affairs is a big problem' (Daily Star, 6 February 2008). His analysis was certainly correct, in that all of the major political and militant actors in Lebanon have external sponsors. Lebanon is one arena of the wider Sunni versus Shiite regional struggle, with the former championed by leading Western states, the EU and Saudi Arabia, and the latter (the so-called 'Shia crescent') backed by Syria and Iran. Lebanon is thus the site of a development and reconstruction proxy war, and regional interests largely explain the timing, publicity, sectoral prioritisation and methods of aid disbursement chosen by official donors. The United States and Saudi Arabia in particular have used reconstruction assistance as a means of bolstering Siniora's beleaguered government. On the other hand, Iran used its resources to support non-governmental (at times anti- or alternative-governmental) actors.

5.2 The humanitarian response

The war had three important consequences for post-war assistance. First, its unexpected occurrence and severity caught national and international humanitarian and development organisations, as well as the Lebanese government, off guard. Second, its short duration meant that the humanitarian emergency was limited: there was no need for feeding programmes or the reception of vast numbers of displaced people for an extended period. Instead, the priorities were clearing unexploded ordnance and the provision of shelter for those whose homes had been damaged or destroyed. Most of the displaced returned home within 24 hours of the cessation of hostilities, without assistance from humanitarian organisations. Lebanon's main task was reconstruction rather than emergency relief. Third, the short duration of the war left little time for external donors and humanitarian agencies to make pre-intervention preparations.

In response to the conflict, about 730,000 Lebanese (reaching one million by the end of the conflict) fled their homes in southern Lebanon, south Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, seeking refuge in other parts of the country with families and friends and relief agencies, in schools, churches and mosques. About 230,000 fled to neighbouring countries, particularly Syria and Jordan (HRC, November 2006; IDMC, 2006). The Lebanese government was not prepared for the impact of the war and

immediately requested international assistance, including medical supplies, shelter and fire-fighting equipment (OCHA, 2006b; Mahdi, 2007).

The Lebanese Red Cross (LRC), with some 5,000 volunteers and staff, and Jihad al Bina were the first to deliver emergency assistance (with the LRC sustaining casualties in the process). Early assistance also came from the ICRC, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, including the provision of ambulances and trucks from the Turkish, Qatari and Kuwaiti Red Crescents (Berger, 2006), and local NGOs and political organisations.


In this case as in others, tracking financial allocations during the humanitarian phase is a tricky business. FTS is incomplete, but reporting to other sources is also patchy, resulting in a partial picture of the overall level of support. The Flash Appeal sought donor funding to meet the relief needs of an estimated 800,000 displaced persons, and additional funding for OCHA coordination activities. The combined agency appeal was for \$155m. However, according to FTS, almost five times that amount (\$520m) was allocated to the response effort. A quarter of this was from non-DAC donors. The top ten non-DAC donors were Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Turkey, Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic. Saudi Arabia was the second largest donor overall (the largest being the US), contributing over \$60m in emergency funds to the government. The UAE and Kuwait were also in the top ten donors, contributing \$25m and \$20m respectively. However, only a very small portion of non-DAC funding was allocated to projects listed in the Flash Appeal (5.7% of the appeal). Over 95% of non-DAC allocations went to activities that were not put forward as a priority intervention by the UN. For example, even though Saudi Arabia was the second largest donor overall, it contributed only 3.8% to the Flash Appeal. In comparison, DAC donors contributed 83.5% of the appeal.

A significant portion of non-DAC emergency funding (28%) was allocated to shelter and non-food sectors. Shelter was also heavily emphasised in the reconstruction phase. The vast majority of the funding (nearly 70%) was classified as multi-sectoral or unspecified. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lodged \$1bn and \$500m respectively in the Central Bank during the war to protect the Lebanese currency (MoF, 29 January 2008).

5.3 The reconstruction response

Lebanon presented a difficult problem to emergency and development assistance agencies as its needs fell between these two aid responses. It required a reconstruction effort tailored for a medium-ranked developed country (according to the Human Development Index). Also setting Lebanon apart from many other emergency contexts was the presence of a very capable indigenous civil society and other non-state actors, and the fact that it was the recipient of a significant and immediate international financial response. Historical ties, geography and culture also meant that a number of

Figure 22: Contributions to the Flash Appeal versus alternative relief responses



prominent non-DAC donors seemed well-suited to respond to the needs and aspirations of the Lebanese.

In response to the war, the Swedish government hosted a pledging conference on 31 August 2006, bringing together 60 donor countries including EU members, Arab states, the US and Japan, as well as international and local NGOs. While the Siniora government hoped to raise \$537m, a much higher amount, \$900m, had been pledged by the end of the conference. Of this, 87% was in the form of grants and 13% (or approximately \$120m) was in concessional loans. The major donors were the Gulf States, while the EC contributions (ECHO and non-ECHO) represented 10% and the US approximately 6% (MoF Report, 12 October 2006). More pledges resulted from the January 2007 Paris III conference. This was a continuation of the Paris I and II conferences, a plan agreed between the IMF and the Hariri government to restructure the Lebanese economy. Paris III, which included an updated economic and social reform programme, attracted substantial reconstruction pledges of \$7.6bn, including \$0.8bn in grants and \$2.4bn in soft loans. Saudi Arabia once again emerged as a major contributor, pledging \$1.1bn.

The Siniora government created three main channels for donor assistance (MoF Report, 12 October 2006):

1. Sponsor a project directly (e.g., the reconstruction of a bridge).
2. Lodge a payment with the government’s account in the Central Bank.

3. Provide in-kind contributions (e.g., replacement equipment for schools).

Donations were channelled towards two main outcomes: paying compensation for damaged private housing and implementing projects such as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. In the early phase of recovery and reconstruction, UNDP estimated that housing compensation represented the largest direct cost of the war, accounting for 53% (or \$1.1bn) of losses.

Municipalities were given the right to accept unconditional grants or in-kind assistance without reporting to the ministry, while conditional grants to municipalities required approval from the Minister of the Interior. The deputy head of a municipality in southern Beirut reported that working with Arab donors was much easier than working with European ones as European funds came with conditions and tended to be more bureaucratic (for instance donor accounts had to be registered with the Central Bank, a time-consuming process). Arab donors tended to disburse unconditional grants or in-kind assistance.

Most of the non-DAC countries worked through the government at first, adopting heavily damaged villages in the south. Donors usually had a list of projects and sectors of interest, but these were subject to government approval. The precise approach differed from donor to donor, and depended on whether assistance was destined for housing compensation or projects. Many non-DAC countries signed protocols with the Lebanese

government and either opened accounts at the Central Bank or routed funds through the Higher Relief Council (HRC) account at the Central Bank before beginning their assistance (HRC report (in Arabic), 28 November 2007).

Reconstruction was shaped by two key factors, both of which had an impact on donor behaviour. The first was the strategy to reconstruct and repair housing through compensation rather than a public building programme. Fawaz (2007: 23) noted how the government's 'neo-liberal tradition in public governance conceptualised its role in reconstruction as "relief"; its involvement limited to paying financial compensation to those who had lost their homes, while the management of reconstruction would be left to individual homeowners and contractors'. This allowed non-state actors to play significant roles in reconstruction. The second point is to differentiate between the two principal categories of reconstruction assistance: compensation (for housing), and projects (mainly the reconstruction of infrastructure and public facilities). These categories attracted different donors and demanded different partners, different ways of working and different levels of coordination.

5.3.1 Types of assistance

Lebanon received unconditional grants, conditional grants, soft loans and in-kind assistance in the wake of the 2006 war. In the main, assistance from DAC donors came in grant form, often with strings attached. For Lebanese government representatives donor rigidity was a problem, particularly when donors stipulated a particular sector for their funding, rather than allowing the government to allocate money according to need or its preferences. The government was particularly grateful for Saudi funding, which was allocated without conditions, allowing the government a measure of autonomy in how to disburse the money.

Overall, non-DAC donors tended to provide assistance mainly through grants (directly to central government, ministries, municipalities or to their own assistance organisations). Kuwait, for instance, donated \$15m to the Lebanese government for relief needs, allocated a \$300m grant for the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED)'s reconstruction activities (much of it channelled through municipalities) and made provision for soft loans. In-kind assistance from both DAC and non-DAC donors was limited, and mainly took the form of generators or water in the emergency phase.

5.3.2 Timing of assistance

Qatari and Iranian reconstruction organisations stressed the rapidity of their responses. The Qatari National Relief Committee had an Emergency Response Team in Lebanon during the war, and the Emir visited Beirut's southern suburbs four days after the cessation of hostilities. The Iranian government and civil society organisations such as the Emdad Committee organised public appeals across Iran and mobilised personnel for the

Iranian Contributory Organisation for the Reconstruction of Lebanon during the war. Another early responder was Jihad al Bina, particularly in providing cash compensation to affected populations in the south. A number of respondents were aware of the psychological value of early responses and pledges of support from external parties. For example, the deputy mayor of one municipality in Beirut noted that UNDP offered \$60,000 within a few days of the end of the war. While the amount was small, he reported that 'It's the empathy that's important. A promise is often as good as a gift'.

While some donors emphasised early emergency responses, others focused on long-term development. A representative of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development observed that 'fast recovery is not always long-lasting' and justified Kuwaiti interventions post-2006 in terms of a longer-term development programme. Kuwait only started its reconstruction projects in March 2008, almost two years after the war. Part of this delay stemmed from the need to conduct assessments and the requirements of the Lebanese government bureaucracy. There also seemed to have been an inclination to have all of the aspects of reconstruction work (consultants, contracts etc.) in order before starting work. In some cases, for example in relation to European Commission objectives or certain UNDP Programmes, donors fought hard to ring-fence their governance and development activities from post-war needs. Such strategies created resentment among some Lebanese, who saw a mismatch between on-the-ground needs and donor objectives.

Regardless of the timeliness of early responses, virtually all observers noted that reconstruction interventions were slower than they had wished. Most placed the blame with the Lebanese government, with one interviewee labelling it 'the stick in the wheel'.³⁰ Explanations for perceived government tardiness included incompetence, corruption, politically motivated punishment of selected municipalities and communities, poor coordination and bureaucratic difficulties. Representatives of the Iranian, Kuwaiti and Qatari reconstruction agencies all complained that national and local governments were often unable to supply them with basic social, demographic or infrastructural information, necessitating their own assessments. One interviewee was critical of the rigidity of the government's housing compensation scheme, which awarded fixed sums to householders regardless of the size of their property. Others complained that the convoluted reconstruction architecture and political bias led to government inflexibility. The government asked Kuwait to delay its final instalment of housing compensation because it did not have funds in place to cover its own housing compensation scheme.³¹

5.3.3 Channels of disbursement

Lebanon has a complex structure for receiving and disbursing assistance. Channels of disbursement are not always clear,

³⁰ Interview with senior representative of WAAD.

³¹ Interview with government advisor on reconstruction.

especially in cases of multiple subcontracting. The government has taken steps to improve transparency, partly in response to donor pressure during the Stockholm conference.³² Bilateral assistance has been the ‘traditional route’ for donors, and many European governments and Saudi Arabia preferred this means of disbursement. Saudi Arabia in particular made the government the ‘central reconstruction actor’, probably in an effort to shore it up and counter Iranian influence.³³ Bilateral assistance is usually routed through the Prime Minister’s Office or off-shoots, namely the Higher Relief Council or Council of Ministers. From there, the route depends on the purpose of the assistance and the geographical area targeted. The Council of the South administered housing compensation for southern Lebanon, while the Ministry of the Displaced dealt with Beirut’s southern suburbs.

A number of non-DAC donors sought independence from government-controlled disbursement channels. Interviewees suggested that this reflected a fear of corruption, political distrust of the government and frustration at government tardiness.³⁴ There is some evidence to suggest that corruption fears were not misplaced (Daily Star, 7 March 2008). One anonymous interviewee from the Central Bank expressed concern at the power vested in the prime minister to transfer funds from the Bank.

Donor independence was most visible in two ways. The first was the apparently new trend for many donors to deal directly with municipalities, bypassing central government. The second was through the establishment or use of national reconstruction vehicles such as the Iranian Contributory Organisation for Reconstructing Lebanon (ICORL) (an organisation set up specifically for the relief effort) and the KFAED. The Iranians were probably the most autonomous of the overseas donors through their use of the ICORL and their funding of Jihad al Bina. Although its operations were on a much smaller scale than those of Iran, Syria also acted independently of the government. The Kuwaiti experience is noteworthy in that, in early 2007, it replaced its initial bilateral disbursement with routes that dealt directly with municipalities and other ‘frontline’ service providers. It is thought that the change (away from direct contact with the government) reflected dissatisfaction with government disbursement mechanisms. Qatar has had a dual strategy of direct funding for the government for housing compensation, combined with a preference for dealing directly with municipalities for reconstruction projects.³⁵

Disbursement routes for selected donors:

Saudi Arabia → Prime Minister’s Office → Central Bank → Ministries → Projects

³² Interview with senior civil servant.

³³ Interview with UN Programme Manager.

³⁴ Interviews with a deputy mayor from a Beirut Southern Suburb Municipality and with a UN Programme Manager.

³⁵ Interview with government advisor on reconstruction.

Iran → ICORL → Projects
 → Jihad al Bina → (Direct) housing compensation
 → Municipalities → Housing compensation beneficiaries
 → Projects
 → WAAD → Rehabilitation of completely destroyed housing units

ECHO → UN agencies (e.g., UNDP, UNHABITAT) → Municipalities
 → European NGOs → Lebanese NGOs

5.3.4 Geographical and sectoral distribution of assistance

Most war damage was concentrated in Shiite areas in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the bulk of reconstruction assistance went to those areas. Observers in south Beirut expressed concern that their needs were neglected in comparison with the south of the country. Few pre-2006 donors had experience of working in south Beirut, and Qatar, for example, restricted itself to working in southern Lebanon. Donors had considerable autonomy in choosing the geographical areas or sectors to fund, at times resulting in coordination problems that were often resolved by the personal intervention of the prime minister. A number of non-DAC donors adopted villages, offering to rehabilitate and reconstruct all housing and infrastructure. Saudi Arabia adopted 101 villages (MoF report, 29 January 2008: 1), Kuwait 25, the UAE six, Qatar four and Syria two (MoF Report, 29 January 2008: 6). The nature of the village adoption schemes often meant that assistance extended beyond war damage to more general rehabilitation of the village infrastructure. One interviewee identified the phenomenon of ‘star villages’, whereby donor governments competed to choose the most devastated sites.³⁶

Donors differed considerably in terms of their sectoral biases. Some, such as Egypt, concentrated on just one sector (electricity), while others offered a more comprehensive suite of assistance. In very general terms, it is possible to highlight differences between the sectoral preferences of DAC and non-DAC donors. Although the need for housing reconstruction and rehabilitation was urgent and obvious, European donors and international organisations were not geared up to disburse compensation packages or effect housing repairs, and so played to their ‘strengths’: either short-term emergency assistance and protection, or longer-term livelihood and governance projects.³⁷ Many DAC donors were worried about the security situation in the south of the country, and the fact that in some cases DAC states were unwilling (or unable due to legal restrictions) to liaise with the main local stakeholders (for example Hizbollah) in affected areas placed an obvious limitation on their ability to intervene.

³⁶ Interview with UN Programme Assistant.

³⁷ Interview with ECHO Programme Assistant.

5.4 Non-DAC responses: case studies of Kuwait, Qatar and Iran

This section describes in more detail the role of three non-DAC donors, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran.

5.4.1 Kuwait

By the beginning of 2008, Kuwait had pledged \$315m, focused on housing compensation and reconstruction projects. In terms of housing compensation, KFAED adopted 25 villages in the south and 12 high-rise apartment buildings in Beirut, pledging \$100m and \$15m respectively. The mechanism for paying housing compensation was announced by the Lebanese prime minister as follows:

The donors deposit the funds for compensation in the HRC account at the Central Bank. Requests for compensation in the South of Lebanon are submitted to the CoS [Council for the South] and those in the rest of Lebanon to the Ministry of the Displaced or the Central Fund for the Displaced. The overall indemnity – 1st and 2nd payments – for total destruction has been set at LBP60 million.³⁸ The disbursement of the two payments is by way of cheques issued by the HRC in the names of beneficiaries and distributed by the Council for the South or the Ministry of the Displaced after submitting all required documents (PCM Report, 15 December 2006).

According to the Lebanese government, the first payments were issued on the basis of data collection and survey assessments undertaken by the various governmental institutions involved, followed by case-by-case verifications conducted by Khatib & Alami, a consulting firm retained by the HRC. Cheques were issued by the HRC and were then distributed by the Council for the South (for southern Lebanon) and by the Ministry of the Displaced for those in the rest of the country (PCM report, 15 December 2006). Kuwait started its recovery and reconstruction intervention in January 2007. Infrastructure projects were not restricted exclusively to the regions heavily affected by the war; instead, part of the \$185m budgeted for this work was to be spent on development projects in northern Lebanon and west Bekaa.

5.4.2 Qatar

Qatar, through the Qatar National Relief Committee, was the first donor to opt for the village adoption strategy, choosing the four most heavily targeted areas in the war: Aita, Bent Jbeil, Ainata and Khiam. The four villages were chosen because they were the biggest in the south, had a high population density and were heavily damaged.

³⁸ The LBP60m figure comprises LBP50m for the house and LBP10m for contents.

Similar to the Kuwaiti approach, Qatar pledged \$300m for housing indemnities and projects. However, Qatar did not use the government's preferred route for housing compensation. Rather than channelling funds through the HRC's account at the Central Bank, direct payments were made to beneficiaries (HRC Report (in Arabic), 28 November 2007). The Qataris felt that this more direct process worked well.

Housing compensation was based on assessments conducted by a Qatari team in collaboration with the Council for the South. Initially, according to the Qatari Fund, the plan was to pay housing compensation at a rate higher than that promised by the government. In terms of projects, the Qataris pledged to reconstruct and rehabilitate schools, hospitals, places of worship (regardless of denomination) and infrastructure in the four adopted villages. The project implementation mechanism involved the Qatari organisation using an independent team comprising consultants and engineers contracting local Lebanese suppliers, workers and service providers.

5.4.3 Iran

Like Qatar, Iran was a 'quick responder'. No official announcement was made on the amount to be pledged to Lebanon, but the Iranian government declared its readiness to intervene in all damaged areas and sectors without any funding ceiling.³⁹

The ICORL sought to sign protocols with the Lebanese government for project implementation. ICORL was asked to lodge its pledged funds with the Lebanese government but was not keen to do so, believing that, given the scope of the destruction, a more direct and flexible approach would be more effective. The Iranians also had concerns about the inflated costs of government-managed schemes, citing the Abou Al Aswad highway project in 2000, when the government estimated that the work would cost \$990,000 but the Iranians managed to do the job for \$97,000.⁴⁰ This account tallies with others that paint government-led projects as slow and costly. Rather than directly signing protocols with the government, ICORL tended to make linkages with municipalities, Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and relevant ministries. Since projects (as opposed to housing compensation) required government approval, they were subject to delays.

As the Lebanese government lacked the capacity to conduct its own comprehensive damage assessment, ICORL sent its own teams to conduct a rapid damage assessment. This was done unilaterally, though sometimes in parallel with Jihad al Bina's own surveys. Based on the assessment results, the Iranians developed an action plan focusing on household compensation and reconstruction projects in the Bekaa, south Beirut and southern Lebanon. ICORL set up five offices, with a matching decentralised management structure:

³⁹ Interview with senior representative of the ICORL.

⁴⁰ Interview with mid-level representative of the ICORL.

- One central office in Bir Hassan-Beirut to coordinate the work of all offices.
- One office in Beirut.
- Two offices in the south (Nabatieh and Tyre).
- One office in Baalbeck.

Each office comprised experts and consultants to conduct research, prepare action plans and monitor implementation, as well as administrative, financial and engineering departments. ICORL has not revealed how much has been spent on reconstruction in Lebanon. Estimates in the local media suggest a figure of \$1bn, though it was not possible to verify this.

5.5 Donor motivations

When considering donor motivations, it is difficult not to use the lens of power relations in the Middle East. All donors had positions on the Siniora government ('a bulwark against the Shiite resurgence' or 'a Western puppet', etc.) and all had positions, often divergent, on the summer war ('a humanitarian tragedy', 'an opportunity for Israel to break Hizbollah', 'an opportunity to humble Israel', etc.). Lebanon can be seen as just one theatre of a wider conflict between the United States and its regional allies (principally Saudi Arabia) and the forces of Iran and Syria. Lebanon is heavily penetrated by external forces and it would be naive to assume that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance (DAC and non-DAC) could somehow be free of the ideological, religious, political and economic interests that dominate other interventions, even if expressions of compassion and human empathy were common among interviewees.

Political motivations among non-DAC donors are easy to find. The Iranians, for example, stressed the importance of standing up for 'the disenfranchised', while Yasser Al Minaei, the Director of the Qatari National Relief Committee, asserted that 'the organisation is part of the Qatari regional role'. The June 2008 Doha Accord, in which Qatar brokered a deal to break Lebanon's constitutional impasse, revealed that Qatar regards itself as having a regional mediation and stabilisation role. Some Lebanese respondents (particularly those from the Shiite community) depicted the assistance of some non-DAC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, as 'rushing to clean their hands from the sense of guilt they felt for not having stood by the Resistance during the Israeli aggression'.⁴¹ These interviewees also believed that 'these non-DAC countries have intervened in the way they did for the purpose of containing the Iranian influence in the region'.

A number of non-DAC donors mentioned the importance of religious duty as a motivation behind their interventions in Lebanon. While interviewees from non-DAC donors claimed to assist communities regardless of denomination, anecdotal evidence suggests that religious factors were at play. Matters

may be complicated by the fact that Shiite areas bore the brunt of war damage. Qatar's decision to repair places of worship regardless of domination, however, does provide evidence of a non-sectarian approach to reconstruction, at least on the part of this donor.

5.6 Coordination

Most relief and reconstruction situations are accompanied by reports of poor coordination. In the case of Lebanon, coordination was attempted at a number of levels: within government, between government and donors, between international organisations and INGOs and NGOs, and between donors. Not all coordination attempts were successful. In part, poor coordination was due to the sheer multiplicity of humanitarian and reconstruction actors. But political factors were also at work. For example, the Prime Minister's Office (the hub of much reconstruction planning) had no contact with Jihad al Bina, the largest indigenous reconstruction body.⁴² Some large donors also had no contact with the organisation. As Jihad al Bina was part of Hizbollah, many Lebanese and international actors viewed it through a political lens. The largely pro-Sunni and pro-Western government regarded Hizbollah (and its affiliated organisations) as a competitor, or even a threat. Some NGOs and INGOs were also reported to be wary of public dealings with Hizbollah for fear that it might jeopardise their funding from the US or UK, both of which categorised Hizbollah as 'terrorist'. Such sensitivities had obvious consequences for coordination.

In general, DAC donors seemed more willing to engage in formal coordination schemes than their non-DAC counterparts. To help coordinate the humanitarian response, the Lebanese government asked UNDP to assist the HRC, the main coordinating body for the humanitarian crisis. This resulted in the creation of a humanitarian operations information system whereby the relevant line ministries, CDR, municipalities and the Lebanese Red Cross supplied the HRC with the basic data needed to meet unfolding humanitarian needs. It remains unclear whether the system worked since only one high-level donor briefing was convened by the UNDP Resident Coordinator during the emergency.

Following the cessation of hostilities, OCHA handed over its coordination responsibilities to the Resident Coordinator's office. Under the cluster approach, WHO led on health, with support from UNICEF and UNFPA; food/nutrition was led by WFP, water and sanitation by UNICEF, logistics by WFP, shelter by UNHCR and protection/mine action by UNMACC, in cooperation with UNDP (OCHA, 2006c). Although the cluster system was significant in coordinating the activities of many UN agencies and INGOs, it was ineffective in coordinating the activities of non-DAC donors and Lebanese and non-DAC NGOs. For many non-DAC NGOs, the media was the only

⁴¹ Interview with a council member of BSS Municipality.

⁴² Interview with government advisor on reconstruction.

source of information on what activities were being carried out.⁴³ As a result, there were instances of duplication and failure to attend to some basic needs.

For the reconstruction effort, at the governmental level multiple institutions and committees were involved: the Prime Minister's Office, the Higher Relief Council, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Council for Development and Reconstruction, the Council for the South and individual ministries, including the Ministry of Finance. The Prime Minister's Office (and its adjunct, the HRC) were the key players, and effectively monopolised the intra-government coordination role. The Council of the South considered itself to be excluded.⁴⁴ A bi-weekly internal coordination meeting was held between the PMO/HRC, the CDR and the Ministry of Finance. In the initial post-war phase the Shiite political parties (Amal and Hizbollah) cooperated with the government on reconstruction matters, but this ceased for political reasons.⁴⁵

The prime minister was personally involved in liaising with overseas donors, actively soliciting donations and coordinating to minimise duplication.⁴⁶ This situation was subsequently regularised, with the Ministry of Finance holding quarterly meetings with DAC and non-DAC donors, on top of regular bilateral meetings. The more proactive coordination role played by the Ministry of Finance seemed to have been a response to external pressure applied at the Paris III conference. In terms of externally funded infrastructure projects, the CDR (which reports to the PMO) played a coordination role.

A number of interviewees noted that Arab and Gulf donors rarely attended coordination meetings. One observer noted that 'they are mammoth donors but they're only present when a Lebanese Minister is there'.⁴⁷ It was also noted that there was no way to force INGOs to coordinate. One interviewee noted that 'Some INGOs are free agents: they just land at the airport and go south'.⁴⁸ Formal coordination links between INGOs and NGOs were rare (unless the former subcontracted to the latter), and the municipalities were often the 'clearing house' for information and on-the-ground coordination. The enhanced role of the municipalities in part reflected their relative capability (often in terms of baseline data) in comparison with central government.

Coordination and links between non-DAC donors were patchy. The Gulf Cooperation Council does not coordinate the humanitarian activities of its member states. In Lebanon, Iran cooperated with Qatar and the UAE, for example sharing information and coordination activities at the local level, but not with Saudi Arabia. Qatar cooperated with Iran,

43 Interview with senior representative of the Qatari Overseas Assistance Organisation.

44 Interview with a senior representative of the Council of the South.

45 Interview with government advisor on reconstruction.

46 Interview with senior government politician.

47 Interview with mid-level civil servant.

48 Interview with senior representative of the Council of the South.

the UAE and Kuwait, but had no contact with Saudi Arabia. Cooperation was mainly in terms of information sharing on the scope and dimensions of aid and humanitarian intervention by each donor. Frosty Qatari/Saudi relations within Lebanon reflected the wider regional competition between the two countries. Most coordination was in relation to specific projects. Of the major non-DAC donors, Kuwait seemed the most integrated into the international coordination network, through, for example, its attendance at cluster meetings.

While many non-DAC donors had limited contact and coordination with DAC donors and international organisations, some of the latter did not pursue links with non-DAC donors either. One UN organisation that was actively soliciting donations from states for its projects had not considered approaching Gulf and Arab states, even though these were among the largest donors.

One example of successful coordination came from the bottom up. Following public consultations, Hizbollah managed to convince communities in Beirut's southern suburbs to hand over their compensation payments to the WAAD (Promise) organisation. WAAD, a community-based collective of architects, residents' committees, entrepreneurs and citizens, planned to take a leading role in the reconstruction. In part, communities were motivated by the tardiness of the government in rebuilding the suburbs, although political factors (namely WAAD's close links with Hizbollah) were a consideration as well.⁴⁹

5.7 Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation was less important among non-DAC donors than among their DAC counterparts. Often, national organisations such as ICORL and KFAED were responsible for managing and monitoring funds/grants from their own governments and publics. The Kuwait Fund, for instance, was tasked by the Kuwaiti government with conducting the \$315m reconstruction programme, as well as any monitoring, including hiring consultants. The same situation pertained with both the Qatar Committee and ICORL. It is possible to track the spending of Qatari and Kuwaiti organisations through their reports to the HRC or CDR and their published financial reports. The situation is less clear with respect to Iran.

It should be noted that most non-DAC organisations asserted at the time that they are not in a position to evaluate their projects yet because 'the work is still ongoing and hence it is still early to conduct evaluations on the impact of the project'.⁵⁰ It is also worth noting that some Gulf States are keen to monitor their own indigenous charitable organisations lest they support out-of-favour political causes (Kroessin, 2004; Levitt, 2004).

49 Interview with senior representative of WAAD.

50 Interview with senior representative of KFAED.

5.8 Conclusion

Many observers rated non-DAC donors as the most significant actors in Lebanon's emergency response and reconstruction in terms of effectiveness, timeliness and user-friendliness. In part, these opinions reflected the type of non-DAC interventions that took place: culturally intuitive, large scale, tangible, heavily trailed and highly visible, as against many European-funded projects that were small-scale, often intangible (e.g., governance-related) and not necessarily targeted at areas or sectors that local stakeholders believed were urgent. These opinions, together with the sheer volume of assistance from non-DAC donors, meant that the Lebanese reconstruction and humanitarian context had a significant non-DAC character. It should be stressed that Lebanon has received important DAC, and specifically European, assistance (and indeed European states form the backbone of the UN peacekeeping mission), but the perception of many interviewees was that European donors were somehow lacking when compared to some non-DAC actors. This perception extended to the US, even though US financial assistance to Lebanon was substantial.

Lebanon's humanitarian and reconstruction context is acutely political. This had far-reaching consequences for the channels of disbursement used, attitudes towards government efficiency and trustworthiness and Lebanese interpretations of donor motivations. Although they may be using 'humanitarianism' or 'reconstruction' as labels, DAC and non-DAC donors alike are engaged in political activities through their work. This has potentially profound implications for Lebanon's internal political dynamics. In a deeply penetrated and contested state like Lebanon, it is difficult to reconcile many 'humanitarian' and 'reconstruction' interventions – from whatever source – with notions of neutrality. To some extent this is simply a function of the acutely political context. But it is also related to the deliberate political strategies of many intervening agents.

It is possible to identify differences between DAC and non-DAC donors in terms of their *modus operandi*. Although we must

be careful not to over-generalise, this difference was perhaps most visible in terms of attitudes towards coordination, with non-DAC donors being more wary of formal coordination structures mediated by international organisations. It is not possible to construct a clear DAC versus non-DAC dichotomy since non-DAC actors do not comprise a homogenous group. It is however possible to find differences between non-DAC actors in terms of their prioritisation, mode of operation, scale of assistance and political stance. Apart from political differences, perhaps the most significant difference among non-DAC actors was in their professionalism. In blunt terms, some seemed more professionally organised than others (a point that can be made in relation to the DAC category as well).

Two points set Lebanon apart from many other reconstruction contexts. The first is that, in Jihad al Bina, Lebanon has a highly organised, extensive and apparently very effective indigenous (though probably largely foreign-funded) NGO. That it is a politico-humanitarian organisation is by no means unusual in the Lebanese context. The second point is to highlight the *laissez faire* attitude of the Lebanese state towards reconstruction. The state enables and facilitates other actors (some would accuse it of obstruction), but has not engaged in much direct reconstruction itself. In such a context, it is unsurprising that other actors (many of them external) have stepped in (Shearer and Pickup, 2007). It is also unsurprising that reconstruction has become a locus of political conflict.

Lebanon presents a fascinating example of the extent to which non-DAC actors can play a major role in humanitarianism and reconstruction. Certainly the non-DAC sector seems to be expanding, and many non-DAC interviewees reported that they were using their Lebanese experience to inform their emergency, reconstruction and development activities elsewhere. Lebanon's reconstruction legacy may well be found in decades to come in other theatres of disaster relief, post-war reconstruction and development.

Chapter 6

Darfur case study

Jago Salmon and Daniel Large

Humanitarian action in Sudan has historically been Western-led. Following the considerable Western relief operation in Sudan in 1984–85, conflicts in Darfur were ‘invisible to the world’ for a decade (Flint and de Waal, 2008: 167). In the more recent Darfur crisis from 2002, the role of China has been at the foreground of international attention and, in different ways, Africa and the Middle East have also been prominent. Analysis of these countries’ humanitarian response to the crisis has not matched that devoted to the UN and NGO-led response of Western states.

This chapter reviews humanitarian aid to Darfur from countries outside the DAC, tracing the volume of non-DAC assistance, analysing the primary sources of non-DAC aid and considering the different channels through which assistance has been provided. Like the two preceding case studies, the chapter concludes with an analysis of issues around donor and field coordination.

6.1 Background

Beginning as a low-level insurgency in 2002, fighting in Darfur escalated in April 2003. The government’s counter-insurgency response began in earnest the following July, and major multilateral fundraising for humanitarian action began in September (Broughton et al., 2006: 5). On 15 September 2003, the UN announced the ‘Greater Darfur Special Initiative’, a \$22.8m plan for humanitarian operations (OCHA, 2003). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees appealed for \$16.6m. On 4 June 2004, a donor meeting in Geneva called for \$236m in funding.

Initial responses to the crisis from non-DAC donors were led by the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS). In April 2004, the Sudanese government and rebels agreed to an AU monitoring mission. The following month the AU established a Ceasefire Commission, and in July it announced the deployment of the first monitors from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), with around 300 AU soldiers to protect them. AMIS’ mandate was strengthened in October 2004 to include a degree of civilian protection. In April 2004, the LAS dispatched its own fact-finding commission to Darfur. Reporting ‘gross human rights violations’ in Darfur, this was the first ever statement by the organisation criticising a member state for its human rights record (Hasbani, 2007).⁵¹

As international pressure mounted on the Sudanese government, however, several non-DAC donors became increasingly

⁵¹ Following a protest by the government of Sudan at the LAS summit in Tunis in May 2004, however, the report was withdrawn from the public domain.

concerned with forceful Western demands for intervention. Middle Eastern regimes, closely observing the effects of international involvement in Iraq, considered the threat of either a non-consensual intervention or sanctions to be significantly more destabilising than the humanitarian crisis. In August 2004, the LAS unanimously voted to oppose sanctions and military intervention and urged restraint from Western nations. Following an emergency session of the LAS, Secretary-General Amr Moussa stated that it was unacceptable for Sudan to become a ‘playground’ for international troops (Elbagir, 2004). China steadfastly supported Sudan’s sovereignty and opposed non-consensual intervention. India too offered political support to Khartoum, maintaining that Darfur was an ‘internal crisis to be resolved by the GOS in consultation with the AU’ (Joint Statement of India and Sudan, 2005). Meanwhile, South Africa opposed a Human Rights Council resolution critical of Khartoum’s conduct in Darfur, supporting instead a resolution excluding any reference to the Sudanese government’s responsibility to protect civilians.⁵²

Non-DAC donors were also reluctant to participate in the Western-dominated relief effort in Darfur. Early support in 2004 was relatively strong but it was not sustained. Support came from the Gulf, with particularly large bilateral contributions of \$11m from Saudi Arabia and \$10m from Kuwait, following the August LAS emergency meeting. The Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society dispatched 70 tons of food, shelter and medicines to Darfur in August 2005, while medical teams from Egypt and Turkey set up field hospitals and clinics in El-Fasher and Nyala.⁵³ Although Middle Eastern governments pledged \$150m to AMIS at the LAS summit in March 2006, by the following March only \$15m had been disbursed (Hasbani, 2007). For its part, China donated just over \$1m in aid in the form of ‘goods and materials’, and a further \$400,000 in support to the AU.

As the crisis in Darfur unfolded, pressure grew on non-DAC governments to take a more active role. In October 2006, a group of Arab human rights organisations publicly criticised what it called ‘the silence of the Arab world in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur’.⁵⁴ Articles critical of the ‘Arab’ response began to emerge in the Middle Eastern press (Winter, 2007). In response to this growing criticism, Egypt

⁵² A UK-sponsored resolution on human rights in Sudan and Darfur was not passed in the UN General Assembly Third Committee (Social Cultural and Humanitarian) in 2005 after a ‘no action motion’ tabled by Nigeria and supported by India (and Malaysia) was passed by 84 votes to 79, with 12 abstentions (Nathan, 2008).

⁵³ There were two exceptions to the trend of bilateral donations following the LAS summit: a \$3m donation from Saudi Arabia to UNICEF, repeated in 2005, and a \$100,000 donation to OCHA from Qatar in January 2005.

⁵⁴ Cairo Institute for Human Rights, <http://www.cihrs.org>.

and Saudi Arabia boycotted the LAS summit in Khartoum in 2006, and Egypt refused to support Sudan's bid to chair the AU. Middle Eastern countries and China also pledged their active support to a UN/AU hybrid force for Darfur, agreed in principle in November 2006. The most important step forward was the May 2007 Tripoli summit. Attended by officials from Sudan, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as the AU, the EU, the LAS and the UN, this sought to coordinate regional and international peace initiatives. Shortly after the Tripoli summit, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal facilitated Sudan's acceptance of the second phase of the hybrid force (Sudan Tribune, 2007). Finally, in October 2007, an unprecedented joint donor-NGO fundraising conference was held. Chaired by Sudan and Saudi Arabia, ministerial delegations from Arab countries participated as well as Arab investment and financing funds, civil society organisations and AU, OIC and UN representatives. Emphasising the needs of returnees in Darfur, the conference pledged an estimated \$250m for resettlement, repatriation and rehabilitation, water, health, agriculture and education.

China also became more involved, supporting the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by the Sudanese government and a rebel faction in May 2006, and playing a key role in brokering agreement on the UN/AU force. A US-activist led campaign to label the 2008 Beijing Olympics the 'Genocide Olympics' undermined China's attempts to use the games to raise its international profile. By early 2008, China had provided material assistance totalling some \$11m to Darfur, \$1.8m in aid to the AU and \$500,000 to the UN for Darfur. Chinese peacekeepers were deployed to Darfur from November 2007 to bolster the hybrid force. Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa also contributed to the UN mission.

6.2 Volumes and sources of non-DAC assistance to Darfur

As with the other case studies, tracking non-DAC humanitarian assistance to Sudan with precision is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, general trends in the volumes and origins of non-DAC assistance can be discerned.

DAC countries contributed an average of \$1.1bn annually to Sudan in 2005 and 2006 (roughly 16% to 18% of total DAC annual official humanitarian aid) (Development Initiatives, 2008: 1). The largest sustained support for humanitarian operations in Darfur has come from the United States.⁵⁵ Total OCHA-recorded non-DAC funding between 2003 and 2007 amounts to \$85m, or 2% of total humanitarian aid contributions to Sudan during that period. In 2003 and 2004, the only non-DAC countries that reported pledges to the crises

in Darfur and Chad were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with a total of \$33.1m, constituting 2.5% of the total. This compares to 41.5% for the US and 15.4% for the European Commission (Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, 2005). These contributions were primarily in the form of in-kind donations directed either bilaterally to the Sudanese government or to FAO, WFP and UNICEF. A broader group of non-DAC states donated \$10.6m in 2005, with the largest single donation (\$9.1m) coming from Saudi Arabia. Again, the majority of this funding was in-kind, including 400 tons of dates from the UAE. With the exception of \$100,000 from Qatar to OCHA, aid was primarily distributed bilaterally.

According to FTS data, non-DAC humanitarian aid has not only been on a much smaller scale than DAC assistance, but has also followed different trends. Thus, as we have seen, non-DAC aid declined following an initial peak in 2004. This contrasts with steady increases in DAC aid between 2003 and 2005, after which there was a small reduction. Volumes of non-DAC assistance begin to increase in 2007.⁵⁶

As we have seen, Arabian Gulf states dominate the reported non-DAC humanitarian response in Darfur. Indeed, in 2004 donations to the Sudanese government intended for Darfur from Saudi Arabia (\$20.6m), including the \$11m donation provided after the LAS emergency meeting, and Kuwait's \$11m exceeded support provided by several DAC countries, including France (\$6.9m) and Italy (\$7.6m).

Although data quality makes reliable analysis difficult, the strongest apparent correlation for sources of non-DAC aid is regional proximity and 'solidarity', expressed through shared religious or ethnic identity. As Table 11 shows, Saudi Arabia was by far the largest non-DAC humanitarian donor to Sudan between 2003 and 2007 (\$52.5m committed or contributed), followed by Kuwait (\$11m). The majority of this support was granted in one-off, cash or in-kind transfers following sessions of the LAS. A similar spike in 2007 recorded by FTS involves a \$20m cash grant from Saudi Arabia to assist flood victims in eastern Sudan. Available evidence indicates that economic relations with Sudan are only a weak indicator of humanitarian aid. Between 2003 and 2007 China, Sudan's most important economic partner by far, provided a significantly smaller volume of aid than Saudi Arabia. However, this only captures part of Chinese funding (China only began reporting to FTS in 2007, which means that its bilateral commitment of some \$11m since 2004 is not recorded). Of the other members of the so-called BRIC group of emerging economies, Russia made a \$2m in-kind donation in 2006, and India provided 20,000 tons of food relief in 2004. Of the Sub-Saharan African states, only South Africa contributed, providing \$192,959 in cash donations during 2004, 2005 and 2006, along with 40 tons of in-kind relief supplies.

⁵⁵ According to FTS, the US contributed 35% of total humanitarian funding (\$210m) to Darfur in 2007, and 38.3% of total humanitarian assistance to Sudan (\$536m), compared to China's share of 0.4% (\$5m) of humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

⁵⁶ Donations made following the October 2007 League of Arab States donor conference were not registered as either pledges to agencies or contributions in FTS during 2007.

Figure 23: Humanitarian assistance to Sudan from DAC countries, 2003–2007 (US\$)⁵⁷




Table 11: Ten largest non-DAC donors to Sudan, 2003–2007

Donor country	US\$ contributed
Saudi Arabia	52,532,383
Kuwait	11,000,000
China	5,298,013
Libya	4,514,792
Russia	2,000,000
UAE	1,941,790
Czech Republic	980,358
South Korea	650,000
Turkey	572,000
Jordan	310,000
Total	79,799,336

Source: FTS

6.3 Channels of non-DAC assistance to Darfur

6.3.1 Bilateral aid

In contrast to DAC donors, non-DAC actors have provided very little multilateral funding to Darfur, and field operations have been limited. Aid or direct assistance has focused on capacity-building rather than humanitarian grants. For instance, Malaysia and Egypt provide Darfurian students with

⁵⁷ The ‘other donors’ category includes allocations of unearmarked funds by UN agencies, Central Emergency Response Funds, Carry-over funds, private and unknown.

Table 12: Humanitarian assistance to Sudan from the Middle East, 2003–2007⁵⁸


Year	US\$ contributed
2004	32,500,380
2005	10,574,546
2006	4,738,936
2007	21,924,002*
Total	69,737,864

Source: FTS

* Includes a \$20m Saudi cash donation to the government of Sudan to provide relief to flood victims in regions outside of Darfur.

scholarships for study in national universities, in the case of Malaysia up to doctoral level. India has opened a Centre for Vocational Excellence in Darfur. Pre-existing developmental aid programmes to Sudan have continued as a routine part of bilateral relations. Non-DAC donors have maintained strong developmental support to Sudan throughout the war in

⁵⁸ This graph excludes all FTS information on non-DAC humanitarian aid not specifying the type of delivery mechanism and is therefore only indicative of trends. Donor countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the UAE, Yemen, the occupied Palestinian territory, the OPEC Fund, the OIC, the Islamic Development Bank and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Figure 24: Non-DAC aid to Sudan by recipient, 2004–2008⁵⁹

Darfur. For many, including the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), operations ‘were not changed at all by the conflict in Darfur’ (El-Abdeen al-Said Ahmed, 2008).

Bilateral aid is given largely in response to a direct request from a government ministry to a donor’s representative in Sudan or abroad. All bilateral aid is formally registered by the Sudanese government, but records for bilateral assistance are often incomplete and dispersed between ministries. According to FTS, Middle Eastern countries provided \$57.1m of humanitarian aid bilaterally to the Sudanese government between 2003 and 2008 (\$22.4m of which was registered as assistance for flood victims in eastern Sudan). Only two of 18 FTS-tracked humanitarian contributions from Saudi Arabia to Sudan between 2003 and 2007 were not bilateral.

6.3.2 UN agencies

Non-DAC support for multilateral humanitarian agencies and coordinating bodies in Darfur is notable by its absence, with only \$16.2m registered by FTS. Despite great generosity in providing both cash and in-kind support to UN and multilateral humanitarian operations in other crises (for example the \$500m pledged by Saudi Arabia to WFP in 2008), non-DAC donors have not contributed substantially to the international humanitarian operation in Darfur. In 2007, total non-DAC

⁵⁹ This graph excludes all FTS information on non-DAC humanitarian aid not specifying the type of delivery mechanism and is therefore only indicative of trends. Donor countries are: Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, the UAE, the ADB, the OPEC Fund, the OIC and the Gulf Cooperation Council.


contributions to Darfur through UN agencies and the UN Work Plan (\$1.1m) were smaller than donations from private bodies and individuals (\$3.7m) (OCHA, 2008). Saudi Arabia earmarked \$3m for UNICEF in 2004 and 2005, and China contributed \$500,000 to the UN Trust Fund for the political process in Darfur.

According to WFP’s contributions database, whilst Saudi Arabia provided \$51m of cash and in-kind support earmarked for WFP emergency operations in specific countries between 2003 and 2007, it contributed nothing towards emergency operations in Darfur. This pattern is repeated for other key non-DAC countries. China, India, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia and Qatar all contributed to WFP operations in different theatres, but did not support operations in Darfur between 2003 and 2007. In Darfur these donors have focused on the delivery of aid either bilaterally or through the Red Crescent network; support for UN agencies has come from smaller humanitarian donors, most importantly the UAE and Libya. Again these donations are episodic, with the bulk of all assistance provided in a one-off cash grant by Libya of \$4.5m in 2006.

6.3.3 Non-governmental organisations

Very few non-DAC donors have funded international NGOs. One exception is the Qatar Charitable Foundation (QCF), which is funding CARE in Nyala with \$200,000 in a cooperation arrangement featuring a capacity-building component for QCF staff stationed in Darfur. A small number of non-DAC INGOs have been working in Darfur. Perhaps the most elusive of these are the religiously inspired organisations and institutions of the Arabian Gulf. Previously integrated as a primary channel of

Figure 25: Non-DAC donations to WFP operations in Darfur, 2003–2007



Box 3: Non-DAC donors and pooled funding

Several forms of pooled humanitarian funding are operational in Sudan. With the exception of the Central Emergency Response Fund, a global humanitarian fund, non-DAC engagement with these mechanisms has been extremely limited. In interviews non-DAC donor representatives in Khartoum indicated no principled objections to engagement with pooled funding mechanisms. However, most had scant and incomplete knowledge of these funds and were not considering contributing in the future.

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly in December 2005, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a tool created by the United Nations to pre-position funding for humanitarian action. Since its launch on 9 March 2006, Sudan as a whole has received 8.85% of total CERF funding, or \$60.9m.

Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)

Since 2005, the UN, donors and NGOs have cooperated in formulating an annual UN Work Plan as a tool for planning,

coordination, fundraising and evaluation. In support of the Work Plan several donors, most importantly DFID, established the CHF as a pooled funding mechanism. Non-DAC participation has been limited: although the fund accumulated \$165m from seven DAC donors in 2007, no non-DAC donors contributed. Out of total allocations of \$23.5m for Darfur during 2007, with the exception of a single grant to Islamic Relief of \$100,000 no Islamic, Asian or national NGOs were listed as recipients of CHF allocations for projects (Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan, 2007).

Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF)

The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) was established on 24 October 2007 to promote peace-building and reconciliation in Darfur through community-based recovery and development activities. The first commitment was signed with Germany on 21 December 2007. However, as of March 2008 no non-DAC donors had either pledged or contributed to the DCPSF.

aid to Sudan during the 1990s, since 9/11 many such charities have been forced to adhere to strict requirements on financial procedures which have dramatically cut financial flows. Nevertheless, in 2004 these INGOs were a key component of the delivery apparatus of Saudi contributions to Darfur. The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), which is based

in Jeddah, provided over \$500,000 of relief supplies to 2,000 families, and was working with 30,000 displaced individuals providing non-food items, wells and health services. In 2006, according to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the number of INGOs from the Arabian peninsula had grown to 20, constituting roughly 10% of the total NGO presence. In

early 2008, 16 Islamic NGOs were reported to be working in Darfur, including nine from Saudi Arabia and three from the UAE, with a total budget of roughly \$1.1m. The largest of these is thought to be the IIRO, which has acted as a partner with IOM in IDP registration and with WFP in relief distribution, and is responsible for camp management at as-Salam and Seraif IDP camps in South Darfur.

The Malaysian NGO Mercy Malaysia operated in El Geneina from August 2004 to 2006, when it withdrew due to lack of funds, before returning in mid-2007. Another NGO, the Council for Mosque Youth under the patronage of the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, has been especially established for Darfur. Both NGOs were funded by public donations from Malaysia including a public fundraiser launched by a private television channel. In December 2007 the first 'Dapo for Darfur' ('Kitchen for Darfur') project saw the Council for Mosque Youth refurbish a mosque and an orphanage in Nyala (a project involving less than \$200,000).

6.3.4 International Red Crescent and Sudanese Red Crescent Societies

An important channel of non-DAC humanitarian aid to Darfur has been through the Red Cross/Crescent Society (RCS) network. The majority of such assistance has come from the national societies of the Arabian Gulf and Middle East, where national societies have acted as one of the primary channels of official humanitarian relief. According to the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRCS), no Asian RCSs are active in Sudan.

RCS aid is divided into three components.⁶⁰ The first is international RCS support for UN humanitarian agencies. Whilst the bulk of non-DAC contributions to UN agencies has been delivered directly in the form of cash transfers, some substantial donations in kind have been channelled through national Societies. One such case was the donation in 2005 of 400 tons of dates through the UAE Red Crescent Society to the WFP.⁶¹

The second is national Societies with operations on the ground. According to the principles of the International Federation of the Red Cross, overseas Societies in Sudan work under the umbrella of the national Society. The SRCS regards itself as an auxiliary to government bodies. Tasked with coordinating Red Cross and Red Crescent Society activities and donations within Sudan, the SRCS and national RCS' are mandated to receive coordination from the ICRC in conflict-affected territories. Direct interventions

⁶⁰ Technically a fourth mechanism exists in the form of support for International Federation of the Red Cross/Crescent (IFRC) annual and emergency appeals. However, non-DAC RCS have not provided donations in appeals for Darfur. The only non-DAC transfers recorded by the IFRC are in response to the floods in Eastern Sudan in 2003 and 2007, for which the UAE RCS and Bahraini RCS transferred CHF5,000 (roughly \$5,000) and \$20,000 respectively. On top of this, the UAE RCS provided CHF127,000 and the Syrian RCS \$35,000 in bilateral support for the SRCS (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2007).

⁶¹ This donation, reported to FTS, included \$10,300 of local expenditure to support logistics for the transport of the dates.

were launched by the Saudi, Iranian, Egyptian and Turkish Societies in 2004. The emphasis of these operations was on providing field hospitals in the capitals of West, South and North Darfur, as well as food and NFI distribution. The largest non-DAC operation was the Saudi RCS' programming, including a \$1.2m programme to build a primary and secondary school and a health centre at each of its operational locations. The complete budgets of these operations are unknown, and direct interventions have declined in number as security has worsened. Most dramatically, in November 2006 Chad accused 'circles close to the Royal Family' of Saudi Arabia of helping to recruit and equip rebels attempting to overthrow the government of Idris Deby, leading to the withdrawal of the Saudi RCS from Darfur. In March 2008, only three non-DAC societies remained in Darfur: the Iranian RCS, which has run a clinic in Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, since 2006, the Turkish RCS, with a full field hospital based in Nyala, and the Egyptian RCS, working bilaterally in cooperation with the Sudanese Ministry of Health.

Third, direct cash and in-kind donations coordinated by the SRCS, which has coordinated donations received directly from the UAE RCS, the Qatar RCS and the Kuwait RCS. Non-DAC donations through the RCS network have neither been fully reported to the FTS nor effectively tracked by the IFRC/RCS (Tijani, 2007). Many national RCS', particularly from the Arabian Gulf, have provided donations outside of appeals and with very limited coordination. The emphasis has been on direct, ad hoc and spontaneous charity, often following a personal request from royal families in the Gulf. Planeloads of donations have arrived with little warning, and in-kind donations have occasionally been unsuitable and impractical. A series of donations amounting to roughly \$521,300 was recorded by the SRCS in 2004.

6.3.5 Other assistance channels

Other channels of assistance are known to exist, including private donations, Islamic charity or Chinese commercial companies, but these are diverse and difficult to track. While no accurate data on private donations from non-DAC countries is available, interviews indicate a possible inflow of such funding during 2004, primarily from the Arabian Gulf. In 2008 the Saudi Arabian Kingdom Foundation (KF), a private foundation under the chairmanship of Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal, donated \$3.2m towards building a complete village in Darfur intended to serve 500 families, complete with 500 houses, a water station, clinic, school, police station, electricity generator, mosque and mill. This contribution was in response to an earlier invitation from Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to Al-Waleed to attend the October 2007 fundraising conference in Khartoum.

One area of Chinese involvement has proceeded via Chinese firms. By 2008, Beijing had provided \$50m-worth of concessional loans for development projects in Darfur, particularly water supply projects in South Darfur. Chinese companies have dug 46 wells and built 20 small-scale power

Table 13: Humanitarian aid provided by Middle Eastern Red Crescent Societies to Darfur, July–December 2004

Source	Number of deliveries	Tonnes delivered	Type of donation
UAE Red Crescent	14	522	Nutritional supplies, clothes, blankets, shoes, soap
Kuwait Red Crescent	22	264 124	Two local purchases of blankets, plastic covers and nutritional supplies
Egyptian Red Crescent	2 containers	26	Medicines, blankets, food, clothing
Iranian Red Crescent	2 containers 1 cargo plane	28 48	Blankets, foodstuffs, medicines, blankets, plastic sheets
Saudi Red Crescent	37	1,411	Medical equipment and supplies, nutritional supplies
Syrian Red Crescent	1	40	Nutritional and medical supplies

Source: Sudanese Red Crescent Society

plants and water supply projects in southern and northern Darfur, as well as providing equipment to schools including prefabricated houses, computer equipment and technical training. A \$10m concessionary loan for a water supply project from Al-Qadarif State to al-Fasher was also being prepared in early 2008.

6.4 Coordination

The government of Sudan has in effect been the coordinator for non-DAC assistance. Non-DAC donors have continued to support the government's prerogatives, in contrast to DAC donors, which have been extremely reluctant to hand over humanitarian coordination to government authorities in Darfur. The lack of non-DAC conditionality and the overlapping mandates of Sudanese coordination institutions have been posited as complementary factors in ensuring aid flows according to political priorities.⁶²

The government has established three parallel aid coordination mechanisms.⁶³ The first is the Aid Management and Coordination Unit (AMCU) of the Ministry of International Cooperation, the ministry that coordinates Sudan's relations with international and regional organisations. The second is the International Cooperation Directorate (ICD) within the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The ICD is in turn divided into four units: Islamic Development Bank; Arab Funds (loans and grants); the Bilateral desk (dealing with India, Malaysia and China); and International Financial Cooperation (other banks and funds, and international groups like COMESA and GAFTA). Whilst formally distinct, the mandates of these departments overlap. Both the ICD and the AMCU, formally responsible for loans and grants respectively, also manage small amounts of grants and emergency assistance from specific counterparts.

Finally, and most importantly in relation to humanitarian aid for Darfur, there is the HAC, housed within the Ministry of

⁶² Interview with government official, Khartoum, 24 January 2008.

⁶³ Excluded here are the plethora of institutional arrangements established since 2005 dealing specifically with the coordination of North–South recovery and development assistance, for example the Joint National Transition Team.

Humanitarian Affairs. Mandated to coordinate humanitarian field operations and distribute bilateral humanitarian resources, the HAC is formally the lead agency in coordinating recovery, emergency and humanitarian assistance within Sudan. It registers all NGOs/INGOs, provides travel permits and visas to all NGO staff and has the right of approval over NGO projects. Two further agencies are involved in coordinating assistance to Darfur: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which coordinates the travel permits and movement of diplomatic staff into and out of Darfur; and the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), a temporary authority established to manage recovery operations following the DPA.

Government concerns over external interference have over time produced an elaborate system of control and coordination for humanitarian assistance. This has consolidated executive control over distribution by producing overlapping ministerial mandates and competition over the management of aid.⁶⁴ The end result has been that, up until 2007, Sudan lacked a harmonised policy on aid coordination or a strategy on aid mobilisation. A National Committee for Aid Coordination was convened in 2007, but met only once. Rather than being solely procedural, these differences allow for a systemic blurring of the distinctions between humanitarian and development aid. Whilst this system is most evident in the complex bureaucratic procedures around NGO activity, a key premise of this policy is shifting assistance from 'relief' to 'development'.

For many non-DAC actors this policy dovetails with an understanding of the Darfur crisis as primarily developmental. Developmental aid, wherein humanitarian aid is a sub-category, is framed in terms of 'solidarity' or 'partnership' with Khartoum. The Arab Coordination Group, a technical coordination body containing the major national and regional funding agencies of the Middle East, for example, continues

⁶⁴ Reflecting a desire to manage external interference, Sudan's aid system is equally designed to maintain partisan control over government resource flows. One government official interviewed for this research described the opacity, fluidity and complexity of Sudan's aid coordination system as an intentional strategy allowing the National Congress Party to control aid distribution despite the existence of opposition figures within the government following the signing of the CPA, DPA and Eastern Peace Agreement.

to follow its principles of coordination for developmental aid, and is 'prepared to offer advice, not directions. The central guiding principle is that the beneficiaries should be solely responsible for the development and implementation of their own developmental strategies' (Arab Coordination Group, 2006). This flexibility in non-DAC aid, and the reluctance of DAC donors to fund recovery projects in Darfur, has resulted in non-DAC aid being seen as an important alternative to DAC conditionality. As the secretary-general of the TDRA commented after seeking funding for recovery programming in Darfur following the DPA: 'we tried to work with Western donors but there was no point, so we moved to the Arab, Islamic and Chinese donors' (Suleiman Adam, 2008).

Whilst DAC-funded humanitarian operations have expanded in Darfur since 2006, the Sudanese government has increasingly and successfully approached non-DAC donors to support recovery activities. The TDRA has substituted lapsed pledges from DAC donors with non-DAC support. In 2007, the IDB granted \$1m for early recovery to the TDRA, and in 2008 a \$10m soft loan was agreed, to be repaid within 30 years. The latter will allow the TDRA to implement its first projects within Darfur focusing on the rehabilitation of schools, hospitals and water points. Given the variety of conditions prevailing throughout Darfur's vast extent and the shifting patterns of conflict, the push for development has some merit, and various forms of recovery are in progress. Support for recovery and development activity is clearly appropriate and much needed in places, but in a situation of ongoing conflict timing the transition from humanitarian operations to recovery is key.

China's direct coordination with the Sudanese government is an integral part of bilateral relations. Decision-making processes concerning needs assessments and aid design are opaque, but appear to proceed in close consultation with and respond to priorities identified by Khartoum. It follows that China's response to Darfur as a donor has been confined to government-held areas. China has channelled aid through the TDRA, with whom it appears to have consulted on conditions and needs, including through visits by Chinese representatives to the capitals of North and South Darfur.

6.4.1 Donor coordination

Recognising the strategic importance of non-DAC bilateral funding, DAC donors and UN representatives have sought a deeper engagement with non-DAC donors, opening up channels for closer cooperation and more effective communication. Whilst initial dialogue began during 2007 and continued in 2008, this remains primarily diplomatic and characterised by scepticism on both sides. For example, despite months of preparations the UN was not invited to the LAS conference in October 2007 until shortly before it opened, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was invited to speak only following an offer by the UN RC/HC to the Sudanese government.

There are several structural differences inhibiting coordination between non-DAC and DAC donors. First, and perhaps most important, policy and advocacy on humanitarian action in Darfur is firmly Western. There is no operational coordination forum focused on Darfur where non-DAC donors or NGOs regularly meet the major Western humanitarian agencies or DAC donors. The primary donor coordination forum, the Darfur International Partners Group, had no regular non-DAC attendance, despite invitations. Second, the lack of engagement with multilateral coordination mechanisms enables non-DAC donors in principle to deliver aid more cheaply than DAC donors. Whilst DAC aid coordination is handled by large technical offices in Sudan or complex multilateral bureaucracies, non-DAC aid is managed primarily by single representatives or through diplomatic missions. The Special Envoys of Malaysia and the LAS, for example, combine political representation roles with donor coordination responsibilities.

Coordination efforts among non-DAC donors have increased, concentrated on regional initiatives in fundraising. The LAS has emerged as a coordinator for Middle Eastern aid to Darfur, though it lacks dedicated expertise in humanitarian affairs and remains dominated by bilateral relationships with the government in Khartoum.⁶⁵ Despite high-profile pledges, often no timeframes or implementation mechanisms were established and actual contributions by the League have been frequently late and small-scale. China has not officially coordinated any aid activity with non-DAC donors, mostly due to its preference for bilateralism, and also to some extent the absence of mechanisms to deliver aid outside of its preferred modalities. China has consulted with other actors, notably the US government, on such questions as UN/AU force and supporting political efforts to resolve the conflict, but these represent communication channels more than strict coordination. Beijing has also consulted DFID on possible aid cooperation. During his visit to London in February 2008, China's special representative on Darfur, Ambassador Liu Guijin, cited a joint water supply project in Nyala for which Sudanese government consent had not been forthcoming. Had it gone ahead, the project would have represented a new departure for Chinese aid operations in Sudan.⁶⁶

Malaysia's role in the OIC and IDB is the exception to the general absence of coordination by Asian actors, but equally emphasises the importance of personal relations and initiatives. As a response to the lack of non-DAC coordination at the national level, an informal diplomatic meeting of eight Asian countries, the 'Asian Ambassadors Group', has

⁶⁵ This deficit remains despite recent improvements in the technical coordination of development aid during the 1990s. In 1995, members of the Arab Coordination Group, established in 1975 by Gulf donors to improve technical and procedural harmonisation of development aid, undertook joint efforts to harmonise policies, procedures and practices. This process is ongoing and now has eight sets of common procedures, guidelines and model agreements on issues including project appraisal, procurement, disbursement procedures and evaluation of completed projects.

⁶⁶ Elsewhere, notably in the DRC, China has embarked on programmes with DFID and the World Bank.

met regularly since 2007, conducting visits to areas outside Khartoum. Although not a formal coordination mechanism as such, all participants agree on a preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral funding, and the role of the government in coordinating relief.⁶⁷

The UN has made concerted efforts since 2004 to host donor meetings and briefings, and these have reportedly often been attended by non-DAC countries and the LAS. Representatives of the LAS were also present at meetings with the Joint Implementation Mechanism, a forum to discuss access and operational problems with the government. However, non-DAC donors are less familiar with the international humanitarian architecture, and the extent to which they have effectively engaged with multilateral donor or programming coordination mechanisms is open to question. Most importantly, the majority of non-DAC donors have not distinguished in planning, coordination or disbursement between humanitarian, early recovery or development assistance in Darfur. These definitions are often considered to be little more than internal benchmarks set by humanitarian agencies, and in many cases are poorly understood. This lack of engagement is justified by recourse to principles of ‘solidarity’ and ‘partnership’ in non-DAC aid, principles used to legitimise ‘mutually beneficial’ tied aid and a reliance on government coordination agencies.

6.4.2 Programmatic coordination

Programmatic coordination by non-DAC actors within Darfur has been generally absent, with the exception of coordination among national Red Cross/Crescent Societies by the Sudanese Red Crescent and the ICRC. Coordination between the SRCS, IFRC and ICRC is generally good, with weekly meetings of the SRCS and ICRC. However, coordination between the SRCS and national RCS’ operating in Sudan has been weak in practice. The Saudi RCS in particular has been criticised for its refusal to share resources, participate in national coordination meetings led by the Sudanese or integrate activities into strategic planning.

Although coordination is limited, several important civil society initiatives rooted in non-DAC countries have worked closely with Western NGOs within Sudan. The first is the formation by a network of African and Arab NGOs of the ‘Darfur Consortium’ in September 2004, designed to unify African civil society action on Darfur, particularly through engagement with the AU. The second is the opening of a national chapter of the ‘Humanitarian Forum’ in November 2007. Launched by Islamic Relief Worldwide after 9/11, the Humanitarian Forum has a mandate to ‘facilitate coordination of the activities of stakeholders present in humanitarian relief’ and ‘to promote and enforce existing best practices in NGO management and project implementation’ (Humanitarian Forum Website, 2008). The chapter has however had little impact on humanitarian delivery in Darfur.

⁶⁷ Participants are China, Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan (Vohra, 2008).

Box 4: An INGO response: Oxfam-GB’s engagement with the Middle East

Oxfam-GB has been engaging with the LAS and its members on humanitarian advocacy since 2007. In October 2007, Oxfam and Islamic Relief were the only INGOs invited to the LAS donor conference in Khartoum.

Oxfam GB is establishing a presence in Cairo to engage with non-DAC countries on issues of assistance and civilian protection. Darfur and the Occupied Palestinian Territories are two of the crises upon which Oxfam GB focuses its humanitarian advocacy in the region. Oxfam GB seeks funding from some non-DAC donors but does this on a case-by-case basis because of reservations about accepting funding from donors that may have poor human rights records. Oxfam has also contributed as a steering committee member to the Humanitarian Forum, a network of key humanitarian and charitable organisations from each of: Muslim donor and recipient countries; the West; and the multilateral system.

Efforts at engagement face a number of obstacles, including a lack of awareness of Oxfam’s work within non-DAC countries, the reluctance of several states to engage directly with INGOs and differences over the definition of humanitarian assistance and whether it includes the protection of civilians and basic human rights.

6.5 Conclusion

Sporadic communication, limited coordination and differences in approach have contributed to misunderstandings and suspicion between DAC and non-DAC donors in Sudan, creating a perception of what one DAC donor termed ‘another world of donor delivery and assistance’. As opposed to DAC aid, non-DAC humanitarian assistance tailed off after 2004, partly in reaction to the internationalisation of the crisis but also out of recognition that Darfur was covered by Western donors. The pattern of donorship by the main non-DAC donors has not followed the course of the conflict with any strong degree of correlation; notably, there were sizeable donations amidst great need in Darfur directed elsewhere in Sudan at the same time as limited assistance was granted to Darfur. Nevertheless, non-DAC actors in Darfur have shared a degree of official rhetorical agreement on the humanitarian ideal, with China, for example, insisting that its aid is principled and not politically expedient. Similarly, Middle Eastern rhetoric of ‘solidarity’ is not mere semantics and is reflected in the often substantial direct charity channelled to Darfur’s population.

Regional proximity and political solidarity appear to have been the main factors influencing aid contributions. Many non-DAC countries express the basis of assistance in terms of a historically informed language of ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnership’ founded on solidarity with Khartoum, whether

rooted in and expressed primarily in terms of shared political principles (China, India) or religion (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait). The LAS donor conference of 2007 was, for example, described not as an act of charity by the LAS Special Envoy to Sudan, Salah Halima, but as an 'expression of solidarity with the people of Darfur' (Halima, 2008). Furthermore, the nature of this approach is held to contrast positively with the more forceful diplomacy of the West by its more consensual as opposed to confrontational diplomacy. However, a range of different interests has inevitably informed the varying responses of non-DAC actors, and there has been a continuation and intensification of political differences with the prescriptions of the 'international community', especially surrounding sovereignty and conceptions of rights.

The greater readiness to work through and with the Sudanese government is one indication of a broader contrasting, alternative attitude towards the central state in Sudan. Rather than holding the state primarily accountable for conflict in Darfur, like the US or EU, or seeking to operate on the basis of transcendental humanity, as many advocacy groups have urged, non-DAC donors have tended to uphold the supremacy of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

The conclusions suggested by several non-DAC donors interviewed for this research are that, first, non-DAC preferences for bilateral contributions represent a desire to maximise visibility and impact for countries that are unlikely to influence the international humanitarian architecture or humanitarian policy. The preference for bilateral relations also reflects the limited presence of non-DAC donors on the ground, which dramatically reduces delivery options. Third, technical expertise in aid management and coordination is lacking amongst non-DAC donors, and many have no developed apparatus to mobilise overseas humanitarian assistance. It might be argued that, as a result, improved coordination, capacity-building and greater information exchange are required, but this in itself calls for interaction with non-DAC actors predicated on a shared outlook. Finally, there is the apparent preference for supporting recovery or development over humanitarian aid. Despite the fact that non-DAC donors have channelled relatively small amounts of financial assistance to Darfur, they retain importance in the context of Sudan's predominantly adversarial and confrontational relations with key Western powers and institutions. Darfur has also been significant in Muslim efforts to develop a more involved humanitarian role, in part due to the backlash against Muslim countries' relative inactivity in Darfur.

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ISBN: 978 1 907288 16 6

