

Challenging choices: protection and livelihoods in conflict

Case studies from Darfur, Chechnya, Sri Lanka
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

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About the authors

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Contents

List of acronyms	iii
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Methodology	1
1.2 What is protection?	2
1.3 What is a livelihoods approach?	3
Chapter 2 Conflict and its effects on protection and livelihoods	5
2.1 Introduction	5
2.2 Violent conflict: trends and causes	5
2.3 Linkages between threats to protection and livelihoods	6
Chapter 3 Causes and consequences of vulnerability in conflict and community responses	9
3.1 Introduction	9
3.2 Causes of vulnerability	9
3.3 Protection and livelihoods responses	11
Chapter 4 Protection and livelihoods analysis, assessment and targeting	15
4.1 Introduction	15
4.2 Analytical and conceptual frameworks	15
4.3 Assessments	16
4.4 Targeting	17
Chapter 5 Protection and livelihoods programming	19
5.1 Introduction	19
5.2 Protection and livelihoods activities	19
5.3 Complementary protection and livelihoods strategy and programming	21
5.4 Protection consequences of livelihood recovery in conflict environments	27
5.5 Mainstreaming protection principles in livelihoods work	27
5.6 Institutional and organisational issues	28
Chapter 6 Conclusions	31
Annex 1 Livelihoods frameworks	35
References	39

List of acronyms

CBO	community-based organisation
CFW	cash for work
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

Chapter 1

Introduction

This report presents the findings of a three-year study into the links between protection and livelihoods in situations of conflict. Many agencies now adopt protection and livelihoods approaches as part of their humanitarian programmes in conflict, yet in most cases interventions are implemented separately or in parallel. At the same time, at the most basic level of analysis it appears obvious that protection and livelihoods must be linked; risks to livelihoods are often a consequence of violence and human rights abuse, and a loss of livelihoods inevitably makes people more vulnerable to the threats in their environment.

Livelihoods and political economy analysts have pointed out the need to link the two at the level of analysis and action (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002; Collinson, 2003; Narbeth and McLean, 2003; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). Likewise, protection actors have long recognised the need to link protection and livelihoods approaches for specific categories of people, for example refugees and former combatants. Protection assessments often highlight how protection risks are linked to livelihoods activities, and that constraints to livelihoods can create protection risks. The research reported on here builds on this earlier work by studying populations affected by conflict from a livelihoods and a protection perspective, and by looking in detail at programmatic options to address livelihoods and protection risks.

The study examines the link between:

- The threats to protection and risks to livelihoods and subsistence.
- How people respond to these threats and balance these risks.
- Livelihoods and protection analysis and action by operational agencies working in conflict.

The overall aim is to understand whether and how greater complementarity between livelihoods and protection analysis and action can more effectively reduce the risks that conflict-affected populations face, and maximise positive impacts on both livelihoods and protection. The study analyses the different approaches that agencies use to address protection and livelihoods risks. It reviews how agencies analyse protection and livelihoods, their programme and advocacy activities and the similarities, differences and complementarities between protection and livelihoods approaches. Finally, it considers how different elements of these usually separate sectoral approaches can be combined to produce maximum impact.

The report starts with a brief introduction to key concepts in livelihoods and protection. Chapter 2 provides an overview

of conflict trends relevant to livelihoods and protection, and analyses the links between livelihoods and protection threats in the case study countries. Chapter 3 discusses vulnerability, power and community responses and proposes a new way of looking at livelihoods and self-protection strategies. Chapter 4 reviews approaches to assessment, analysis and strategy development, in particular how protection and livelihoods analysis can compensate for each other's weaknesses, and how to target populations facing the greatest protection and livelihoods risks. Chapter 5 looks at agency experience with linking livelihoods and protection programming.

The target audience for this report is practitioners in agencies involved in livelihoods and/or protection work. This includes livelihoods and protection specialists, as well as managers and coordinators of programmes in areas of conflict. The report is also intended for donors engaged in supporting programmes in conflict.

1.1 Methodology

The research was carried out over a three-year period. The foundational hypothesis of this work is that closer linkages between protection and livelihoods approaches could lead to more effective action to reduce risks to both livelihoods and protection, and that, for conflict-affected people, protection and livelihoods are already intimately linked.

The research started with a literature review and agency interviews to examine existing knowledge on the connections between protection and livelihoods threats and community responses, and efforts by practitioners to link the two in practice. An initial HPG working paper was published in 2007 (Jaspars and O'Callaghan et al., 2007). The research also included a number of different country case studies, in Darfur, Sri Lanka, Chechnya and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) (Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008; O'Callaghan, 2008; Jaspars, 2009; O'Callaghan, Jaspars et al., 2009). The studies in Darfur, Sri Lanka and Chechnya were part of a global review of the work of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) on protection and livelihoods in 2008. The OPT study was carried out in 2009 in collaboration with UNRWA and Oxfam. The initial background review, the OPT case study and this final paper were funded through HPG's integrated research programme, to which a number of donors contribute. The Darfur case study was jointly supported by HPG and DRC, which provided the bulk of the funding. The Sri Lanka and Chechnya case studies were conducted for DRC. The field work for these three case studies was therefore limited to DRC's areas of operation, and concentrated on DRC's programmes. Nonetheless, although the studies are geographically separate and cover only limited

areas and population groups, they highlight similar risks and community responses.

In Darfur, the study area included the eastern part of West Darfur (the Zalingei, Nyertete and Wadi Saleh area). This is the heart of the Fur homeland and the centre of the conflict between the Fur-dominated Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid faction and the Sudanese government and Arab militia. The review included both Arab and Fur groups, with a primary focus on rural populations. As such it is not representative of the whole of Darfur, or of the aid operation overall. In Sri Lanka, the study included internally displaced people (IDPs), returnees and resettled people in Vavuniya and Trincomalee in the north and east, a part of the country affected by conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the 1980s. The review in Chechnya focused on returnee and IDP populations. Finally, the research in the West Bank and Gaza examined various livelihoods and at-risk groups, selected on the basis of a literature review and with the advice of UNRWA and Oxfam-GB.

Groups studied included:

- In Darfur: Fur farmers in coercive relationships with Arab pastoralists in government-held areas in rural Zalingei, Abbata and Wadi Saleh, Arab pastoralists and IDPs in camps in Zalingei, Nyertete and in rural areas.
- In Sri Lanka: IDP, returnee and resettled Tamil populations in Trincomalee and Vavuniya. All were affected by political violence and movement restrictions.
- In Chechnya: displaced Chechens in Staropromyslovki Rayon (Grozny), Platina, Duba Yurt and Serzen Yurt.
- In the West Bank: farmers affected by the Barrier, Palestinian communities in Hebron cities affected by Israeli settler violence, refugee camps affected by incursions by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Bedouin agro-pastoralists affected by restricted movement, settler violence and drought.

Focus group discussions were held with community leaders, community-based organisations (CBOs), both women and men and members of different ethnic groups. We also carried out interviews with female-headed households and others identified as vulnerable, for example new arrivals in IDP camps and IDPs living with resident populations in rural areas. Interviews focused on the threats people faced, their responses and the effectiveness and impact of the different forms of assistance they received. In Darfur, the key threats identified through this work were to physical safety, freedom of movement and basic subsistence, which are all key protection threats with direct implications for livelihoods. In subsequent case studies, these threats were investigated more explicitly, although in Chechnya and the OPT the focus was more on access to land and property than on basic subsistence, as analysis of secondary information had already identified these as key issues. A large number of semi-structured interviews

and field visits were also undertaken with agencies including the UN (OCHA, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNRWA), NGOs (IRC, Oxfam-GB, SC-UK, ACF, CRS, CARE and MercyCorps), national NGOs and the ICRC.

The analysis started with an exploration of livelihoods and protection threats and the links between them. We then looked at how different communities or livelihood groups were affected by these threats, how they responded and how they balanced risks to their livelihoods and to their physical safety. Finally, we examined whether and how agencies' approaches and responses addressed these risks, and analysed information on impact. Although the findings in this report are mainly from the case studies, they are supplemented by analysis from the wider literature where relevant. Unless referenced, the findings are from our own research.

Preliminary findings were discussed at a workshop in July 2009, involving key agencies including DFID, the ICRC, DRC, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNHCR, WFP, ActionAid and Oxfam. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss our initial findings, debate approaches to linking protection and livelihoods programming and examine the institutional requirements and constraints to linking livelihoods and protection in practice. The discussions and conclusions from this workshop are incorporated in this report. A series of working papers has also been published as part of this research, available on HPG's website at www.odi.org.uk/HPG/protection_livelihoods.html.

1.2 What is protection?

The most commonly accepted definition of protection is as follows: 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law' (Giossi Caversazio, 2001). In conflict situations people's rights are protected by a variety of international and national laws, including international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law, refugee law and national legislation.¹ IHL regulates the use of force and the weaponry states and other armed actors can use in international and non-international armed conflicts, and recognises relief and protection activities by impartial humanitarian organisations. In particular, it establishes that restraint must be exercised in order to protect civilians and other protected categories from attack (see Box 1).

Protection involves efforts to prevent or put a stop to actual or potential violations or abuses of law, including through eradicating the causes of violations or the circumstances that gave rise to them. It also involves activities that seek to reduce the exposure of civilians to risk and limit the consequences

¹ While some international human rights can be derogated in emergency situations if specific conditions are met, some are never derogable, including the right to life and prohibitions on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, slavery and servitude and retroactive criminal laws.

Box 1: Common Article 3 (extract)

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

of such exposure (ICRC, 2008). The responsibility to protect civilians rests first and foremost with the state. In situations of conflict, warring parties also have obligations under IHL to respect the lives, security, integrity and dignity of civilians. It is only when authorities and warring parties fail in their duties to protect civilians that the need for protection by other parties arises.

Protecting, as well as assisting, those affected by crisis is central to the humanitarian agenda. This means that, in addition to assistance activities which can have a positive impact on people's protection, agencies should also engage in distinct protection activities aimed at encouraging duty-bearers to abide by their responsibilities. This imperative is enshrined in IHL and reflected in a range of policy documents, including the Humanitarian Charter. While the role of humanitarian agencies in assisting, rather than protecting, civilians has traditionally predominated, humanitarian agencies' engagement in protection has increased in recent years, and new actors have joined the traditional cadre of agencies with specific mandates under international law to protect those at risk (ICRC, UNHCR and OHCHR). There are several reasons for this, including aid agencies' increased proximity to violence as a consequence of working in situations of internal conflict, the limitations of relief in addressing the rights violations that lie at the heart of many crises and the increased attention to protection in political, human rights and military spheres (O'Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007).

The all-encompassing nature of the definition outlined above, its legal basis and the emphasis of the *aim* of protection rather than what it actually entails have meant that some agencies

have struggled to use it in practice, opting instead to adopt more specific concepts to guide their work. Slim and Bonwick (2005), for instance, describe protection more concisely as seeking to assure the safety of civilians from acute harm. Others argue that the adoption by humanitarians of the language of 'protection' is problematic because it suggests that aid actors can physically protect those at risk of violence, when this is neither their role nor within their capabilities and risks transferring protection from the responsible authorities to unarmed aid actors (Bonwick, 2006; Dubois, 2009).

A range of other actors are often involved in a protection response, such as legal (e.g. the International Criminal Court (ICC)), security (e.g. UN peacekeeping forces) and human rights (e.g. human rights monitors). This report does not analyse the actions of these other protection actors, but rather focuses on those of the humanitarian community.

Protection in situations of conflict has clear links with livelihoods. Violations of IHL and human rights law (e.g. targeting civilian assets) have serious consequences for livelihoods. Information on the impact on livelihoods can be used for advocacy with the authorities and to substantiate the need for assistance. The provision of assistance (whether livelihoods or other forms of assistance) can in itself often be an important form of protection. Combining assistance with engagement with the state or other protection actors ensures that violations are highlighted and that the humanitarian community does not become complicit in abuses.

1.3 What is a livelihoods approach?

A livelihood is defined as the capabilities, assets and strategies required for a means of living (Chambers and Conway, 1991). Livelihoods approaches emerged during the 1980s in recognition that effective poverty alleviation required action at the community level as well as at the level of government policy and services (Ashley and Carney, 1999). Livelihoods approaches gained prominence within the humanitarian sphere in the late 1980s, following the severe famines of that decade, with a particular emphasis on livelihood (or asset) protection to reduce vulnerability and save lives in the longer term. Livelihoods activities can also be understood more broadly as work to strengthen institutions and influence policy, as well as supporting assets. Activities may therefore range from food aid and cash transfers to agricultural support, market and income support and influencing policies on land rights. More recently, livelihoods approaches have been used to guide analysis and response in complex emergencies.

A set of principles and a framework underpin a livelihoods approach. Livelihoods principles include taking a participatory and capacity-building approach, working at different levels (micro and macro, or national and international, as well as community), learning from change and adaptation and promoting sustainability, though the last may not be feasible

in conflict settings (Ashley and Carney, 1999; DFID, 1999). The livelihoods framework shows the key elements of livelihoods and how they interact. It includes assets, strategies, outcomes and policies, institutions and processes (DFID, 1999). (See Annex 1 for a description of the livelihoods framework.)

Livelihood strategies encompass what people do, such as agriculture and wage labour (Schafer, 2002), and what they have, including their natural (land, forest products, water), physical (livestock, shelter, tools, materials), social (extended family and other social networks), financial (income, credit, investments) and human assets (education, skills, health). Political status, which may be added as a sixth asset, can be understood as proximity to power, such as representation in local institutions and connections to structures of power such as political authorities and armed actors. People's livelihoods are also determined by the wider governance environment: the policies, institutions and processes (PIPs) that determine access to and control over assets. Policies may include the policies of warring parties, for instance with regard to the use of local militia, the movement of people and goods, land rights and taxation. Institutions may include those concerned with delivering basic services, markets and justice institutions. Processes may include the marginalisation of particular areas or groups, power relations between groups and changes in the nature of conflict.

In conflict-related emergencies, a number of points are worth highlighting in relation to livelihoods. First, livelihoods can

be exploitative; in other words, situations exist where one group's livelihood is dependent upon the exploitation of others. Livelihood strategies in themselves may be violent, such as theft and looting or coercive practices, or may entail risks to safety. Second, assets can be a liability and can make some communities or households vulnerable to attack or exploitation (Collinson, 2003; Young, Osman et al., 2005; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006; Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006). Third, policies, institutions and processes often consist of different forms of deliberate violence and abuse. Livelihoods frameworks have been adapted for complex emergencies, incorporating power relations and politics more explicitly (Collinson, 2003; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). Finally, 'security is a basic dimension of livelihood sustainability' (Chambers and Conway, 1991).

Livelihoods approaches in conflict have clear links with protection. Policies and institutions of violence and abuse result in protection risks or risks to physical safety for certain groups. This means that an analysis of power and politics is essential for livelihoods approaches in conflict, and a protection analysis could assist with this. The provision of assistance, including livelihoods assistance, may reduce exposure to risks (though on the whole livelihoods assistance tends to address the consequences of violations, in terms of food insecurity and reduced income for instance). Combining livelihoods approaches with protection approaches makes possible additional activities to reduce violence itself, and to reduce people's exposure to it.

Chapter 2

Conflict and its effects on protection and livelihoods

2.1 Introduction

In analysing the risks that people and communities face in situations of conflict, we look at risk as a function of protection threats, vulnerability and people's capacity. In this study we use an adaptation of models developed by Slim and Bonwick (2005) and ICRC, which in themselves are adaptations of earlier models developed for natural disasters (Twigg, 2004). The model used by ICRC is shown below:²

$$\text{RISK} = \frac{\text{THREAT} \times \text{VULNERABILITY}}{\text{CAPACITY OF AFFECTED POPULATIONS TO RESPOND}}$$

Threats include the deliberate targeting of civilians and other forms of physical violence, restrictions on movement or access to land and property and deprivation of the things people require for basic subsistence. In conflict situations, these threats may be perpetrated by the state, groups or individuals. The risk of a particular violation is related to vulnerability, which is often linked to people's identity, assets and capacities. Thus, some people may be more at risk than others because of their ethnicity or political affiliation, or because of the types of assets that they have. The presence or otherwise of accountable and effective institutions is also important in determining people's vulnerability.

The way people or communities respond is linked to the range of response options open to them and their capacity to cope with the threat. Thus, humanitarian actors can reduce the level of risk that populations face in situations of conflict by acting to help reduce threats, reducing vulnerability or increasing people's choice and capacity to respond.

Drawing on the findings of the case studies, this chapter provides a brief description of some of the key characteristics of the conflicts reviewed, drawing parallels with broader trends in conflicts elsewhere. This provides a background to a discussion about protection threats commonly found in situations of conflict, and how they are linked to people's livelihoods. Chapter 3 looks more closely at vulnerability and community responses.

2.2 Violent conflict: trends and causes

The conflicts in the four contexts studied for this report – Darfur, Sri Lanka, Chechnya and the OPT – have unique and

² Slim and Bonwick (2005) also include duration, or the length of time people or communities are exposed to threats, though this can be more generally viewed as part of vulnerability.

complex histories and characteristics.³ At the same time, however, they also share some key features which reflect broader trends in modern warfare. These include civilians being the primary targets of violence and destruction and the protracted nature of conflict, which is often associated with a shift from political to economic motivations among key actors. Periods of military action and acute violence are interspersed with periods of violent peace, and in both cases there are shortcomings in efforts to protect civilians.

Widespread killing of civilians, mass displacement, restrictions on movement and decimation of livelihoods assets featured in every context. During the Chechen conflicts in the 1990s, international organisations criticised both sides for 'blatant and sustained' violations of IHL (Human Rights Watch, 2007), including widespread civilian casualties, the displacement of approximately 800,000 people, the large-scale destruction of villages and towns and the decimation of housing and infrastructure (Youngs, 2007). The aerial bombardment of Grozny alone lasted between October 1999 and February 2000, reducing the capital to what the UN called the 'most destroyed city on earth'.⁴

The protracted and inconsistent levels of violence in the cases reviewed are also features of contemporary warfare. The Chechen wars began in 1994, Sri Lanka's 20-year conflict only ended in mid-2009 and the conflict in Darfur is in its sixth year. In conflicts such as these, periods of open war differ little from situations of 'violent peace', with similar levels of violence, death and displacement (Duffield, 2001). In Chechnya, for example, conflict simmers beneath the surface and resurfaces periodically, with insecurity still evident in the south in particular (Beehner, 2006). In Darfur, the conflict is now characterised by fragmented and localised violence and banditry, as new disputes emerge over land and power. The long-running Israeli–Palestinian conflict has, over its 60-year history, been marked by consistent low-level violence, punctuated by periods of full-scale war. Fighting has been conducted by regular armies, paramilitary groups, terror cells and individuals, with a large number of civilian fatalities on both sides. Here, as in other contexts including Chechnya and Sri Lanka, the 'war on terror' provided a form of legitimacy for state violence and abuse against rebel movements and civilians perceived to be supporting them, by branding them as terrorists (Keen, 2008).

Whilst many conflicts start with clear political aims, they often mutate into contests over economic resources. Protracted

³ Each conflict is described in greater detail in the full case studies, available on the HPG website.

⁴ 'Scars Remain Amid Chechen Revival', BBC News, 3 March 2007.

conflicts are often associated with parallel or war economies, and involve coercive or exploitative practices such as forced labour, extortion and the control of trade, land and other valuable assets. State incumbents and warlords seek self-preservation and the accumulation of wealth through trans-border and parallel trade (Keen, 2000; Duffield, 2001). The case studies provide numerous examples of this pattern. In Chechnya, for instance, kidnap for ransom is common, and in Sri Lanka armed groups extort businessmen and traders. Arab pastoralists in Darfur are involved in the coercion of neighbouring farmers. Both state and non-state actors benefit from timber extraction and extortion (Young and Osman, 2006; Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2008).

Finally, the four conflict contexts reaffirm the difficulties and deficiencies in international efforts to protect the lives and livelihoods of civilians in conflict. This is despite increasing international policy engagement in protection, most notably in the adoption of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. First articulated in 2001, R2P gained political momentum at the 2005 UN World Summit, when governments agreed that, when a state ‘manifestly fails’ in its responsibilities to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, the international community has an obligation to act, including collective use of force authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

International military intervention in internal conflict has become much more common since the early 1990s. However, international political and security interests, rather than the protection of civilians, tend to be the guiding motivation for the deployment of troops. Furthermore, as the experience in Darfur indicates, weaknesses in the mandates, scale and quality of troop deployments have undermined peacekeeping missions in virtually every country where they have been tried (Holt and Berkman, 2006). Political efforts in the form of diplomacy and sanctions have also met with variable success. While attempts have been made to increase accountability for breaches of international law, most notably in the establishment of the ICC, the Court’s experience in Darfur demonstrates the difficulty of bringing alleged perpetrators to justice even where arrest warrants are issued. Finally, the recent prioritisation of stabilisation and state-building in Western foreign policy has undermined the legal protection which protects conflict-affected populations (Collinson, Darcy et al., 2009). Post-9/11 international counter-terrorism and ‘stabilisation’ efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan have put increasing strain on international norms as terrorists are cast as ‘illegal combatants’ and thus denied the protection afforded by IHL.

These international military, political and legal approaches to protection serve as a backdrop to humanitarian efforts to protect the lives and livelihoods of civilians in conflict. They are also a reminder of the limitations of humanitarian advocacy in reducing the threats civilians face (as advocacy is often targeted towards these actors), and of the relatively

minor roles that humanitarians frequently play in protecting at-risk populations.

2.3 Linkages between threats to protection and livelihoods

This section looks at how threats to protection and livelihoods are often linked and how their connectedness can serve to deepen the risks that people face. The threats civilians affected by conflict confront have direct impacts on livelihoods through attacks on villages and the destruction, looting or theft of important livelihoods assets, such as houses, land and livestock. Violence can also produce indirect effects, whereby livelihoods are undermined and assets lost through the decimation of basic services, the collapse of public health systems and loss of access to employment, markets, farms or traditional pastures through limitations on movement. The research for this report identified a number of threats to physical safety, freedom of movement (including displacement) and access to land and property. Other issues, such as arrest and detention (OPT), discrimination (OPT and Chechnya) and loss of personal documentation (Sri Lanka and Chechnya), confirmed the close connection between rights violations and the undermining of livelihoods in situations of armed conflict. Box 2 highlights a range of protection threats that have direct implications for people’s livelihoods.

In the case studies, physical violence included rape or other forms of attack in Darfur, arrests, detentions and disappearances

Box 2: Protection and livelihoods threats

1. Physical violence, torture, abduction, arrest and sexual violence (affects livelihoods options and productive capacities, access to livelihoods assets, can result in death and injury and the destruction of livelihoods assets).
2. Restrictions on freedom of movement, including forced return, checkpoints and curfews (affects access to land, markets, migration opportunities, employment opportunities, networks, social services).
3. Forced displacement (affects access to livelihoods strategies and assets, can reduce productive capacities, affects networks).
4. Attacks on or theft of civilian assets such as houses, land, hospitals and food, or extortion or exploitative practices (affects livelihoods assets, income).
5. Disruption to property and land rights (affects livelihoods options, in particular people’s ability to access land, but also other employment options).
6. Discrimination on the basis of social status (affects livelihoods options such as access to employment).
7. Loss or theft of personal documentation (affects proof of ownership of livelihoods assets, access to services).
8. Landmines (death and injury, lack of access to land and other livelihoods assets).
9. Forced recruitment into fighting forces (death and injury, reduction in productive capacities).

in Chechnya, Sri Lanka and the OPT, as well as other violence resulting in injury and death. For many Fur villagers in Darfur looting and attacks – both within towns and villages and when travelling on nearby roads – remain common after six years of conflict. Similarly, farming and firewood collection have been associated with the risk of rape or attack for IDPs and rural populations, particularly in highly contested areas such as the land around Zalingei. Many people limited farming activities to the safer environs of towns and villages, although the more vulnerable tended to take greater risks and collect firewood or farm further afield. With the reduction in livelihood opportunities for all groups, competition over resources is fuelling conflict, for example between pastoralists and IDPs over firewood (Young, Osman et al., 2007; Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2008). In southern Chechnya, landmines and unexploded ordnance limit opportunities to collect firewood, garlic and wild berries, while the deliberate targeting of the male population during the conflict meant that men’s productive capacities were effectively wiped out as they minimised their engagement in livelihood activities in an effort to reduce risks, leaving women to take over traditionally male roles. In Sri Lanka, the risk of abduction or murder presented both immediate physical danger and limited movement and therefore access to land, markets and employment. Fear of abduction meant that only essential travel was undertaken. For some groups – Arab pastoralists in Darfur and Sinhala populations in Sri Lanka, for instance – direct threats to personal security were less of a concern, although these groups too faced risks travelling through territory held by opposing groups.

Military or militia incursions into camps were a feature in the West Bank, Sri Lanka and in Darfur, as camps were often associated with high levels of resistance or militancy. This could result in destruction of property, injury and sometimes death. In the West Bank, settler violence against Palestinians led to death and injury, as well as damage to livelihood assets, destruction of harvests, constraints on access to agricultural land and displacement. In Hebron, there was a combination of random violence, including harassment, obstruction of movement, physical attacks and stone-throwing by young Israelis, as well as more organised attacks, often led by rabbis or other adults. Often, however, the methods of war employed in the OPT are less overt. An elaborate, longstanding and multi-faceted bureaucracy of restriction and control over movement and access to land and property fundamentally affects livelihoods.

Forced displacement featured in all four case studies. Nearly three million people have been forced from their homes in Darfur (OCHA, 2009), violence in Chechnya led to the displacement of 800,000 of the country’s 1.1 million people (UNDP, 2005) and an estimated 500,000 are newly displaced in Sri Lanka (IDMC, 2009). An estimated seven million Palestinians are displaced worldwide (Badil, 2007), including more than 2.7m refugees in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (UNRWA, 2008). In all, UNHCR estimates that there were some 42m displaced people

and refugees worldwide at the end of 2008 (UNHCR, 2009). Displacement breaks up families, undermines networks and separates people from livelihood opportunities. As many of the displaced population in Darfur are farmers, displacement has had implications, not only for those directly affected, but also for the food security of the entire Darfuri population, as agricultural production has dwindled, markets have collapsed and reciprocal relations between farmers and pastoralists have been disrupted. Conversely, both pastoralist and farming communities claimed that some villages were spared attack because they contained markets or basic services such as medical centres.

Lack of freedom of movement – often as a result of deliberate restrictions imposed for political or economic purposes – was a significant impediment to livelihoods in each of the case studies. In Sri Lanka, there are restrictions on movement out of displacement camps and on access to land in ‘High Security Zones’ (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2009). Many of the recently displaced in Sri Lanka have been interned in displacement camps which they are not permitted to leave (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2009). Movement of people and goods in the north and east of the country is controlled through a large number of checkpoints and permit requirements, in what amounts effectively to an economic blockade.

Likewise, the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza following the takeover by Hamas in 2006 has devastated the economy, disrupting markets, distorting prices and degrading the infrastructure and basic services. Movement outside Gaza has been largely impossible since 2007; farmers attempting to reach their lands near the border fence surrounding Gaza risk being shot at by Israeli soldiers, and fishing is at times limited to three miles off the coast. Conditions within the Gaza Strip are desperate as a result: 48% of Gazans are unemployed, 80% live in poverty and the great majority depend on aid (FAO and WFP, 2007). In the West Bank, restrictions on the movement of goods limit trade with Israel, Jordan and Gaza, while the increased transport costs incurred by Israeli controls means that Palestinian products cannot compete on the international market (World Bank, 2008). Employment in Israel – a key source of income for many Palestinians – fell by about 50% between 2000 and 2008, and has become almost impossible for males aged between 18 and 30.

In Darfur, movement has also been limited by the coercive ‘protection regime’ imposed on certain communities by Arab groups, and the imposition of fines at checkpoints. The movement of Arab camel-herders has also been affected; migratory routes have been closed off, journeys to markets take three times as long as normal and many have to pay for fines or escorts to travel through areas held by opposition groups. Although freedom of movement has improved in Chechnya, many people continue to curtail all but essential travel, and discrimination against Chechens makes it difficult

for people to move to other states in the North Caucasus or Russia to look for work.

The last issue of concern relates to the denial of land and property rights. In each of the four studies, land issues played a fundamental role in fomenting conflict, and continue to affect people's lives and livelihoods. It is widely believed that Arab groups participated in the conflict in Darfur in part because the Sudanese government promised them land in exchange. Even if the security situation stabilises, secondary occupation of the land of displaced populations in both Darfur and Sri Lanka means that some displaced people will be unable to recover their lands. In the West Bank, the Barrier constructed by Israel has resulted in loss of access to 10% of West Bank territory (International Court of Justice, 2004). Fewer than one in five farmers are given the visitors' permits they need to reach their land, and for those who do procedures are difficult, costly and unpredictable. As a result only low-maintenance crops can be grown, and production has decreased. In addition, in parts of the West Bank construction work is subject to Israeli permission, and difficulties in obtaining permits mean that it is impossible to build key livelihoods assets such as water points, irrigation works, roads and animal shelters. Planning regulations and the destruction of illegal infrastructure and property slow construction, limit investment and curtail agricultural production. Israeli statistics show that, between 2000 and 2007, fewer than one in ten Palestinian requests for building

Box 3: Farmers in the West Bank affected by the Barrier

The Barrier is a 10m-high concrete wall or fence surrounded by ditches, patrol roads and barbed wire. Although the International Court of Justice has indicated that the Barrier is illegal insofar as it deviates from the demarcation line between Israel and the West Bank, today only 20% of the Barrier follows this line, with the remainder intruding well into West Bank territory. Reaching land situated on the Barrier's western side is regulated by Israel, either by a permit system or list and gate procedures. Obtaining permits to cross is extremely difficult: only landowners and first-degree relatives are usually granted them. The list system generally limits access to certain days and times of the day, as well as to certain categories of people. An OCHA survey in 2007 showed that more than 50% of communities directly affected by the Barrier no longer have regular access to their land (OCHA, 2007). Erratic and reduced access has resulted in decreased agricultural production and changes in the crops grown, leading to reductions in income, expenditure and diet. Some farmers are selling their land and leaving, though staying on the land and continuing to cultivating it, even at a loss, is considered a form of passive resistance.

permits were granted, and that, for every permit approved, 55 demolition orders were issued (Peace Now, 2008).

Chapter 3

Causes and consequences of vulnerability in conflict and community responses

3.1 Introduction

An analysis of vulnerability is a key element of both protection and livelihoods approaches. A more in-depth understanding of vulnerability allows for more effective targeting, and programming which takes account of the impact of protection and livelihoods threats on different groups, as well as the strategies that they employ in response. In this section, we combine the analysis of others with our own to look at vulnerability and risk as follows:

- The causes of vulnerability, in relation to protection threats, the functioning of institutions and long-term economic, social and political processes.
- Vulnerability related to people's or communities' identity, their assets or where they live.
- The response options and capacities that people have, and the risks to protection and livelihoods that these responses may entail. This includes both the consequences of limited options, and the strategies that people have developed to avoid, minimise or confront threats.

This combines and builds on the model proposed by Slim and Bonwick (2005) for analysing protection risks, and combines this with the analysis recommended for vulnerability in conflict situations by both livelihoods and political economy analysts (e.g. Duffield, 1994; Keen, 1998; Collinson, 2003; Young, Osman et al., 2005; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). The former emphasises the importance of considering threats, vulnerability and capacities, and the latter examines vulnerability in conflict in more detail. This includes an analysis of assets as liabilities, as well as an analysis of the policies, institutions and processes that influence people's livelihoods, protection and welfare. This is explained in more detail below.

3.2 Causes of vulnerability

The protection threats highlighted in this research are all causes of vulnerability. These threats are often part of wider policies of oppression, such as the various restrictions on movement in the OPT and Sri Lanka. They can also be the result of more local-level action, such as informal taxation at checkpoints or markets or extortion for protection. As in other conflicts, the ones studied in this research were preceded by the long-term social, political and economic marginalisation of certain groups or areas: Tamils in Sri Lanka, Palestinians in Israel and the OPT and the under-development and political marginalisation of Darfur. Within Darfur, the Arab pastoral or nomadic populations were politically marginalised and had

little access to services such as education (Young, Osman et al., 2009).

The reach and accountability of civil, economic, judicial and political institutions play a large part in determining the vulnerability of certain groups. All four of the case studies were characterised by inadequate rule of law, failed justice systems, widespread impunity and corruption. For example in Chechnya, corruption of the judicial system affected people's ability to defend their property, employment and social rights; the poor lacked access to justice because they were unable to pay legal fees or the bribes that were frequently required to facilitate the legal process. In addition to institutions concerned with security and rule of law, other key institutions in this study were markets, and those which determine access to land and natural resources such as water, firewood and grazing grounds. The way in which access to institutions changes for particular groups in an emergency is also crucial to their protection and ability to pursue livelihoods strategies; people may lose access to court systems, markets or land. Both formal and informal institutions are dynamic and will reflect changing power relations during conflict. Institutions themselves can also be vulnerable as budgets for health care and education, for example, are drained, existing systems collapse and people with skills and institutional memory flee the area or country (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). In Darfur, the breakdown of traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution in relation to land, water and natural resources was a major threat to livelihoods (Young, Osman et al., 2007).

3.2.1 Vulnerability related to identity and assets

Whether people or communities are vulnerable to particular protection threats also depends on what people own, who they are and where they live. As in other conflicts, an analysis of the case study findings shows that economic vulnerability is often a consequence of political vulnerability, and can in turn lead to greater vulnerability or exposure to protection threats.

Whilst in many emergencies assets are a source of resilience, in situations of conflict they can become life-threatening liabilities (Duffield, 1994; Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). For example, living in resource-rich areas, such as fertile land in Darfur, OPT or Sri Lanka, has opened people up to attack, exploitation and coercion. In Sri Lanka, traders, businesspeople and professionals were chosen for extortion. Risks of abduction was worst for people originating from former LTTE-controlled areas, including in particular relocated people. In the West Bank, Palestinian Bedouin and farmers living in areas under complete Israeli control were more

vulnerable to home demolitions and land confiscation. How assets affected vulnerability in Darfur is illustrated in Box 4.

Vulnerability to abuse or protection threats may also be linked to social characteristics such as age or gender, or involvement in particular political or military activities. For example, it is often the case that men of military age are at greatest risk of recruitment into fighting forces, or most vulnerable to detention or arrest. In refugee camps in the West Bank, young men between the ages of 14 and 35 are most affected by IDF activity: they are often targeted in raids, and form the core of the resistance that camp residents mount in the face of incursions. In humanitarian crises associated with high levels of violence, young men often experience some of the highest mortality rates (Salama, Spiegel et al., 2004; Grandesso, Sanderson et al., 2005; Jones, 2009).

3.2.2 Capacity, choice and risk

Livelihood strategies in conflict become severely constricted for populations exposed to protection threats. In all the case studies, as in other conflict environments, livelihood strategies were often limited to subsistence agriculture and marginal economic activities. Other options include illegal, exploitative or risky activities, similar to the findings of other studies in conflict-related crises (e.g. Le Billon, 2000).

Most camp residents made a meagre living based on low-paid and dangerous work, and faced periods of malnutrition despite receiving humanitarian assistance. IDPs in Darfur and Sri Lanka relied on brick-making, collecting wood, domestic labour, petty trade and wage labour (including farm labour). In the West Bank, the main livelihood opportunities for IDPs in camps was casual labour within the West Bank and occasional illegal work in Israel. However, taken together these strategies were not sufficient to meet people's basic needs and many – such as firewood collection and brick-making in Darfur – are not sustainable because they entail significant environmental

Box 4: The impact of conflict on IDP and pastoralist assets in Darfur

In Darfur, IDPs are vulnerable to food insecurity in the short term due to the loss of their financial and natural capital (their farms), which in turn makes them more vulnerable to exploitation and attack. The nomadic population's financial and natural capital has increased because of military income and firewood sales and better access to land and water. At the same time, however, their social, political and human capital decreased. The loss or erosion of different assets therefore creates very different vulnerabilities and consequent needs (Young, Osman et al., 2009). The differential impacts of conflict on pastoral livelihoods were also evident during this study, which found that assistance priorities focused on longer-term items such as education, agricultural support and veterinary services, rather than security or food.

Box 5: Vulnerability related to social and political status

In Darfur, the vulnerability of different groups was in part determined by people's ethnicity as well as their residence status (e.g. IDP, rural resident), previous livelihood (farmer, agro-pastoralist, pastoralist) and whether people were living in government- or SLA-controlled areas. Fur farmers and IDPs are particularly vulnerable to rape and sexual assault by Arab militia. Newly arrived IDPs, or those without access to humanitarian assistance are particularly at risk and are less well represented through the leadership system in camps.

In Sri Lanka, all Tamil populations were vulnerable to political violence (arrest and detention), restrictions on movement and access to land or fishing grounds. IDPs, returnees and resettled people are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability is also linked to area of origin, with people from LTTE-controlled areas facing more severe harassment by the security forces. Within these groups, men were particularly at risk of arrest and detention.

In OPT, people were vulnerable because of where they lived, and simply for being Palestinian. Vulnerability was also closely related to military or political activity. For example, living in area C in the West Bank, where Palestinian movement and construction is highly restricted, means vulnerability to home demolitions and limited access to services. Farmers living close to the Barrier were vulnerable because they were cut off from their land, which resulted in reduced agricultural production and the risk of land loss.

risks, undermining livelihoods in the longer term (Young, Osman et al., 2009). These strategies also often involved greater exposure to physical danger.

Farmers in Darfur and the OPT faced similar restrictions on their livelihoods. Despite limited access to land, farming remained a key strategy. In parts of Darfur, farmers' safety depended to a large extent on the arrangements made with neighbouring Arab communities. In general, farmers in Darfur and the OPT cultivated small areas of land, as going to fields far from the village was not considered safe. In Sri Lanka, this meant that people did not have access to their paddy land to grow rice. Whereas farmers had previously produced a surplus, they were now finding it difficult to meet subsistence needs. Similarly in the OPT, many farmers affected by the Barrier were reduced to meeting subsistence needs and going into debt. For returnee and resettled populations in Sri Lanka, access to land was in most cases limited, and the main income-earning activities consisted of wage labour and petty trade. In extreme cases, people pawned or sold their jewellery. Going into debt, begging or relying on relatives were also common among Bedouin in the OPT affected by movement restrictions and drought.

Wars and war economies also create new livelihood strategies, some of which are coercive, exploitative or illegal (Keen, 1998; Le Billon, 2000). Conflict-affected women may turn to prostitution, and young men may enlist in the military or join an armed group. In Sri Lanka, for instance, extortion is common among government-aligned militia in Vavuniya, and Arab nomads in Darfur rely on violence, exploitation and the coercion of other communities. Such ‘maladaptive strategies’ (Young et al., 2009) are illegal, are not based on any recognised entitlement or right and have the potential to further fuel conflict. As such they are not sustainable.

3.3 Protection and livelihoods responses

All our case study countries were characterised by a failure of formal protection mechanisms. In Darfur, villagers felt that neither the police nor the military, nor for that matter the hybrid AU/UN force UNAMID, were able to provide security. In parts of the West Bank, where Israel is in theory responsible for the safety of civilians, little is done in practice to act on complaints of settler violence or to protect civilians under attack. There was some confidence in the police among interviewees in Sri Lanka, and some felt that security had improved with the establishment of police stations. Generally, however, everyone interviewed felt that they were responsible for their own security.

With the failure of formal protection mechanisms in so many contexts, a number of analysts emphasise the importance of understanding and supporting the steps at-risk populations take to protect themselves from threats to their safety and dignity (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson, 2001; Slim and Bonwick, 2005; Bonwick, 2006). In many conflict situations, these strategies are likely to be essential to people’s safety. Bonwick suggests three types of protection strategy: avoidance, containment and confrontation. Avoidance strategies are aimed at escaping the threat. They include flight or displacement, changing patterns of movement (such as travelling at night or taking safer routes) or developing information networks or systems to warn of danger. Containment strategies are described as living with the threat. They comprise the widest range of responses, including travelling to markets or farms in groups, paying militia for protection, vigilance and contingency planning and lobbying or negotiating with the authorities and warring parties. Other options include paying ‘taxes’ or protection money or negotiating with warring parties to remain neutral. Payment for protection may include giving a daughter to military commanders or payment with sex. The final response, confrontation, involves fighting back through the formation of self-defence or vigilante groups, or joining a party to the conflict.

In a study in eastern Sri Lanka, Korf (2003) combines livelihoods and protection strategies in three ‘pillars’. The first is managing personal risk to life, which looks particularly at how people respond to political violence, including avoidance strategies such as displacement as well as risk-taking. The second pillar,

managing household economics, includes strategies to control expenditure and investment, in part as a way of living with threat and minimising risky livelihood strategies. Vincent and Sorenson (2001) similarly distinguish between protection strategies and subsistence strategies. Korf’s third pillar, accessing external support, includes looking for refuge with wider family and seeking state and NGO support.

Building on the work of other analysts, in this study we identified six different categories of livelihood and protection responses. These are:

- avoiding risk – displacement;
- reducing risk through alliances with power-holders;
- minimising exposure to or spreading risk (including managing expenditure and investment);
- risk-taking; and
- resistance or confrontation.

3.3.1 Avoidance: escaping the threat through displacement

Displacement is a key feature of conflict-related humanitarian crises, and was a key protective response in all four study contexts, albeit displacement was largely forced rather than a voluntary decision involving some choice. Displacement may take place as a direct result of violence – as in Darfur in 2004, when conflict displaced large numbers of farmers. Only some farmers received advance warning and were able to take some of their assets with them. It can also be the result of restrictions on livelihood opportunities through reduced mobility or asset loss. In 2008, for example, crop failure and drought combined with severe asset depletion forced people into camps. In the OPT, lack of access to grazing land, restrictions on the building of water points and other key livelihood assets and limited access to markets and employment have combined with overall economic decline, compelling Bedouin communities in the West Bank to abandon their way of life and migrate to urban areas.

3.3.2 Reducing risk through alliances with power-holders

Forming alliances with power-holders, whether local authorities or armed actors, was an important strategy, particularly in Darfur. Having an agreement with Arab population groups for ‘protection’ was one of the key determinants of people’s physical safety in many parts of Darfur. In villages that had pre-existing dispute settlement committees to deal with minor problems between Arab and Fur groups, the Arab group became a ‘protection force’, allowing farmers to continue to work their land. In many cases this was not a voluntary agreement, and villagers were forced to pay for protection. Most said that they would have left their village if they had been able to do so. In Zalingei, these protection forces were more prevalent in market towns, as pastoral groups needed to maintain some markets and access to services. Examples of such agreements are given in Box 6. Payment for protection has been reported in a number of other contexts, for example during the height of the Somali famine in 1992 (De Waal, 1997).

In Sri Lanka, Tamil communities in resettlement and returnee sites in Vavuniya also tried to establish links with nearby military camps, for example through voluntary work, in an attempt to reduce the risk of harassment. In one resettlement site in northern Sri Lanka the Rural Development Society, one of the main CBOs, reached an agreement to allow a member of the Society to accompany into detention individuals arrested by the security forces. The Society also takes responsibility for site visitors, reducing the number of search and cordon operations by the security forces. Our research in Sri Lanka focused on Tamil populations, but Korf (2003) found that it was easier for Muslims or Sinhalese to establish links with military actors to enable them to continue economic activities or gain a new source of income. In the Sinhala settlements studied by Korf in the east, home guard employment was a significant new source of income, and as a consequence the Sinhala were better off financially than they had been before the conflict. Muslim traders were able to form alliances with the military, allowing them to pass through checkpoints and reach markets.

3.3.3 Minimising exposure to threats and spreading risk

In Darfur and Sri Lanka, people minimised their exposure to threats by travelling in groups to markets or fields. Similar strategies have been noted in Uganda and the DRC (Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006; Thoulouzan, Rana et al., 2006; Haver, 2009). In Sri Lanka, group travel was also a way of ensuring that, if one member was arrested, the others in the party could inform their family. It is also common to ensure that the group contains a Sinhala speaker (Sri Lankan soldiers speak only Sinhala). A similar strategy was used in the West Bank, where Bedouin herders travelled in groups near Israeli settlements. In Darfur, women commonly travel to markets rather than

Box 6: Examples of protection payments in Eastern West Darfur, Sudan

In Trej and Orokum, 'protection' was organised by many of the same Arab individuals who had previously been part of peace and reconciliation committees. Armed with weapons from the government, two men took up residence at the village police station. Later, every household paid 2SDG a month, along with some sorghum. Each day, ten households would be told to feed the militia for breakfast, with another ten households providing lunch and dinner.

In Abata in 2004, Janjaweed militia manning checkpoints received a one-off protection payment comprising ten sacks each of sorghum and millet. Later payments (ten sacks of millet) were made to protect farms and to prevent crops from being destroyed. Large payments stopped in 2005, but people with irrigation pumps on their farms still pay 3SDG a month. Other payments continue to be made by people with farms in isolated areas. Villagers in Kalgo (close to Abata) said that they had to hand over 30 bags of sorghum and 15SDG a year.

Box 7: Family splitting as a coping strategy in Darfur

A large family from Siday (Wadi Saleh) fled the village in 2003 when it was attacked. Twenty-five family members went to Dileig. Some stayed Dileig, where four people were later registered for food distribution. Others moved to Waro, where they obtained some farmland and two ration cards. The father has also received training in carpentry from DRC, through which he receives an income. Carpentry is a more secure trade than farming, as crops are often destroyed by livestock. The father returns to Dileig for food distributions. In 2004, the remaining ten family members moved to Zalingei, and took up residence in Khamsa Digaig camp.

In another example of splitting, a family of 16 (including seven children) moved from Kulo to Dileig in 2003. The head of the family sent five of the seven children and their grandfather to Kalma, for free education. In 2004, six family members moved to Waro because of insecurity in Dileig. Those family members that remain in Waro engage in farming, and send some produce to their relatives in Dileig and Kalma. Five family members also have ration cards.

Several large families from SLA-held villages near Golo, Guildu and Thur in Jebel Marra have also split up, with some staying to farm, others moving to Guildu to stay with relatives and others moving to Zalingei. Family members in Zalingei occasionally travel back to Golo and Guildu to visit relatives, and may take some flour and okra with them if they have earned enough money from the sale of firewood.

men, on the basis that the risk of sexual violence against women was a lesser evil than the risk of death for men. In the West Bank, women tended to face less severe violence than men, and were therefore more likely to engage in livelihood strategies that called for mobility.

In both Darfur and Sri Lanka, family splitting has become a major way of coping with limited livelihood options and protection risks. Families spread themselves over a number of different locations, with some members farming in their home area or renting land elsewhere, and others moving to camps and towns to look for work. Male family members left because of the higher risks they faced, or to avoid conscription. Other studies have shown the increasing transnational characteristics of livelihoods in situations of conflict, whereby IDP or refugee families have relatives in neighbouring countries, Europe and the US (Horst, 2006; Young, Jacobson et al., 2009).

3.3.4 Managing expenditure and investment

Reducing food intake and expenditure were common ways of maintaining livelihood assets. People reported changes in diet, buying cheaper items and reducing the number of meals eaten, and cutting expenditure on entertainment and cultural activities. As we have seen, farmers in the West Bank affected by the Barrier switched to low-maintenance crops

like grapes and olives, rather than vegetables and peaches, for which they need more frequent and regular access to their land. Similar findings have been reported in the DRC, where households made only minimal investments in household equipment, agricultural inputs and home construction (Vlassenroot, Ntububa et al., 2007). In Sri Lanka, households often converted assets into moveable items such as jewels, in preference to items that cannot be hidden or taken with them when migrating (Korf, 2003).

People frequently prioritised education, despite the cost. In Um El Kher south of Hebron, for instance, almost all Bedouin children go to school. Parents realise that agriculture and herding will become increasingly difficult, and that without an education it will be much harder for their children to find work.

3.3.5 Risk-taking

Many conflict-affected people deliberately take risks in their search for livelihoods, for instance by collecting firewood or fishing in unsafe areas or providing sex in exchange for jobs, education or relief aid. In Chechnya, rural communities in insecure areas continued to collect berries and wild garlic despite the risk from unexploded ordnance. In Hebron, people reported breaking curfews to get work, and trading in goods from Jordan that have not been declared at customs. Many Palestinians also cross the border into Israel to work illegally, risking physical violence, detention or fines. Once in Israel, their illegal status makes them vulnerable to mistreatment and exploitation by their employers and the authorities (B'Tselem, 2007). Likewise in Thailand, Burmese refugees working illegally face mistreatment by their employers, as well as arrest and detention (Chandra, 2006). Women and certain ethnic groups in Darfur faced discrimination when trying to secure work outside camps and often received lower wages for casual work and farm labour (UNOIOS, 2002).

3.3.6 Resistance or confronting the threat

Resistance and confrontation were common responses to threats. In the OPT, resistance often consisted simply in

refusing to be displaced or continuing to farm, despite extreme hardship, ongoing attacks and rising debts. It also meant taking risks to farm land illegally, for example outside of official opening times of the Barrier or during curfew hours in the Jordan Valley. For families in the H2 area of Hebron resistance is both passive, expressed in terms of a refusal to move, as well as active, involving violent confrontations with Israeli settlers. Other examples of active resistance include rebuilding demolished homes, marches, demonstrations and media campaigns. In camps, resistance can include meetings with the Israeli authorities to protest at security incidents, and stone-throwing by young Palestinians. Examples of confrontation strategies elsewhere include the formation of self-defence groups, carrying arms when travelling to fields and joining the military, militia forces or armed groups (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson, 2001; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006).

To conclude, the range of strategies that people use and the risks they face depend on the choices they have. The lowest risks are often associated with situations where people have some degree of choice. This may include the choice to flee to a safer place or to remain behind to pursue livelihoods, the ability to call on social networks or make political alliances, send relatives to safer places or change expenditure or food intake without life-threatening consequences. As choice decreases, risks to safety or livelihoods become severe. The highest risks are associated with situations where people have no choice but to undertake dangerous strategies for economic survival or to leave their homes through force or as a last resort because even economic survival is no longer possible. Table 1 (page 14) summarises these strategies and provides a framework for analysing their impact on livelihoods and protection risks. The table also shows that people have to carefully balance risks to protection and livelihoods, as strategies that minimise risks to safety often have negative consequences for livelihoods and vice-versa. Strategies that may minimise risks in the short term could potentially involve longer-term risks to livelihoods, for example loss of land.

Table 1: Protection and livelihoods strategies in conflict

Type of strategy	Examples	Impact on protection risks and livelihoods
Avoiding threat <i>Displacement in advance of threat</i>	Flight after receiving advance warning Changing patterns of movement (e.g. moving at different times of day) Temporary displacement (e.g. fleeing to the bush at night)	Benefits include retaining some assets and reaching safety Potential long-term risks to livelihoods due to loss of land and property
Reducing exposure		
<i>Spreading exposure to threats or spreading risk</i>	Travelling in groups to carry out livelihood strategies (farming, firewood collection, accessing markets) Shifting livelihood strategies to household members at lowest risk (e.g. elderly and women travelling to markets) Splitting of families between area of origin, camps, other towns or countries. Sending children to safe places	Maintenance of some livelihoods and assets Maximise limited livelihoods options or create new options Reduce physical danger
<i>Managing expenditure or investment</i>	Reducing quantity and quality of food intake Changing crops to ones that need less care Reduce land cultivated and investment in agriculture	Minimise exposure to physical danger Reduce livelihoods strategies or income
<i>Alliances with power-holders</i>	Payment of protection money to 'opposing' groups Establishing links with armed actors or those in power	Reduce exposure to physical danger Short-term risks to livelihoods (increased expenditure), but potential for maintaining livelihoods assets in longer term
Confronting the threat <i>Resistance</i>	Refusal to move despite going into debt and suffering attack Stone-throwing, self-defence groups, increasing number of armed people in the community	Maintain livelihoods assets – land and property (but at a cost) High threat of physical danger
Exposure to threat		
<i>Risk-taking</i>	Farming, collecting firewood or wild foods in unsafe areas Working illegally and risking arrest or detention Mistreatment and exploitation by employers (including sexual exploitation) Survival sex	Economic survival but high exposure to physical danger or exploitation and loss of dignity
<i>Forced displacement</i>	Displacement due to attack, destruction and looting of assets Displacement due to deliberate restriction of livelihood strategies	Loss of livelihoods High level of physical danger, risk of death

Severity of risk

Degree of choice

Chapter 4

Protection and livelihoods analysis, assessment and targeting

4.1 Introduction

The inter-relationship between protection and livelihoods provides a strong incentive for greater complementarity between these two approaches. Adopting a complementary protection and livelihoods analysis could provide a more comprehensive understanding of vulnerability and the opportunities open to people to minimise the risks they face. Combining livelihoods and protection approaches addresses both the causes and consequences of vulnerability more effectively than either approach is able to do alone. It also expands the range and scope of available interventions. Advocacy and dialogue on protection threats can help prevent the occurrence or recurrence of abuse, whilst livelihoods assistance and other interventions can help address exposure to some threats by increasing choice and reducing people's need to engage in risky livelihood strategies. Assistance also addresses the consequences of that exposure by directly addressing food insecurity, malnutrition or medical needs. Protection assistance can in turn have a positive impact on livelihoods by improving freedom of movement or access to land, markets and employment. Protection activities can help reduce barriers or obstacles at a policy level, both in relation to the direct threats that populations face, and in relation to more specific risks to livelihoods. Finally, combining protection and livelihoods approaches can help reduce the risk that interventions will exacerbate unequal power relations or further endanger communities.

4.2 Analytical and conceptual frameworks

A good protection analysis focuses on the cause and intent of a violation, as well as the humanitarian consequences, to develop a strategy that reduces violations and minimises the consequences for affected populations. This includes an assessment of the type and pattern of abuse, who is responsible and their motivations, as well as an analysis of who is most vulnerable. The latter is often done by disaggregating the population into different 'risk' groups, for example according to age, gender, ethnic group, social status and religion. Assessing people's own responses, identifying legal standards and analysing the level of political commitment to protection are other key factors. A protection analysis is therefore multi-dimensional, as it focuses on a number of different levels: the structural environment (legislation), behaviour and motivation (actions of warring or abusive parties) and community impact and response. In practice, the consequences of abuse have not featured as strongly in the protection analysis of humanitarian agencies. However, this is changing as the range of agencies

involved in protection increases. The analysis of self-protection strategies is likewise a relatively recent area of interest for protection specialists. UNHCR's participatory assessment tool, for example, includes exploration of the strategies employed by affected populations (UNHCR, 2006).

A livelihoods analysis usually starts by identifying different livelihood groups (groups with similar food and income sources) and how livelihood strategies have changed as a result of crisis. Livelihoods frameworks adapted for complex emergencies have provided a useful basis for comprehensive livelihoods analysis in conflict, including not only an analysis of changes in livelihoods strategies and assets, but also policies, institutions and processes (Collinson, 2003; Young, Osman et al., 2005; Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Stites, Mazurana et al., 2006; Young, Osman et al., 2007). A comprehensive livelihoods analysis should therefore provide information on how different livelihood groups are affected, which group is most affected or vulnerable, the policies, institutions and processes that contribute to this vulnerability and how institutions themselves have been affected by conflict. This should lead to the identification of appropriate responses at local, national and international level, in the form of programming and policy-level work. In reality, what is included in a livelihoods analysis depends on its purpose. Operational agencies rarely cover all elements of the livelihoods framework, but tend to focus on food security or household economy, and as a consequence response options usually consist of the provision of inputs rather than recommendations to influence policies or institutions. In addition, livelihoods strategies may be analysed in terms of risk to livelihoods, but rarely in terms of risks to personal safety.

There are similarities and differences between a livelihoods and protection analysis. The causes of vulnerability relate both to protection threats and to policies, institutions and processes, such as violence, oppression, punishment and unequal power relations between groups. There are also similarities between the analysis of 'institutions' (which include state and non-state actors) and of the legislative environment. Section 3.2 shows that a key cause of vulnerability is the degree of accountability and effectiveness of institutions such as the judiciary, police and local administration. Weak, corrupt or unrepresentative institutions will be most likely to exclude or marginalise certain populations. These elements are generally part of a protection analysis of the legislative environment and customary practice governing a particular context. This includes the capacity of different institutions and the level of respect for laws and policies amongst warring parties and

state actors. This could equally form part of a livelihoods analysis in situations of conflict. Narbeth and McLean (2003) also highlight similarities, and recommend a joint analysis which looks at the structural causes of exploitative relations. Examining changing power relations is a crucial part of both a livelihoods and a protection analysis.

Although both livelihoods and protection analyses consider threats, vulnerabilities and community responses, and examine them at community, household (or micro) and national or international level (or macro) level, their starting point is often different. A livelihoods analysis usually begins with an analysis of the impact of conflict on different livelihoods groups, in terms of changes in their strategies and assets, and then may examine specific policies, processes and institutions. A protection analysis usually begins with an analysis of particular human rights or IHL violations, and then may examine the impact on populations. A protection analysis goes further than a livelihoods analysis by looking into the question of who is responsible for violations.

Protection and livelihoods analysis also consider vulnerability in different ways. A livelihoods analysis usually analyses threats and vulnerabilities in relation to livelihood groups, rather than at the individual level. A protection analysis will generally break down the population into different forms of social distinction, such as IDP or refugee, religious group, ethnic group or age or gender groups. There are many examples where a livelihoods analysis is also done by wealth group, but few where analysis is also done by political, social or ethnic group, or by the particular risks that these groups face. An exception is a Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) assessment in the West Bank, which analysed the food security of farmers whose land has been confiscated, sheep herders whose movements have been restricted due to the Barrier and families confronted by settler violence (FAO, 2007).

Whilst in some aspects livelihoods and protection analysis are different, therefore, they are also clearly complementary. Greater incorporation of livelihoods issues or humanitarian consequences in protection assessments would help reinforce advocacy towards the responsible authorities by highlighting humanitarian impact. It would also mitigate the humanitarian consequences of violations and reduce the likelihood that people affected by them will place themselves in further danger by adopting risky strategies. Integrating protection issues into livelihoods assessments would allow the development of a livelihoods strategy which addresses the causes and not just the consequences of vulnerability. An analysis of the wider conflict environment is also necessary because livelihoods inputs such as income or agricultural support can only have limited impact in the face of restrictions on access to land, markets and freedom of movement. Furthermore, an analysis of power relations between groups is necessary to ensure that assistance is not manipulated and that it does not exacerbate existing power imbalances.

4.3 Assessments

Livelihoods and protection assessments tend to be undertaken separately, thus potentially causing duplication and missing opportunities for greater collaboration. In interviews, many agencies indicated that it is often impossible to conduct an in-depth assessment with equal emphasis on livelihoods and protection. Livelihoods and protection analyses are time-consuming when done separately, and it may not be possible to cover everything in one assessment. In our research, we identified key protection threats that were also risks to livelihoods for each of the case studies, based on a literature review and initial interviews, and then focused on the impact of these threats on different livelihoods and risk groups, and community responses. The initial study in Darfur combined dedicated livelihoods and protection expertise.

There are few examples where agencies attempt to give equal emphasis to livelihoods and protection in the same assessments. Even where agencies have both protection and livelihoods expertise, they undertake their assessments separately. UNHCR's participatory assessment methodology represents an attempt to examine physical risks (or risks to safety) as well as social and economic risks (all are considered protection risks) (UNHCR, 2006). These assessments examine the risks, identify their causes and pinpoint capacities within refugee communities and their proposed solutions. As such, they have many elements of a 'joined-up' livelihoods and protection analysis. In practice, however, UNHCR often has difficulty finding multi-functional teams.

In this research, it was more common to find livelihoods issues raised in protection assessments, rather than vice-versa. For example, Oxfam protection assessments in Darfur and Chad found that certain groups were being excluded from food distributions, and identified protection risks associated with particular livelihoods strategies (Oxfam, internal documents, 2007). Similar issues were raised in WFP protection assessments, in relation to registration, the manipulation of assistance, the exclusion of marginalised groups from distributions and targeting (Martin, Lonnerfors et al., 2004; Mahoney, Laughton et al., 2005; Eguren, Bizzarri et al., 2006; Thoulouzan, Rana et al., 2006). It is much less common for livelihoods assessments to identify protection problems, although if access to markets, land or employment are part of the assessment freedom of movement may be a factor. Some assessments have also highlighted issues of forced repatriation, for example ACF's assessment of Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia (ACF, 2004). In Sri Lanka, livelihoods and protection specialists produced very different analyses of the situation in Vavuniya in October 2008. Protection analysis focused on increasing political violence and the risk of a renewed humanitarian crisis; from a livelihoods perspective, the priority was to develop interventions that would lead to sustainable livelihoods for resettled or returnee populations. This emphasises once again the importance of joint analysis

(between or within agencies), even if assessments are done separately.

There are other advantages to linking livelihoods and protection analysis. Questioning communities about the abusive strategies of warring parties or other armed actors can place them and humanitarian agencies at risk. A livelihoods analysis has been recommended as a comparatively safe way of investigating sensitive political and economic relationships in insecure environments, as these are examined indirectly by exploring how people live (Collinson, 2003). In workshops in Darfur, for instance, the livelihoods framework was used as a neutral forum for discussion between stakeholders with diverging aims and views (Young, Osman et al., 2007b).

4.4 Targeting

Providing assistance solely according to need, without discrimination, is a key humanitarian principle. In programming terms, this is often translated into targeting the most vulnerable or those most in need, in particular those most vulnerable to malnutrition, mortality and food insecurity, as well as protection threats. However, targeting can be difficult if different people face different risks: if, say, one group faces food insecurity but not protection threats, while another faces protection threats but not food insecurity.

Who is targeted, and with what type of response, will depend on the objective of the response. This in turn will depend on the findings of a livelihoods and protection analysis (as well as the expertise and capacity of the implementing agency). Targeting of both livelihoods and protection interventions to the same population groups was most common when rural populations had the same livelihoods and faced the same protection threats. For example, in Darfur DRC provided assistance in rural areas to reduce the risk of displacement into camps and to assist people in retaining access to land. ICRC also prioritised rural communities most affected by protection issues. In the West Bank, the target group was farmers affected by the Barrier, in order to prevent displacement. Similarly, Save the Children UK targets communities in the Jordan Valley (West Bank) and northern Gaza as these populations are most at risk of forced displacement due to home demolitions and limited livelihoods options.

Camp populations are often targeted for humanitarian response. Like the rural populations described above, people living in camps may face similar protection threats (such as incursions by the military or militia, limited freedom of movement, and risks to physical safety associated with carrying out livelihoods strategies outside of the camp). They may also have restricted livelihoods options. In Sri Lanka, DRC targeted IDPs, resettled and relocated populations as groups not only suffering ongoing political violence (this affects all Tamils), but also vulnerable due to loss of assets, limited access to land and restrictions on movement. A focus on

IDPs in Darfur has led to perceptions that the humanitarian community was not impartial in its response.

Impartiality also means not discriminating on the basis of race, nationality, religious beliefs, political opinion or class. In practice, this means assessing and engaging with all groups affected by conflict. For example, whilst Arab nomadic groups in Darfur may not have the same acute food and protection needs, they may have other acute needs (e.g. health), and the lack of engagement with this group and how they have been affected by the crisis has jeopardised both protection and the provision of assistance to sedentary farmers in the short term, and the viability of pastoral livelihoods over the longer term. DRC in Darfur took an area-based approach to providing assistance to all groups, including Arabs settled in damras and the Fur villages nearby, although the type of assistance provided to each group was not necessarily the same.

It is more difficult to target both protection and livelihoods interventions to households who suffer similar protection threats but have different livelihoods. For example in Sri Lanka, women whose husbands have been detained or abducted do not necessarily have the same livelihoods or the same humanitarian needs. DRC in Sri Lanka provides assistance to families affected by abduction through its Individual Protection Assistance programme, which often consists of grants for income generation. In Chechnya, assistance for the families of people abducted or killed (the so-called 'disappeared') consists of both livelihoods interventions and psychosocial support, whilst families are provided with travel assistance to visit detained relatives. Those targeted with political violence, abduction or torture may be the elite rather than the vulnerable in society, and need protection but not necessarily livelihood support. Examples include traders and businessmen in Sri Lanka and the better educated in Chechnya.

The examples given above all relate to ways in which targeting assistance to areas or population groups facing protection threats can either reduce this threat or address its consequences. Targeting itself can, however, also create protection risks if not carefully planned. For example, it could be argued that assisting people in the OPT to retain access to land in fact means their continued exposure to violence. In interviews, agencies said that decisions were made on the basis of consultations with affected communities, who were determined to stay on their land regardless of agency interventions. This may not be the same for all communities, however. In Darfur in 2004, coerced populations in Kailek asked to be taken to safety rather than being provided with assistance (United Nations, 2004). The important factor here is that communities need to be able to make an informed choice.

Targeting areas or populations that face the greatest protection risks is also difficult from a programmatic perspective.

For example, targeting people in Area C in the West Bank with livelihood support poses challenges due to Israeli restrictions on building and development. Some work is possible, however. For example, CHF obtained permission to undertake livelihoods projects north of Abu Dis in Area C and Oxfam secured funding from ECHO to undertake shelter projects. FAO projects with Bedouin aim to provide livestock inputs and services, but also animal shelters despite permit restrictions. Although the IDF has issued orders to demolish some of the shelters, FAO has found a way to move the shelters outside of area C, whilst still making them accessible.

Other protection risks associated with targeting result from targeting only certain households or communities within a larger population group affected by conflict. In Uganda, WFP allocated food aid in Karamoja to different zones on the basis of severity of food insecurity. However, this attracted large numbers of non-targeted villagers during distributions, as well as raiding and food riots. An assessment by a team consisting of both protection and programme staff recommended the abolition of targeting (Pattugalan, Michels et al., 2008). The difficulties of targeting specific communities or households in complex emergencies have been well documented (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008).

Chapter 5 Protection and livelihoods programming

5.1 Introduction

Humanitarian organisations, for reasons related to mandate, expertise or programmatic expediency, generally distinguish between protection and livelihoods and undertake these activities separately, despite the connections between them. This chapter demonstrates the synergies between protection and livelihoods activities. It starts with a background description of protection and livelihoods activities in situations of conflict. This is followed by a review of the different ways in which livelihoods and protection programmes have been linked in practice, and the potential for doing more. The discussion starts with programming which has both protection and livelihoods objectives, following on from the last section in chapter 4 on targeting. A discussion follows of protection interventions which can also have livelihoods outcomes, and vice-versa.

5.2 Protection and livelihoods activities


5.2.1 Protection activities

The determinants of civilian protection in conflict centre on two interconnected elements: the actions of the authorities and warring parties in abiding by their responsibilities to safeguard civilians, and the steps that people themselves take to assure their safety and dignity. Protection activities by humanitarians (and other external protection actors, whether

military, political or legal) are defined in relation to these elements. Protection can involve a range of different activities or ‘modes of action’, such as engagement with states or other armed actors to prevent or put a stop to violations or abuse, or interventions and assistance that reduce the exposure of at-risk populations to threats or limit the effect of exposure (Giossi Caverzasio, 2001). As outlined in Figure 1, protection can involve various forms of advocacy, capacity-building support or assistance (often called substitution) activities.

Advocacy is aimed at persuading or pressurising authorities or warring parties to abide by their responsibilities to protect; for instance, a large amount of advocacy is undertaken in the OPT to encourage Israel, as an occupying power, to abide by its responsibilities towards Palestinians. There are three different types of advocacy. *Persuasion* involves confidential dialogue with the authorities; ICRC, for example, undertakes confidential dialogue or persuasion with warring parties to encourage them to use restraint in the conduct of war in order to protect civilians. However, other agencies may also highlight these issues directly with the authorities; one example is the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), which monitors IDF incursions into refugee camps in the West Bank. *Mobilisation* seeks to use the influence of other parties – including states, NGOs and international organisations – to encourage action. OCHA and other agencies often adopt mobilisation techniques, for instance by advocating

Figure 1: Protection activities or modes of action



Source: ICRC (2008).

within the UN Security Council to take action in relation to a specific conflict. Mobilisation can also occur at a national or local level. An excellent example of successful mobilisation is in relation to advocacy in Darfur to remove legislative obstacles to assistance for rape survivors. Finally, *denunciation* involves publicly highlighting violations or abuse in an effort to shame those responsible into taking protective action. In Chechnya, local human rights organisation Memorial was very active in documenting and publicising human rights abuses by the Chechen and Russian authorities.

Capacity-building support involves technical or material assistance to the authorities or warring parties, to help them to fulfil their responsibilities to protect civilians, or to communities, to reduce their exposure to risk. In terms of the former, OHCHR, UNHCR and OCHA often provide support to governments to ensure that the rights of refugees and IDPs are recognised. Examples of initiatives aimed at reducing civilian exposure to risk include providing displaced communities with information so that they can make free and informed decisions on whether and when to return home. In the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, a number of organisations ran information programmes on the return process and the situation in places of origin to ensure that Southern Sudanese were able to return home in a safe, dignified and voluntary manner.

When agencies provide assistance or services in the place of authorities who are unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibilities to protect, these activities are termed substitution. Substitution can include physical protection, for instance evacuating people at risk to safer areas, tracing missing persons and providing services (e.g. legal, medical or psychosocial assistance) to populations suffering the effects of violence. Whereas some organisations might describe some substitution activities purely as humanitarian assistance, especially where they involve direct services such as medical support to survivors of sexual violence, which can be viewed purely as a medical programme, others describe them as protection activities, as they are in response to rights violations.

The increased engagement of humanitarian agencies in protection has shaped its development. Much of the expansion has occurred amongst actors that lack the mandate (and sometimes also the relationships and influence) to engage directly with the states or warring parties which bear the primary duty to protect civilians. Many instead have strong links at the community level, and international links and influence. As a result, many of the most significant developments in protection have either been at a macro-level, in international advocacy in an effort to put indirect pressure on states, or at a local level, to reduce the exposure of populations to risk (e.g. community protection initiatives) or mitigating the consequences of exposure (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007).

5.2.2 Livelihoods activities

Livelihood interventions are not well-defined, particularly in situations of conflict. Broadly speaking, livelihood interventions can be divided into those that support the assets people need to carry out their livelihood strategies, and interventions that support policies, institutions and processes (Lautze and Stites, 2003; Young, Osman et al., 2007). The objectives of livelihoods programming in emergencies range from assisting in meeting basic needs (or livelihood provisioning) to livelihood protection (protecting assets) and livelihood recovery and promotion (improving strategies and assets, strengthening institutions and influencing policy) (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2009).

Interventions that meet basic needs include food aid and the provision of essential non-food items such as shelter, blankets and jerry cans. Cash transfers are an increasingly common response in situations of conflict, as well as natural disasters (Harvey, 2007). Both food aid and cash transfers can also have livelihood protection objectives. For example, in Darfur WFP increased rations in 2005 explicitly to allow IDPs to sell food aid, thereby generating income and lowering food prices in local markets. The intervention also had a major role in keeping grain markets functioning (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Buchanan-Smith and Abdullah Fadul, 2008). In the OPT, WFP provided food for work to farmers affected by the Barrier in part to help them retain access to their land. Cash transfers (grants, cash for work) were an important component of UNRWA’s assistance programme for refugees and DRC’s assistance to conflict-affected people in Chechnya. Cash grants have been more common in livelihood recovery, when the situation is considered more stable, for example for returnees in Sri Lanka. In conflict situations vouchers are used more frequently than cash because they are considered less susceptible to theft or diversion; seed vouchers and vouchers for milling have been used in Darfur, for instance.

The provision of seeds and tools is probably the most common emergency livelihood protection programme, alongside agricultural and livestock services. Support for home gardens (or kitchen gardens), in particular for returnees and resettled people, were components of livelihoods programmes in Sri Lanka and Chechnya. In Darfur and the OPT, assistance for rural farming populations focused on improving agricultural techniques as well as the provision of inputs. Support for human assets may include training people in new skills or providing information on rights and entitlements to increase their knowledge.

Emergency livelihood interventions to enhance or influence policies or strengthen institutions are not common in situations of conflict, although support for markets is attracting more interest. A number of agencies in the OPT, for example, help olive farmers access international markets. In Sri Lanka, Oxfam assisted returnee farming families by facilitating links with potential purchasers. Strengthening institutions can also

include social mobilisation and capacity-building, for example to enhance basic services by working with line ministries and community-based organisations. Influencing policies is a key part of a livelihoods strategy, and could include advocacy on border closures (easing border restrictions can allow remittance flows) and policies on taxation, land rights and compensation for lost assets (Lautze and Stites, 2003; Jaspars and Maxwell, 2009). In the OPT, advocacy included local-level negotiation to open up access to markets and efforts to promote Palestinian goods on international markets.

As a conflict progresses, developmental or recovery approaches that aim for self-reliance become more common, in particular following a ceasefire or peace agreement, despite the fact that, in many cases, these agreements simply change the nature of a conflict, rather than bringing it to a close. In Darfur, for example, the main stimulus for an increased focus on livelihood support came with the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) following the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006. Recommended interventions for livelihood recovery included the provision of micro-credit to returning farmers, training in improved agricultural techniques, animal health services, vocational training, support for customary systems addressing land disputes and compensation for lost assets. In Darfur, these interventions are part of the new 'early recovery' paradigm, where livelihood support is expected to contribute to recovery. In Sri Lanka, micro-finance projects were established following the ceasefire, but these had to be abandoned when people were again displaced or were unable to repay their loans.

Developmental livelihoods approaches to achieve self-reliance are problematic in protracted conflict situations, as interventions are often targeted at those who are economically viable rather than the destitute or those most in need. During protracted conflict, with ongoing risks to physical safety and freedom of movement, self-reliance or sustainable livelihoods are unlikely to be achieved. In such contexts, livelihood support is about seeking alternative ways to meet basic needs, increase choice and provide people with as many options as possible to keep safe. As the originators of the sustainable livelihoods concept noted nearly 20 years ago, 'security is a basic dimension of livelihood sustainability' (Chambers and Conway, 1991).

5.3 Complementary protection and livelihoods strategy and programming

This section discusses the different ways in which protection and livelihoods can be linked. As will become clear, some of these interventions are interchangeable, highlighting once again the similarities and complementarities between the two approaches.

5.3.1 Joint livelihoods and protection strategies

As indicated above, joint livelihoods and protection responses are more feasible where rural populations face the same

protection threats and have the same livelihoods. Unsurprisingly, the research indicated that it was difficult to establish joint protection and livelihoods programmes in the absence of a clear strategy for doing so. Where a strategy was in place, the starting point was usually protection, in an effort to reduce threats and the consequences of exposure to threats. While specific objectives will depend on the nature and severity of the threat and the livelihoods of affected people, the most common examples from our work include preventing forced displacement and land confiscation. ICRC in Darfur had one of the most developed operational frameworks for linking livelihoods and protection, driven by protection concerns:

1. Identify the protection concerns (for ICRC this involves an analysis of violations of IHL).
2. Analyse which communities are affected and prioritise those most affected by protection issues.
3. Identify the humanitarian consequences of violations.
4. Identify who is responsible.
5. Identify a potential protection vector – i.e. a humanitarian response which could mitigate the humanitarian consequences of violations, while at the same time creating the foundations for protection dialogue.
6. Identify which perpetrators/actors can be approached in order to create a dialogue on protection issues.

Preventing displacement and helping people to retain access to land was also a key objective of joint protection and livelihood strategies in OPT. The ICRC adopted an integrated programme in the West Bank in 2006, focusing on farmers affected by the Barrier. The protection department raises issues relating to the overall occupation as well as specific violations of IHL with the responsible parties, and the economic security team implements programmes that address the consequences of these violations. The two are linked in that the protection department recommends changes in policies and practices that are having negative humanitarian consequences, based on analysis gleaned from assistance work. In Gaza, ICRC undertook an economic survey in 2008 to highlight the impact of the closure regime at community level, whilst large-scale relief and livelihoods activities were undertaken to address the consequences of the closure.

There were very few examples of integrated livelihoods and protection strategies for camp populations, perhaps in part because livelihood support in camps entails finding new and viable livelihood opportunities, usually based on income generating activities, which are generally in very short supply. In the West Bank, UNRWA has an integrated strategy for damage and demolitions resulting from military incursions in camps, involving intervening with the IDF on protection issues affecting refugees through the Operations Support Office, as well as direct responses in the form of cash and in-kind assistance and psychosocial counselling. In Sri Lanka, UNHCR's protection strategy for returnees and resettled populations included both protection and livelihoods activities. In 2008,

UNHCR developed a relocation policy for the east, which includes identifying livelihood gaps and appropriate interventions (UNHCR, 2008).

5.3.2 Joint protection and livelihoods programming

Joint protection and livelihoods programmes can have the following objectives:

- Preventing the occurrence or recurrence of violations or abuse that impact on people's livelihoods.
- Reducing people's exposure to violations that threaten their livelihoods.
- Reducing the need to engage in strategies that entail risks to protection.
- Limiting the consequences of exposure to violations for civilians.

The ICRC distinguishes between 'authority-centric' and 'victim-centric' activities. Authority-centric activities aim to make the authorities aware of, or help them fulfil, their responsibilities; victim-centric activities help lessen the vulnerability of people at risk (ICRC, 2008).

Although there have been successful joint programmes elsewhere, the research in OPT identified a greater level of joint programming, for a number of reasons. First, threats to protection and livelihoods are widely regarded as fundamental features of the conflict (see, for instance, ICRC, 2007). Second, the conflict in OPT is more protracted than anywhere else in the world, and as a consequence agencies have the experience, time and interest to adopt more innovative approaches. Finally, a large number of international and national organisations with long-standing protection and livelihoods expertise are working in OPT, which provides an opportunity for collaborative approaches. Some examples of joint programming, mainly in the OPT but also elsewhere, are given below, and summarised in Table 2.

Advocacy, monitoring and livelihoods support to help farmers affected by the Barrier to maintain access to their land and livelihoods

A number of different agencies are working on the problem of land confiscation and access in the OPT. ICRC is one example. Beneficiaries are selected on the basis that they have lost consistent access to their land, are in economic need and are willing to engage in the project. Livelihoods interventions include cash for work to support olive and vegetable farmers at planting and harvesting times, the provision of basic inputs such as seeds and tools, water projects, such as renovating water systems, support to cooperatives and training in improved production practices. ICRC also supports farmers' applications to the Palestinian authorities, which then coordinate with Israeli counterparts to allow access to land. Permits are often issued only for the duration of the project (e.g. three months), although there are increasing efforts to expand this as much agricultural

work requires year-round rather than periodic access. When there are problems farmers contact the ICRC, which in turn asks the Israeli authorities to open Barrier gates. The ICRC uses information from these projects to highlight to the Israeli authorities the humanitarian implications of IHL violations, for instance by publishing extensive analysis of the economic consequences for farmers who have lost free access to olive trees.

Other agencies also seek to address land problems. OCHA and UNRWA liaise with the Israeli authorities to ensure adherence to approved opening times for farmers and communities, and then monitor the gates at these times. To facilitate greater access, UNRWA has provided the Israeli authorities with agricultural calendars, showing how consistent land access is required for cultivation, as well as the specific times of the year when access is crucial. A number of agencies undertake livelihoods support to increase productivity and assist in marketing. In interviews, farmers reported that, while they appreciated help with relief and livelihoods assets, the most important support was assistance in ensuring that gates remained open (O'Callaghan et al., 2009).

Advocacy, legal assistance, monitoring, emergency relief and livelihoods support

Save the Children UK's strategy to reduce and respond to displacement in the West Bank includes a combination of advocacy, legal assistance, emergency relief and livelihood support, as well as establishing systems for the monitoring and documentation of forced displacement. Relief and livelihood support has included water, health and educational services and psychosocial care, as well as legal assistance to challenge demolitions, land confiscations and other displacement-related issues. Advocacy aims to encourage international actors to put pressure on the Israeli authorities to halt rights violations. 'Protection Committees' educate people on their rights and help them establish links with observers and other protection initiatives.

Educating IDPs on their rights and helping them to access these rights

Non-mandated actors have developed integrated protection and livelihoods approaches, including training and dissemination of information on rights and entitlements. In Mindanao in the Philippines, for instance, Oxfam has combined protection, public health and livelihoods support to conflict-affected populations. Oxfam's programme aimed to help people to make free and informed decisions about displacement, return and resettlement. Key components of the programme included a media information campaign on IDP rights, interaction and dialogue between displaced populations and local government officials and the provision of water and sanitation, agricultural and aquaculture rehabilitation and the creation of alternative livelihoods options for IDPs. The involvement of government units in designing the programme made it easier for Oxfam

Table 2: Examples of joint protection and livelihoods programmes

Objective	Activities	Strengths and weaknesses
Supporting farmers to retain access to land and livelihoods in OPT	Monitoring and documentation of violations, advocacy at national and local levels and livelihoods support, such as cash-for-work, seeds and tools inputs, water interventions and agricultural support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall policy on access to land and livelihoods remained unchanged, but change was possible for some individual farmers • Significant time investment required to monitor violations
Preventing and responding to demolitions and displacement in OPT	Monitoring and documentation of forced displacement; legal support; advocacy; livelihoods support activities such as water, health and educational services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possibility of different agencies undertaking different interventions through coordinated action • Preventative aspect of the work less developed and less successful than the emergency response • Complex programme involving many different agencies • Involvement of local organisations very beneficial as they are often willing to be more active on advocacy than international organisations
Educating IDPs in Central Mindanao on their rights and assisting them in obtaining these rights	Media campaign on IDP rights; supporting dialogue between displaced people and government; provision of livelihoods support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using government officials as trainers in the programme increased their commitment to IDP rights • Livelihoods support provided a less sensitive entry-point for protection activities

to influence government officials, and the provision of livelihoods inputs provided an entry-point for other less tangible protection work (Polotan-dela-Cruz, Ferrer et al., 2006). In Sri Lanka, DRC conducted training in IDP rights, as well as training of duty-bearers.

5.3.3 Programming which could be considered relevant either to protection or livelihoods

The programmes highlighted above are examples of cases involving a combination of protection and livelihoods activities. However, there are also many examples of activities which have an impact on both protection and livelihoods, or can be considered relevant both to livelihoods and protection.

Fuel-efficient stoves to support livelihoods and reduce sexual violence

Fuel-efficient stoves are the quintessential protection and livelihoods intervention. Fashioned from clay and water, they cut down on firewood usage by up to 40%, reducing the frequency with which women have to travel outside the relative safety of camps in search of fuel. They also decrease the income that needs to be spent on purchasing firewood, or increase the income that can be generated from firewood collection by reducing consumption. This therefore has simultaneous livelihoods and protection benefits. Fuel-efficient stoves have been widely used in Darfur, Kenya and

elsewhere (O'Callaghan and Pantuliano, 2007). Relatively easy to implement, they have been incorporated into both protection and livelihoods programming.

Advocacy on access to land and markets, and on return policies

Advocacy can be viewed as either a protection or livelihoods intervention when breaches of international law have implications for people's livelihoods. The two are more likely to come together at national level, for example on policies of return, compensation or land, and are usually the preserve of protection actors. At local level, there are examples of both livelihoods and protection actors liaising or negotiating with armed actors to allow access to land or markets.

Access to information programmes

Access to information programmes is a key component of both livelihoods and protection interventions. For example, providing information on food aid entitlements is an important element in participatory food distribution methods, and one of the main ways to ensure accountability and reduce the risk of diversion and exclusion of vulnerable groups. As such, it also has implications for people's protection. Access to information as a protection intervention may involve providing details on issues such as registration or conditions in places of return, both of which also have impacts on livelihoods.

Capacity-building

Both protection and livelihoods interventions can involve capacity-building. From a protection point of view, capacity-building entails supporting duty-bearers (usually the state or armed actors) to take on their responsibilities to protect their citizens. This may include training state officials on law, rights and entitlements, facilitating the development of legislation where it is found wanting or providing financial or material support. A livelihoods approach to capacity-building seeks to help communities become self-reliant by strengthening community-based organisations and government services such as agriculture and livestock health and bringing about wider policy change. A joint approach to capacity-building would involve helping governments act more responsibly towards their citizens, in order to improve their protection and livelihoods. As such, it should be distinguished from broader capacity-building, which is concerned with supporting and strengthening social structures and capacities more generally.

5.3.4 Protection interventions with livelihoods benefits

Protection objectives that can have positive impacts on livelihoods include preventing violations or abuse (or addressing the causes of protection and livelihoods threats), reducing people's exposure to risks and limiting the consequences of such exposure.

Preventing violations or abuse through advocacy

Advocacy to prevent abuse involves encouraging those responsible for threatening behaviour (the warring parties) or those responsible for protecting civilians (the state, or when states fail other actors) to fulfil their responsibilities to safeguard civilians. In many contexts, simply providing people with livelihoods support is insufficient as it does not tackle underlying issues, and may even put people at risk. Livelihoods specialists often view such advocacy as too politically sensitive, and in any case usually do not have the training to engage in it. The research showed that advocacy initiatives tend to be prioritised only when the programme also includes protection capacity.

There are countless examples of advocacy and dialogue on violations or protection issues that have, or can have, positive impacts on livelihoods. In the OPT, as we have seen, human rights organisations and aid agencies undertake a range of different public and private advocacy efforts on issues such as access to employment in Israel (B'Tselem, 2007), land and property rights in the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2002; OCHA, 2007) and fishing rights in Gaza (OCHA, 2007). Protection agencies advocate for the rights of refugees (e.g. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Burmese in Thailand), helping them access employment and services. A number of NGOs work with UNHCR to monitor and profile population groups, particularly IDPs, gathering information on protection issues and on issues relating to their basic needs, including food security and livelihoods. Although high-level policy change often requires a

Box 8: Examples of advocacy in Sri Lanka

For the Danish Refugee Council, advocacy on political violence is often too sensitive at a local level. Instead, issues such as inadequate assistance, children dropping out of school and land problems were addressed in meetings with government officials. When the subject was sensitive, for instance concerns over forced return, DRC worked through inter-agency fora. DRC's national-level policy and advocacy on the impact of conflict and on IDP protection also informed briefings to senior UN officials and donors. Protection specialists rather than staff involved in relief or livelihoods programmes led advocacy with WFP to increase food rations.

A study for WFP in Sri Lanka (Keen, 2009) found that fear amongst aid actors that advocacy on sensitive issues would lead to loss of access ultimately had adverse effects. Humanitarian space shrank and the ability to deliver relief was severely constrained by the government in particular. Furthermore, sending a signal that humanitarians will not speak out on issues in order to gain access to populations may imply that humanitarian action can be reduced to the mere provision of relief internationally as well as locally.

long-term commitment, it can have major implications for large numbers of people. Engaging on these issues may however be too sensitive for agencies without a specific mandate in this area. As such, some of the most successful examples of advocacy by NGOs have been at local level. Examples of advocacy work in Sri Lanka are given in Box 8.

Preventing violations or abuse through capacity-building

Supporting responsible actors through capacity-building is another way to address causes of violations. The main example that emerged from the research involved training government officials on their responsibilities towards civilians in conflict. This is a particular role of the ICRC in its capacity as guardian of IHL. Very little evaluative material is publicly available to show whether and when training activities are successful, and what the determinants of success might be. As training is designed to prevent abuses from happening, it is also extremely difficult to quantify impact. That said, research in the DRC indicates interest amongst communities and security and government officials in training on rights and responsibilities (Haver, 2009: 33). In Sri Lanka, communities and local officials found most useful training that had practical implications, for instance in relation to relief entitlements, agricultural issues or support in accessing documentation.

Capacity-building can also involve helping community groups to demand their rights. Experience in a number of contexts shows that more cohesive communities are better able to address protection threats. In Colombia, for example, some communities have managed to negotiate neutral spaces as 'peace villages' (Bonwick, 2006). While support to and training

for local community groups is important, research in Darfur shows that it can compound tensions in divided communities. This is discussed further below.

Protection assistance that reduces exposure to risks

Working at a community level can also reduce people's exposure to protection and livelihoods risks, for instance by offering legal help and assistance with documentation. Loss of documentation or changes in status are frequently associated with crisis or displacement. In many contexts, personal documentation is critical for movement and for access to employment, land, markets, services and aid entitlements. For this reason, protection agencies run programmes to assist populations in accessing personal documentation. In Sri Lanka, for instance, DRC organises mobile clinics to assist people in obtaining documents, and in Chechnya legal assistance is offered to people trying to navigate the complicated bureaucracy involved in obtaining documentation.

One of NRC's core activities is providing information and legal assistance to refugees and IDPs to help them understand and claim their rights. Such programmes usually involve issues relevant to people's livelihoods, including property and housing problems, or discrimination in labour or education. In the OPT a large number of Israeli, Palestinian and international organisations provide legal assistance. In one instance, changes to the route of the Barrier wall were ordered following petitions to the Israeli High Court, potentially restoring 2.5 million acres of land to its Palestinian owners (OCHA, 2007). Also in the OPT, the human rights agency B'Tselem runs an innovative and very effective programme to prevent attacks on people's land, involving the distribution of cameras for Palestinians to use to film attacks by Israelis. In 2008, pictures of an attack in the media resulted in the arrest of two settlers. Communities described the cameras as being as 'effective as a gun' in deterring attacks on their land. Other examples of interventions by NGOs include the provision of whistles and bells in the DRC, for people to raise the alarm in the event of attack, though the use of bells has also had the negative effect of attracting militia to affected communities (Haver, 2009).

Assistance to address the consequences of risks

A range of different activities also help to reduce the impact of threats on people, including assistance to survivors of sexual violence, psychosocial assistance or the provision of relief assistance to 'extremely vulnerable individuals' (EVIs). These programmes do not necessarily have explicit links to livelihoods, but such links can be developed in practice. Although these activities could be regarded simply as assistance, the fact that they target individuals or communities affected by protection threats means that they are often included in protection programmes.

It has become common practice for agencies involved in protection to provide individual assistance to EVIs, usually

based on predetermined criteria of vulnerability, such as orphans, female-headed households and the disabled. The research in Sri Lanka showed that, in most cases, individuals needed livelihoods assistance because they had lost a wage-earning family member (due to killing, detention or arrest). This usually comprised assistance for people to set up shops or other businesses. This was not always successful as some people did not have either the knowledge or the capacity to carry out such activities, and needed basic welfare assistance instead.

Psychosocial assistance as a protection activity can also be linked to livelihoods activities. In Chechnya, local CBOs and NGOs linked psychosocial activities for women with access to employment programmes, on the grounds that poverty and unemployment were increasing despondency. The organisation provides women with skills training and develops a recruitment service to help women prepare CVs and put them in contact with potential employers.

5.3.5 Livelihoods activities with protection benefits

There are a number of ways in which livelihoods activities can contribute towards protection objectives, or themselves have protection benefits. Objectives might include reducing exposure to threats or the need to engage in risky strategies, addressing the humanitarian consequences of exposure to threats, promoting access to markets and land and ensuring that livelihoods activities do not put conflict-affected people at additional risk.

The main way of reducing the need to engage in risky strategies is through targeting those population groups facing protection and livelihoods threats, such as forced displacement or loss of land. This has been covered above. In Darfur, for example, the expansion of food distribution from camps to rural areas was important in helping people to remain in their areas of origin. Livelihood support for farmers affected by the Barrier and by the Israeli closure regime in the Jordan Valley was often implemented with the same intention. These interventions also constitute a form of protection by presence. Some communities in rural areas reported feeling safer when international organisations were nearby. Livelihoods actors may also engage in advocacy. Livelihoods activities may also impact on protection by reducing the need to engage in strategies that entail risks to physical safety, and by addressing the humanitarian consequences. Livelihoods interventions can also have negative impacts on protection, in particular when there is a shift towards developmental approaches in a context of ongoing threats or exploitative and abusive power relations.

Livelihoods activities to reduce exposure to risks

Livelihoods interventions to meet basic requirements can have protection outcomes by reducing the need for conflict-affected people to engage in risky strategies. This can include the provision of food aid and other forms of relief. Providing or protecting assets, such as seeds, tools, livestock and cash,

can likewise reduce the need to travel to unsafe areas. Studies in Darfur showed that food aid reduced the need for people to carry out livelihood strategies which involved risks to personal security, such as firewood collection outside of camps, and also gave people greater bargaining power in negotiating wage rates or making arrangements to farm as share-croppers or renters of land (Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, 2006; Jaspars and O'Callaghan, 2008). Similarly, in the OPT in-kind and cash assistance helped reduce reliance on begging, distress migration, the gathering of wild foods in unsafe areas and illegal or exploitative work. In Hebron and the Jordan Valley, interviewees reported that assistance was a factor in helping them remain in these areas, thus reducing displacement. The Rural Centre for Sustainable Development (RCSD) is providing firewood to Bedouin to discourage them from venturing into restricted zones in search of fuel. Elsewhere, cash or food for work programmes provide a safe form of employment close to people's homes.

Agricultural support can have a similar protective impact by increasing production from the limited area of land that people can safely access. In Sri Lanka, home gardening had a protective impact as cultivation did not require people to travel far from home. It also reduced the need to travel to markets to buy food. In Darfur, training in harvesting, storage skills and soil conservation was designed to maximise production and reduce the need to engage in risky livelihood activities. Also in Darfur, CHF implemented a number of livelihood interventions in IDP camps with the explicit objective of improving people's physical safety, including the production and sale of shelter materials through women's groups, income generation, vocational training, veterinary care and the provision of small livestock (Hill, Diener et al., 2006). In Gaza, backyard and rooftop gardening were common interventions, alongside small-scale inland fishing, providing an alternative for fishermen whose livelihoods are threatened by military restrictions on where they can fish at sea.

A key question in linking livelihoods activities with protection objectives is whether livelihoods support should be provided on the basis of protection objectives regardless of the need for livelihoods inputs. This could be seen as ignoring the principle of impartiality in order to pursue protection objectives. This might include the provision of assistance in order to facilitate access to communities affected by violence, so that action can be taken with the relevant authorities, or providing livelihoods assistance to communities affected by specific protection threats. Integrating protection and livelihoods in targeting may in some instances mean that assistance is provided on a broader set of criteria than simply need for assistance alone. It could be argued that whatever is the greatest threat necessitates a response, whether this is a physical threat or a physiological need.

Providing assistance that reduces key expenditures is another way of increasing available income and reducing

protection risks, and may be a safer way of doing so than distributing goods. Example of this includes the provision of milling vouchers and vouchers for school fees (Mattinen and Palmaera, 2008; Bailey, 2009). In DRC, difficulties in paying school fees were linked with 'payment' in sexual favours or working on teachers' farms (Haver, 2009). Other ways of reducing expenditure might include school fee waivers or tax exemptions.

Advocacy and programmes to promote market access and freedom of movement

A range of different interventions can result in both improved access to markets and freedom of movement. Advocacy that attempts to address the restrictions in movement that hinder access to markets is often most successful at the local level. This can involve liaison with local authorities or armed actors to facilitate the movement of goods, and developing or rebuilding links between opposing sides in the conflict. Advocacy may also include more general awareness-raising and campaigns; for example Oxfam works with Israeli human rights organisations to help raise awareness of the impact of trade barriers on people's lives, and works with Palestinian farmers to increase access to new international markets.

Given the OPT's dependence on the Israeli market, there are a large number of marketing initiatives that seek to create and develop links between Palestinian and Israeli traders. This is a sensitive issue, and working with Israeli companies focuses on the business rather than political implications of these transactions. Actors including the Danish Foreign Ministry, ACF and Oxfam have established trade fairs in order to increase economic activity between Israeli traders and Palestinian producers. Other initiatives have sought to help Palestinian farmers secure international certification for their products. Fairtrade certification is supported by several agencies, including PARC and Oxfam, and work is also in hand to strengthen the Palestinian certification authority. Although certification can take more than ten years to achieve, many Palestinian organisations are making efforts to apply fair-trade principles, opening up markets in North America and in Arab and European countries. The importance of these interventions in helping farmers overcome the restrictions they face cannot be overestimated: interviewees reported that, without this assistance, many more farmers would have stopped planting and quit their land.

In Sri Lanka, an Oxfam GB dairy project involved the establishment of a milk collection system for marketing. When movement restrictions increased, the project initially had problems at checkpoints, with long delays and spoilage due to military checks. Oxfam's local partner trained the military on how to check the milk and ensured that the same person always took the milk through checkpoints. In Darfur, DRC's advocacy with local armed actors helped facilitate access to markets for rural populations on specific days.

5.4 Protection consequences of livelihood recovery in conflict environments

As explained above, livelihood promotion can include the creation of new assets, for example new skills through education or vocational training or financial assets through income generation. Many of these more developmental interventions are carried out with CBOs in an effort to promote sustainability and self-reliance. In conflict situations, these interventions complement more traditional forms of assistance, such as food aid and seeds and tools. When more developmental objectives are applied, however, the most vulnerable population groups may be excluded. In Darfur, for instance, our research showed that the poorest and those under the most stress were often unable to attend vocational training sessions. In addition, many activities were geared towards providing skills for the future, but could not help generate income to meet immediate needs now.

In Chechnya, DRC's income-generating activities focused on those with experience, education and entrepreneurial skills. This approach required fewer inputs and had a higher success rate, making it more cost-effective, but it did not explicitly target the most vulnerable, who instead received smaller grants to help with agricultural activities. Similarly in Sri Lanka, proposed community loan projects require potential beneficiaries to have experience in the proposed activity and evidence of savings, neither of which is likely among the most vulnerable members of a community. In addition, the projects initiated with these loans yielded very little income, and people have not been able to pay back the loans with the profits made. A number of credit societies have begun litigation in an attempt to recover their loans (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2008). This type of approach represents a shift away from humanitarian principles as it no longer necessarily targets those most in need. If such interventions are implemented in protracted conflict situations, more effort needs to be made to include the poorest and most marginalised sections of the population.

The strengthening or creation of CBOs often forms part of a livelihoods programme. In Sri Lanka, CBOs were often established to start saving schemes, assist with land registration and do voluntary work, such as village cleaning or organising cultural events. In some cases, CBOs assumed a protective function, mediating disputes between Tamils, Muslims and Sinhala. In some Tamil resettlement sites, being part of a CBO helped in liaising with military actors. In Darfur, DRC established Community Area Councils (CACs) consisting of villagers and Arab groups from neighbouring damras. The purpose of the Councils was two-fold: to help identify and implement appropriate interventions, and to promote peace by facilitating dialogue between the two groups. However, these were divided communities and some projects requiring community participation, in particular those associated with income generation, were not successful as the more powerful group controlled the project and the income it generated (see

Box 9: Power relations and livelihoods assistance: the Community Area Council in Trej, Darfur

Beginning in the 1990s, the community grain mill in Trej village had been run by a co-operative, and the revenue used for community purposes. During the war the co-operative collapsed as funds were used to pay protection money to nearby damras. In 2006, DRC supported the re-establishment of the co-operative to run the mill, a bakery and a butchery, comprising Fur and Misseriya Jebel tribes. However, members of the damras were concerned about favouritism towards the villagers and worried that the villagers might use the funds generated by the co-operative to buy guns. The grain mill was therefore brought under the control of a CAC, consisting of Fur and Jebel Misseriya villagers plus several Arab tribes from the damras. The villagers refused to cooperate with the damras, which progressively took over the management of the grain mill. In 2007, the villagers asked DRC to remove the grain mill from Trej.

Box 9). The provision of goods or inputs to both groups was however considered essential by members of the weaker group to ensure that they could hold on to them. Education and health care were considered the least controversial interventions.

5.5 Mainstreaming protection principles in livelihoods work

Many organisations new to protection focus on incorporating protection approaches into their ongoing assistance activities, including livelihoods assistance. The term 'mainstreaming' protection describes humanitarian programming which helps to prevent or mitigate harm to civilians and which also purposefully uses assistance to help people keep safe.

Protection mainstreaming is particularly important for livelihoods programming because of the developmental nature of some livelihoods programmes, in terms of objectives, target groups and the widespread use of local partners in livelihoods interventions. In fact, it could be argued that the entire section above, on livelihoods activities with protection outcomes, presents forms of protection mainstreaming. In other words, it involves taking steps to minimise any risks associated with the provision of livelihoods support and ensuring that assistance takes into account the needs of vulnerable groups, that potential barriers to obtaining assistance are minimised and that livelihoods assistance helps reduce the risks that people face.


A recent inter-agency initiative has set out five standards for integrating protection into livelihoods:

1. Agencies promote equitable access to livelihood opportunities and resources.
2. The needs of vulnerable groups are central to livelihoods programmes.
3. Agency practice and livelihoods programmes reduce reliance on unsafe livelihoods practices.

Box 10: WFP’s protection role

WFP has begun to integrate protection into its work. For WFP, protection means ‘safe and dignified programming’. This incorporates three elements: employing a protection-oriented analysis of hunger; seeking to ensure that programming does not incur new risks; and agreeing procedures for action when abuses are witnessed. A ‘concentric circle model’ has been developed which depicts the potential scope of WFP’s work. The inner circle represents protection issues directly related to WFP’s hunger-related operations. Here, WFP can make conscious efforts through analysis and planning to design programmes that seek to maximise the potential protective benefit, as well as minimising damage. It can also undertake advocacy with partners, insisting that operations are safe and as far as possible free from protection risks to civilians. In the second sphere are protection issues related to food insecurity, for which WFP has an entry-point for

advocacy. Finally, in the outermost circle, there are broader protection concerns, not related to hunger. WFP’s role in this context is limited to instances where staff and cooperating partners witness abuses during operations. Beyond this lie specialist protection activities which require dedicated protection capacity, which are not considered appropriate for WFP. In Burma training on protection helped WFP staff challenge government policy that only specific types of crops (those suitable for export) should be planted, on the basis that it undermined people’s food security. In Karamoja in Uganda, an analysis of protection in WFP’s areas of operation highlighted that the provision of assistance on the basis of need alone was leading to conflict between different districts. As a result, WFP provided general rations across food insecure and less food insecure districts, which reduced theft and attacks.



- 4. Agency livelihoods programmes increase the resilience of individuals and communities against protection threats.
- 5. Safety aspects of livelihoods practice are a fundamental concern to agencies (Caritas Australia, CARE Australia et al., 2008).

5.6 Institutional and organisational issues

Amongst agencies working in livelihoods and protection in conflict, there was widespread recognition of the links between the two. Despite this recognition, occasions where a fully integrated or comprehensive protection and livelihoods strategy and approach are adopted are rare, partly because few agencies have similar capacities in both protection and

livelihoods. Even those agencies which have expertise in both (ICRC, Oxfam, UNHCR, Save the Children UK and DRC, for instance) may not have similar capacity or approaches at a country level. As such, many agencies will instead use either protection or livelihoods as a starting point for their complementary protection and livelihoods work.

As discussed, integrated strategies or joint programming usually take protection as the starting point. It is therefore the agencies with a protection mandate, such as ICRC, UNHCR and SC-UK, which are most likely to develop integrated strategies. However, even for these agencies developing integrated strategies is challenging. Making the links in practice requires dedicated individuals and strong management. An example

of good practice is from ICRC in Darfur, where ‘polyvalent delegates’ are deployed – generalists whose task is to identify violations and then ask for support from protection and/or economic security delegates in developing a coherent strategy. Each sub-delegation develops local strategic frameworks which describe how different responses will contribute to the overall protection objective.

UNICEF and SC-UK both use the Convention on the Rights of the Child as their operational framework. Programmes linking protection and livelihoods occur mainly in disarmament and demobilisation work, to support the demobilisation of former combatants, in particular the reintegration of former child soldiers. UNHCR has a mandate to protect refugees, IDPs and other persons of concern. This involves a range of activities, from supporting refugees in securing asylum to the provision of assistance and the coordination of camps for displaced populations. In UNHCR, livelihoods interventions will vary with the stage of displacement. For example, during displacement the main aim may be to prevent risks, such as gender violence or forced recruitment, whereas preparing for durable solutions is more likely to focus on achieving self-reliance. At this stage, the key livelihoods constraints include land issues (compensation for lost land, land titles, documentation), as well as legal and civil status. Work in post-conflict environments might also include assisting with the legal and economic integration of refugees in different contexts. However, UNHCR finds it difficult to identify implementing partners with which to put livelihoods support into practice.

Non-mandated agencies or agencies whose mandate is more livelihoods oriented reported a number of initiatives which brought about greater institutional links between livelihoods and protection. This included protection reviews, as for example in Oxfam and WFP, and management support, encouraging global experts to work together and integrating both programme sectors as part of managers’ performance objectives. Oxfam’s protection review raised the profile of protection within the agency, and the resulting strategy was endorsed by senior managers. The review also highlighted that livelihoods was a key issue in relation to protection. WFP’s protection review arose out of the protracted crisis in West Africa, and was a response to donors’ concerns that the agency was not incorporating protection within its work. WFP now has a protection manual and carries out training of its staff.

The incentive for these reviews, and subsequent attempts at more integrated programming, often stems from staff encountering livelihoods and protection issues which would benefit from a more ‘joined-up’ response. Whether and how these agencies follow up on these issues depends on capacity and expertise. For example, Oxfam’s programme in Darfur started with protection mainstreaming early in the conflict, before developing a livelihoods programme which also had protection objectives. This contrasts with Oxfam’s programme in the Philippines (described earlier), where livelihoods, public

health and protection programmes were implemented within an overall protection framework. WFP’s protection role includes both mainstreaming and dedicated protection activities, and now includes a protection-oriented analysis of hunger, ensuring that programming does not incur new risks, and agreeing procedures for action when abuses are witnessed. As for other agencies, however, joint assessments or analysis remain rare.

In interviews, agencies indicated that there are also challenges in balancing scale and complexity. As programmes become more integrated and complex, the tendency is to make the overall programme smaller in terms of area covered or beneficiaries reached. At the same time, many agencies aim to reach the maximum number of beneficiaries in humanitarian crises, which is easier with a single-sector response. Moreover, for agencies without specific protection mandates, there are often fears that involvement in protection programming will divert attention away from other sectors, or may put staff at risk. Likewise, for agencies that engage in protection but not livelihoods, adding livelihoods programmes may appear a daunting prospect if capacity to run other programmes is already stretched.

In some contexts, therefore, collaborative approaches between agencies may be the way forward. In the OPT, for instance, OCHA coordinated with local and international actors to undertake different functions. For instance, once a demolition becomes known the agencies involved alert each other in order to ensure the presence of national and international agencies and the media in order to raise awareness and support for those affected. The involvement of local partners was particularly useful as they tended to be more proactive than international agencies. SC-UK is one of several agencies in the OPT participating in a Displacement Working Group, which has developed an inter-agency strategy for protection and livelihoods. The group’s aim is to help prevent as well as respond to forced displacement in the West Bank. The Working Group coordinates a range of agencies, from the prevention stage to emergency response, as well as immediate, intermediate and longer-term measures in the aftermath of displacement.

Joint funding for integrated approaches is critical, but this does not always fit well with donor priorities. Agencies in

Box 11: Promoting joint programming

- Joint assessments and/or joint analysis following separate assessments.
- Protection reviews; reviews of protection programmes or of protection concerns in areas where livelihoods agencies are working are likely to highlight links.
- Management support for integration between sectors.
- Collaboration between agencies as part of a coordinated strategy.
- Flexible and long-term funding.

the OPT spoke of parcelling together different parts of an integrated protection and livelihoods programme to suit donor guidelines. Another difficulty is that, even though many conflicts have become protracted crises, funding was still mainly being provided in 12–18-month cycles, making it difficult to develop longer-term strategies. This was particularly an issue for livelihood support, which goes beyond food aid and other short-term measures to meet basic needs and protect livelihoods. Oxfam’s market support for olive farmers in the West Bank is an exception, with EU funding for a period of 30 months. In places like the West Bank, the provision of mainly relief-oriented assistance in a context of strong local capacities and good (if difficult to access) local resources is hard to justify. During interviews, communities repeatedly reported that emergency assistance was welcome

as it reduced expenditure and costs, but did little to address their major concerns: unemployment and economic decline.

What kind of livelihood support can be funded in protracted conflict situations is another important issue. In Darfur, longer-term livelihood support such as micro-finance and market assistance followed the DPA in 2006. Whilst longer-term livelihoods programmes were necessary in this context, given the ongoing conflict the objectives of recovery (promoting self-reliance) were widely considered inappropriate. In the countries and populations studied for this research, it would have been appropriate to consider longer-term livelihoods interventions to address both basic needs and structural problems as part of a humanitarian protection strategy in protracted crises.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

This research shows that, for people affected by conflict, livelihoods and protection are intimately connected. The threats to people's livelihoods and protection are linked, as is people's vulnerability to these threats and their capacity to respond. This means that the humanitarian community must make greater efforts to link its protection and livelihoods analysis and action.

Risks to safety may include direct attack, aerial bombardments and rape, arrest or detention. This has immediate consequences in terms of mortality, loss of labour and restricted access to land, markets and employment. In most internal conflicts, large numbers of people are displaced. Violence also manifests itself in the form of coercion, exploitation and asset-stripping as part of a war economy. Risks to physical safety clearly restrict freedom of movement, as do deliberate, direct obstacles, such as curfews, checkpoints and permit requirements. The impact of these protection threats reduces many to subsistence activities purely for economic survival. The strategies that people adopt often entail risks to their safety and dignity, or are unsustainable either because they deplete natural resources like firewood and water, or because they are illegal or criminal and involve the coercion and exploitation of others.

In our research, camp populations often faced some of the greatest risks. These camp populations suffered repeated military or militia incursions involving destruction of property, injury, rape, abduction, arrest and killing, and had some of the most restricted livelihoods options. Rural farming and pastoral populations were confronted by similar threats, and as a consequence lost access to land, grazing ground, markets and employment. The risks that conflict-affected people faced were a result of the nature and severity of the protection threats, their vulnerability and their choice or capacity to respond. Vulnerability itself was linked to people's identity, assets and capacity, and the policies, institutions and processes that influence people's livelihoods, protection and welfare. The latter included in particular rule of law and justice systems, markets and policies and institutions governing access to water, firewood and land. As in other conflicts, long-term social, political and economic marginalisation was also an important factor.

The threats faced by civilians are direct violations of international law. They also represent a failure of responsible states, warring parties and the international system to protect civilians, and put pressure on states and opposition movements to respect the laws of war and other relevant international and national laws. Given the failure of the state and the international community to protect people, they are left to do this for themselves.

Most of the strategies people adopt still entail some risk, whether to protection or livelihoods, in the short or long term. People adopt a number of strategies, ranging from displacement to alliances with armed actors, reducing their food intake, or continuing to take risks. A key determinant in the strategies that people adopt are the choices they have. The lowest risks are associated with situations where people have the greatest choice. As choice decreases risk increases, and strategies involve either severe risks to safety or to livelihoods. When choice is at its most restricted, risks are high both in terms of livelihoods and protection. People may be able to survive economically, but only with high exposure to physical danger, or they may lose their livelihoods and still face danger. People therefore often had to make impossible choices, and no strategy was risk-free. It is difficult to see how these strategies can be supported in programmatic terms. Instead, people need support to increase the range of options they have, so that they do not have to adopt strategies involving the greatest risks.

Our analysis clearly shows that conflict-affected populations do not separate protection and livelihoods. Such a distinction is an artificial construct of the humanitarian community and cannot be justified. Most agency representatives interviewed were also clear that the two 'sectors' were linked, and that steps needed to be taken urgently to address this. The failure to link the two in practice was generally considered to be a result of the mandates of particular agencies, which tended to lean more towards either protection or livelihoods, as well as capacity and funding constraints. Integrated protection and livelihoods strategies require flexible and longer-term funding to support a range of different programmes as part of humanitarian assistance and protection. Whilst 'joined-up' livelihoods and protection programmes were relatively limited, there were some good examples of how this could be done, in both analysis and action, and how protection activities could have livelihoods benefits and vice-versa. Our findings therefore show that linkages can be made, and that this can effectively address both the causes and the consequences of vulnerability.

There are already similarities in protection and livelihoods assessment and analysis. Livelihoods and protection approaches both emphasise understanding of the conflict environment, and ensuring that responses are based on an in-depth analysis of the nature of the threats faced by conflict-affected populations, who is most vulnerable to threats and the capacities or responses of communities themselves. Both carry out analysis at different levels, international, national and local. Assessing protection threats through a livelihoods lens may also be less politically sensitive than focusing directly

on violations of international law. In situations of conflict, linking conceptual frameworks for livelihoods and protection could provide an effective tool for analysis. In addition, some agencies developed joint protection and livelihoods strategies. These strategies generally start from a protection perspective, which is not surprising given that risks to livelihoods in conflict are generally a result of violence and human rights abuse. As expected, therefore, 'joined-up' strategies were most common in agencies with a protection mandate.

These strategies also had common objectives to reduce protection threats, reduce exposure to threats and address the consequences, and were usually implemented for populations who confronted the same threats, and who had the same livelihoods. The risks associated with targeting populations facing the greatest protection threats need to be carefully analysed, however. Allowing populations themselves to make an informed choice is a key element, as there is a danger that such interventions could put people at additional risk.

Combining a range of activities is particularly effective in addressing protection and livelihoods risks, by linking advocacy and policy work with programme activities. Advocacy might involve dialogue with authorities on IHL, and often it was found that advocacy with local authorities could also be an effective way of improving access to land or markets. Programming might include a range of livelihoods activities, such as food aid, cash transfers and vouchers, agricultural, income and market support, as well as providing information on rights and entitlements, and specific protection activities such as legal assistance and assistance with obtaining civil documentation.

Protection activities supported livelihoods in a number of ways. Advocacy addressed issues relating to land rights, access to employment and access to humanitarian assistance or social welfare. Legal assistance and civil documentation programmes improved access to services, land and property, as well as freedom of movement and hence access to markets, land and employment. Livelihoods assistance reduces exposure to threats by targeting areas or population groups most at risk; for example, assistance reduces the need for IDP populations to engage in risky strategies, and training in improved agricultural techniques maximises production in the face of limited access to land. Protection and livelihoods assistance address the consequences of risks in largely the same way: by assisting in meeting the immediate needs of the most vulnerable.

Capacity-building is a component of both protection and livelihoods approaches, but in conflict environments this requires careful consideration of benefits and risks. Working with CBOs is usually a more developmental livelihoods approach to promote self-reliance, but in conflict environments CBOs can also perform an important protection role. Community groups can sometimes liaise with local authorities or armed actors to minimise harassment or abuse.

The way in which livelihoods and protection can be combined changes as a humanitarian crisis becomes more protracted. In the acute stage, food assistance, vouchers and other basic services may be provided, perhaps in combination with high-level advocacy to raise awareness of the crisis and to encourage warring parties to abide by their responsibilities to spare civilians in conflict. As the situation endures, other forms of livelihoods support (agricultural support, income generation, skills training) may supplement food and cash assistance, alongside local and national-level advocacy to assist with access to markets and land, as well as legal assistance. A key issue for livelihood support in protracted conflict is that it often leads to the inappropriate adoption of more developmental approaches aimed at enabling people to achieve self-reliance, when what is needed is help to meet basic needs and provide as many options as possible for people to keep safe and protect their livelihoods. In addition, more developmental livelihoods approaches to improve access to markets, generate income or create new skills often target the economically viable or those with existing capacity. In conflict situations, more effort needs to be made to include the economically and socially vulnerable, or those who would normally be too busy making a day-to-day living to participate in training or capacity-building. Any livelihoods activity will, however, have limited impact in the context of ongoing violence and human rights abuse, and these limitations need to be acknowledged.

The findings of this study highlight the need for a radical rethink by the international community of how it responds to the risks faced by conflict-affected populations. In our case studies, the creation and maintenance of camps often put people at ongoing risk of attack and restricted their livelihoods options. Although camps are in theory a policy of last resort for the humanitarian community, in reality in many situations they are a key component of the response. Given the predominance of camps and their attendant risks, there is a need to review the policies that lead to their formation, and to rethink the type of assistance given in them and the way in which protection and assistance is provided. This includes paying greater attention to rural populations, as providing assistance to camps alone risks dislocating people from their land. It also means not adopting approaches that aim for self-reliance; instead, the aim should be to increase people's options or the range of strategies they are able to use. The greater the choice, the lower the risks to protection and livelihoods.

The focus on camps or on displaced populations alone often means that the broader conflict context is not fully understood. The livelihoods and safety of conflict-affected populations are intimately linked. In many conflict situations, previous relationships between population groups, based on reciprocity and exchange, become distorted through the manipulation of grievances for political ends, changes in the balance of power between groups and in some cases the economic gains to be made in the war economy. Engaging only with selected groups, without understanding how all are affected by conflict, risks

neglecting the needs of some groups, exacerbating the conflict and presenting the humanitarian community as biased in its response. This in turn may lead to loss of access to sections of the population affected by conflict and/or increased security risks for aid workers themselves. Much better conflict analysis is needed. Linking a protection and livelihoods analysis can assist in this by exploring the causes of vulnerability in relation to protection threats, the policies, institutions and processes that lead to vulnerability and people's assets and identity. This needs to be combined with an analysis of the consequences in terms of the risks people face, and the options and choices they have to respond to them.


Finally, despite the reservations that many agencies have about engaging in advocacy, failing to highlight human rights abuses by warring parties can make the international community appear complicit in those abuses and injustices.

In the absence of such advocacy, the provision of assistance risks becoming a replacement for effective political action. In the OPT, for instance, the readiness of international donors to address the humanitarian consequences of conflict and occupation undermines Israel's accountability for its actions, and implicates donor governments in the policies of the occupation and the cycle of destruction and reconstruction in the territory. Similar concerns have been raised in Sri Lanka, where the international community remained silent about IHL violations and human rights abuses. While better integration of protection and livelihoods analysis will not address all these issues, it is one way for humanitarians to engage both on the causes and the consequences of vulnerability in situations of conflict. This will become all the more important in the current global context, where counter-terrorism and stabilisation measures frequently jeopardise the protection of conflict-affected populations.

Annex 1

Livelihoods frameworks

The DFID livelihoods framework



Key elements of the livelihoods framework include:

- *The vulnerability context*, which is the external environment in which people exist. This can include factors such as shocks (natural, economic, conflict), trends (e.g. population change) and seasonality, which shape the assets and strategies available to different groups.
- *Livelihood assets* encompass the assets that people control or have access to. These can include natural (land, forest products, water), physical (livestock, shelter, tools, materials), social (extended family and other social networks), financial (income, credit, investments) and human assets (education, skills, health).
- *Policies, institutions and processes (PIPs)* can be broadly interpreted as the governance environment, both formal and informal, and include government, agency, customary governance and private sector policy; civic, political and economic institutions and other social customs and rules (such as gender norms and expectations) that are part of society; and processes which determine the way in which institutions and people operate and interact.
- *Livelihood strategies* are the strategies that people use to meet their livelihood goals; they can include activities such as farming, pastoralism, wage labour, the collection and sale of natural resources and migration for work. A livelihood strategy often comprises a combination of different activities performed by different household


members, and will vary by season, context and other factors.

- *Livelihood outcomes* are given in the DFID framework as increased income, food security or wellbeing, reduced vulnerability and the sustainable use of natural resources.

The DFID livelihoods framework has been adapted for complex emergencies, as illustrated in the figures overleaf. They differ from the sustainable livelihoods framework in a number of ways: first, they place vulnerability more centrally within the livelihoods framework; second, they incorporate power relations and politics more explicitly; and third, they incorporate an analysis of assets as liabilities. Each asset in the asset pentagon (natural, physical, social, human and financial) can be turned into a liability.

In adapted frameworks, the vulnerability context has either been placed more centrally in relation to the other elements of the framework (Collinson, 2003), or removed from the framework as an additional box, because vulnerability is considered central to strategies, assets and PIPs (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). The adapted framework developed by Lautze and Raven-Roberts is shown overleaf. Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006) argue that violence is an integral part of PIPs, and can be considered as a policy, an institution and a process. Violence determines both people's access to resources and the strategies they are able to use, and therefore their vulnerability. The external box indicating


The humanitarian livelihoods framework



the vulnerability context is therefore removed. Lautze and Raven-Roberts also recommend making a distinction between livelihood goals and outcomes. Livelihood goals are what the household aspires to, and can include increased income, food security, wellbeing or the more sustainable use of natural resources. In emergency contexts these goals may focus on personal safety or survival. Livelihood outcomes are what actually happens in the pursuit of a livelihood strategy. This might be improved food security or better health, or it could be malnutrition, impoverishment or increased exposure to insecurity.

Collinson’s adapted framework also includes a sixth asset, political status or proximity to power. To give greater attention to power relations within the livelihoods framework, Collinson adds an additional box to show how power is affected by assets, and how power affects engagement with and access to policies, institutions and processes. As such, a livelihoods analysis in conflict is similar to a political economy analysis, and recognises that vulnerability is linked to political status and lack of power, rather than simply economic status and material need (Collinson, 2003).

Collinson's adapted livelihoods framework



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