

**Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian
Assistance to Sudan
1992-1998
Final Report**

Margaret Buchanan-Smith
Steve Collins
Christopher Dammers
Fred Wekesa
Joanna Macrae

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Overseas Development Institute
Portland House, Stag Place
London, UK, SW1E 5DP.
Tel: (+44)20 7393 1600.
Fax: (+44)20 7393 1699.
Email: <hpg@odi.org.uk>
Website: <www.oneworld.org/odi/hpg/>

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GLOSSARY

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ADRA	Adventist Development Relief Agency
CAP	(UN) Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
CEAS	Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
DCA	DanChurchAid
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee (of UK NGOs)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Government)
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) (now UNOCHA)
DRC	Danish Red Cross
DSM	dried skimmed milk
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
FEA	Food Economy Approach
GoS	Government of Sudan
IAC	International Advisory Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP(s)	internally displaced person(s)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
kcal	kilo-calories
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MinOps	Minimum Operational Standards
MSF(B)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium)
MSF(D)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Denmark)
MSF(H)	Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland)
Mt	Metric tonne
NGO	non governmental organisation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OSIL	Operation Save Innocent Lives
RASS	Relief Association of South Sudan (SSIM)
RPO	Regional Programme Officer (UNICEF)
SEOC	Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SCF(UK)	Save the Children Fund (UK)
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA/United	Name adopted by the breakaway Nasir faction in 1993; since 1994 it has been used by various commanders dismissed from the SSIM by Riek Machar in 1994
SRRA	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SPLA)
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Force
SSIA/M	South Sudan Independence Army/Movement (title adopted by the SPLA United in 1994)
SSUM	South Sudan Unity Movement
SRC	Sudanese Red Crescent Society
TB	tuberculosis
TCHA	Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (IGAD)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

UNCERO	UN Coordinator for Emergency and Relief Operations in Sudan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHCU	United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Unit (Sudan)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIPAC	UNICEF Procurement and Assembly Centre (Copenhagen)
UNOCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN), (formerly the DHA)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

EVALUATION OF DANISH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN 1992 – 1998:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Context

The origins of the current complex political emergency in Sudan date back more than forty years, when the first civil war began. It continues to the present day with no end in sight. Deliberate targeting of civilians has been a key feature of the war, to deny support to the opposite side, and to gain access to valuable resources. The impact is a chronic emergency that defies the traditional emergency model of a short-term, contained event. There are periods of particularly acute humanitarian suffering and need, of which the most recent and one of the most severe examples is the famine in Bahr El Ghazal in 1998.

Much of the international humanitarian response to Sudan's complex political emergency is organised through OLS, a unique tripartite agreement, formalised in 1994, between the GoS, the rebel movements in the south (SPLA and SSIM) and the UN. Key features of OLS include:

- humanitarian access based on negotiation between the UN and warring parties
- significant periods when humanitarian access has been denied
- recognition of the sovereignty of GoS
- the *de facto* development of very different operational environments between the government-held northern sector and the rebel-held southern sector of OLS
- growth in coverage of OLS, particularly in the southern sector, in terms of locations reached and number of agencies operating within the framework

A number of agencies operate outside OLS, in the southern sector, mostly for strategic reasons.

The evaluation

The evaluation has been carried out by a four person team, between April and July 1999. Two team members covered the southern sector, spending time in Kenya and South Sudan. The other two members were supposed to visit the northern sector, but were refused visas by GoS, reportedly because of their British nationality. This has been a major constraint to the evaluation, which has had to rely heavily on documentation and telephone interviews for the northern sector. This has delayed the evaluation process. At short notice, a non-British member of the southern sector team was able to spend one week in Khartoum and Wau to conduct a much curtailed field programme. This evaluation focused on issues of concern to DANIDA, although the 1996 Review of OLS has been an important reference point.

An overview of Danish humanitarian assistance

Sudan has become one of the largest recipients of Danish humanitarian assistance during the period of 1992-98. DANIDA has donated a total of DKK 236,366,000 through multilateral organisations, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement. In both northern and southern sectors, the principal channels have been UNICEF, and three Danish NGOs – DanChurchAid, Red Barnet and the Danish Red Cross. WFP has also been a recipient, and UNHCR and UNHCU each received one-off grants. In the southern sector, DANIDA has provided one-off grants to two additional NGOs – MSF-Denmark and ADRA. Contrary to wider donor trends, DANIDA has increased its proportion of funding to the UN (rather than NGOs) during the period under review, and has increased the proportion of funding to OLS rather than non-OLS agencies. More typical of wider trends, DANIDA has decreased its proportion of humanitarian aid to the northern sector, in favour of the southern sector.

Appropriateness of aid channels

DANIDA's choice of implementing partners is heavily conditioned by its policy of active multilateralism and its desire to support Danish NGOs. DANIDA's mechanisms for approving grants are based on a high degree of trust of its implementing partners, with no technical scrutiny of proposals. Without a regional presence in the field, DANIDA's knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of its partners is limited. Whilst most of the programmes visited were relevant and appropriate, DANIDA has, on occasion, funded partners to implement projects for which they are ill-suited. DANIDA funding to multilateral agencies is usually unearmarked.

None of the Danish NGOs is operational in Sudan. All act as conduits for funding to national and international partners. The value added by Danish NGOs is variable. DCA has added value, particularly in the southern sector, enhancing the effectiveness of Danish humanitarian assistance and ensuring it has been used in a transparent and accountable fashion. Red Barnet has organised several evaluations in recent years, some of which have improved SCF(UK)'s operations. But in general it has struggled to add value, partly because it acts as an intermediary to SCF(UK), a comparable but much larger international NGO. For ADRA-Denmark, the value added is more limited, apart from access to Danish resources. Despite its small size, MSF-Denmark does seem to have added value, by providing volunteers to MSF programmes, and by raising public awareness of humanitarian issues. DRC channels the majority of its funds through the ICRC. It exerts little influence over programming, and in this sense appears to add little value, although it has provided a number of health delegates.

It should be noted, however, that an external evaluation such as this cannot substitute for improved procedures within DANIDA, which would enable more systematic appraisal of proposals and of programmes.

Needs assessments and appeals

There have been a number of attempts to monitor and improve understanding of vulnerability in Sudan, with a longer term perspective. These generally rely upon nutritional and socio-economic indicators and pay less attention to the inherently political nature of vulnerability.

Annual needs assessment procedures employed by different agencies have been criticised for lacking standardisation, although the food economy methodology is now used in

both northern and southern sectors. Particular problems arise in estimating population figures. This contributes to donors' lack of confidence in the needs assessment process, which undermines the annual CAP. A vicious cycle has emerged whereby donors' assume that appeals routinely overstate need, and revise their donations downwards. This leads operational agencies to reduce appeals according to what they envisage donors will tolerate. This was particularly marked, and serious, in 1998.

Another problem is the presentation of the CAP in February. This is only two months before the window for cheaper transport by land, and the period of greatest need in the southern sector during the planting season, effectively closes. Whilst more complex assessment methodologies have been developed, donors continue to be far more responsive to pictures of a fully-blown crisis, rather than to genuine early warning.

Coverage

Persistent donor under-funding, particularly in response to the annual CAPs, has had a negative impact on coverage of the humanitarian response, and has resulted in under-investment in the humanitarian system and disaster preparedness. In response, some aid agencies have started to revise downwards the standards to which they are working – an ominous development. This was particularly significant in the case of WFP. Until late in 1998, they used a 1900 kcal daily requirement to calculate needs and to target, rather than the internationally recognised minimum rate of 2100 kcal per day. This hugely reduced the amount of food WFP appealed for, for Sudan. Although DANIDA's humanitarian aid contribution has been more or less sustained, it cannot possibly compensate for the wider downward trends of other donors' contributions.

Denial of access, however, especially by air, is the single most important constraint facing agencies in their attempts to reach the war-affected. Parts of Blue and Upper Nile provinces and the Nuba Mountains have remained inaccessible for much of the period covered by this review. Although negotiating humanitarian access is one of the main reasons behind OLS, this has been constantly manipulated by the warring parties. Denial of access has become part of the strategy of the war effort. DANIDA's limited presence in the region and limited engagement means that it has not been an active contributor to negotiations to expand humanitarian space.

DANIDA's funding of OLS, non-OLS and Red Cross agencies has made effective use of the available humanitarian space. OLS and non-OLS agencies are, however, inter-dependent, and a flight ban imposed on OLS will often ground non-OLS agencies as well, who fear their planes will be shot down. The coverage of DANIDA's portfolio has not been planned strategically. It is determined by the coverage and location of its partner agencies. This has resulted in a disproportionate allocation to the southern sector, particularly since funding to SCC was stopped (for good reason) in 1996. Yet the extent of humanitarian needs in government-held areas is considerable and unmet.

An estimated 2.5 million, out of a total 4 million IDPs are in government-held areas, marginalised and living in acute poverty. The displacement process has been economically and politically manipulated by government in the north. International and national aid efforts have failed to meet the needs of this group. Mostly focused on the provision of education and health services, international humanitarian agencies have paid less attention to wider and underlying political issues.

Coordination

Coordination is challenging in the Sudan context, because of the very different operational environments in the northern and southern sectors, and because of the growing number of agencies operating within the OLS framework. Coordination functions are divided into a) strategic coordination, and b) technical/programme coordination.

The OLS Review was critical of strategic coordination, principally because of the *de facto* division of OLS into northern and southern sectors, which undermined the coherence of the operation. Other reasons included unclear relations between UN agencies in the northern and southern sectors. A number of changes have been instituted in response, including:

- (i) clarifying the role of the UNCERO as overall coordinator of OLS, now under OCHA
- (ii) strengthening the role of UNHCU
- (iii) holding quarterly strategy meetings, for senior UN managers from both sectors
- (iv) establishing the IAC in Geneva
- (v) holding twice yearly meetings of donor representatives from northern and southern sectors

These structural changes have improved relations between the northern and southern sectors and have strengthened strategic coordination. But some fundamental problems remain. For example, it appears to have made little difference to OLS's ability to negotiate access to Bahr El Ghazal in the run-up to the 1998 famine. Ultimately, GoS sovereignty, upon which the concept of OLS is founded, can block the humanitarian effort.

A significant development, with potential for improving strategic coordination, is the resumption of the TCHA, which has met twice since 1998, and has been chaired by the UN. It has produced some concrete outputs, including the Security Protocol.

Still unresolved is the strategic coordination role of UNICEF in the southern sector. Donors are increasingly questioning UNICEF's appropriateness for this position, expressing a preference for OCHA – an issue being addressed by an internal UNICEF review, to be published in September 1999.

The negotiating position of the UN, on behalf of OLS, with the warring parties, is weak, and it is often dependent upon the intervention of Western donor governments. But there is a lack of coherence of positioning amongst Western donors – an obstacle to effective coordination that rarely seems to be acknowledged. On occasion the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Sudan has succeeded in negotiating access, for example, for the recent assessment mission to SPLM-held areas in the Nuba mountains.

DANIDA's engagement is principally through attendance at IAC meetings. But the more influential and detailed policy discussions between OLS and the donors usually take place in the region where DANIDA has a very limited presence.

Technical coordination of programmes is particularly problematic in the northern sector where NGOs sign their agreement with the GoS and there is no consortium. Where it does happen, it is mostly *ad hoc* and inadequate.

In the southern sector, UNICEF's ability to coordinate, as lead agency, depends upon its credibility. Without direct control over funding resources, coordination relies upon the consent of operational agencies. In some sectors this has worked well, for example in livestock, and water and sanitation. But in two of the most important sectors – health and nutrition – the record is poor and UNICEF has attracted sustained criticism from NGOs. Some of the reasons why technical coordination has been so problematic include: inadequate human resource and technical capacity, inadequate capacity in the field, coordinators spending little time in South Sudan, weak information management and lack of financial information about other agencies. The consequences are reduced effectiveness of the international aid response - evident during the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine.

Coordination functions have been poorly funded, finding it hard to compete with higher profile, more visible activities preferred by donors. The annual funding cycle and short timeframe attached to grants undermines continuity and learning in coordination posts. DANIDA is unusual in its willingness to fund these 'invisible' yet very important activities. Since 1994, UNICEF has earmarked much of DANIDA's contribution for coordination.

Despite the difficulties and shortcomings associated with OLS, the team concludes that it should continue to be supported. It remains the most appropriate arrangement on offer for organising the humanitarian response to Sudan's complex political emergency.

Connectedness

Linear 'relief to rehabilitation to development' models are inappropriate to Sudan's complex political emergency. Alternative models remain both elusive and contentious. The issue is ensuring that short-term relief responses are connected to longer term approaches, but also ensuring that the operation retains a capacity to respond when and if the crisis intensifies.

The theme of connectedness has been embodied in OLS since it was founded. The OLS Review was critical of the move to make relief assistance more developmental, for example, because it underplayed issues of neutrality when development partners are also directly or indirectly allied to the warring parties, and because the options for reducing the vulnerability of the war affected are limited; it therefore argued that the need for humanitarian assistance remains. This reality has not changed since 1996, despite current donor interest in exit strategies. Nevertheless, there is scope for investing in longer term processes. For example, the southern sector UNICEF office has experimented with a number of capacity-building programmes, but unfortunately there is little evidence of systematic evaluation and learning from this initiative.

The range of donor positions about what is legitimately 'humanitarian', and the desirability of developmental relief, in turn influenced by political factors, inhibits a coherent approach, particularly within the southern sector. Whilst some donors are willing to fund rehabilitation and capacity-building activities, others define life-saving activities very narrowly.

There has been a striking lack of longer-term strategic planning in the humanitarian response to Sudan's emergency, although the war has raged since 1983. Humanitarian planning and funding centres on the annual OLS needs assessment and appeals process.

Some of the negative consequences, such as a lack of longer-term investment in emergency preparedness measures, were all too evident during the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine.

DANIDA's portfolio of programmes during the last eight years shows a high degree of connectedness, ranging from short-term emergency interventions to longer-term capacity-building initiatives. But the policy behind this has been unclear. Despite strong endorsement of the concept of 'development-oriented assistance', there are no guidelines on how this should be implemented with the result that it is open to wide interpretation, with sometimes disruptive consequences. Some partner agencies feel they have to re-negotiate this issue on an annual basis.

Similarly, requiring relief funds to be spent within twelve months is inappropriate for some aspects of the emergency response, such as capacity-building and providing relief resources year-on-year to a relatively 'stable' IDP population.

The Danish NGOs generally wish to promote a relief-to-development model, tending to overestimate the extent to which developmental models are appropriate in conditions of chronic instability. Amongst DANIDA's implementing partners, there are different operational styles, particularly evident in the southern sector. These range from a more conventional relief approach, reliant on a high number of expatriates often working on short-term contracts. In these cases the agency is not usually well-integrated into the local environment, and has therefore not been privy to politico-military information which leaves it vulnerable to attack. At the other end of the spectrum, agencies are dependent upon local networks, which improves their early warning information and institutional base for longer-term capacity-building initiatives. The challenge here is to retain the 'emergency edge', to respond quickly should humanitarian conditions deteriorate.

Appropriateness of the humanitarian response

DANIDA has a reputation for being able to respond quickly and effectively to requests for funding. But the record shows that, more often, the timing of appropriations has been inappropriate - too late to support preventive and mitigation measures. This is partly because DANIDA's partners have been slow to request funds, but it is also because DANIDA has been more geared to responding to a fully-blown crisis than investing in earlier preparedness and mitigation activities. The consequence has been the late delivery of relief goods: for example, all grants for seeds and tools were made after the planting season and too late for land transport. Missing this window for land transport seriously detracts from cost efficiency.

This problem is not unique to DANIDA, and is widespread. In terms of food aid, the bulk of it usually reaches people during the harvest season, too late for road transport or for the hungry season when people are planting. Instead, it can have a negative effect on food prices at a time when farmers are trying to sell their produce.

Monitoring and evaluation

DANIDA has not been rigorous in its monitoring and evaluation requirements. Combined with other factors, this has made it difficult for DANIDA to assess its partners' performance. Where evaluations have taken place, it has sometimes been on the initiative of the intermediary agency. DANIDA's limited capacity to absorb and respond to evaluation reports is a constraint on the learning process.

The record of DANIDA's partners in monitoring and evaluation is variable. On the whole, the performance of the NGO and Red Cross agencies has been better than that of the UN. The plethora of evaluations taking place in Sudan in 1999, some of overlapping relevance, indicate the need for greater coordination amongst donors and agencies in planning such exercises. Some will be of direct relevance to DANIDA. One of the most significant system-wide evaluations – the OLS Review in 1996 – has generated a number of institutional changes, which have so far mostly been greater than the impact on practical programming. There is a tendency to see the OLS Review as a one-off, when in fact an appropriate follow-up is needed.

Humanitarian assistance and conflict

Sudan has been a testing ground for innovations in the international humanitarian response to conflict. A key example is the Ground Rules, introduced into the southern sector in 1992, in an attempt to regulate the conduct of the war. In government-held areas, standard international conventions are supposed to apply. In supporting OLS, DANIDA has implicitly backed the principles on which it is based.

Humanitarian aid has persistently been used to promote the interests of warring parties, for example through the taxation of food aid in Bahr El Ghazal during the 1998 famine, and has been an unfortunate factor sometimes influencing patterns of attack. In an impoverished area it represents a valuable resource.

A number of agencies have entered the domain of 'peace-building', but there are again examples of how the warring parties have tried to hijack this agenda. Other agencies have started to engage with a rights-based framework, to address some of the war-related abuses. Whilst these programme interventions may get close to the root causes of the conflict, only a wider political settlement will resolve the war and end the emergency. IGAD is the main forum for peace negotiations, but prospects for a resolution to the Sudanese civil war currently appear remote. If the Danish government is to upgrade its response to the Sudanese tragedy, advocacy and support for peace negotiations should be a key component.

Bahr El Ghazal famine

Ten years after OLS was formed, the epicentre of famine was once again Bahr El Ghazal. Having suffered progressive depletion of resources and attacks, heavy fighting in early 1998 caused displacement on a large scale. The GoS-imposed flight ban denied humanitarian access in February, and then restricted it to a few sites where large numbers of vulnerable people congregated, triggering a major health crisis. In some of these locations rates of mortality and malnutrition were almost off the scale of recorded human suffering.

In late 1997, OLS predicted a crisis in Bahr El Ghazal during 1998. But the speed at which the food economy broke down and famine developed took most aid agencies by surprise. Despite this prediction, the CAP requested *fewer* resources than in 1997, because of the negative donor reaction the previous year. Generally, the pledging of donor funds was very late, peaking in July when the famine was already full-blown. This massively increased the cost of the response: the needs had increased and intensified, requiring high-cost specialist food – the general ration was no longer adequate – and causing intense competition for transport and materials. The weakness of OLS coordination mechanisms was evident in the lack of preparedness and contingency planning during the period when access was blocked.

DANIDA similarly responded late and appeared reactive to the development of widespread starvation, particularly when it was reported by the Danish media. No funds were released at the beginning of the year when there was still an opportunity for famine prevention; only one-third had been released by May, when land transport was still possible. This reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of DANIDA's contribution.

Some of DANIDA's NGO partners – SCF(UK), MSF and CEAS – were among the first to respond to the crisis, although all admitted they had responded poorly to the warning signs.

Analysis of DANIDA's policy towards, and management of humanitarian assistance to Sudan

Strengths:

- (i) DANIDA has remained a committed and generous donor to Sudan during a period which has seen declining contributions overall;
- (ii) DANIDA usually provides unearmarked funds, and is renowned for its flexibility and ability to respond fast. It has not attempted to micro-manage programmes inappropriately;
- (iii) it has not imposed political agendas or conditions on the use of funds for Sudan;
- (iv) DANIDA has developed close working relationships with most (but not all) Danish NGOs working in Sudan, especially at the Copenhagen level.

Weaknesses:

- (i) DANIDA lacks some of the tools required to guarantee a quality programme, for example subjecting project proposals to a technical assessment;
- (ii) its low level of engagement with partner agencies in the field means it has limited knowledge of their operational strengths and weaknesses;
- (iii) DANIDA has missed opportunities to pursue some of its global priorities, such as coordination of humanitarian assistance, because of a lack of engagement with the programme, particularly in the region;
- (iv) the timeframe of some of DANIDA's grants is inappropriate, requiring funds to be spent by the end of the financial year, and because of delayed disbursement;
- (v) DANIDA lacks an overall strategy to guide its programming in Sudan

DANIDA has an extremely limited field presence – approximately 10 to 15% of the time of the Humanitarian Aid Officer for Somalia, based in Nairobi. Thus, DANIDA's exposure to conditions on the ground in Sudan, and to the programmes it is funding, is very limited. Its engagement in policy and operational discussions is confined to attending the IAC meetings in Geneva, whereas the more influential policy discussions usually take place in the region.

DANIDA's programme funding decisions on Sudan are guided by its broad global policies, but are not supported by accompanying guidelines on how they should be interpreted or implemented in practice. A number of 'policies' and priorities appear to be unwritten which becomes problematic as the humanitarian aid budget grows and the number of implementing partners working in complex political emergencies increases.

Finally, DANIDA's response to Sudan's emergency has mostly been reactive, to project/programme proposals received from UN agencies and from Danish NGOs and the Red Cross Movement. There is currently no overall strategic plan or framework to guide DANIDA's country-level humanitarian response.

Recommendations

- **It is recommended that DANIDA develop policies and guidelines for responding to complex political emergencies.** There do not appear to be any new policy statements on humanitarian aid since 1995, despite the fact that there have been a number of changes and a substantial amount of learning within the sector, particularly after the Rwanda crisis which was thoroughly evaluated in 1995/96. The statements that do exist are at a very general level. There is a need for clearer and more stringent guidelines when funding humanitarian operations year after year in an ongoing complex political emergency, that reflect the chronic nature of the emergency and the need for strategic thinking and planning.
- **It is recommended that DANIDA develop a strategy for its overall response to Sudan.** This will ensure greater coherence of DANIDA's efforts to this ongoing chronic emergency, and will help to exploit DANIDA's particular strengths and policy priorities as a donor, in the interests of strengthening the overall humanitarian response.
- **It is recommended that DANIDA play a more engaged role in relation to Sudan within the donor community, possibly looking to specialise in areas of particular interest where it could have considerable influence.** This would be welcomed by many of those interviewed, because of the Danish government's commitment to multilateralism, and because of its less politicised humanitarian aid programme. Particular policy issues of relevance to Sudan, and of interest to DANIDA, include:
 - strengthening coordination of humanitarian aid, with links to, and implications for the UN reform process
 - promoting multilateralism, and defending the integrity and objectivity of the UN in the face of strong bilateral donor political interests
 - strengthening the accountability of humanitarian aid, especially through improved monitoring and evaluation¹
 - developing and promoting a stronger gender perspective

If there was scope for developing a 'Nordic position' on any of these issues, it could substantially increase the potential for influence. Given DANIDA's capacity constraints, a specific policy focus could be the most effective way to influence positively the international humanitarian sector.

¹ This could build upon the influential role that DANIDA played in the multi-donor evaluation of the Rwanda response

- **It is recommended that DANIDA find ways to increase its engagement in Sudan, including, as a minimum, considering the placement of a humanitarian aid offices in the region.** This builds on the experience of the humanitarian aid officer for Somalia, based in Nairobi, and recognises that most of the key policy discussions take place in the region rather than in Europe. In a location such as Nairobi, one humanitarian aid officer could be responsible for more than one country. Given DANIDA’s human resource constraints, such a position could be on a two to three year contractual basis, drawing on humanitarian expertise from the sector, for example experienced NGO or UN personnel. The objectives of greater engagement would be:
 - (i) to strengthen understanding and analysis of the emergency; to feed into development of a strategy
 - (ii) to contribute to improving the overall international humanitarian response, by focussing on particular policy issues
 - (iii) to build better relationships with partners in the field, and thus to develop greater knowledge of partners’ strengths and weaknesses

- **It is recommended that DANIDA strengthen its technical and analytical capacity within its humanitarian aid department.**

- **Although recommending a more pro-active engagement, DANIDA should resist any trend to micro-management of its humanitarian programmes or excessive earmarking of funding.**

- **DANIDA should increase its emphasis on partner transparency, accountability and learning.**

- **Finally, it is recommended that DANIDA retain its capacity to respond rapidly to sudden-onset disasters.**

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the resumption of civil war in Sudan in 1983, parts of the country – particularly in the geographical south – have been gripped by a ‘complex political emergency’². As a result, Sudan has become one of the largest recipients of Danish humanitarian assistance during the period 1992-98. In the 1980s – particularly after the famine of 1984/85 – DANIDA was channeling significant amounts of bilateral development assistance into Sudan. This formed part of Denmark’s overall strategy for the Sahel. However, development aid flows ceased in the early 1990s, following the military coup that installed General El Bashir and the National Islamic Front in power. This marked the beginning of a serious deterioration in relations between the Sudanese government and Western countries, including Denmark, which closed its embassy in Khartoum in 1991.

This evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance to Sudan between 1992 and 1998 is one of six country case studies being carried out simultaneously as part of an overall evaluation of Danish humanitarian aid during the 1990s. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are presented in Annex I.

² A complex political emergency can be defined as a political crisis within a state that has involved armed conflict and widespread social upheaval (Minear, Scott and Weiss, 1996:5).

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Approach

The evaluation has been carried out by a four person team, between April and July 1999. It evaluates Danish humanitarian assistance to the whole of Sudan, but for logistical purposes the team split to cover:

- humanitarian assistance to populations in the rebel-held part of Sudan, in the south of the country (2 team members)
- humanitarian assistance to populations in the government-held part of the country – the north and parts of the south, e.g. garrison towns held by the government in the south, such as Juba and Wau (2 team members)

Figure 2.1 indicates the current territorial divide between government and rebel movements and how this changed during the 1990s. The Team Leader was responsible for providing an overview, and visiting agencies working on both sides of the conflict.

Following the terminology of Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the report refers to the government-held parts of Sudan as ‘the northern sector’ (although geographically this includes territory in the southern half of the country). It refers to rebel-held areas as ‘the southern sector’.³

2.2 Evaluation of the southern sector

A two person team spent time in Nairobi, Lokichokio and south Sudan. A total of 16 days were spent in South Sudan, visiting five sites in rebel-held territory. Access, by air, was not seriously constrained, either by security or by the rains which had only just begun (although one site had to be abandoned from the original itinerary because of the rains). See Annex II for the itinerary. The team visited all agencies funded by DANIDA in the southern sector, except for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which was working with refugees outside Sudan.

2.3 Evaluation of the northern sector

The two other members of the Sudan team were due to leave for Khartoum at the end of April. Initially the trip was delayed because of difficulties in obtaining visas from the Government of Sudan (GoS), which indicated that the visas would take time but would be granted. After a number of fruitless weeks of waiting and wasted time, it became apparent (in early June) that the visas would not be granted at all, reportedly because of the British nationality of the team members⁴. At this point, the northern sector team made contingency plans to spend more time visiting the headquarters of DANIDA’s

³ In practice, the distinction is more complicated, as certain rebel groups in the south have temporarily aligned themselves with the government. And there has sometimes been ambiguity and disagreement about whether OLS refers to war-affected (ie including IDPs around Khartoum), or to those trapped within war zones (Karim et al, 1996:26).

⁴ The amount of time wasted is indicative of the financial/opportunity cost to negotiating access – a cost routinely imposed, on a much larger scale, on humanitarian agencies operating in Sudan.

implementing partners for the northern sector – in Geneva and Copenhagen. Meanwhile, the Kenyan member of the southern sector team spent one week in Khartoum and Wau. This enabled valuable fieldwork to be carried out, but was much truncated (7 days) compared with the original plan of spending a total of 30 days conducting fieldwork in the northern sector. See Annex II for the itinerary for the northern sector.

As a result of this disruption, the team has had to rely heavily on documentation and on telephone interviews to cover the northern sector. There are inevitably gaps, and the whole evaluation process has been seriously delayed.

2.4 Focus of the evaluation

The team has used the Good Practice Review on ‘Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies’ (Hallam, 1998) to interpret the terms of reference, particularly the evaluation criteria. (See Annex I). In response to specific issues identified for the Sudan evaluation, the team has looked at issues of coverage, in relation to humanitarian need and humanitarian space⁵, paying particular attention to coverage between the northern and southern sectors (see chapter 8). As far as possible, issues related to meeting the humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also been examined. However, this has been constrained by lack of access to the northern sector, which contains the largest number of IDPs.

Inevitably, institutional memory and available documentation are strongest for the most recent events. The evaluation has focussed particularly on the humanitarian response to the famine in Bahr El Ghazal in 1998. This is a highly relevant case study, illustrating many pertinent features of the international humanitarian response to Sudan’s complex political emergency. This covers issues such as delivery of food during a cease-fire, and the combination of man-made disaster and natural disaster (drought), both highlighted in the terms of reference.

As indicated in the terms of reference, the evaluation focuses on key themes relevant to Danish humanitarian assistance to Sudan. It is not a commentary on all humanitarian programmes funded by DANIDA since 1992.

The 1996 Review of OLS (Karim et al, 1996) has been an important reference point for the evaluation. To what extent have changes been made and the recommendations implemented? However, it must be noted that this monitoring of progress and change is partial not comprehensive, particularly focussing on issues of concern to DANIDA. This evaluation is *not* another OLS review, which would have required a very different approach and greater resources. Instead, it has thrown up the challenge of one donor evaluating its humanitarian assistance when it has contributed to an operation funded by many official donors and by some private funding (e.g through non-governmental organisation[NGO] fund-raising).

⁵ Humanitarian space usually refers to negotiated access, in other words, securing the agreement of warring parties to the movement of neutral humanitarian aid (Duffield, 1994).

2.5 Sources of information

The evaluation has drawn on a number of different sources of information. These have included:

- structured and semi-structured interviews with key informants – within DANIDA, its implementing partners, and other key actors (including other donor agencies – see Annex IIB)
- visits to project and programme sites in the field, particularly in the southern sector, but also in Khartoum and Wau in the northern sector (see Annex IIA)
- telephone interviews with some key informants (See Annex IIC)
- follow-up e-mail correspondence with some of DANIDA’s implementing partners
- a review of literature and documentation, including reports, previous evaluations, files etc. (The full bibliography is presented in Annex VIII)

Very few of the people who had been involved in the humanitarian operation in the early part of the period (1992-95) were still present in the field and available for interview. Where possible, reports and evaluations from these early years have been used, although they too have been hard to access. Thus, inevitably, the evaluation covers later events more thoroughly.

2.6 Constraints

The evaluation has faced a number of constraints:

- the most serious has been the lack of access for the two principal evaluators to the northern sector, as described above
- the timing of the evaluation which coincided with the peak of the Kosovo crisis meant that access to staff in DANIDA’s humanitarian department, and in some NGOs has been severely constrained
- inconsistency of data from different sources, for example on S3 grants to Sudan, has been problematic
- DANIDA’s filing and archive systems have made it difficult to retrieve specific project and programme documents
- the seven year time span, for a sector renowned for institutional amnesia, has meant that the evaluation is biased towards more recent years

2.7 Other evaluations

Finally, there has been a plethora of other evaluations/ reviews of humanitarian operations in Sudan during 1999, by:

- Médecins Sans Frontières, Belgium (MSF-B)
- MSF(Holland)
- the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) of British NGOs
- the Dutch and United Kingdom (UK) governments of the World Food Programme's (WFP) operations during 1998
- the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), conducting an internal review of its programme and co-ordination functions
- the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), through the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), which is currently reviewing the impact of humanitarian assistance, in both northern and southern sectors.

This list of evaluations is symptomatic of some of the shortcomings of humanitarian co-ordination in Sudan. (See also Chapter 9). And it has been time-consuming for some of the operational agencies that have had to service and meet with the different evaluation teams, with a certain amount of duplication.

Figures 2.1 a-d:

Maps of Areas of Control in OLS Southern Sector

1994 to 1999

INSERT MAP

INSERT MAP

INSERT MAP

INSERT MAP

3. OVERVIEW OF THE COMPLEX POLITICAL EMERGENCY IN SUDAN

Sudan currently ranks eighteenth from the bottom in terms of its Human Development Index (based on 1995 data, quoted in the Human Development Report of 1998). See Table 3.1. Since independence, the cost and disruption of fighting a major civil war have seriously hampered its economic development.⁶

Table 3.1: Sudan Background Statistics

Estimated population	26.7 million	1995
Life expectancy at birth	52 years	1995
Infant mortality rate	73 (per 1,000 live births)	1996
GDP per capita	US\$1,100	

Source: Human Development Report, 1998

The origins of the current complex political emergency in Sudan date back more than 40 years. Annex III provides a timeline of key events related to the war and to the humanitarian response since 1955. The first civil war began shortly after independence, in 1955, ending in 1972. Military hostilities resumed in 1983 and continue to the present day. The war is characterised as ‘north’ versus ‘south’. In reality, the fault-lines are complex – to do with access to political power, access to resources (especially oil), religion and ethnicity. The southern population has been most severely affected. Until the early 1990s, the war was being fought between the GoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In 1991, the southern rebel movement split into factions, coinciding with withdrawal of support from the Government of Ethiopia. This factionalisation has been a fluid feature of the 1990s, with some southern factions aligning themselves with the government for short periods of time.

Rather than the battles and tactics of ‘conventional’ warfare, the conflict in Sudan has been fought largely through the civilian population, relying on tactics of forcible displacement, terrorisation and asset-stripping. These tactics necessarily and deliberately create humanitarian disasters.

The impact is to produce an ongoing, chronic emergency that defies the traditional emergency model of a short-term, contained event. With little obvious progress towards peace (see below), there is every reason to expect the war to continue into the future, for at least another few years. It has produced the largest number of IDPs in any one country – 4 million, of whom 1.8 million are living in and around Khartoum (UNHCU 1999b). The number of Sudanese refugees living in neighbouring countries is much lower.

Despite the chronic nature of Sudan’s emergency, it goes through periods of very acute humanitarian suffering and need. Chapter 14 describes in detail the most recent and one of the most severe examples - the famine in Bahr El Ghazal in 1998 - caused by intensified conflict superimposed on a five-year drought. Mortality rates were higher than almost any other recorded humanitarian crisis this century, including Goma in 1994.

⁶ It is estimated that the war costs the GoS US\$ 1 to 2 million per day

Efforts to end the war, and thus bring an end to one of the world's longest running complex political emergencies, have so far failed. Current efforts are centred on the peace process facilitated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In common with other complex political emergencies in Africa, there appears to have been greater investment in the humanitarian response to the war, than in finding a long-term political solution⁷.

⁷ This was a particularly strong finding from the multi-donor evaluation of the international response to the Rwanda crisis (Eriksson, 1996).

4. OVERVIEW OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

4.1 OLS

Much of the international humanitarian response to Sudan's complex political emergency is organised through OLS⁸. This is a unique tripartite agreement, formalised in 1994, between the GoS, the rebel movements in the south (specifically the SPLA and the South Sudan Independence Movement [SSIM]) and the United Nations (UN) (Karim et al, 1996). OLS was first established in 1989, in response to the international community's failure to intervene and prevent famine in Bahr El Ghazal in 1988, when almost 300,000 people lost their lives. Initially, OLS was an *ad hoc* and informal agreement, designed for a discrete period of time, with the aim of improving humanitarian access to all war-affected populations. Geographically, it was focussed on the south. As the political landscape changed, it became clear that a more flexible and continuous mode of access needed to be established. Thus, in 1994 a greater sense of formality was introduced with the signing of the tripartite agreement (between GoS, the UN and two southern rebel movements), aiming to provide humanitarian access (although in practice still subject to negotiation), and broadening the geographical focus.

Key features of OLS and its evolution include:

- humanitarian access based on negotiation between the UN and the warring parties, particularly the GoS. The success of these negotiations are frequently dependent upon the successful application of international pressure on the warring parties. Unlike some other complex political emergencies, the humanitarian operation is not dependent upon the military protection of humanitarian aid and those in need;
- significant periods when humanitarian access has been denied, because of lack of agreement by one of the warring parties: for example, the government's refusal to allow humanitarian flights into south Sudan during February 1998, thus paralysing the international humanitarian response to the famine;
- respect for the sovereignty of the GoS, thus establishing a legitimate OLS cross-border relief operation from Kenya, and giving the GoS extensive power to shape the operation;
- the *de facto* development of very different operational environments between the northern and southern sectors of OLS. The former resembles a more restricted regulatory environment under control of the Government, whilst the latter has developed into a more liberal contractual system, nominally under UN co-ordination;
- growth in coverage of OLS, particularly in the southern sector, from less than 10 sites served by air in 1992, to over 200 sites by the end of 1997;
- rapid growth in the number of NGOs operating within the OLS framework, in the southern sector increasing from 6 to 7 in 1992 to almost 40 in 1998. By contrast, in the northern sector the operating environment has become increasingly difficult, resulting in a decline in the number of NGOs;

⁸ The description of OLS in this section draws upon the 1996 OLS review

- only a few agencies (UN agencies plus a few international NGOs) operating in both northern and southern sectors, with a far greater number operating in the southern sector alone;
- expansion of activities, from ‘pure’ humanitarian relief services to include activities such as capacity-building of counterparts (including the humanitarian wing of the respective rebel movements), and promoting self-reliance although this is always implicit in the OLS mandate ⁹;
- lack of trust between many of the key donors and UN agencies.

In 1996, OLS was subject to a thorough review. This was an independent evaluation, funded by donor governments and managed by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)¹⁰. Although broadly supportive of the OLS framework, the review was critical of many operational aspects of OLS. Its long list of recommendations has been the basis for much discussion and a number of changes to OLS since.

The flight ban imposed by the GoS in February 1998 tested OLS to its limits. Some agencies were beginning to consider working ‘illegally’ outside OLS, just at the point when the ban was lifted. All those interviewed in the process of this evaluation, particularly donor agencies, re-affirmed their support for OLS, despite the difficulties of 1998. However, some donors have consciously and strategically increased their funding for non-OLS humanitarian programmes since.

4.2 Outside OLS

Approximately 14 NGOs operate outside OLS in the southern sector. For most, this has been a strategic decision. For example, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is more of a solidarity NGO, working closely with the SPLA. For the Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS), the church network does not sit comfortably within OLS. Potentially, these non-OLS routes provide an important alternative when OLS has failed to negotiate humanitarian access, for example providing some humanitarian aid to the Nuba Mountains whilst OLS has been denied access. But in practice they may also be grounded when a flight ban is imposed on OLS because of the risks of flying ‘illegal’ aircraft (see Chapter 14).

Because of its specific mandate and status within the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also operates outside OLS. Unusually, since 1993, the ICRC has run its entire programme out of Khartoum – a decision that was taken after the GoS had suspended the ICRC’s operations in 1992.

⁹ The OLS mission statement, dating back to January 1997, refers to: saving lives, promoting self-reliance, protecting people’s safety and dignity and enabling them to invest in their future.


¹⁰ Now called UN OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

5. OVERVIEW OF DANISH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN

5.1 Overall funding

Between 1992 and 1998 DANIDA has donated a total of DKK 236,366,000 of humanitarian assistance to Sudan, through a variety of partners¹¹. The largest tranche of funding was donated in 1992 – DKK 47 million, peaking again at DKK 36,700,000 in 1998. See Figure 5-1. Fluctuations in DANIDA’s annual allocation to Sudan do not appear to match annual fluctuations in the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP).

Figure 5-1 Proportion of DANIDA humanitarian funding to NGOs, the Red Cross movement and UN agencies, 1992 - 1998




The relatively steady allocation of funds to Sudan throughout the 1990s has occurred against a backdrop of increasing Danish humanitarian assistance, from around 4% of total development assistance in the mid 1980s to 8-10% by the 1990s. There is evidence that Denmark has tried to restrain the proportion of aid spent on emergency relief, although it has not applied a ceiling (Nielson 1995b). During the period under review, there have been many competing demands for humanitarian assistance, for example from the Great Lakes, Somalia and former Yugoslavia. Denmark appears to have

¹¹ This and the following figures exclude grants to WFP for food aid to Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in East Sudan, in 1997 and 1998. As agreed with DANIDA’s evaluation department, these grants were excluded from the evaluation because of lack of access of the team to the northern sector.

maintained its humanitarian funding for Sudan, at a time when overall funding for Sudan has declined. See Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 OLS appeals and receipts 1994 – 1999



5.2 Funding channels

DANIDA's grants have been made to multilateral organisations, principally UNICEF and WFP¹², with one-off grants to UNHCR and to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA); emergency and developmental NGOs and to the Red Cross Movement (see figure 5.3). In both northern and southern sectors, the principal channels for DANIDA's humanitarian aid have been UNICEF, and three Danish NGOs: DanChurchAid (DCA), Red Barnet and the Danish Red Cross (DRC), each operating through local or international partners. In the southern sector, DANIDA has provided one-off grants to two additional Danish NGOs – MSF-Denmark and the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA).


¹² In this evaluation more attention is paid to UNICEF, as the recipient of larger amounts of DANIDA funding than WFP.

Figure 5-3 Agencies funded by DANIDA to work in Sudan between 1992 and 1998

agency	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
ADRA							
DCA							
DRC/ICRC							
DRC/IFRC							
MSF							
OCHA							
SCF							
UNHCR							
UNICEF							
WFP							

Figure 5-4 shows the relative importance of these different channels during the 1992-98 period. Of particular note is the increased proportion of funding to the UN during the six years under review – see Figure 5-1. This appears to be in line with DANIDA’s policy of active multilateralism, and is in contrast to the pattern of funding for many other donors in Sudan¹³.


Figure 5.4 Proportion of DANIDA’s humanitarian assistance by agency type 1992-1998



¹³ The OLS review estimated that, until 1994, the UN and NGOs secured roughly comparable amounts in response to Sudan appeals. By 1996, however, it was estimated that UN agencies were receiving only about two-thirds of the combined INGO budget.

Also unusual is the increased proportion of DANIDA funding to OLS compared with non-OLS agencies. See Figure 5-5. As mentioned above, some donors – particularly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) – have made the strategic decision to increase funding outside OLS since the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine.


Figure 5.5 Proportion of DANIDA humanitarian aid through OLS and non-OLS channels



Finally, it is worth noting that the proportion of humanitarian aid donated to the northern sector has decreased over time – see Figure 5.6¹⁴. This is more typical of wider trends in donor support – see Chapter 7 below.

¹⁴ This graph excludes grants to the ICRC as it has not been possible to disaggregate the grant data into northern and southern sectors (ICRC treats the Sudan operation as one, without distinguishing between northern and southern sectors). It also excludes two grants made to WFP in 1997 and 1998, for Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the east of Sudan. The grant to WFP/IEFR in 1992 has been assumed to be North Sudan.

Figure 5.6 Allocation of DANIDA's humanitarian assistance to the northern and southern sectors of Sudan, 1992-1998



5.3 DANIDA's decision-making mechanisms

Currently, DANIDA funds only Danish NGOs – all of which act primarily as conduits for funding to other operational agencies. For example, Red Barnet transfers funds to Save the Children Fund (SCF-UK), DRC to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and to the ICRC. Danish NGOs usually receive humanitarian funding in one of three ways:

- C through annual negotiation of the *Aktstykke*¹⁵ –DCA and DRC in the case of Sudan;
- C through a less formal process of negotiation and agreement in principle, by S3, to provide humanitarian funding to specified emergencies, for example in the case of ADRA;

¹⁵ This was introduced in the mid '90s, as a kind of framework agreement between S3 and some of the larger Danish emergency NGOs, whereby the NGO identifies expected humanitarian need in the coming year (often in prolonged and therefore more predictable emergencies), and submits a proposal to S3. This is discussed and negotiated, resulting in an *Aktstykke*, or appropriation agreement. For the subsequent release of the funds, the NGO must submit only a brief project proposal. This enables S3 to plan forward, and assess the likely drawdown on some of its budget early in the financial year.

C in direct response to a specific project proposal, for example in the case of MSF-Denmark; but also for unanticipated projects, not included in the *Aktstyrke* for other agencies.

Rather than responding directly to the CAPs, DANIDA requests each of the UN agencies to submit a proposal indicating how it would like to use DANIDA funding, particularly in terms of countries to be prioritised. Thus, the allocation is made per agency, rather than per country.

Although sometimes DANIDA approved a project proposal very rapidly, for example, in only one day in the case of a grant to ADRA in response to the 1998 famine, the average response time was much higher – 41 days per grant for NGOs working in Sudan, and 51 days for the UN agencies. See Table 5.1

Table 5.1 Approval time by DANIDA for humanitarian aid grants to Sudan, by agency, 1992 – 1998

agency	average time to approval (days)	total number of grants
ADRA	1	1
DCA	37	16
DRC/ICRC	62	7
DRC/IFRC	28	2
MSF-D	16	2
SCF-D	56	11
UNHCR	84	1
UNICEF	58	8
WFP	17	8

5.4 Relative significance of DANIDA funding

For the period under review, Denmark ranks amongst the top ten donors of humanitarian aid to UN agencies working in Sudan, and similarly in terms of total humanitarian assistance to Sudan (including donations to NGOs and the Red Cross agencies). See Table 5-2. Denmark's ranking as a donor is higher for the UN agencies than for total humanitarian assistance, reflecting its commitment to multilateralism compared with a number of other donors.

Table 5.2: Relative significance of DANIDA as humanitarian aid donor to Sudan

Year	Donations of humanitarian aid to UN agencies		Total Humanitarian Assistance	
	Ranking amongst donors	% of total funding	Ranking amongst donors	% of total funding
1995	N/A	2%	6	4%
1996	5	8%	5	7%
1997	4	7%	7	5%
1998	8	2%	9	2%

Source: UN CAPs for Sudan

The significance of DANIDA as a funder of Danish NGOs, globally, is presented in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3 Relative importance of DANIDA funding to Danish NGOs, globally, 1997 (DKK'000,000)¹⁶

funding	agency						
	DCA	SCF-D	DRC	MSF	ADRA	UNICEF (SS)	WFP (SS)
S3	69	12	85	2	4	15	5
total DANIDA	216	40	231	2	49	15	
total funding	294	66	257	5		119	178
% funds from S3	24%	19%	33%	39%	7%	13%	3%
% funds from DANIDA	73%	60%	90%	39%		13%	

¹⁶ Data for UNICEF and WFP taken from 1997CAP report (OCHA 1998). Data for ADRA reported during agency interview. Data for DCA, Red Barnet, DRC and MSF-D taken from figures compiled by MSF-D from the following sources:

DanChurchAid

1997 tal Folkekirkens Nodhjaelps Arsberetning 1997; side 3 og Arsregnskab 1997 side 34
 1998 tal DANIDAS NGO-samarbejde 1997; Bilag 3; Side 28
 1999-2002 tal DANIDA nyt 1 December 1998 side 15

Red Barnet

1997 tal Red Barnets Arsrapport 1997; side 22 og DANIDAS NGO-samarbejde 1997 side 24

Danish Red Cross

1997 tal Dansk Rod Kors Arsberetning 1997; sider 82-83
 1998 tal DANIDAS NGO-samarbejde 1997; Bilag 3; Side 28
 1999-2002 tal DANIDA nyt 1 December 1998 side 14

MSF-Denmark

1996, 1997 og 1998 tal Lager uden Graenser book-keeping 1997 og 1998 og Arsberetning 1996 Red cross

6. APPROPRIATENESS OF AID CHANNELS

6.1 Introduction

DANIDA's partners include both secular and church-based organisations, and embrace a wide range of mandates, extending from the 'purely' humanitarian to the more developmental. As discussed in chapters 8 and 10, this wide range of funding channels makes good use of available humanitarian space and provides flexibility in the type of response.

The findings of this evaluation, however, point to considerable variation in the capacity of DANIDA's different partners. These differences exist not only between different agencies, but also *within* particular agencies, in terms of their sectoral expertise and quality of their staff.

6.2 DANIDA's selection and funding of implementing partners

DANIDA's choice of implementing partners is heavily conditioned by its policy of active multilateralism and its desire to support Danish NGOs¹⁷. The framework for allocation of DANIDA's resources seems to be set more by these broad institutional goals than on the basis of detailed assessments of the capacity and comparative advantage of its different implementing partners.

DANIDA's mechanisms for approving grants are based on a high degree of trust of its implementing partners. There is no requirement for humanitarian assistance proposals or reports to be assessed by technical specialists.

- Similarly, because DANIDA has no regional presence, there is limited field contact with the agencies that DANIDA is funding, except for occasional field trips by S3 staff¹⁸. Thus, decisions to channel aid through a particular agency are rarely based on knowledge of the programme on the ground, but more on negotiations and discussion with the head office in Copenhagen (or New York or Geneva in the case of UNICEF and OCHA).
- It appears that little is committed to paper, in terms of the discussion around a particular proposal, or a decision not to provide funding¹⁹.

The previous chapter identified a number of trends in the way that Danish humanitarian assistance has been channeled to Sudan during the 1990s. In the absence of a country-specific humanitarian strategy for Sudan, these appear to be guided more by global DANIDA policies, for example, on active multi-lateralism.

¹⁷ It must be noted that Danish NGOs are seen to play an important role in raising public awareness within Denmark of international development and humanitarian issues, and thus indirectly encouraging public support for the official aid programme (personal communication, DANIDA officials).

¹⁸ Since 1997 there have been two visits by S3 staff to Sudan, at the end of 1997 and early in 1999.

¹⁹ For example, of the 20 applications that MSF-D has made to DANIDA for S3 funding between 1993 and 1999, 7 have been approved, 2 have been partially funded and 11 have been refused. For the latter, MSF-D claim they have never been given a reason, in writing or otherwise, as to why funding has been denied.

6.3 UN agencies and OLS

Despite its operational difficulties, the OLS framework is critical to the effective delivery of most humanitarian aid to the war-affected in Sudan. DANIDA's support to UN agencies which negotiate, facilitate and co-ordinate OLS is therefore entirely appropriate, particularly as co-ordination activities have tended to be poorly funded by donor agencies. The evaluators are of the view that UNICEF is best-placed to perform the role of programme co-ordinator in the southern sector, whilst significant efforts have been made to strengthen the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU) in Khartoum (both recipients of DANIDA funding). There is still scope for improving the co-ordination role, and scope for DANIDA to play a more active part in encouraging this. See Chapters 9 and 15.

A hallmark of DANIDA funding has been the lack of earmarking of most funds to multi-lateral agencies. This is widely welcomed by the agencies and has enabled them to set their own priorities and to fill funding gaps. It is consistent with a policy of active multilateralism, although more rigorous monitoring and evaluation would strengthen the approach (see Chapter 12).

Only rarely has DANIDA prioritised a particular sector, for example, supplementary and therapeutic feeding during the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine, when it prioritised funding to UNICEF over WFP (Nielson, 1998). But in doing so, it did not seem to base funding decisions on an adequate assessment of the technical capacity of different agencies, nor of the situation on the ground. As described in Chapter 14, UNICEF's slow procurement procedures meant that some of their food items (funded in this case by other donors) arrived too late. With DANIDA funding, the tight timeframe for disbursement stipulated in DANIDA grants meant that items were purchased according to the requirement to spend funds quickly rather than according to need. Overall, UNICEF was less efficient and effective in scaling up to implement nutrition and health interventions in the field compared with some international NGOs. It is therefore questionable whether this was an appropriate channel for funding.

In the northern sector, UNICEF has made efforts to adopt a more rights-based approach in its work, including a much less compliant attitude to government policies. For example, public statements on the issues of child abduction and slavery have caused considerable tensions. Although in the opinion of one close observer these reached the point early in 1999 where the agency faced expulsion (and may well have been a factor in such matters as the rejection of the ODI visa applications) it is perhaps more significant that UNICEF programmes, including those in such sensitive areas, have been allowed to continue without serious hindrance. Moreover, a considerable degree of success has been claimed for UNICEF's limited work on abduction and slavery, as well as a shift to 'behind the scenes diplomacy' as a substitute for maintaining a high public profile²⁰. The evaluation team was not, however, in a position to evaluate this process. It would seem to indicate that the caution long displayed by UN agencies vis à vis the government may sometimes be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the trade-off between constructive engagement

²⁰ There are certainly indications that the question of inter-ethnic abduction - which has a long history in the Sudan - is a considerable embarrassment to the government and there is indeed scope for constructive action.

and constraints on cooperation is very real, and often difficult to assess without detailed inside knowledge.

6.4 DANIDA's NGO partners

None of the Danish NGOs that receive funding for humanitarian work in Sudan is operational in the country. Instead, they all act as conduits for funding their sister agencies.

In the case of its four largest NGO partners²¹, DANIDA has carried out in-depth institutional capacity assessments. These studies were carried out at headquarters level; the second part - the planned fieldwork to assess programming capacity - was not completed. These are an important source of information for DANIDA, although do not cover the smaller Danish NGOs.

Current arrangements for allocating resources to NGO partners raise two key questions: first, whether and how DANIDA chooses the appropriate NGO for the task; second, the costs and benefits of using Danish organisations as intermediaries with other bodies

In response to the first question, DANIDA usually appears to be re-active to project proposals, and has limited knowledge of the relative strengths and weaknesses of its implementing partners. Whilst most of the NGO programmes visited were appropriate and relevant, there is evidence that DANIDA has, on occasion, funded partners to implement projects for which they are ill-suited. An example is the provision of funding to ADRA-Denmark, to enable ADRA-South Sudan to carry out nutritional activities during the Bahr El Ghazal famine in 1998. See Chapter 14.

With respect to the value added by the Danish 'conduit' NGOs, again the picture is mixed.

DCA has made an important contribution to humanitarian response, globally and in relation to Sudan more particularly. It played an important role in the establishment of Action by Churches Together (ACT), a coordinating body which aims to improve the ecumenical system's ability to respond to complex political emergencies, particularly by co-ordinating appeals. In both northern and southern sectors DCA has added value to Danish humanitarian assistance, enhancing its effectiveness and ensuring that it has been used in a transparent and accountable fashion.

In the northern sector, this has been achieved through DCA's reasonably close links with its implementing partner, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). The most significant outcome has been the suspension of humanitarian funding after 1996, when SCC failed to account adequately for DANIDA funds provided through DCA. This indicates that DCA has been serious in its quest for transparency and accountability, through supporting evaluations (notably the Femconsult evaluation of 1997 [Gibson and Hayward, 1997]) and being prepared to follow up and act on its recommendations. However, there is evidence that closer liaison and/or support would have enabled DCA to have had a more positive impact on the restructuring and overall capacity of SCC,

²¹ DCA, Red Barnet, DRC (although not strictly an NGO), and the Danish Refugee Council (which is not operational in Sudan).

increasing the possibility of restoring support for its emergency programme (which remains on the agenda of DCA)²².

From DANIDA's perspective, the suspension of ongoing support to SCC through DCA has left a major gap in its support for humanitarian work in government-controlled areas of Sudan, particularly since DCA is the NGO with the strongest connections to local structures and institutions - i.e. those of the churches.

In the southern sector, DCA has also played an important role. In 1994, DCA pressure for an external evaluation was an important influence behind the transformation of the Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium (SEOC) (Duffield et al. 1995). This evaluation initiated a process that over the next few years led to a complete change in orientation from large-scale food delivery into longer-term programming of relief for development with the establishment of CEAS. Since that time, DCA has supported six external evaluations of CEAS, all of which have been made available to DANIDA.

Red Barnet has struggled to add value in its intermediary role. This is partly because it acts as an intermediary to a comparable, though much larger, international NGO – SCF(UK). In recent years, with DANIDA's encouragement, Red Barnet has organised several evaluations of its contributions to SCF(UK) programmes in Sudan. These have yielded mixed, but generally positive, results. In the northern sector, where SCF(UK) is heavily dependent on DANIDA funding for its IDP programme in Khartoum, the relationship between SCF(UK) and Red Barnet has worked relatively well. Here the value-added of Red Barnet can be described as limited but generally positive. Aspects of the SCF(UK) programme which might be considered controversial, such as cooperation with government and Islamic NGOs, have not been significantly challenged by Red Barnet nor by DANIDA. It can be argued that the positive humanitarian impact of the programme should outweigh such concerns, since the political impact of such collaboration is quite limited. However, such factors should generate more active policy debate.

In the southern sector, differences in policy and approach between Red Barnet and SCF(UK) have strained the relationship, particularly in recent years. Nevertheless, Red Barnet has provided added value to the programme providing displaced persons' kits, in terms of design (based on consultation with IDPs) and evaluation (Madsen, 1997). This programme has been funded by DANIDA.

For **ADRA-Denmark**, the value added appears more limited. It was the recipient of one emergency grant in 1998 in the southern sector for biscuits and milk powder purchased in Denmark and passed onto ADRA-South Sudan. Both agencies had limited capacity and little experience of emergency nutritional programmes. In fact the majority of the food was passed on once again, to other NGOs with greater experience of emergency nutrition work, such as MERLIN and World Vision International. Although providing valuable food resources, ADRA-Denmark appears to have added little else. It has much less institutional experience in emergency aid, particularly in Sudan, compared with its development experience.

²² A consultant was seconded to help assist with monitoring of the emergency programme, with positive but limited impact since the person trained subsequently departed. Assistance with financial management would almost certainly have been more useful.

MSF-D is the smallest Danish NGO to have received humanitarian assistance funding from DANIDA. Despite its small size, MSF-D is seen to add particular value to DANIDA's humanitarian assistance programme. They raise public awareness of humanitarian issues and provide a relatively large number of volunteers to MSF programmes worldwide, and to Sudan in particular. In 1997 they placed eighteen volunteers in MSF programmes worldwide and during the three years 1996-1999 they have placed ten medical staff in Sudan. This contributes to the development of increasing expertise in the humanitarian sector in Denmark. In relation to their size, this ratio of volunteers to funding is the highest of any of the Danish NGOs evaluated here.

6.5 The Red Cross Movement

Similar questions emerge about the appropriateness and value added of the **DRC** as a conduit for funding. Here the picture is complex, since three other related agencies are involved: the ICRC, IFRC and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRC), the first two as primary beneficiaries and the last as a significant beneficiary of onward funding.

With respect to the ICRC, DRC exerts little influence over programming. Thus, the value added by DRC is limited, to the provision of ICRC delegates. ICRC exerts tight control over its operations, which extend across military lines in the geographical south of Sudan. The ICRC has had a difficult history in Sudan, and their operations there have been repeatedly interrupted. Most recently, in November 1996 there was a serious hostage-taking incident, which resulted in the suspension of all ICRC field activities for eighteen months.

The agency has strong logistical and human resource reserves and a high degree of professionalism in their organisation and management. In the sites visited in southern Sudan (the Lopiding hospital in northern Kenya and the Yirol clinics), the team was impressed by the quality of the programmes. ICRC also appears to have mounted an impressive (albeit late) response to the famine in 1998, despite the absence of any field presence in the months running up to the crisis. The poor transparency of ICRC makes thorough evaluation of this operation's efficiency and effectiveness impossible. (See also chapter 12).

In the northern sector, the ICRC works closely with the SRC, at a local and regional rather than at national level. Much less Danish assistance has flowed through the DRC to the IFRC - only at the beginning, and to a much lesser extent, right at the end of the period under review. The effectiveness of such assistance has depended considerably upon the capacity of the SRC, which has not been the subject of any systematic evaluation. However, the available information suggests that the SRC does have considerable capacity and that it is improving. Concerns persist regarding the neutrality of SRC in view of its close relationship with the GoS. Relations between the IFRC and the SRC cooled during the initial part of the review period when the SRC was seen to be particularly close to the ruling party in Sudan. Relations have been warming and co-operation increasing in recent years, although this has not involved DANIDA's humanitarian funding.

Superficially, there appears to have been some contradiction in DANIDA's attitude towards funding the SRC. As long as the funds are passed through ICRC it is acceptable, but not if passed through IFRC. However, there is a difference in how the two Red Cross agencies engage with a local Red Crescent society, with the former operating in a

more contractual manner, and the latter operating much more in partnership and with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the local society.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that involvement with the IFRC and DRC has enabled the SRC to retain or develop a degree of autonomy and independence that would otherwise have been impossible. Assessments of the extent of such autonomy vary considerably; as for all Sudanese NGOs compliance with general government policy is to be expected.

6.6 Issues for DANIDA

It is possible to draw a number of generic conclusions about DANIDA's selection of implementing partners and its subsequent ability to monitor their work:

Confining support to UN agencies and Danish NGOs restricts DANIDA's options. However, limiting the number of agencies certainly makes DANIDA's humanitarian programme more manageable - an important factor given its limited personnel resources. And the role of Danish NGOs in raising public awareness of humanitarian issues in Denmark is clearly of value to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The value added by Danish NGOs, as conduits for funding, varies considerably. It is appropriate that they be encouraged by DANIDA to add value, but this must be carefully planned to complement the strengths and address the weaknesses of their respective operational partners.

To maximise the advantages of DANIDA's flexible approach to funding, it is essential that the correct partners are chosen for the correct task. The current approach relies upon a high degree of trust of the UN and NGO bodies with whom DANIDA works. It has not always yielded a high degree of quality and transparency of humanitarian assistance. In particular, it is not supported by adequate monitoring and evaluation.

Currently, DANIDA has inadequate information about the strengths and weaknesses of its implementing partners, in general and in relation to their specific competence in the field. Criteria are lacking to appraise different applications and so determine whether or not DANIDA should support a particular project. The lack of transparent criteria and technical support has meant that on occasion DANIDA has supported inappropriate projects, while not funding others that might have merited support.

The lack of a field presence further weakens DANIDA's ability to develop an analysis of humanitarian need and on the basis of this to prioritise its funding.

An external evaluation such as this cannot substitute for improved procedures within DANIDA, to enable more systematic appraisal of proposals. Indeed, there is a risk that an evaluation such as this may present a biased and static view of what is a complex and

rapidly changing environment.²³ Rather, what is required is an increase in DANIDA's capacity to manage its humanitarian assistance programme.

Despite these reservations, the spread of agencies (including OLS/ non OLS), and programmes funded does appear to have been broadly appropriate to the situation in Sudan.

²³ For example, ADRA received only one grant that falls under the terms of reference of this evaluation. This grant was for an emergency nutrition programme, which is not part of ADRA's core competence. Given the constraints and difficulties of such an operation in the context of Sudan, and ADRA's lack of expertise, this programme appears to have been poor. However it is not appropriate to judge the overall capacity and performance of ADRA Denmark, or even ADRA South Sudan, on the basis of the limited findings in this report.

7. NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND APPEALS: THE STARTING POINT OF A HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

7.1 Analysis and understanding of the long-term context

All agencies are aware that they are operating in a protracted complex political emergency. And they give due weight to the war and its subsidiary conflicts as a central component of the emergency. However, the analysis is sometimes over-simplified, ignoring or under-estimating the unequal and exploitative relationships within Sudanese society and the economy, most evident in the case of IDPs. These exploitative relationships constitute a root cause of the conflict and of the famine, and serve to perpetuate both.

Agencies rarely prepare situation analyses that articulate explicitly their understanding of the causes and dynamics of the complex political emergency. This reluctance stems in part from a fear of jeopardising their neutrality but may also act as a disincentive to develop such political analysis. Yet to operate efficiently in Sudan, agencies must be politically informed which does not mean taking a political position in relation to the conflict, nor being driven by a particular political perspective.

In this context, at least in public, agencies are forced to rely upon an understanding of vulnerability which is largely based upon socio-economic and nutritional indicators. This tends to ignore the inherently political nature of vulnerability. As war is a direct cause of people's vulnerability, it is of concern that there are no formal mechanisms to monitor political trends in order to inform a vulnerability analysis. The excellent information collected by the UN's security officers, particularly in the southern sector, for example, is not accessible to programme managers (Bradbury, 1999). This is because security officers are given unparalleled access on condition that they use the information only for security planning, otherwise keeping information confidential. The poor separation between the 'technical' and the political is also problematic. Basic demographic data, for example, is highly sensitive, as it reflects the fluctuating fortunes of war – how many people are living in areas under the control of different authorities.

One way of acknowledging the political determinants of vulnerability is by adopting a more 'rights-based' approach to programming. UNICEF is at the fore of this approach globally and in Sudan, at least in theory. The adoption of this approach does appear to have led to major shifts in understanding of vulnerability by UNICEF and other agencies which purport to be going down this route. UNHCU has also undertaken some important initiatives in the area of human rights and protection.

7.2 Annual needs assessments and appeals: analysis and interpretation of information

The annual needs assessment exercise in Sudan takes place in September-October, after the harvest. This process of needs assessment provides (at least in theory), the technical basis for the design of relief programmes and for fundraising, in particular for the launch of the CAP.

Within OLS, WFP and UNICEF have lead agency status for the food and non-food sectors respectively. This includes responsibility for needs assessment and for

prioritising programmes. In doing so, OLS compiles information from a variety of sources, using a variety of methods:

- baseline annual food economy assessments in selected areas (September and October);
- sporadic food economy assessments conducted according to perceived needs;
- on-going UN and NGO assessments and surveys;
- distribution monitoring;
- SRRA population assessments;

Needs assessment procedures have been criticized as lacking standardization between different agencies (Macaskill, 1999). Until 1996, the assessment methodologies used to identify need differed significantly between the two sectors. The coverage and methodology of the assessment process was particularly problematic in the northern sector, with tight governmental control and poor technical quality a recurrent theme (Karim et al, 1996). By contrast, there was much greater freedom for needs assessment in the southern sector; the greater quality and quantity of humanitarian space in rebel-held areas encouraged innovation in assessment methodologies, particularly in relation to food security. Some of these criticisms from 1996 remain valid; others have been addressed. Generally, it is important to place these criticisms in the context of the huge constraints facing humanitarian agencies, particularly regarding access.

In addition to OLS needs assessment, all the agencies funded by DANIDA also conducted their own assessments. It appears that there was generally good co-operation between agencies with joint assessment and sharing of results both within and outside of OLS. The Food Economy Approach (FEA) was pioneered by SCF(UK), and has been one of the most important assessment innovations in Sudan. It has provided the mainstay for the annual needs assessment exercise in the southern sector since 1994.

Since 1997, following the criticism of the OLS Review, the FEA has been used in the northern sector as well. Similar methods for disaggregating data at a regional level and a joint questionnaire to assess non-food needs are now used to ensure consistency of approach across the sectors.

The FEA attempts to quantify food deficits experienced by a particular population, both in terms of the percentage of households facing a deficit and the size of that deficit for each representative household. The validity of the FEA in complex political emergencies has been questioned on a variety of grounds. However, the details of these criticisms are beyond the remit of this evaluation²⁴.

²⁴ For example, the assumption of stability implicit in the October – November assessment of needs does not sufficiently acknowledge the central role that instability and displacement play in reducing access to food. The FEA does not fully recognise that there may be crises where everyone is in need of food aid nor does it examine social dynamics or power relations, focusing instead on relatively static economic groups. Many communities are now so well-versed in the food economy approach, and in WFP's targeting criteria, that it is difficult to really get to know what communities think, let alone what they actually do (and even if they do say what they think, SRRA knows what they should think and will translate by giving the "correct" answer) (Jaspers, personal communication).

Despite its technical limitations, the FEA did predict the 1998 famine in sufficient time to allow a prompt response (see also chapter 14.) Critical, however, was the failure of the relevant agencies to translate data from the needs assessment process into a representative and successful appeal.

The robustness of the FEA as a tool to inform objective appeals has been tarnished by distrust of population figures in Sudan. Poor access to populations has further complicated a problem already difficult even in peaceful but poor environments, where population data are often scarce and unreliable. WFP has relied upon the warring parties for population data, supplemented by its own rough counts of those attending distributions within a limited radius from which they could have come. A further problem has been the reliance of WFP on expatriate staff to conduct assessments, who in turn rely upon the SRRA for translation services. This has provided plenty of scope for selective use of information

Overcoming these difficulties in Sudan will not be straightforward or rapid. WFP is increasing its field presence through the deployment of national staff. But it is conscious of the need to protect its staff from intimidation from the warring parties, and that it will take time to develop the necessary skills and confidence in its staff. Such a long-term project requires sustained funding support.

But until more robust systems are in place, donors continue to lack confidence in the needs assessment process which underpins the appeal. A vicious cycle has emerged whereby donors' assumptions that appeals routinely overstate need leads operational agencies to reduce appeals in line with what they envisage donors will tolerate. For example, in 1998 despite a bleak needs assessment predicting a very serious famine, the annual appeal for funds was actually *lower* than that of the previous year. Such 'budget-based' needs assessment further undermines the credibility of the process, and any claims that assessments and appeals are objective and technically based.

Recognizing these difficulties, particularly after the 1998 famine experience, OLS has created a Food Security Analysis Group to disseminate more widely relevant information and to prompt more timely response. In addition, the credibility of the FEA methodology and its role in early warning is to be enhanced. The number of dedicated staff is being increased.²⁵, and regular assessments are being introduced throughout the year. These will use a systematic sampling frame to cover areas with different food economy zones.

Other strategies to enhance donor support for the annual appeal include direct discussions between OLS and donors. For example, some donors engage in pre-appeal discussions at the end of the calendar year in order to define priorities and to indicate areas and scale of likely support. DANIDA does not undertake such consultations, relying instead upon the information generated for the CAP. Arguably, the UN has failed to advocate sufficiently vociferously for enhanced financial support for the operation, and to explain to donor governments and their publics the impact of

²⁵ In particular WFP has recruited 15 field staff dedicated to assessments and improved the training of all other field staff. At the time of writing they are also in the process of hiring Sudanese field staff.

consistent under-funding (see section 8.2)²⁶. The need for donors to be better informed and involved in the needs assessment process was highlighted in a recent report commissioned by OLS (Grunewald et al, 1998). Whether these measures will result in donors increasing resource flows to the emergency remains to be seen. In the view of the team, lack of donor confidence in the appeal is an important factor responsible for the downward trend in financing relief in Sudan.

While operational agencies have developed increasingly complex concepts to understand the nature of food insecurity and of famine, the donor community seems to remain locked into a relatively old model of famine. The evidence suggests that, in the absence of pictures of people actually starving, donors are slow to mobilize emergency aid funds. In other words, rather than seeing relief as a means of reducing the vulnerability of communities facing a series of chronic and acute threats to their lives and livelihoods, emergency aid is often seen as being necessary only when all else has failed.

Such an approach fails to capture adequately the nature of famine and the way in which relief aid can be used most effectively to reduce it. The effects of a prolonged war, fought against and through the civilian population, combined with structural poverty, underdevelopment and vulnerability to natural hazards have left Sudan's population particularly at risk. The level of human need is such that the often talked-about need for 'prioritization' of relief inputs is inherently problematic. 'Prioritization' necessarily entails rationing even the most basic goods required for survival – choosing between adequate nutrition or water or medical supplies. Thus, despite donor complaints, the CAP is already prioritized to an extent that would be considered negligent in the context of other crises, such as that in Kosovo.

These pressures on resources reflect the fact that there are many competing pressures on donor governments to respond to emergencies, and in particular to respond to the latest and most visible emergencies. The Sudanese emergency has persisted while 'new' crises in the Great Lakes, Bosnia and most recently Kosovo have demanded attention. Maintaining public and political support to finance these chronic, seemingly endless, political emergencies is now a major issue affecting Sudan.

Even if the assessment and appeals procedures worked perfectly, to produce accurate information and adequate funding, utilizing both these commodities is constrained by the *timing* of these procedures. The value of the information collected and presented to donors is time-limited, relying upon all actors having and acting upon the information at the right time. The CAP is presented to donors in Geneva and New York in February, only two months before the window of opportunity for cheap land transport and for useful seed distributions in the south has closed²⁷. Usually the donors take time to

²⁶ For example, in the run up to the 1998 famine, UNICEF in particular appeared reluctant to shout to the donors about the impending famine for fear of being accused of being alarmist. For example, as late as May, at a time when mass displacement and a total breakdown of food security had already occurred, road access was impossible and WFP had a very low air-life capacity, the Head of OLS southern sector still underplayed the problem, denying the existence of famine (USAID, personal communication). Similarly, DCA did not approach DANIDA for additional funding, believing that their application would be refused.

²⁷ Apparently attempts are being made to release the CAP earlier in 1999 by or before December.

respond and therefore efficiency gains of using land transport and the possibilities of increasing the populations' resilience are lost. (Chapter 11 provides a more detailed analysis on issues of timeliness).

8. COVERAGE

8.1 Introduction

The extent to which actual and assessed needs are met is determined by a complex interplay of factors. These relate to factors within the aid system itself, in particular the availability of resources and the choices made by aid agencies regarding how these resources are deployed. Coverage is also determined by wider political and institutional factors. This chapter examines these aspects of coverage. It also assesses the impact of inadequate and uneven coverage on the health and well-being of populations in Sudan.

The constraints of conducting accurate needs assessment outlined above (see chapter 7), and the fact that there are few statistics which correlate need with delivery and impact, mean it is difficult to measure accurately the extent and quality of coverage. This remains a notable weakness in an operation that has been in place for so long.

8.2 The impact of donor under-funding and resourcing

A necessary condition for achieving adequate coverage is the availability of sufficient funds. In contrast to other donors, DANIDA has been increasing its support for the UN operation in Sudan (see Chapter 5 and, in particular, Figure 5.1). However, this additional support has not been sufficient to counter the overall trend of diminishing funding of the UN operation. (See Figure 5.2). UNICEF, which takes the lead in the provision of basic health and education supplies and in water and sanitation, has been constantly under-funded. In 1997, for example, \$32 million dollars was requested, only half of which was received.

According to many of those interviewed during the course of this evaluation, NGOs working in the southern sector are facing similar funding constraints. As described in section 8.5, the funding constraints are particularly acute in Government-held areas.

This chronic under-funding has resulted in an under-investment in the humanitarian system itself, and in particular in its preparedness and response mechanisms. This in turn has had a negative impact on the capacity of relief agencies to respond adequately, particularly in relation to an acute emergency, such as the famine in Bahr El Ghazal in 1998 (see Chapter 14).

More fundamentally, it means that the population lacks access to the most basic services. For example, in two of the three southern provinces, less than 20 percent of the population is believed to have access to clear water (Kwacakworo, 1993). In 1992, it was estimated that only 11 percent of the population had sufficient access to health care, a figure unlikely to have improved significantly since that time (*Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Sudan*, quoted in MSF Holland 1998).

The poor level of international financial support for the relief operation in Sudan implies that the international community accepts the extremely high level of deprivation as being 'normal', and not requiring particular or special support. In the context of an on-going war where none of the warring parties seems able or willing to prioritize meeting the most basic needs of the populations under their control, this under-funding contributes to further deprivation.


8.3 Standards of coverage

The OLS Review concluded that the UN had failed to quantify the implications of a sustained gap between estimation of need and actual aid receipts. It argued that this contributed to a lack of confidence in the appeals process: it did not seem to matter if all the funds requested were not forthcoming – the impact was not quantified.

A striking feature of the relief operation in Sudan is that aid agencies have revised downwards the standards to which they are working. For example, until September 1998 WFP estimated need based upon a calculation of families' access to all sources of food, including wild foods, using a theoretical 'normal' requirement of only 1900 Kcals per person per day. This was 200Kcals per day below the internationally recognized minimum ration and represented insufficient food to survive in the long-term (Ville de Goyet et al, 1978). It was only once populations were considered unable to meet this revised, lower target that they were considered to be 'in need' and qualified for access to relief. In other words, levels of need which would be expected to attract a large scale emergency response were being considered as 'normal'.

These modifications have had a substantial impact. Figure 8.1 is a statistical representation of the impact of this increase in the threshold determining populations' entitlement to access relief.

Figure 8.1 Theoretical cumulative frequency plot demonstrating the effect of targeting based on "A" 1900 Kcal and "B" 2,100, on the percentage of a population eligible for food aid assistance



Put simply, the figure represents two theoretical populations, one 'vulnerable', the other more 'resilient'. It then illustrates the effect of changing the criteria of eligibility to relief on these two different groups. What it shows is that increasing the threshold at which populations become eligible for relief, results in an absolute reduction in the (target) availability of food to the population, and has a disproportionate impact on the most

needy. Adjusting the target from 2100 to 1900 Kcals, reduces the access to relief of more than twice as many 'vulnerable' people compared with the 'resilient' population.

Furthermore, the policy of waiting until people are effectively destitute, increases the pace at which populations become impoverished. In order to survive, those people already at the margins have to sell their remaining assets, or adopt other survival strategies that may have a negative long-term impact on their health and livelihoods. The policy impoverishes the community, since it results in increased pressure on those food supplies which are available, requiring communities to spread their resources more thinly.

In the Sudanese context, the proportion of the population that is vulnerable is very high. Quiet modification of internationally accepted standards has had a profound impact on their welfare and health. The tactics of war have de-capitalized an already poor population. Aid policies have *de facto* reinforced this process, forcing people to divest themselves of those assets they have managed to retain in order to survive


WFP South Sudan was aware that in revising their criteria for entry into relief programmes, international standards were being severely compromised. They argued that this had proved necessary because of funding constraints. An alternative analysis would suggest that in making such an adjustment, WFP was masking still further the extent of unmet need in Sudan in absolute and relative terms, and was thus complicit in a wider failure of the international community to meet basic standards of health and welfare²⁸.

The targeting strategy pursued by WFP assumed that even these reduced quantities of aid could be delivered. But in Sudan, this has been constantly compromised by logistical, political and military factors, further diminishing the quality and quantity of coverage.

Figure 8.2 shows the actual versus planned deliveries of food aid to the OLS southern sector in 1995-1998. It illustrates that in the 42 months between August 1995 and December 1998, WFP has met or exceeded their targets for food aid distribution only four times. This inability to meet targets, combined with an inappropriately stringent threshold for eligibility, has resulted in a great shortfall in the amount of food actually received by populations.

²⁸ Although WFP reinstated the 2100 Kcal requirement towards the end of 1998, following a Nutrition Assessment Mission by A. Hudacek, the 1900 Kcal figure was being used during planning for the response to the 1998 famine.

Figure 8.2: Actual versus planned deliveries of food aid into the southern sector 1995-1998



Source: WFP Lokichokkio

8.4 Security and negotiated access

A central reason behind the formation of OLS was to facilitate access for the provision of humanitarian relief.²⁹ OLS has achieved some success increasing the number of sites served by air from 7 in 1992, through 126 in 1996 up to a high of 250 at the end of 1997.

However, the quality and quantity of this access fluctuate considerably during the year according to the military and political climate. Restriction of access at vital times, together with systematic disruption of livelihoods and coping mechanisms, were central causes of the famine in 1998, see chapter 14.

Since the SPLA took several important towns on the road to Bahr El Ghazal in 1997 there have been greater opportunities for road transport into the province during the first four months of the year. This reduces transport costs and the Operation's vulnerability to flight bans, thereby increasing coverage. In 1999 OLS has started to take advantage of this route with 3,000MT of food transported by road into South Sudan in April. However, the poor condition of the roads, and the political indecision by donor governments as to whether or not to finance their repair, has precluded substantial investment.³⁰ Consequently, this route and the prospects for increased access and cost-efficiency that it represents continue to be under-utilised.

²⁹ "The relationship between the creation of humanitarian space and the flow of assistance to war affected populations is the basis for Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)....". see UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Terms of Reference For an OLS Review"

³⁰ In 1999 USAID has begun to invest in road building.

Insecurity and political obstacles have been by far the most significant factors limiting the coverage of the humanitarian operation in Sudan. Parts of Blue and Upper Nile provinces have remained almost completely inaccessible for much of the period covered by this evaluation. In other parts of Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, insecurity has frequently precluded access for agencies and destroyed programmes on the ground.

In addition to actual fighting, the political interests of warring parties have led to persistent manipulation of humanitarian access. For example, since 1995, the GoS has systematically prevented access to northern Bahr El Ghazal during the vital period before the April/May planting seasons. It has done this either by promoting insecurity or by imposing flight-bans on the grounds of insecurity. This restriction of access at vital times forms part of a wider strategy of famine creation, in turn part of the tactics of war. The implications of this political manipulation of relief operations in Sudan are discussed further in Chapter 13.

The refusal of the GoS to allow agencies to work in the Nuba Mountains, an area of acute conflict, human rights abuse and humanitarian need, is a strong example of the subordination of humanitarian concerns to political and military criteria. The UN has made considerable efforts to secure access to the region, but with little effect. In June 1999, the Director of OCHA, Geneva, spent four days in the region with a small UN Team. This was the first UN visit for ten years, and represents a potentially important step forward in international efforts to access the Nuba with a second assessment mission under preparation. But, in the opinion of many observers, this initiative is too little too late - the UN could and should have taken a tougher stance on this issue, raising the stakes in the negotiations with the Government on the assumption that it would concede rather than countenance further political isolation. This is certainly an arena in which donors have a legitimate place.

However, here, as elsewhere, DANIDA's voice appears to have been quite muted. DANIDA has not actively intervened in order to try to increase humanitarian space in the Nuba or elsewhere. Denmark has not lobbied the GoS with respect to flight bans nor engaged with the SPLA regarding its decision to expel Action Contre le Faim (ACF) from Twic County, an event that prompted a more concerted response from other donors. Denmark was also absent from the recent IGAD Partners Forum.

8.5 The coverage of DANIDA-funded programmes: an overview

DANIDA relies upon its NGO and UN partners to channel assistance. These in turn depend upon their implementing partners (particularly in the case of NGOs) to plan, establish and implement different types of programme in different areas of the country. In this context, DANIDA has little scope to plan its support to Sudan strategically to ensure adequate coverage.

This does not necessarily make the response inappropriate, but it does set definite limits. Within the existing political status quo, however, DANIDA's funding of OLS, non-OLS and the Red Cross has succeeded in maximizing the available humanitarian space, but not in increasing it. Implementing through the Red Cross and CEAS has enabled DANIDA funding to reach locations such as the southern part of Blue Nile and the northern part of Upper Nile provinces, when the GoS has denied OLS permission to work. CEAS in particular has been instrumental in the implementation of several OLS

projects in these regions.³¹ Thus, DANIDA's broad spread of funding to many different agencies has been important in maintaining flexibility in the face of insecurity, limiting the extent to which security constraints on single agencies affects access to DANIDA funded projects as a whole.³²

However, the extent to which this approach can increase humanitarian space is extremely limited. Non-OLS agencies usually rely on OLS to provide them with 'cover', only flying into South Sudan when OLS is also operating flights. On the occasions when total flight-bans have been imposed, CEAS has also grounded relief flights for fear that their planes would be shot down.

8.6 Coverage of DANIDA-funded programmes: political and institutional dimensions

In a conflict that is played out in part along ethnic lines, ensuring equitable coverage across groups is a humanitarian imperative. In a context where political divisions have been institutionalised in the aid response, through the development of different co-ordination regimes between Government-held and rebel-held sectors, this issue is further complicated.

Although all DANIDA-funded agencies working in Government areas are also working in rebel-held areas, the balance of their programmes reflects their own organisational priorities. DANIDA's move towards funding more work in the rebel-held sector (see figure 5.6), appears to be influenced more by circumstance than by design. The most significant factor determining reduced coverage of DANIDA's programme in the north was the loss of its principal channel for funding, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) through DCA. Funding to SCC was stopped in 1996 as a result of problems with accountability.

The disproportionate allocation to the rebel sector (apparently not based on strategic decisions by DANIDA) is problematic, given the extent of the humanitarian needs in Government-held areas. There is a danger that this compromises the impartiality of the humanitarian response.

Any attempt by DANIDA to redress the balance between work in Government- and rebel-held areas is critically dependent on the capacities and historical responsibilities of the agencies it supports. Its current list of NGO partners does not provide much scope for increasing coverage in Government-held areas. This leaves the UN and the Red Cross as the primary mechanisms to redress the current inequality in the distribution of resources across the sectors.

Within the different sectors, agencies have sought to work with all population groups,

³¹ On several occasions, CEAS has facilitated OLS programmes, providing small amounts of cargo transportation during flight-bans. For example the UNICEF hand pump project and the OLS polio vaccination campaign in Blue Nile province both benefited from these services in 1998.

³² For example, after Kerubino took their staff hostage in Wunroc the ICRC suspended all operations in South Sudan for 18 months. However, although ICRC were a relative major channel of DANIDA funding the existence of many other NGO and UN partners allowed DANIDA to redirect the funds elsewhere

irrespective of their ethnic and religious origins. Several of the DANIDA-funded NGOs, such as SCF(UK) and CEAS, have strategies of working both in SPLA (Dinka) and SSIM (Nuer) areas. Others such as MSF-B, although only operational in SPLA areas, have sister organisations such as MSF-H, which maintain a balance by operating on the other side of this ethnic and political divide. However, OLS and non-OLS agencies alike have achieved poorer coverage in SSIM areas, principally Upper Nile, where the population has extremely limited access to basic services such as health and education. The continuing insecurity in this region and the extremely poor road communications have been the major factors behind this. Without peace it is difficult to see how humanitarian space in this province can improve.

8.7 Internally Displaced Persons

Although there has been no systematic census, UNHCU estimates that Sudan has four million internally displaced people, more than any other country in the world. Of these 2.5 million are in Government-controlled regions of the country, primarily in squatter areas, but also in other urban settlements or in specially designated camps. These IDPs are distributed as follows:

Table 8.1 Location and numbers of internally displaced persons in Sudan

Location	Number of displaced persons
Khartoum State	1,800,000
White Nile	55,000
North Kordofan	17,000
South Kordofan	200,000
Upper Nile	6,000
South Darfur	140,000
Bahr El Ghazal	75,000
Equatoria	115,000
Blue Nile	20,000
Kassala	45,000
Port Sudan	15,000

Source: UNHCU, Population Estimates for IDPs in Government Areas in Sudan, March 1999

Conflict, insecurity and the destruction of economic opportunities in places of origin, almost invariably in south Sudan, comprise the overwhelming reasons for this massive displacement. Economic and physical insecurity remains a dominant feature in the lives of most displaced people, many of whom have been subject to multiple displacements. Ostensibly this repeated displacement is in the interests of 'urban planning'. In fact, it derives from a policy of dispersal and/or fragmentation of communities seen by the Government as a political threat - as well as a source of potential economic profit.

Life for IDPs is generally characterised by acute poverty and underemployment. In their struggle for survival most face a range of discriminatory practices based on ethnic stereotyping and racism. Urbanisation and government manipulation of traditional leadership leads to further fragmentation and diminution of social capital and solidarity. At the local level, the politics of displaced communities are heavily influenced by

patrimony and clientalism, and are almost invariably conducted along ethnic lines. In the opinion of one commentator:

Since 1988, GoS has been clear and consistent in terms of general state policy toward displaced Southerners. Economically, the issue is one of making displaced Southerners an integral and self-supporting labour component of the agrarian and urban economy of Northern Sudan. Politically, through acculturation, education, urban planning and Islamisation, Southerners are to be re-socialised as new Sudanese citizens. Taken together, this incorporation defines the place of Southerners within the historic project of political Islam. (Duffield et al, forthcoming, early draft)

In 1996, the OLS Review argued that the internally displaced living in Government-held areas had been largely neglected by the international community. Government had used its authority as the sovereign power to effectively block UN initiatives to respond to the needs of the displaced. It concluded that the UN had not challenged this state of affairs sufficiently, apparently accepting it as the price to be paid for access to rebel-held areas. This situation does not seem to have changed substantively.

Given the size of the affected communities, the impact of national and international aid agencies is distinctly limited. A recent study of displaced communities in Khartoum indicates that less than 10% of this population derives direct benefits from the activities of aid agencies (Loveless, 1999, p.43). Despite this very low figure, several of the agencies interviewed during this evaluation felt that overall the coverage of this population was reasonable, although none provided hard evidence to support these claims.

The above study also reports, although does not quantify, continuing child malnutrition within these communities. Alarming rates of malnutrition are reported from long-established camps at Ed'Dien in South Darfur and El Nahud in West.

Despite some recent changes, influenced by moves towards a more rights-based approach, agency interventions have been overwhelmingly in the field of the provision of health and education services. Less often and usually less successfully, there have been developmental programmes, the prospects for which remain extremely limited.

Lack of resources and the size of the communities involved are major challenges to agency intervention and funding in support of, or in defence of, IDPs in Sudan, even to the extent of accurately assessing and meeting their most basic needs. Under-funding, described above, directly impacts on the ability of humanitarian agencies to develop effective and adequate coverage in displaced communities.

Relief programmes undoubtedly meet some needs, but do not (and do not claim to) address the root causes of the marginalization and exploitation of the displaced communities. Needs are still seen primarily in terms of indicators of poverty, health and nutrition, with such research as exists largely based at a household level. Wider political and social dynamics receive less attention.

Of the NGOs, Red Barnet/SCF-UK, with DANIDA encouragement, have gone furthest in producing studies and policy papers which begin to address the issue. In the words of the study they commissioned on IDPs (Loveless, 1999, p.44, italics in original):

Many NGOs avoid political issues. They believe that politics do(es) not fall within their mandate and that they are constrained by their own countries' charity laws and the laws of Sudan. Both points are valid. However, these attitudes are sometimes pursued to the degree that political considerations are not taken into account in the planning of programmes.....*It is argued here that there is no such thing as an apolitical programme...* What is important is that policy-makers take full account of political factors influencing their work....*Constructive and critical engagement with the Government is vital if real progress is to be made.*

In the absence of field visits by the principal evaluators, it is difficult to assess the extent to which UN agencies have been able to develop a twin-track approach while able to embrace the needs of displaced and war-affected communities for assistance and protection, although UNHCU's IDP Programme appears to be an important attempt.

Despite a number of constraints, DANIDA has demonstrated some interest in moving on from the conventional approach of limited service provision amongst Sudan's enormous population of IDPs. It has supported analytical and practical work on the internally displaced. Improving the analytical basis of policy is crucially important if appropriate interventions are to be developed. The IDPs in northern Sudan remain a hugely disadvantaged and exploited section of the population. Development of a more coherent country policy by DANIDA should give high priority to defence of their rights and interests.

8.8 Issues and implications for DANIDA

The scale of humanitarian need in Sudan is overwhelming and is beyond the capacity of any single donor or agency to meet. Although the humanitarian system as a whole appears unable to quantify the extent to which it is meeting, or failing to meet, this need, there are important signs of under-provision of relief to those in need on all sides of the conflict. Further, the aid that is being provided is not always allocated on the basis of need, but rather reflects institutional priorities and capacities.

Many factors determine the often thin and uneven coverage of humanitarian need in Sudan. DANIDA has proved ill-equipped to influence any of these in a strategic and significant way, partly as a result of its very limited regional presence. It has not engaged in negotiations with the warring parties to enhance humanitarian space, nor has it actively sought to underpin the UN's efforts to maintain and increase access, particularly by keeping open air routes.

Chronic under-funding of the humanitarian operation has resulted in under-investment in the physical and human infrastructure required to ensure effective and timely response. Thus, for example, the constraints to expanding the logistical capacity of OLS have hampered the operation, limiting its ability to take advantage of access when it is secured. DANIDA's relatively sustained support of UN operations is important, but has not been able to compensate for the global decline in support for OLS and more generally in response to the emergency in Sudan.

The environment of chronic under-funding, coupled with a lack of engagement by donors, including DANIDA, on strategic issues has resulted in a *de facto* acceptance by the international community of unacceptable levels of malnutrition and ill-health within

the Sudanese population. This is expressed most vividly in the erosion of international standards for targeting limited resources.

The lack of a clearly stated strategy with respect to assistance to Sudan means that DANIDA lacks a mechanism to ensure actively the impartiality of its programme. Its lack of strategic engagement with partner organisations, means that coverage tends to be defined by opportunity, rather than need. This approach has resulted in unequal coverage between Government and rebel-held sectors, and in inadequate provision of assistance to the internally displaced, one of the most vulnerable population groups in the country.

9. COORDINATION

9.1 Introduction

Strong coordination is critical to the effectiveness of the humanitarian response in Sudan, for example, to negotiate humanitarian access in the most efficient and effective way, to ensure coherence of the operation and to avoid duplication and promote complementarity of the aid effort. Improved coordination of international humanitarian assistance has been a policy priority for the Danish Government, which was instrumental in the establishment of DHA in the early 1990s.

Coordination is central to the OLS framework. The UN Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations in Sudan (UNCERO), based in Khartoum, has overall coordination responsibility for OLS. But in practice, in the northern sector humanitarian aid coordination functions are split uneasily between the UN and the GoS. In the southern sector coordination functions are more simply the responsibility of the UN, specifically UNICEF.

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Sudan also plays an important role, for example in negotiating access and addressing major security issues.

This evaluation focuses principally on coordination within OLS. Coordination functions are divided into:

- Strategic coordination (i.e. dealing with the political/ humanitarian interface)
- Technical/programme coordination (i.e. dealing with programme and operational issues)

9.2 The coordination challenge

There are a number of reasons why coordination is particularly challenging in the Sudan context:

- The very different operational environments in the northern and southern sectors: the former is tightly controlled by the GoS, where programming may have more to do with GoS approval than actual need, and coordination functions are severely constrained. Meanwhile, the southern sector is a more liberal contractual environment where the UN has much greater scope to play an active coordination role.
- Nevertheless, in the southern sector the absence of formal state structures means that the UN must fulfil many of the coordination functions usually undertaken by the state. But it must also interact with the humanitarian wings of the rebel movements, which have weak institutional and human resource capacities, and are only nominally independent of military and political control.

- The growing number of agencies operating within the OLS framework: in the southern sector, 42 agencies by March 1999³³, with a further 14 NGOs, the ICRC and the humanitarian wings of the three major rebel factions in South Sudan operating outside the OLS consortium. There is a much smaller number of agencies operating in the northern sector.
- In the southern sector, the increasing number of locations reached by humanitarian agencies operating within OLS: from 7 locations in 1992 to over 200 in 1999. Many agencies are working in active war zones, variously controlled by four different political authorities and many only accessible by air for large parts of the year. There is a wide range of geographical variation, and of conditions and logistical problems in the large area covered by the southern sector.
- Amongst the agencies operating within OLS (both in the northern, but especially the southern sectors), the wide ranges of expertise, scale, mandate, funding base, advocacy stance and mode of operation.
- In the southern sector, for historical reasons, UNICEF having to expand its usual range of activities to an unprecedented extent to act as lead agency³⁴, providing many of the underlying support functions for OLS. This includes security, logistics, establishing and developing ground rules, as well as acting as the focal point for political liaison with counterparts such as SRRA and RAAS. Within the agency (particularly at headquarters level), and amongst donors, the implications of this for management, staffing and other resources do not appear to have been grasped fully, nor provided for (see section 9.7 below).

9.3 Strategic coordination

The OLS Review was highly critical of the ‘*de facto* division of OLS into Northern and Southern sectors (which) has produced a critical flaw in the political coherence of the operation’ (Karim et al, 1996:2). They argued that this compromised a key OLS principle – access to war-affected people regardless of their location – which was not ‘robustly pursued’ in the northern sector. They also argued that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative was an inappropriate candidate for the position of UNCERO, because of a conflict of interest between development processes where the GoS is perceived as a development partner, and negotiations for humanitarian purposes where it is perceived as a warring party. They commented negatively upon the unclear relations between UN agencies in the northern and southern sectors, and upon the apparent contradiction for UNICEF, operating as coordinator in the southern sector, yet also having to maintain and support its own operations.

³³ There are 39 national and international NGOs, 3 UN agencies (UNICEF, WFP and the World Health Organisation [WHO]), all funded by approximately 16 donor agencies.

³⁴ Nowhere else in the world does UNICEF perform this role in an emergency operation with the exception of Iraq, between 1992 and 1996 where it unofficially acted as lead agency for coordination in Kurdish areas. In the southern sector in Sudan, it has assumed this role because of the pioneering work of the then-Executive Director, James Grant, in 1989, setting up the ‘corridors of tranquility’ for the delivery of humanitarian relief, with UNICEF taking the lead, formalised in the 1994 OLS agreement.

A number of changes have been instituted since, in response to the OLS Review:

1) Leadership, and clarification of roles

Coordination has been unified by clarifying the role of the UNCERO as overall coordinator of OLS, in both sectors. A number of other measures have been taken to strengthen coordination between the northern and southern sectors (see below), in the interests of strengthening the political coherence of OLS. However, the recommendation to separate the role of UNCERO from the role of UNDP Resident Representative was rejected by UN agencies at headquarters level. It was seen to contradict the UN's commitment to maintaining a unified managerial and coordination structure wherever the UN is operational (OLS, 1999a). Some donors have criticised this decision. The evaluation team has found it difficult to assess, not least because of the lack of access to the northern sector for the principal evaluators. It is worth noting that the UNCERO position is now OCHA's responsibility, an indication that humanitarian concerns have been given primacy over developmental ones³⁵. In practice, the personality and experience of the UNCERO representative has been a significant determinant of the effectiveness of this role. Donor opinion is divided between prioritising diplomatic skills versus prioritising humanitarian experience and robust defence of humanitarian principles - skills which are not necessarily incompatible.

2) Strengthened role of UNHCU

In response to the OLS Review's criticism of the downgrading of UNHCU, this unit has been strengthened in the last couple of years, both in terms of its coordination mandate and its resources. It is now charged with coordinating assistance to, and protection of, IDP populations; facilitating coordination between OLS northern and southern sectors; and acting as secretariat to the UNCERO and to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan. This has proved popular with donors and UNHCU has been reasonably well-funded over the last couple of years, including a well-placed DANIDA grant in 1998 (see below)³⁶. The proposed organigram for UNHCU for 1999 comprises seven international positions, including an NGO liaison officer.

3) Quarterly OLS strategy meetings

Since October 1996 these meetings have been held on a regular basis, alternating between Khartoum and Nairobi, for senior UN managers from both sectors. Their role in improving coordination between the northern and southern sectors – particularly at macro-level, although perhaps less at field and programme levels – is acknowledged by many donors, (OLS 1999c). Joint OLS policies have been developed since June 1997.

4) International Advisory Committee (IAC) meetings in Geneva

Establishing the IAC was a recommendation of the OLS Review. Comprising major donors, it was intended to support implementation of the OLS agreement, with an advisory role on assessment, implementation and conditionality issues (Karim et al, 1996). The first meeting was held in late 1996, with three or four since. They are usually attended by representatives from donor agency headquarters, or their diplomatic representatives in Geneva. In practice, the IAC meetings appear to perform more of an

³⁵ In practice, the Deputy UNDP Resident Representative is fully responsible for managing technical assistance projects in GoS areas, with the UNCERO spending most of his time on the humanitarian portfolio.

³⁶ Lack of access to Khartoum by the principal evaluators of the northern sector has meant that it is almost impossible to evaluate the performance of UNHCU.

information exchange function, with key OLS UN staff providing briefings to donor representatives with some accompanying discussion, often relating to the CAP (OLS 1999b).

5) Twice yearly meetings of donor representatives from northern and southern sectors

This is a new initiative. The first meeting was held in November 1998, in Khartoum. The second was held recently, in Nairobi in June 1999, and included NGOs for the first time. The aim is ‘to provide donors and member agencies of OLS working in both northern and southern sectors an opportunity to share viewpoints on a number of key policies and events currently affecting OLS. It brings donor representatives from Khartoum and Nairobi together. This is important, as the views within one donor agency can vary according to the location of its representatives, complicating the process of strategic coordination. In practice, this appears to be the forum where more detailed policy and strategic discussion take place, because the regional donor representatives are usually more engaged and involved with OLS than their colleagues at headquarters³⁷. Thus, at the June 1999 meeting, issues such as post-famine strategies, and OLS-counterpart relations were discussed (OLS 1999c).

Although hard to quantify, these structural changes are widely acknowledged to have improved relations between the northern and southern sectors(OLS 1998a, OLS 1999c). Again, personalities have been an important factor, and are reported to have worked together more harmoniously in the last 18 months. But the ultimate test is whether these structural changes have improved the political environment for humanitarian operations. Only a year ago, a UN confidential report lamented that the ‘pragmatic incremental approach’ of OLS had not resolved certain problems, for example securing access to the Nuba Mountains. Yet this year the deadlock has been broken, and a UN mission was authorised to travel to the SPLM/A areas of the Nuba Mountains. The OCHA Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator from Geneva (and leader of the mission) claimed that this would have been impossible without close collaboration between northern and southern sectors in terms of coordinated negotiation with both sides of the conflict. In short, improved UN coordination between northern and southern sectors does seem to have made a difference, although the fact that access has been denied to the Nuba Mountains for so many years is a sharp reminder of one of the more serious failures of OLS.

The OLS Review was critical of the UN’s failure to challenge the GoS over humanitarian issues. There have been some changes since, for example in the approach to IDPs in the northern sector since UNHCU has been strengthened. But the structural changes described above appear to have made little difference to OLS’s ability to negotiate access to Bahr El Ghazal in the run-up to the 1998 famine by reversing the GoS-imposed flight ban. Ultimately, OLS is a framework agreement that honours GoS sovereignty, and this frequently acts as a constraint.

Learning from the 1998 experience, a confidential ‘crisis management matrix’ was drafted in March 1998, by UN agency representatives from both northern and southern sectors, outlining contingency plans should there be a repeat of events. This is an important

³⁷ The monthly donor meetings in Nairobi, and in Khartoum, are similarly engaged with more policy and strategic issues, although the Khartoum meeting is sometimes accused of inappropriate ‘micro-management’.

initiative, but very slow to materialise for an operation that has been in existence for a decade, and that has had to deal with annually-imposed flight bans.

One of the more significant developments, with potential for substantially improving strategic coordination, is the resumption of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA), functioning within the remit of IGAD³⁸. At the request of IGAD, this has been chaired by the UN, by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy. So far, two TCHA meetings have been held – in November 1998, and recently, in May 1999 – attended by GoS, the SPLM and OLS³⁹. This appears to have become an important forum for addressing issues at the political/ humanitarian interface, and for producing some concrete outputs. For example, a Security Protocol was agreed and signed by GoS and the SPLA at the November 1998 meeting, breaking some of the previous deadlocks over communications equipment that the UN was allowed by GoS. At the same meeting, 'Minimum Operational Standards (MinOps) for Rail Corridors and Cross-Line Road Corridors' were agreed and signed by both parties. Although neither has proved fail-safe⁴⁰, it is an important development that this regular forum now exists, with the UN playing a central role. At the recent TCHA meeting in May 1999, both parties agreed to the extension of the humanitarian cease-fire in Bahr El Ghazal.

An unresolved issue on strategic coordination is the unusual role of UNICEF as lead agency for strategic coordination in the southern sector. Donors are increasingly questioning UNICEF's appropriateness for this position, and expressing a preference for OCHA to take over, arguing correctly that these functions are central to OCHA, rather than UNICEF's mandate. This is one of the key issues being addressed by an internal UNICEF review of its role in OLS (UNICEF 1998c). The review is due to be published in September 1999. It is expected to recommend that although OCHA should upgrade its strategic coordination role in the southern sector, UNICEF should retain its role as consortium coordinator at an operational level.

Alone, the UN on behalf of OLS is in a weak negotiating position with the warring parties. Unable to use the withdrawal of humanitarian aid as a threat to the warring parties, the success of its negotiations is often dependent upon international pressure and the intervention of Western donor governments. The latter, which have a wider range of policy options at their disposal with which to exert pressure on the GoS, SPLA or other parties to the conflict. To work successfully, such pressure requires the donor community to coordinate, which in turn requires a coherence of positioning amongst Western donors. At times this may work, for example in negotiations with the SRRA over the proposed SRRA-NGO Memorandum of Understanding in 1999, when combined donor pressure, supporting OLS, forced the SRRA to change some of their demands, for example over ownership and disposal of assets. But more characteristic of the donor community is the diversity of views, and hence political positioning. This was acknowledged by one donor representative who talked of 'a good atmosphere of discussion, but no coherence'. The obstacle that this poses to effective coordination of political positioning by the UN seems rarely to be acknowledged.

³⁸ The decision to re-establish the TCHA was taken at an IGAD ministerial sub-committee meeting in Addis Ababa, in August 1998.

³⁹ The Government of Kenya attended the first TCHA meeting in November 1998, in its capacity as Chairman of the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee on South Sudan Conflict.

⁴⁰ For example, on 18th May 1999, a WFP barge convoy was attacked near Adok, in Unity State/ Western Upper Nile, in breach of the Security Protocol. And implementation of the 'MinOps' is reported to have been patchy, according to one OLS commentator.

DANIDA's engagement is principally at the Geneva level, through attendance at IAC meetings. However, as mentioned above, much more influential and detailed policy discussions between OLS and the donors take place in the region, where DANIDA has a very limited presence. Yet potentially, DANIDA has an important role to play, because of its less politicised humanitarian aid programme and its commitment to multilateralism. It is perceived as a moderate and more objective donor, which could usefully counter-balance the influence of some other bilateral donors whose foreign policy interests tend to have a disproportionate influence on the overall international humanitarian response.

9.4 Technical/programme coordination: northern sector

This is particularly problematic because international NGOs are not officially part of the OLS northern sector; their agreements are signed with GoS. In theory, this could mean that GoS has responsibility for technical coordination. In practice, it has tended to confine its role to political regulator. This lack of a consortium arrangement between the UN and NGOs has seriously hampered programme coordination.

Where it does happen, it is *ad hoc* and inadequate (OLS, 1999a). A new coordination structure has been established in June 1997 – the Humanitarian Aid Forum⁴¹. Other government coordination structures exist at federal and local levels, but often suffer from lack of resources. *De facto*, the role of lead agency for non-food programmes has fallen to UNICEF, and UNHCU attempts some coordination of IDP programmes. In the latter case, UNHCU has established six sub-field offices, and there are plans for developing an inter-agency approach within a strategic framework that focuses on assistance and protection to IDPs. But in practice, 'progress in field and programme coordination continues to be hampered by UN Agency mandates' (OLS, 1999a). Further comment on technical coordination in the northern sector is limited by the principal evaluators' lack of access to Khartoum.

9.5 Technical/programme coordination: southern sector

The adoption by all OLS partner agencies of the OLS Mission Statement was aimed at improving consistency of approach. This has achieved only a minimal tightening of the aims and methods of consortium members. Considerable differences still remain.

In practice, UNICEF as lead agency and as the agency responsible for technical coordination in the non-food sector, relies upon the consent of operational agencies to fulfil these dual elements of its coordination mandate. UNICEF exerts little direct control over the resources channelled into the sectors that it is nominally charged to coordinate. NGOs receive the majority of their funding directly from external donors. The agencies' agreement to be coordinated by UNICEF therefore relies upon their accepting that UNICEF has the technical skills, information management skills and leadership qualities to assume this role, and thus has the credibility to coordinate.

In some sectors – livestock, and water and sanitation - UNICEF has demonstrated that it does have these skills, and has therefore been able to command the support of NGOs. In others, particularly the health and nutrition sectors, UNICEF has attracted sustained criticism from NGOs. As the health and nutrition sectors cover a large proportion of programmes on the ground, they are the principal focus of this part of the evaluation. In

⁴¹ Which the team is unable to comment upon because of lack of access to Khartoum.

the view of the evaluation team, many of the criticisms regarding the quality of UNICEF technical coordination, particularly in the health sector, are justified. In addition, the evaluation team heard consistent observations that there is a lack of leadership within OLS in Lokichokkio. However, it is also the case that many consortium members do not fully acknowledge the constraints facing UNICEF in its efforts to coordinate the political and technical response in the southern sector.

The following are some of the reasons why technical coordination has proved to be so problematic:

- ***Inadequate human resource and technical capacity:*** coordination appears to have been consistently under-funded (see below), and it is thus poorly staffed. For example, the UNICEF health team is responsible for the entire southern sector in which an estimated 5.5 million people live, with a target of 1200 primary health care facilities and of 40 referral hospitals. UNICEF's health team comprises one health project officer in Nairobi (International Officer, level 3), and two assistants in Lokichokkio, both of whom were employed on short-term contracts, together with two cold-chain staff. At any one time one or more of the staff based in Lokichokkio are on leave or occupied with guests, leaving only two people to cover the entire southern sector. The nutrition sector has even less capacity – only one nutritionist (Grade C) employed in Nairobi. In 1998 this staff member was supposedly responsible for coordinating targeted feeding programmes consisting of over thirty centres with more than 15,000 beneficiaries⁴². The problem is not confined to a lack of staff numbers. Even where UNICEF has attempted to improve coordination by deploying more staff, several of the NGO partners interviewed felt that quality of staff had not been adequately prioritised in the recruitment process, and roles were not sufficiently clearly defined.
- ***Inadequate capacity in the field:*** the SPLM/SRRA-OLS Joint Task Force identified poor field level coordination as a major impediment to effective relief in 1998. It recommended the reinstatement of Regional Programme Officers (RPOs), a post abandoned in 1996. In response, UNICEF began appointing RPOs in August 1998, starting with Ajiep. This occurred after the peak of the famine and their job descriptions are still to be finalised. Although late, those interviewed see these officers as potentially useful to improve geographical coverage, manage information, provide a buffer between NGOs and the counterparts and follow up on humanitarian principles. However, given the large size of the country there are still too few of these RPOs.
- ***Inappropriate location of the coordinator:*** in response to the recommendations of the OLS Review, UNICEF transferred some programming functions to Lokichokkio.⁴³ However, most UNICEF decision-makers still reside in Nairobi and some have been reluctant or unable to visit South Sudan. For example, the health project officer based in Nairobi has not visited the field since August 1998, and at the

⁴² And the OLS nutritional standards available in 1998 were inadequate, containing insufficient practical guidelines. In the case of therapeutic feeding, where the technical quality of care is of vital importance, the guidance given was insufficient and the dietary recommendations obsolete. All the major OLS agencies had their own technically superior and more up-to-date guidelines.

⁴³ For example UNICEF created the post of OLS field co-ordinator in response to the Review's recommendations.

time of the evaluation was unable to specify the health agencies active in Ajiep, the epicentre of the 1998 famine. Yet evidence suggests that successful co-ordination is closely related to field presence. For example, in the livestock and water & sanitation sectors, where UNICEF has a greater presence in the field and at Lokichokio, co-ordination has been strongest. The reverse is true for health and nutrition. The right balance does not seem to have been struck, between having some decision-makers in Nairobi where donors are located, and yet strengthening field coordination from Lokichokio and in South Sudan.

- **Poor Information management:** UNICEF's information management, another important tool for co-ordination, has also been weak. Until 1999, UNICEF has had no central database where information about needs and interventions is collated. In 1999, strenuous efforts are underway to improve this with the appointment of an information officer and the development of the DELPHI information system⁴⁴.
- **Lack of financial information:** an additional constraint to the UN's co-ordination efforts derives from the fact that as lead agency, UNICEF has (up until 1999) had no overview of the funding received by other agencies, particularly NGOs. It is therefore difficult for them to identify situations where there is duplication or gaps in provision.

Inadequate technical coordination has had numerous consequences. It has resulted in missed opportunities and reduced effectiveness, for example in the health sector⁴⁵. It has also meant that UNICEF has been unable to ensure consistent sectoral co-ordination nor balanced allocation of humanitarian resources. These weaknesses were highlighted during the 1998 famine. NGOs new to Bahr El Ghazal were frequently left to decide where they should work or what they should do on an *ad hoc* basis (Timings: personal communication) and gaps in service coverage remained for prolonged periods (Salama, et al. 1998)⁴⁶. There is also an absence of forward planning. The evaluation team encountered a general feeling that no-one is taking charge of ensuring that OLS as a whole reacts not only to crises, but also plans for the future.

Poor coordination sets up a vicious circle. Because UNICEF's co-ordination fora have often been ineffectual, particularly in the health and nutrition sectors, they are sometimes poorly attended.⁴⁷ Agencies have reported many problems with the meetings ranging

⁴⁴ The DELPHI information system aims to compile multi-sectoral information from all over South Sudan. This will enable a more comprehensive overview of needs and service coverage.

⁴⁵ For example, the 1998 UNICEF Polio vaccination campaign did not include a concurrent Vitamin A component. This was an important missed opportunity as Vitamin A is one of the most important preventative measures against excess mortality in children. Even when Vitamin A was included in the measles vaccination campaign in Bahr El Ghazal at the end of July 1998, only 25 per cent of children received the supplement because of insufficient supply.

⁴⁶ In 1998 the MSF-B country management team appear initially to have blocked the access of other NGOs into areas of Bahr El Ghazal even though MSF-B were overwhelmed and could not cope with the size of response required. At that time in May – July, UNICEF did not have an adequate field presence in these areas. Consequently, they had to rely on partners to ensure that resources were appropriately targeted. This reluctance on the part of MSF-B led to delays directing additional agencies to the worst areas, which UNICEF was unable to counter, thereby increasing the mortality and morbidity.

⁴⁷ There are numerous different co-ordination meeting spread between Loki and Nairobi. These occur daily for security, weekly for general programmes issues, monthly for geographic and

from weak chairing to the absence of decision-makers. Consequently, decisions and action points often cannot be formalised, and the meetings fail to focus on substantive issues. Meanwhile, donors become reluctant to pour in more resources.

9.6 Technical/programme coordination: issues for both sectors

In response to the OLS Review, in 1997 joint assessment methodologies were finally adopted for both northern and southern sectors, with production of the first joint OLS assessment report in 1998. More recently, OLS has attempted to improve its strategic planning, for the first time including a 'core programme strategy' as part of the 1999 CAP. Essentially, this is an attempt to improve its process of prioritising, by differentiating between three different types of operational area – areas of acute emergency, areas on the threshold of acute emergency, and areas of chronic emergency – for three different sets of interventions. Although overdue, importantly this exercise combines both northern and southern sectors.


Finally, a small example is indicative of one of the fundamental constraints to coordination of UN agencies. In the unusual instance of a donor providing unearmarked funds to OCHA/ UNCERO to distribute within OLS (as both the Danish and British governments have done recently), there were no agreed procedures for prioritisation and allocation, and evidence of tensions arising between UN agencies. For this reason, an OLS strategy meeting concluded that 'donors should be encouraged wherever possible to contribute directly to agencies with indication of sector' (OLS, 1998a). This does little to bolster the coordination function, and is indicative of the territoriality which undermines coordination of UN agencies.

9.7 Funding constraints

The co-ordination function has been inadequately funded, particularly related to UNICEF in the southern sector. The recent trend in official funding away from UN agencies in favour of NGOs has reduced the overall share of funds channelled through the UN. UNICEF in the southern sector has relied heavily on the core funds that it receives as part of its regular operational programme to subsidise its lead agency roles. It receives minimal additional resources to finance its coordination activities⁴⁸. The size of these contributions has not kept pace with the overall rise in the size of UNICEF's southern sector budget in the three years 1996-1998. Although coordination capacity has grown, it has always lagged behind events. Attempts to increase UNICEF's coordination capacity have generally been reactive, in response to serious lapses. See Figure 9.1. For example, only after the peak of mortality in the 1998 famine did UNICEF re-introduce RPOs in the field. And coordination capacity in Lokichokkio was not increased until serious inadequacies were pointed out in the 1996 OLS review.

quarterly for sectoral co-ordination. In addition there are many ad hoc emergency co-ordination meetings called in response to given crises.

⁴⁸ Until 1997, UNICEF in South Sudan received no general resources or budget support from UNICEF New York. In 1997 and 1998 annual grants of \$350,000 were given. This reflected only a fraction of the total UNICEF budget for the southern sector of some \$15 million in 1997 and \$32 million in 1998.

Figure 9.1 Funding trend for UNICEF-OLS southern sector, 1989 to 1998

There is also a sense that co-ordination, planning, monitoring and evaluation are ill-rewarded when compared with more visible, high-profile interventions. DANIDA is unusual among donors in its willingness to fund these 'invisible' yet very important activities, and this should be applauded. Since 1994, UNICEF has earmarked much of DANIDA's contribution for such activities.

The annual funding cycle and short timeframe attached to grants undermines continuity in coordination posts. For coordination based upon leadership to succeed, OLS coordinators must build up their knowledge and experience of Sudan, and develop meaningful relationships with NGOs and donors. This takes time and investment. Employing coordination staff on short-term contracts, often of only three month's duration, seriously hinders this process.

9.8 Issues for DANIDA

Designing and implementing appropriate structures to strengthen political coordination strikes at the heart of UN reform. Although there have been many important structural and institutional changes in response to the OLS Review, strategic coordination is still problematic. Some of the difficulties are central to the concept of OLS, which is founded on recognition of GoS sovereignty. This has enabled the government to use its power to impede the humanitarian response on numerous occasions, leaving the UN with limited negotiating options. A key issue is whether OCHA should take over strategic coordination functions for the southern sector. According to its mandate it clearly should, in which case a sufficiently long and smooth hand-over is critical, to learn from

UNICEF's extensive experience. In these circumstances it is also crucial that OCHA is adequately resourced and staffed.

Although it is common practice for bilateral donors to berate the UN for its shortcomings in strategic coordination, inadequate account is taken of the diversity of donor positions, which often has the effect of weakening the UN.

The OLS Review's conclusion that UNICEF was over-stretched with its dual roles of coordination and programme implementation still holds today. Under-staffing and excessive workloads have contributed to the weaknesses in technical coordination evident in the southern sector. Although UNICEF struggles with both its mandates, there is a strong argument that operational experience contributes to credibility. In some areas, UNICEF is likely to remain the relevant co-ordination focus, for example in nutrition and health, water and sanitation. In others, the potential role of other agencies, particularly WFP might be explored further. Above all, strengthened technical co-ordination, based on credibility and leadership, will require much greater investment in high quality staff, on longer term contracts, and with an active field presence than has been the case to date. A stronger and more appropriate funding base is critical.

The evaluation team concludes that, despite continued problems in the area of co-ordination, DANIDA's contribution to UNICEF's lead agency role, and its one-off contribution to UNHCU, have added value to OLS. This contribution could be strengthened:

- a) by extending the timeframe of the DANIDA grants, in the interests of promoting continuity of coordination posts, and promoting staff morale
- b) by actively engaging and influencing policy debates on improved coordination in Sudan.

The team also concludes that the OLS framework should continue to be supported. Despite its difficulties and shortcomings, it is the most appropriate arrangement on offer for organising the humanitarian response to Sudan's complex political emergency.

10. CONNECTEDNESS

10.1 Introduction

The concept of ‘connectedness’ is taken to mean: ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes long-term and interconnected problems into account (Hallam, 1998a). It is usually interpreted as the relationship between relief, rehabilitation and development aid, and the ‘grey zone’ in the middle of that spectrum.

The debate about the links between relief and development aid in chronic political emergencies is now a long-standing one. The experience of Sudan has featured heavily in this debate. It is clear that the linear ‘relief to rehabilitation to development’ model is inappropriate to Sudan’s complex political emergency which originates more than forty years ago. However, alternative models remain both elusive and contentious. The crisis in Sudan has no end in sight. It is characterised by long-term chronic deprivation and insecurity, with recurrent periods of particularly acute suffering, such as the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine. Thus, for the aid community, the question is not only how to ensure that relief responses are connected to longer term approaches, but also how to ensure that the operation retains a capacity to respond when and if the crisis intensifies.

As described below, these questions are not straightforward to resolve and have been the subject of considerable dispute between the warring parties and the aid community, between different members of the UN family, between different NGOs and importantly between different donors.

10.2 Connectedness and the policy framework of OLS

The theme of connectedness has guided the UN operation since the founding of OLS in 1989 in the aftermath of the 1988 famine.⁴⁹ More than a decade later, this commitment to adopting more developmental approaches remains. For example, the southern sector mission statement highlights the issue of connectedness. It states:

In striving to meet the needs of southern Sudanese, OLS saves lives, *promotes self-reliance, protects people’s safety and dignity, and enables them to invest in the future* (OLS southern sector mission statement, 30 January 1997, OLS southern sector Strategic Plan, Machakos, Kenya, emphasis added)

The OLS Review criticised the move to make relief assistance more developmental, for some reasons including the following:

⁴⁹ For example, the aim of developmental relief is clearly set out in an early OLS document which describes the objectives of the operation as follows: to: “...help the Government of Sudan to put sizeable amounts of its displaced citizens back in to the mainstream development process of the country”. It argued for this focus on the grounds that: “...the displaced populations will make no contribution to the development of the country unless they are i) rescued from starvation; ii) provided with the means of ensuring their own subsistence (UNDP Planning and Project ~ Emergency Assistance for the Displaced, Project Revision Document, Khartoum, August 9, 1989, quoted in Karim et al, 1996:87).

- 1) it underplays issues of neutrality when development partners are also directly or indirectly allied to the warring parties (see also section 9.3 above);
- 2) the relief-to-development model is based on a model of natural disasters, and is not appropriate to a chronic political emergency: there is no available information on underlying social and economic trends that support this linear model in the case of Sudan;
- 3) the situation of war affected populations has changed little since OLS began; the options for reducing their vulnerability are limited and therefore the need for humanitarian assistance remains.

This reality has not changed since 1996. Nevertheless, there is scope for investing in longer term processes, for example to strengthen the coping ability of local communities. Local resilience can be strengthened by the formation of support groups, and by developing links between NGOs and local structures. The OLS UNICEF office, co-ordinating the southern sector, has experimented with a number of capacity-building programmes in an attempt to address the connectedness issue, including capacity-building of the humanitarian wings of the rebel movements. Unfortunately there is little evidence of systematic evaluation and learning from this initiative, despite its importance and sensitivity.

In practice, the extent to which OLS – and in particular the UN agencies – are able to engage in programmes which address longer term issues is strongly influenced by the policies of its donors. Some donors willingly fund rehabilitation of road infrastructure, and capacity-building of local NGOs and of the humanitarian wing of the rebel movements (for example, USAID). Others define ‘life-saving activities’ very narrowly and thus confine their funding (for example, ECHO and the UK’s Department for International Development [DFID]). The diversity of views about what is legitimately ‘humanitarian’, and the desirability of developmental relief, is partly influenced by political factors, but above all, inhibits a coherent approach within the southern sector. In the northern sector the donor line is less diverse, with a degree of consensus over the embargo on development aid. The embargo has its roots in the political isolation of the government of Sudan. The relevant question in both sectors is not only whether developmental initiatives are sustainable but whether they give *de facto* support to the government, and this too gives rise to differences of perspective.

A recent example illustrates the difficulties for OLS in addressing the connectedness issue when its donors hold such diverse positions. At the Joint Donor Meeting in June 1999 in Nairobi, OLS proposed a post-famine strategy, addressing three issues:

- (i) refining and implementing a long-term strategic vision
- (ii) supporting sustainable livelihoods/ promoting resilience
- (iii) preparing for peace

OLS requested a consensus amongst donors that these issues be prioritised, but none was forthcoming because of the wide range of donor policies and positions (OLS, 1999c).

The lack of longer-term strategic planning in the humanitarian response to Sudan’s emergency is striking. Although the war has raged since 1983, humanitarian planning,

centred around the annual OLS needs assessment and appeals process, is always short-term and dependent upon short-term pledges of funds. The only agency that adopts a longer-term planning perspective is ICRC, which uses a more healthy five year time-span for its strategic planning. Such planning remains confidential.

Over 96% of funds received by OLS are on a one-year planning/ implementation cycle. This is a major obstacle to promoting connectedness. One of the few exceptions was AusAid, which provided \$6million to UNICEF on the basis of a three year planning cycle. The consequence of the short-term funding approach has been to detract attention away from capacity-building and preparedness. This was particularly evident in 1998 during the response to the Bahr El Ghazal famine. There was a lack of sufficient storage tanks for aviation fuel, *ad hoc* and inadequate warehousing structures in Lokichokkio, and very poor road infrastructure due to lack of investment. These all had the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the famine intervention.

Another feature of the ongoing emergency is a kind of ‘normalisation’ of the crisis. Although an emergency operation has been in existence for over ten years, most of the time it is responding to a chronic level of humanitarian need. As the response to the ’98 famine demonstrated, the operation was slow to gear up to a period of acute need, and the response was late. Preparedness was weak. (See also Chapter 14.) There is also evidence of a rising tolerance amongst donor agencies towards humanitarian problems in Sudan. For example, between 1995 and 1998, despite sporadic high levels of malnutrition, appeals for food aid remained only 50% funded.

Finally, a worrying new development is donor interest in ‘exit strategies’. Yet, it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate to consider exiting from humanitarian relief. The words of the OLS review in 1996 are just as apt today:

Despite the rhetoric of moving from relief to development, the situation of war-affected populations in Sudan has changed little during the course of OLS. It remains a chronic political emergency, where people’s options for reducing their vulnerability are limited. In this situation, humanitarian crises have been, and will continue to be, a common feature. The need for humanitarian assistance remains. (Karim et al, 1996:264)

10.3 DANIDA’s policy framework and its application to Sudan

DANIDA has funded a broad range of humanitarian activities in Sudan, from acute high-input emergency health interventions (eg, MSF) to intermediate transitional activities (eg SCF’s displaced kits programme) to low-input capacity-building interventions (eg with CEAS through DCA). Thus, in practice, DANIDA’s portfolio over the 8 year time-span demonstrates a high degree of flexibility and connectedness. But the policy behind this is unclear. Despite strong ministerial statements which have endorsed the concept of ‘development-oriented assistance’ (Nielson, 1995a, 1995b), the policy appears to be open to wide interpretation. Thus, it is generally felt that humanitarian programmes that are too closely linked with the GOS should not be funded, for fear of supporting and giving legitimacy to the government, but there are no clear criteria to guide such decisions (and, indeed, judgements) on this difficult issue.

In the southern sector, the consequences of this unclear policy were particularly evident in 1998. Funding for CEAS’s ongoing capacity-building programme was withheld,

because it did not contribute directly to relieving the Bahr El Ghazal famine; such activities were considered to be too developmental. However, this was very disruptive to a programme which was designed to maintain capacity (through the church networks), on an ongoing basis, to respond to emergency needs as and when they arose. Most NGOs interviewed find DANIDA's division between humanitarian and other forms of funding frustrating and sometimes arbitrary. The division is extremely important because it determines access to funds under different budget heads. Most recognise that DANIDA is a comparatively flexible donor. But the lack of clarity and changeability of DANIDA policy, partly because of the different interpretations by different members of DANIDA staff, have caused some frustration and the feeling that mutual understanding on the issue needs to be renegotiated on an annual basis.

Requiring relief funds to be spent within twelve months is common practice within the humanitarian sector, and may be appropriate in response to annual food needs assessments. But its appropriateness for other aspects of the emergency response, in a long-term emergency like Sudan's, is very questionable – for example, in capacity-building work and providing relief resources year-on-year to a relatively 'stable' IDP population. As mentioned above, this is an obstacle to promoting connectedness and longer term programmes which depend upon continuity of funding.

10.4 Approaches to connectedness: DANIDA's implementing partners

The Danish NGOs (and SCF-UK) generally wish to promote a relief-to-development model, and tend to overestimate the extent to which developmental models are appropriate in conditions of chronic instability. More seriously, they often underestimate the extent to which existing, often long-standing, political and economic relations between target communities (such as IDPs) and those with power militate against sustainable developmental interventions - although the precise situation varies considerably between different locations and circumstances. Red Barnet, and more so their partner agency SCF-UK, are most keen to promote this model, although DCA also gives it considerable and perhaps uncritical emphasis. For the Danish Red Cross the picture is more mixed, with differences between its work with the ICRC and with the more developmentally-oriented IFRC.

In the northern sector, none of the NGOs has an explicit policy of avoiding appearance of support for the Sudanese government, although the question does not really arise for DCA, which works through local church structures. The question of manipulation or control of the SRC by the government has been of concern to the Danish Red Cross, and also to the IFRC. However, the question of the political impact of humanitarian aid has been of most concern to DANIDA itself, in view of the wider political commitments of the Danish government. The policy has not, however, been made explicit and has been given different emphasis by different individuals. (See section 10.2 above).

Amongst DANIDA's implementing partners, it is possible to discern three distinctive operational styles in southern Sudan. These reflect the mandate, organisational culture and, to an extent, the funding structure of different agencies. Importantly, these different styles have implications for the organisations' approach to connectedness (although to some extent all the agencies have addressed longer term issues, such as training) and their operating principles in a conflict zone.

The first is the more conventional relief approach. This has involved direct implementation of relief projects, relying on a high number of expatriate staff, often working on short contracts. The emphasis of this model is more on the control of resources than on participation of the affected community in their management, in part because of the need to protect the impartiality and neutrality of the assistance. This type of operation also tends to be more concerned with maintaining access to high quality relief inputs, particularly to health services, rather than with sustainability of these services *per se*. ICRC and MSF are the most obvious examples of agencies adopting this approach.

The evaluation found a number of limitations of this approach. In the case of MSF-B, the organisation had not developed adequate mechanisms to ensure that it was able to access high quality information regarding the politico-military context, nor had it built up sufficient trust with local populations. This had left programme staff and inputs vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, the lack of language skills on the part of key staff has made them dependent on SRRA staff to provide translation services, so increasing the risks of manipulation of aid resources. WFP has suffered from similar problems in this respect, as it also works primarily through expatriate managers⁵⁰.

An intermediate style of operation is that adopted by SCF-UK. It implements programmes directly, but the majority of their field staff, including field managers, are Sudanese. SCF's ability to identify high quality Sudanese and Kenyan staff reflects the organisations commitment to maintaining and developing capacity and skills within the country. Its approach also enables it to develop a good understanding of the local context and relations with civil and military authorities relatively quickly, since its staff are usually familiar with the local language and culture. Less emphasis is placed on control of relief goods in this model. Although there is no evidence of large-scale diversion of relief goods, post-distribution and end use monitoring have been rather weak. (See also chapter 12).

A third operational style is associated with the church-based agencies which do not implement their projects directly. DCA and CEAS are the primary examples of this approach. A review of this operation (then called SEOC between 1992 and 1995) concluded that the top-down way in which food was managed, coupled with significant inadequacies in assessment methodologies, was in danger of becoming part of the political crisis in southern Sudan, rather than part of the solution. Informed by the DCA approach of 'programming relief for development', CEAS was created in response, and sought to move away from direct implementation and the provision of relief, towards non-implementation and longer-term capacity building. It works on small-scale initiatives, through local partner organisations, including the SRRA, to implement programmes. Being rooted in communities means that CEAS is in a strong position to collect early warning information and to provide an institutional base for the larger, operational agencies such as Lutheran World Federation (LWF). However, in emphasising a longer-term, more developmental approach, in 1998 CEAS appeared to have lost some of its emergency edge (Swinchatt, 1999) (See also chapter 14).

⁵⁰ Personal communication, Susanne Jaspars – consultant to WFP, 1999

10.5 Implications for DANIDA

Although nominally committed to development-oriented humanitarian assistance, there appears to be little analysis within DANIDA of the implications of this for the organization and objectives of its relief assistance. For example, there have been no changes in the timeframe for the implementation of humanitarian assistance, nor are there tools available within DANIDA which enable the agency to develop a strategic plan in response to what is clearly a multi-year crisis in the case of Sudan.

Equally, there is little evidence that the political aspects of development-oriented relief have been given sufficient attention, for example, the implications of building the capacity of the humanitarian wing of a rebel movement, or of attempting to promote sustainable development in conditions of chronic instability. Within OLS more broadly, this has received limited attention and no systematic evaluation.

It is interesting to note that *de facto* there is an expectation that relief will be able to achieve developmental objectives in Sudan, at the same time that Denmark (and other donors) are withholding most development assistance to the country. This contradiction deserves more attention.

Finally, the traditional short term planning framework and funding cycle for humanitarian aid are problematic in the case of Sudan where the emergency is long-term and chronic. The arguments for longer-term strategic planning are compelling, although the lack of coherence of different donor policies is a major constraining factor.


11. APPROPRIATENESS OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

11.1 Timeliness and efficiency

DANIDA has a reputation amongst some of its partners for responding quickly and effectively to requests for funding. This has been welcomed by a number of the agencies consulted during the course of the evaluation. Where DANIDA has been able to respond rapidly and flexibly, this has increased the effectiveness of its contribution beyond its value in absolute financial terms. One of the most striking examples is the provision of DANIDA funds – DKK 10,581,627 – in September 1997, in response to an urgent appeal by UNICEF for more funding to keep the OLS air-bridge open. This grant was released within a couple of weeks and enabled UNICEF to maintain the air-bridge - the only route of supply to over one hundred OLS programme sites - during the rains in 1997 (OLS, 1998). Without these funds the air-bridge would have been closed, forcing operations in many of the sites to cease (personal communication, Ted Chaiban, UNICEF).

More often, however, the timing of DANIDA's funding has been inappropriate, coming late in the year when it is most difficult to support preventive and mitigation measures. See Figure 11.1.

Figure 11-1 Timing of the grant approval for the 53 humanitarian grants made to the UN, Red Cross agencies and NGOs between 1992 and 1998



This reflects in part the inability of DANIDA's partners to present timely requests for funds. In the case of the UN this is linked to the prolonged preparation process for the CAP, discussed in chapter 7, which delays the separate formal request for funding, made

to DANIDA by each of the UN agencies⁵¹. The delays in presenting suitable proposals are not limited to the UN. Some of DANIDA's NGO partners have also been slow in developing proposals during the early part of the year.

This has negative consequences for both the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian response. A particular problem relates to contributions made in kind, such as seeds, tools and non-food items. These are much less cost-efficient and effective if they are delivered to South Sudan after March when the onset of the rains confines access to air for many locations, including Bahr El Ghazal, the site of the 1998 famine. The cost of air transport exceeds the cost of road transport by an estimated 300 to 400%.

In much of South Sudan, the planting season in May/June is a watershed for the provision of aid. This coincides with the end of the usefulness of seed and tool deliveries, the cessation of road transport and therefore much higher transport costs, and the hungry season when stocks are low and people need relief food to provide energy to plant.

Yet DANIDA made the majority of its grants to the southern sector in the latter half of the year (see Figure 11.1), including all grants associated with the provision of seeds and tools. This is after the planting season and too late for land transport. In some cases seeds had to be stored for the following year, wasting money on storage costs and increasing losses (Swinchatt, 1999).


Problems of timeliness are not unique to DANIDA. It is a particular issue for donations of food aid. See Figure 11.2, which illustrates the negative effects of the late provision of WFP food aid. This shows that the bulk of the food usually reaches people during the harvest season, when road transport is impossible, and when it is too late to support the population during the hungry season when they are planting. It also means that relief food may have a negative effect on food prices in local markets, at a time when farmers are selling their produce in order to buy other essential goods⁵². It appears that the delivery time for food aid is not adequately taken into account in the timing of donor funding pledges (WFP, personal communication).

Responsibility for slow response does not rest with DANIDA's partners alone. DANIDA itself appears to be geared more to responding to a fully-blown crisis than investing in preparedness and mitigation earlier in the cycle. See Chapter 14 on the Bahr El Ghazal famine, which also demonstrates the increased costs of late response to famine.

⁵¹ This may be improved with the proposed June (ie mid-year) revision to the CAP.

⁵² It is acknowledged that the harvest in 1997 was adversely affected by drought and later floods, and was again depressed in 1998. Nevertheless, food needs are likely to increase in the months after the harvest, as local production is exhausted.

Figure 11.2 Timing of WFP food deliveries to South Sudan 1995 - 1998



Source: WFP, Lokichokio


DANIDA's humanitarian grants are of a typical, short-term emergency nature. Thus, they must usually be spent by the end of the financial year in December. This is particularly problematic when so many of the grants are made in the latter half of the year, as demonstrated in Figure 11.1. This leaves the recipient agency with 6 months or less to spend the funds, unless an extension is specifically requested and agreed. This appears to be most problematic for the UN agencies where the grants are disbursed latest and procurement procedures are often slowest. For example, UNICEF takes 3-6 months to purchase and transport materials that are not available in Africa, or are held in the UNICEF's Assembly and Procurement Centre (UNIPAC) stores in Copenhagen.⁵³ In 1997 and 1998 DANIDA funding for nutritional programmes arrived between August and October; in 1998 UNICEF had to request an extension because they were unable to spend the funds by December. Although such extensions are easy to obtain, the process is time-consuming. On occasion, these restrictions have led to UNICEF unilaterally reallocating funds to other programmes. This happened in 1997 where UNICEF reallocated \$79,217 intended for education programmes to pay off a debt incurred due to air transport (Oxfam UK & Sudanese Catholic Information Service, 1998). Such arbitrary reallocation weakens DANIDA's ability to fund strategically and transparently.

⁵³ For example, in 1998 the DSM that UNICEF had ordered for the emergency feeding programmes in October 1998 arrived in Lokichokio in the spring of 1999, too late for responding to the 1998 emergency.

11.2 Influence of the media

The timing of DANIDA's response to acute crisis in Sudan appears to have been very dependent upon the arrival of pictures of starvation in the Danish media. This was particularly marked during the Bahr El Ghazal famine in 1998. See Figure 11.3. There was extensive media coverage in the newspapers in June, July and August 1998, with shocking pictures and coverage. This is when DANIDA's funding in response to the famine peaked, despite the early warnings issued in late 1997. As argued in Chapter 14, July/ August was too late for famine prevention or mitigation activities. All that was possible was a belated and inefficient relief operation, too late to save hundreds of lives.

Figure 11.3: Analysis of coverage of Sudan in Danish newspapers



Source: Berlingske Tidende

This was a common pattern amongst western donors, captured in the words of one NGO staff member:

Despite years of fiscal restraint when our project proposals were examined with a fine-tooth comb; despite those same donors' previous insistence on credible needs assessments before any proposal; despite our own firm belief in a participatory process for preparing a proposal, and our conviction that we should only take on projects that we are sure we can implement effectively; we were suddenly being urged to prepare multi-million dollar proposals within days.
(Ashworth, 1999)

The agenda had changed overnight. Whilst the pace must inevitably change when famine threatens, the donor response, including DANIDA's, was clearly media-driven. Generally, however, DANIDA has been less concerned about the visibility of its funding than some other donors. This has enabled it to fund 'invisible' but important activities such as co-ordination.

11.3 Appropriateness and relevance of relief assistance

The range of interventions funded by DANIDA, including acute life saving medical / nutritional inputs, displaced kits, the provision of health services to IDPs, and capacity building programmes, reflects the complexity and longevity of the emergency in Sudan. In general, the team found this spread appropriate to the wide range of needs in the population.

In response to acute crisis, particularly in the southern sector, DANIDA's partners have generally provided relevant assistance. For example, in 1997 in Blue Nile province, CEAS, as part of a consortium with Norwegian Church Aid and the New Sudan Council of Churches, responded to a declaration of disaster with an integrated package of food aid, seeds, tools and other activities. The consortium distributed 1,100 Metric tonnes (mt) of maize, 92mt of seed and more than 12,000 agricultural tools to reactivate agriculture in the area. They supported these material inputs with a programme of agricultural extension, aiming to improve tillage and stimulate vegetable production. The result of this intervention appears to have been very positive, even resulting in a food surplus in 1998 (Chamberlain, 1998).

In response to the major famine in 1998, the spread of DANIDA-funded activities was broadly relevant (albeit late). See Chapter 14. DANIDA's partners provided supplementary/therapeutic feeding, health-care, non-food items, and some general rations, all of which were desperately needed. Despite the delays and huge constraints facing the emergency operation, the DANIDA-funded projects did have a positive impact, although belatedly and with one or two exceptions.

In response to the needs of IDPs, many of whom are living in camps in the northern sector, DANIDA's partners have been involved in service provision to a population that is living in extreme poverty, is poorly served with basic infrastructure, and is therefore heavily dependent on relief aid. As described in chapter 8, much less is being done to address the more difficult and highly political root causes of their poverty and marginalisation. The growing interest in a rights-based approach, spear-headed by UNICEF and also being developed by UNHCU, provides some opportunities, but the results so far are limited.

In terms of supporting livelihoods, in the southern sector, CEAS and SCF(UK) have provided appropriate material inputs to stimulate agriculture and economic activity. For example, the SCF(UK) displaced kit programme distributed is well designed and based upon a careful analysis of need (Masden, 1997). These kits have enabled many thousands of destitute families to regain essential household items, allowing them to return to more normal lifestyles and increase their own resilience through enhanced barter and trade (Brusset, 1999). CEAS has provided seeds and tools in many locations, on occasion resulting in remarkable improvements in food security.

Finally, a number of DANIDA's partners have invested in **capacity-building with a longer time perspective**, especially in the southern sector, despite the difficulties and weak infrastructure. Many of the programmes reviewed appear to have been relatively well-suited to the context, and to have provided assistance that was reasonably robust against insecurity. For example, most of DANIDA's partners included training and/or institutional building in their programmes. In particular, CEAS and SCF(UK) have sponsored programmes of education and strengthening the capacity of local organisations and groups in the southern sector. MSF-B also started a community health care worker school and ICRC has trained health care workers in both Sudan and Kenya. In the northern sector, DCA has invested in capacity-building of the SCC, although with so far limited results, and SCF(UK) is similarly working with a number of local NGOs in the IDP camps around Khartoum

12. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

12.1 DANIDA

DANIDA's low staffing levels and extremely limited field presence, combined with its equally restricted capacity for field visits, make it difficult for DANIDA to assess the performance of its partners. There is no formal requirement from the humanitarian aid department for evaluations. Use of the evaluation tool varies greatly between agencies. Such factors discourage adequate accountability.

Where evaluations have taken place, this is sometimes on the initiative of the intermediary agency, although there is also evidence, particularly in the case of Red Barnet/SCF-UK, that DANIDA has actively encouraged this process. None of the implementing agencies interviewed reported any significant feedback from DANIDA, on evaluation or review reports except in relation to accounting matters. The absence of feedback on the findings of evaluations submitted to DANIDA removes a key link in the educational loop, reducing the potential for learning for the agencies concerned. Consequently, agencies also miss out on opportunities to understand better DANIDA's policies and criteria for support. Improved DANIDA capacity to respond would be invaluable.

12.2 DANIDA's partner agencies

The ability of DANIDA's partners to monitor and evaluate their programmes has been variable. On the whole, the record of the NGO and Red Cross intermediaries has been better than that of the UN agencies. For NGOs, monitoring has generally been weaker than evaluation. For UN agencies external evaluations have been very limited and/or were not made available to the evaluation team. The monitoring and evaluation record in rebel-held areas has been somewhat better than in government-controlled parts of Sudan, probably because of the greater difficulties of carrying out such work in the latter.

UNICEF rarely conducts its own evaluations. This is particularly regrettable because aspects of UNICEF's programme, such as the capacity building and humanitarian principles programmes, are of great significance. In the southern sector the evaluation team found UNICEF more concerned with covering failings than with learning from experience. Limited transparency and the absence of external evaluations have discouraged learning processes and have retarded organisational development. For example there has never been any external review of the capacity building programme; only in 1999, after a 13 year history, did this programme finally start to make attempts to clarify its aims and objectives (personal communication, N.Osodo). In response to widespread criticism following the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal famine UNICEF has apparently conducted a review of its health programmes, although this was not available at the time of going to press; nor was a high level review of UNICEF's role in OLS conducted between March and May 1999, due to be published in September 1999. It is hoped that this will manage to look objectively at UNICEF's co-ordination role, a key area where lessons need to be learned for future planning.

WFP has initiated evaluations of its programmes, but these were not made available to the DANIDA evaluation team.

The evaluation recommends that DANIDA in collaboration with other donors promotes a much more systematic evaluation regime for UN agencies.

DCA has the strongest links with its partner agencies, and this has been reflected in its ability to monitor its programmes. In the southern sector DCA pressure for an external evaluation was an important influence behind the transformation of SEOC (see Section 6.4). Since 1994 DCA has supported six external evaluations of SEOC/CEAS (most recently Swinchatt, 1999), all of which have been made available to DANIDA. The efficiency and transparency of this process deserves wider study within the country, because it is an example of good practice. Nevertheless, as with virtually all agencies under review, that rely upon community-based targeting systems, post-distribution monitoring remains weak. DCA's ability to influence good monitoring and evaluation practice in the southern sector has resulted from its presence in the region, in Nairobi. In the northern sector DCA has been less successful in promoting adequate monitoring procedures within SCC, although it did play an important role in promoting an external evaluation (Gibson and Hayward, 1997) which was much needed as well as overdue (see Section 6.4). DCA subsequently provided some technical support to assist SCC with monitoring of its emergency programme, whilst appearing to neglect even more pressing needs to support financial management capacity.

SCF-UK, as mediated by **Red Barnet**, also provides a mixed picture. In some areas, for example in logistics and stock control, SCF-UK has developed strong systems. In others, notably post-distribution monitoring, their information systems have proved inadequate, sometimes almost non-existent. A corrective has been provided in recent years with evaluations and studies carried out by Red Barnet with DANIDA's encouragement. For example inadequacies in monitoring were identified by a recent evaluation (Dahrendorf, 1999). Other studies and evaluations have contributed significantly to policy development within the agencies - although they have also served to highlight some of the policy differences between Red Barnet and SCF-UK discussed elsewhere (see Section 6.4).

In the southern sector, **MSF-B** appears to have good monitoring systems in place. It has an extremely well developed health information system and is able to draw on significant specialist expertise in this area. As such they were in a strong position to establish and manage the majority of health and nutritional surveillance systems in Bahr El Ghazal during the 1998 famine, providing an essential source of information for relief planners. MSF-B has also initiated an independent evaluation of its response during 1998, which drew some critical conclusions. This report is only available internally.

Monitoring by **ADRA-South Sudan** of its nutrition programme in 1998 appeared weak.

ICRC appears to have well developed monitoring systems. Where ICRC data have, exceptionally, been made available, as in the case of the Lopiding surgical hospital in northern Kenya, they appear comprehensive and useful as management tools. ICRC has recently undergone a number of promising institutional changes, notably the establishment of an evaluation unit early in 1999, which could help promote the development of more explicit policies and of learning within the organisation. Pressure from donors, including DANIDA, for greater dialogue and for a more results-based approach have existed for some time, with some results such as recent donor inclusion in a field mission to Georgia and Columbia. However, ICRC concerns regarding confidentiality severely limit the information that is usually made available, often making

it impossible for donors and others to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of their work. Aspects of ICRC's work definitely need to remain confidential, but there seems little reason why this is extended to routine relief and rehabilitation activities⁵⁴. This is an important issue requiring a good deal of donor coordination, but there seems to be little reason why ICRC should be exempted from monitoring and evaluation requirements which are, at least in theory required elsewhere. ICRC confidentiality constrains DANIDA's ability to make informed choices over allocation of its resources.

IFRC monitoring proved difficult to assess, in part because the DANIDA grants were made right at the beginning and right at the end of the review period. The Sudanese Red Crescent provided minimal documentation, although some of the reporting on development programmes supported by the Danish Red Cross was reasonably detailed. Financial accountability of the SRC is said by the IFRC to have improved considerably during the course of the review period.

12.3 Wider evaluation processes

A number of wider-ranging evaluations of humanitarian assistance to Sudan are of particular relevance. First amongst these is the OLS Review of 1996, seen by donors as much-needed and overdue, since OLS had already been running for seven years without any overall evaluation. System-wide evaluations, although demanding in both production and response, have great potential, affecting a very wide range of stakeholders, as well as having implications well beyond the borders of Sudan.

There is a strong case for greater coordination amongst donors and others in planning evaluations. The plethora of evaluations in 1999 listed at the end of Chapter 2, some of which are of overlapping relevance, is witness to this. There is a need to ensure that the overall international response to the continuing crisis in Sudan receives proper assessment.

The UN response to the OLS Review has been mixed. A 'Final Report on the OLS Review' of January 1999 sets out the formal response in some detail. Although most of the 41 principal recommendations were accepted, and only three rejected outright, nine are considered to be 'outstanding', i.e. accepted but not yet implemented. Institutional change, even though OLS rejected some major recommendations in this sphere, has generally been greater than the impact on practical programming. As the 'Final Report' recognises, monitoring and evaluation remains one of the weakest aspects of OLS.

There has been regular feedback to donors on progress in implementing OLS Review recommendations and an OLS Strategy Team now meets quarterly to review policy and agree on concrete actions. However, the 'Final Report' does not map out a wider review process for the future. Indeed the report appears to see the Review primarily as a one-off, if highly significant, intervention; greater recognition is needed that a process of constant review is required.

Of the evaluations noted in Chapter 2 some are particularly relevant for DANIDA; these include the evaluative study commissioned by ECHO on the impact of aid on the

⁵⁴ The evaluation team were unable to gain access to monitoring or evaluation reports of such routine relief aid rehabilitation activities, in Geneva or in the field, apparently because the reports contain sensitive information relating to other programmes.

political economy of war (Duffield, et al, forthcoming, early draft), and that of WFP's response to the 1998 famine commissioned by the British and Dutch Governments⁵⁵. The ODI is currently finalising a study reviewing international experience of 'principled' approaches to humanitarian assistance, including a major focus on South Sudan.

DANIDA has been supportive of the general need for evaluation and review and has funded such 'intangible' activities. Energy should be directed to ensure that such evaluatory processes continue, although in a more coordinated fashion. A follow-up to the OLS Review itself should be planned for the near future.

⁵⁵ The evaluation was carried out by ETC and is forthcoming.

13. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN RELATION TO CONFLICT

13.1 Conflict in the Sudan and the international response

The war in Sudan is the central cause of the country's seemingly endless humanitarian crisis, which will continue until peace and reconciliation can be achieved. Insecurity and denial of access, which reached new levels in 1998, have greatly hampered the humanitarian response.

Sudan has been a testing ground for important innovations in the international humanitarian response to conflict. In 1989 OLS was itself a novel development primarily because it involved an exceptional degree of recognition of rebel movements. In the southern sector the Ground Rules introduced in 1992 and renegotiated with rebel movements in 1995 represented attempts by OLS to regulate the conduct of the war. One of the most original aspects of the Ground Rules was the incorporation of human rights protection as part of the mandate of humanitarian operations. The Humanitarian Principles Programme overseen by UNICEF has aimed to introduce a code of conduct based on these principles. Capacity building has also been an important component of this approach. The SPLA has sometimes ignored and increasingly questioned the validity of these agreements, but it remains a key framework for humanitarian operations in the southern sector.

In government-held areas, standard international conventions are theoretically in force. Here a more conventional relationship has existed between UN and other humanitarian agencies and a sovereign government concerned to regulate their activities quite strictly. The validity of the OLS framework has been continuously questioned by the government. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to apply OLS principles in the northern sector, particularly in recent years.

Throughout the war all parties have used humanitarian aid and their ability to control access and other aspects of aid programming to further their own interests. This is only constrained where they have sought to maintain credibility or reduce isolation from donor countries and the international community.

In supporting OLS, DANIDA has implicitly backed the principles on which it is based. However, the shifting frameworks for delivery of humanitarian aid in the country are the consequence of a range of international developments over which DANIDA has had little influence - less even than it might have aspired to. Detailed analysis of such developments is beyond the scope of this evaluation: key documents in this regard are the OLS Review of 1996 (Karim et al, 1996), the forthcoming ODI study on Humanitarian Principles in Practice (Bradbury, M., 1999) as well as an important study from the early 1990's, 'A Disaster for Whom?: Local Interests and International Donors among the Dinka of Sudan' (Keen, 1991).

13.2 Aid manipulation and conflict

The manipulation of aid has been a feature of the interfactional fighting in the south of the country, which in recent years has been greater than fighting directly involving government troops. In some areas the delivery of relief has been directly linked to violence, with faction leaders deliberately targeting areas where relief services were provided. This occurred in Bahr El Ghazal during 1995 – 97. The leader of the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM) faction, Kerubino Bol, is reported to have threatened villages receiving WFP food aid with destruction if they did not support him, and to have followed up such threats on a massive scale. The destitution resulting from such attacks meant that humanitarian aid continued to be needed, creating a cycle of violence linked to the provision of aid. It is likely that the opportunity for diversion acted as an incentive for attacks on the population, especially when it is the attacks themselves that are the major source of the need for relief aid (Keene, 1999).

Diversion of food aid has been a serious and longstanding problem. In 1998 high levels of diversion were widely reported and it is probable that a very large amount of the food aid flown into Bahr El Ghazal ultimately went to the SPLA. The most important mechanism for this diversion was systematic taxation or “Tayeen”, although banditry, general disorganisation and exclusion of marginalised groups by traditional leaders also occurred. The main beneficiaries of this taxation were the military. For example, in one town, WFP was accidentally given a report documenting the collection of cereals by the SRRA, 80% of which was allocated to the army, 15% to administration and 5% to the SRRA. The total extent of taxation varied depending on the proximity of military barracks and the front line. Areas such as Ajiep situated close to both, were reportedly particularly hard hit. Many feel that this taxation was responsible for the continued existence of wide-scale starvation despite the presence of a sufficient general ration.⁵⁶

Given the attitude of community leaders towards the SPLA some diversion of relief is inevitable. However it is important that this is minimised by agencies through adequate management capacity, good systems and experience. It also requires the timely implementation of programmes, before traditional systems have broken down completely. Such conditions were not met during the 1998 famine.

Aside from direct theft, diversion has also occurred indirectly through manipulation of exchange rates. For example in 1998 MSF-B became locked into an agreement that diverted many tens of thousands of dollars to the SRRA/SPLM/SPLA. This occurred in 1998 when the MSF-B management team in South Sudan agreed to an arrangement wherein the SRRA changed all their foreign currency into Sudanese dinars at a 10th of the usual exchange rate. Because of the scale of the MSF-B operations during the summer and autumn of 1998 the scale of the diversion was also very high.

⁵⁶ Although there are no data as to the extent of this taxation, in several of the most severe areas of Bahr El Ghazal taxation is rumoured to have accounted for approximately 50% of the general ration. WFP reports that it has since stepped up its post-distribution monitoring, in both sectors. Since January 1999, it claims that “food diversion through taxation has been reduced significantly” (personal communication, Ismet Fahmi, WFP).

13.3 Developments in humanitarian programming

International trends in aid programming, combined with the particularities of the OLS framework and the intractable nature of the Sudanese conflict have stimulated efforts to develop alternative programming approaches to the more conventional models of relief, rehabilitation and development - even though for most agencies such models remain the dominant paradigm. The widespread embargo on aid for development has been a further factor in the development of alternative approaches.

Two policy directions have been particularly significant: the development of 'rights-based' and 'peace-building' approaches, historically identified with UNICEF and UNDP respectively. NGOs have been variously influenced by these perspectives; of those under review this is particularly true for Red Barnet/SCF-UK. The UN is prepared these days to state the significance of the need for such approaches in quite forthright terms:

There is no longer any point in talking about assistance programmes in Sudan without also addressing the root causes of the conflict.... The ten-year history of OLS has demonstrated that in the context of a chronic conflict, the provision of relief assistance to address immediate needs, on its own, is not sufficient and not cost-effective. The famine conditions experienced in Bahr El Ghazal in 1988 and again in 1998 starkly demonstrate that without addressing the root causes of the conflict, the cycle of famine, emergency humanitarian interventions, short-term improvements in livelihoods leading to less emergency assistance and reduced donor support will continue to repeat itself.

As well as not being sufficient or cost effective, the provision of emergency relief assistance on its own may possibly contribute to the continuation of the conflict... Accordingly, peace-building initiatives and a rights based approach will also focus on the mitigation of possible negative impacts of simple life-saving emergency aid. Ethnic conflicts interact with the major conflict between the Government of Sudan and the rebel movement to produce devastating effects on the mostly traditional rural communities of southern Sudan and of the Nuba Mountains: starvation, displacement, abductions of children and women, gender-based violence, loss by children of primary family care, exploitation and abuse, war, disease and malnutrition-induced disabilities, forced conscription of children into armed hostilities, and psychosocial trauma on a massive scale.

At a structural level, the corrosive impact of the conflicts and related human rights abuses have further disempowered the affected communities, weakened and distorted their indigenous structures and value systems, and arrested their capacity to come (up) with initiatives to break the cycle of violence and abuse...Community level peace and reconciliation efforts currently being considered by OLS must be part of the overall efforts aimed at mainstreaming human rights into all aspects of programming...

(extracts from Operation Lifeline Sudan, IAC Briefing Paper 3, July 1999)

It is worth considering further what these approaches have meant.

13.4 Peacebuilding initiatives

Although it was only in 1999 that the OLS CAP included the ending of the conflict as one of the goals of the consortium.(UN, 1999a) peacebuilding initiatives have a longer history. The peacebuilding approach has often been problematic. The adoption of peacebuilding rhetoric by the warring parties has also served to confuse the issue. Some of the schemes promoted under a peacebuilding framework have demonstrably furthered particular political and military objectives, notably those of the government. The ‘peace villages’ of Wau, Juba, and most notoriously of the Nuba hills, and the UNDP ‘Area Rehabilitation Schemes’ associated with them, have been widely criticised, as have the modalities of supporting host communities along with IDPs in Ed Daein (Karim et al, 1996). UNICEF and WFP resources have been utilised in such schemes; they fall under general UN programming which DANIDA has supported. Criticism has focused on the feasibility of promoting pockets of ‘sustainable development’ in conditions of instability and conflict, and on the idea that the provision of sustainable livelihoods will itself do very much to remove the causes of conflict. Parallel developments have taken place in rebel-held areas, where USAID and others have promoted development as a peacebuilding activity in Equatoria, although these do not seem to have attracted so much criticism.

Some initiatives relating to peace and reconciliation seem to have been successful: the Dinka-Nuer reconciliation initiatives organised by the New Sudan Council of Churches early in 1999 are a case in point, borne out by several interviews during the evaluation (Cyer Reluan and Mayol Tong, 1999). This development was facilitated by CEAS and DCA, and supported by DANIDA via STS3 funding. Decreased tensions around the Nuer/Dinka border areas, and renewed trade, are said to have been a direct outcome.

There is a great need for serious evaluation of innovative and/or controversial initiatives such as these, not least because implementing or supporting agencies may be operating beyond their normal areas of competence.

It is debatable to what extent OLS is a suitable vehicle for such initiatives, and to what extent many humanitarian agencies have the expertise for tackling such fundamentally political interventions. OLS is essentially a humanitarian programme and cannot be seen as a vehicle for solving the war.

13.5 Rights-based initiatives

The rights-based approach has generated practical rather than conceptual problems. To date, the impact on practical programming has been quite limited. UNHCU, whose support by DANIDA is strongly endorsed by the evaluation, is a particular paradigm of this approach, but has had limited resources and has not as yet been subjected to any systematic evaluation. UNICEF, as well as Red Barnet/SCF-UK, claim some success in negotiating the return of abducted women and children. The government, despite its poor record on human rights, is clearly capable of embarrassment over some abuses. In some cases it may anyway have difficulty in controlling abuses and may be happy to collaborate or acquiesce in attempts to redress them. There may be opportunities for challenging some abuses against IDPs and others in the courts, an area that has received only limited attention. The GoS although far from being liberal or democratic, is neither monolithic nor totalitarian; it has a vested interest in avoiding further international isolation. The SPLA is also interested in improving its international credibility. A

'rights-based approach' will inevitably have constraints in a situation of conflict and limited legal process, but there is some room for manoeuvre.

13.6 The need for promotion of a political solution

Ultimately the sort of programming interventions outlined above may get closer to the root causes of the conflict and the real needs of the exploited and dispossessed, but will not in themselves resolve the problem in the absence of a wider political settlement. The central framework for peace negotiations has been IGAD, a regional forum which has shown itself to have serious limitations. The intractable problems of the Sudan are compounded by the politics of the region which have deteriorated considerably in recent years. IGAD itself has shown severe weaknesses at a technical as well as at a political level. Despite numerous initiatives, international involvement has been inadequate. UN efforts have not been backed by the serious regional and global power brokers. A dialogue programme run by UNDP in collaboration with UNESCO, involving the GOS and the SPLM in a series of international conferences, and aimed at confidence-building rather than negotiations, has had positive but limited impact. Such programmes are not a substitute for genuine political negotiations.

Whilst prospects in 1999 for any resolution of the Sudanese civil war appear remote, fora such as IGAD or whatever replaces it remain central to any long term prospects for peace. If the Danish government is to upgrade its response to the Sudanese tragedy, advocacy and support for peace negotiations should be a key component.

14. THE FAMINE OF 1998: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION AND RESPONSE TO THE FAMINE IN BAHR EL GHAZAL

14.1 Introduction

In 1998 Sudan experienced famine once again. Like the 1988 famine which had prompted the establishment of OLS, the mortality rates associated with the crisis were almost off the scale of recorded human suffering. Table 1 in Annex IV compares the prevalence of acute malnutrition in this famine with a number of others over the past decade. It shows that the malnutrition rates recorded in some areas of Sudan in 1998 equalled or exceeded those recorded in Ethiopia, Somalia and Liberia over the past decade.

The sheer extent of this terrible event warrants particular scrutiny of the international response, and in particular that of DANIDA. The famine took place against a backdrop of over a decade of experience of, and investment in, humanitarian response in Sudan. In such a context, understanding how and why such large numbers of people died is particularly salient. These events also illustrate many pertinent features of OLS and the humanitarian response more generally.

14.2 The evolution and impact of the famine

As in 1988, the epicentre of the 1998 famine was in Bahr El Ghazal province. This is one of the most remote areas of the country.⁵⁷ The infrastructure and public services are very limited, particularly in the largely rural, rebel-held areas. Despite its vulnerability and the lack of health and other public services, the region has received negligible amounts of international assistance. Only three international agencies have been working in this vast area outside Wau, the provincial capital: UNICEF, WFP and MSF-B.

The particular vulnerability of the region is associated with its strategic importance on the 'frontline' of the war, and with the tactics that have been used to prosecute it. Since 1995, the GoS has worked to secure its military and political objectives through the proxy force of Kerubino Bol. A former SPLA commander, Kerubino's tactics have wrought a devastating impact, attacking civilian populations, displacing them from their homes and looting their assets (see chapter 13).

This chronic conflict, during which people received only minimal humanitarian input, has progressively depleted resources and people's ability to cope with natural and man-made deprivation, displacing many families and destroying cattle and stores. By the end of 1997 the food security and health situation of the population was deteriorating seriously⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ For the small planes used in the relief operation, it is three hours flying time from Khartoum and Lokichokio. And up until 1998 there were few airstrips.

⁵⁸ For example, TB was a major and increasing threat to the population. An epidemic of Kalazar was raging in Western Upper Nile and Guinea Worm was highly endemic. More usual problems such as diarrhoeal disease and respiratory tract infections were also common as a result of poor water and living conditions.

In January 1998, heavy fighting in the Government-held towns of Wau, Gogrial and Aweil caused the displacement of 130,000 people into the surrounding countryside, exacerbating an already precarious situation. The culmination of five years of drought further strained an already fragile food system. Those areas worst affected by the drought were not the same, however, as those worst affected by the famine (see figures 1, 2 and 3 in Annex IV).

The speed at which the food economy broke down and nutritional status declined took most aid agencies by surprise. Despite the threats to food security that had affected the population for years, they had managed to survive, deploying a wide range of strategies. Of particular importance in preventing widespread malnutrition were the strong social support mechanisms, based on kinship, and the extensive use of wild foods. The WFP food economy assessment unit correctly identified the fact that by the end of 1997, the combination of war and drought meant that people could no longer cope – they were facing a severe crisis.

Access to one key resource, relief aid, had been repeatedly blocked by Kerubino's troops. In the 18 months preceding the famine, all but one of the sites to which relief was delivered were deliberately burned, a tactic designed to capture food aid, but also to intimidate communities and aid agencies alike⁵⁹ (see also Section 13.2). They forced the aid community to develop mobile programmes, with little presence on the ground. The limitations on access to humanitarian relief were intensified in February when the government imposed a flight ban preventing air deliveries. This was only partially lifted in late February/early March 1998, leaving only a restricted number of sites accessible.⁶⁰

No longer able to access sufficient wild or other food sources, including relief, in their home areas, people turned elsewhere. They started to move into those few sites to which the government allowed humanitarian agencies access. But these sites had no infrastructure and very poor services. By May, the food economy of several districts in the northern areas of the province had collapsed totally, forcing still more people to move in search of food.

In this context of acute stress, a familiar course of events took place: The concentration of people resulted in increased transmission of disease. Water and sanitation conditions deteriorated. Malnutrition lowered immunity. The outbreak of *Shigella* in Ajiep killed many and weakened others. In Wau there was a similarly fatal attack of diarrhoea.

In Wau during August, mortality rates were probably far higher than 15 per 10,000 per day (figures based upon body counts at graveyards, excluding those buried elsewhere). In Ajiep, where 90 percent of the population had been displaced the crude mortality rate was estimated at 69 per 10,000, the under-five mortality rates at 133 per 10,000 per day. At these rates, in less than two months, half of a population of 10,000 would have died. Although probably an overestimation, due to difficulties in estimating family size and the

⁵⁹ See Annex VI for coverage of EPI sites since 1992/93, showing how few were functioning by 1998/99.

⁶⁰ On February 24 1998, Robert Schaik, the UN Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, negotiated international access to four sites in SPLA-held territory (Ajiep, Adet, Pakor and Akeum), and to the Government-held towns of Wau and Aweil.

concentration of mortality in a few sites, these rates are staggeringly high, unheard of in civilian populations⁶¹.

14.3 Early warning and late response: an overview of the international response

The 1997 annual needs assessment and 1998 CAP predicted "...the same desperate conditions that sparked off the formation of OLS in 1989", forecasting a food deficit of fifty to sixty percent in the Bahr El Ghazal region, and that the conflict was likely to intensify. These predictions proved largely accurate, although they underestimated the extent of insecurity and its implications.

Despite these dire warnings, the UN CAP asked for *less* funding in 1998 than it had done in 1997. In the case of UNICEF, this amounted to a 37% reduction in the budget of the southern sector, down from \$32 million to \$21 million⁶². OLS staff explained this anomaly as a result of the negative donor reaction to the 1997 CAP. In other words, they appealed only for what they expected the donors to give (see chapter 7). This reaction to chronic under-funding on the part of implementors appeared widespread, making a number of them reluctant to ask their donors for more funds during the winter of 1997/1998.

Agency concern that donors were unlikely to be generous proved well-founded. Despite several urgent appeals for additional funding⁶³, by April 1998, when the opportunities for famine mitigation had almost run out, only 20 percent of the funds requested in the CAP had been received. By June, WFP had still received only 40 percent of the amount requested and was again issuing urgent appeals to donors for more funds (WFP, 1998 *Food availability and funding update*, May 5th).

However, the opportunities to revise the CAP were limited by the procedures of some UN agencies. For example, WFP procedures mean that amendments to the appeal are made only on the basis of evidence gathered during food distributions. As few distributions took place in the early part of the year, because of restricted access, no additional request for food was made until much later (personal communications: D. Fletcher, S. Jaspars).

Many of the funds that were pledged were received late. The lack of timeliness of the donor response undermined the impact and efficiency of these limited resources still further, contributing to the high death toll. In July 1998 donors, including DANIDA, started to fund the response in earnest. This sudden release of funds created great competition for transport and materials. However, at this stage the huge displacement and complete breakdown in people's coping strategies had dramatically increased the amount of resources needed, as well as the logistical difficulties of delivering them. The

⁶¹ For example in Baidoa the epicentre of the 1992 famine in Somalia the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) was under 20 per 10,000 per day and even in Goma at the height of the cholera the CMR did not reach above 40 per day 10,000 per day.

⁶² A major part of the reduction in the UNICEF budget can be accounted for by the introduction of cost recovery in the Loki camp and air operations. However, the 1998 appeal also included a 40% reduction in the food security budget and a 60% reduction in emergency health appeals with only a 3% increase in the nutrition budget, compared with 1997 (OLS, 1998c; OLS, 1997c; UNICEF, 1998b).

⁶³ see, for example, OLS, 1998b; UNICEF, 1998; UNICEF, 1998d; WFP 1998a ;

large numbers of severely malnourished children and adults could not be treated using the general ration (comprising low cost foods from Africa), but required intensive treatment, using high cost specialised food from Europe.

The effectiveness and efficiency of the available resources was further limited by the weakness of OLS coordination mechanisms (see chapter 9), which was put into sharp focus by the events of 1998. In the months leading up to the famine, UNICEF took few measures to enhance the quality of field level coordination in preparation for a massive expansion in OLS operations once access was re-established, particularly in Bahr El Ghazal. Consequently, field coordination was either absent or extremely weak in many of the famine-affected areas (Salaama et al 1998).

The weak coordination structures meant that there was no effective forum for contingency planning, or for linking early warning information to operational responses⁶⁴. This reduced the ability of the OLS consortium to respond coherently. Instead, each agency worked to its own plans.

In light of the fact that the GoS had restricted access annually, the lack of a contingency plan to respond to the flight ban was a major failing of the response. In the event, the impression is that programmes were simply put on hold. When access was granted, the system lacked the capacity to utilise it fully. There were shortages of aviation fuel, the road to Lokichokio remained in poor condition, and there was a shortage of trained staff to go in and rapidly assess the situation. OLS should have addressed these bottlenecks earlier. UNICEF undertook no audit of the capacities of member agencies and therefore could not compare overall capacity with projected needs to identify and plan for shortfalls.

Political and military activity early in the year, combined with the late and limited response of the international community, meant that by mid-1998 the famine was out of control. This meant that need far exceeded the capacity of the humanitarian community to respond. For example, in order to satisfy international guidelines, it would have been necessary to deploy 200 specially trained nutrition staff in Wau alone to manage therapeutic feeding⁶⁵. Although dwarfed by events in Bahr El Ghazal, there was also substantial humanitarian need in other provinces, such as Western Upper Nile, placing still further pressure on the limited humanitarian capacity.

The intensity of the famine also demanded a change of operational tactics. In particular, the SPLM/SRRA-OLS joint task force concluded that community-based targeting failed in the context of an acute famine. Particularly vulnerable groups, including those families with a member at the feeding centre, widows and those at the lower end of the socio-economic hierarchy, were systematically excluded from distributions. This led to many deaths even after sufficient general rations and supplementary feeding were made

⁶⁴ In 1999 UNICEF are taking steps to collate information in the UNICEF monitoring and evaluation unit and to link this into decision-making. There is, however, still no forum for developing a co-ordinated contingency plan for the whole consortium.

⁶⁵ This is based on the MSF recommendation that 2 expatriate staff are required to support therapeutic feeding of 150 people. In Wau alone, there was a need for approximately 6-8,000 places for children in therapeutic feeding centres, with at least the same number required for adults. Similar levels of need were reported in other major 'famine centres' such as Ajiep and Panthou.


available. In such acute crises, there is a need for special targeting strategies capable of reaching the most marginalised.

14.4 DANIDA'S response

DANIDA's funding to Sudan increased by a modest three percent. In common with many other donors, the majority of DANIDA's funding arrived late and appeared reactive to the development of widespread starvation. DANIDA released none of the DKK 34,700,000 spent in South Sudan at the beginning of the year when it could still have had a positive effect in stopping displacement and in preventing the famine. In the period up to May, when land transport was still possible, DANIDA had released less than a third of the year's funding. By this time, the famine in Bahr El Ghazal was at an advanced stage.

Figure 14.1 correlates the disbursement of Danish humanitarian assistance funding with the numbers of people entering supplementary feeding centres in 1998 to early 1999. It shows clearly the lateness of DANIDA's response, which appears to correlate more closely with media coverage of the famine in Denmark, than with need on the ground (see Chapter 11). Lack of timeliness had a significant and negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of DANIDA's contribution to the famine response.

Figure 14.1 Disbursement of Danish humanitarian assistance funding during 1998 mapped against the numbers entering supplementary feeding programmes



14.5 The effectiveness of DANIDA-funded programming

DANIDA's key NGO partners in the southern sector – SCF-UK, MSF and CEAS, were among the first to respond to the crisis. However, all admitted to the evaluation team that they had responded poorly to the warning signs of famine and were thus poorly prepared for the demands it would make upon them in terms of management, resources and the need to change operational objectives⁶⁶ ICRC did not resume its activities in South Sudan until June 1998.

All of DANIDA's partners expanded massively during the summer of 1998. MSF-B responded most quickly, and within two months of access being resumed was active in seven sites, managing large supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes and providing some basic health care. As indicated above, the scale of the disaster was potentially overwhelming, even for the most experienced agency. In this difficult environment, MSF-B made a major contribution to alleviating malnutrition and treating health problems in the province. Its eight centres provided supplementary feeding and health support for over 20,000 patients, while an additional 2000 people received therapeutic feeding (source, Epicentre). In addition, the agency operated two health care centres and ten primary health care units. MSF-B's work in Bahr El Ghazal was not without problems, however. It suffered from poor management, internal wrangling within MSF International and the late deployment of some specially trained staff. Perhaps most serious are accusations by other agencies that in June and July 1998, MSF failed to admit the limitations of their own response with the effect that other agencies were deterred from working in Bahr El Ghazal⁶⁷. This negatively affected coverage.

SCF-UK also experienced problems in its response to the famine. Most fundamentally, it appeared unable to translate the very high quality of its information from the field, particularly regarding the likely deterioration in security in and around Wau and Aweil, into an operational plan and response. Interviews conducted during the course of this evaluation indicated that decision-makers in Khartoum, Nairobi and London were reluctant to acknowledge the likely scale of the famine, limiting the ability of field personnel to prepare adequately.

By contrast, despite its absence from the field in early 1998, ICRC was able to use its network of tracing staff to build up a picture of the evolving situation during the year. Once its operations were restored in June 1998, it had to conduct fresh field assessments before deploying an operational field presence. However, ICRC's strong logistics and human resource capacity enabled the organisation to respond quickly and to scale up its operations in both northern and southern sectors.

Striking is the fact that few of DANIDA's partners collect data which allows an analysis of their effectiveness. MSF-B is an exception. Table 14.1 shows the outcome of MSF's nutritional rehabilitation measures in Bahr El Ghazal May-December 1999.

⁶⁶ SCF budgeted 10 percent contingency funds in their 1997 appeal but this proved inadequate as their programme expanded more than this. Interviews with SCF staff suggested that SCF underestimated the scale of the famine. MSF-B was slow to change its mode of operation from one providing longer-term essential care programmes in a chronically unstable context to one designed for an acute emergency (personal communication, F. Fille). CEAS was reluctant and sluggish to become involved on any significant scale in the provision of food aid.

⁶⁷ It was not until the SRRA invited two Concern staff to perform a joint assessment in Ajiep that the extent to which MSF-B was overwhelmed was revealed.

Table 14.1 Effectiveness of MSF nutritional rehabilitation centres in Bahr El Ghazal, May - December 1998

outcome	SFC	TFC
cured	48%	74%
death	3%	12%
defaulter	49%	14%
total patients	18,259	2,312

Legend:

SFC = supplementary feeding centre

TFC = therapeutic feeding centre

Source: Epicentre

Annex IV, Table 2 provides further data regarding MSF-B's adherence to international standards of relief programming established by SPHERE⁶⁸. Whilst not attaining the output standards (in terms of reduced mortality, for example), they did adhere to most of the process criteria. Additional data (Appendix IV) show that MSF-B did have an impact in reducing mortality. It is regrettable that comparable data are not available from DANIDA's other partners.

There is other evidence, however, which indicates that some of DANIDA's partners were not so well-placed to respond to humanitarian need during the famine. This reflects on ADRA-South Sudan's ability to implement effective nutrition programmes more generally.

In 1998, DANIDA donated DKK1.2 million in kind to ADRA-Denmark for nutritional activities in Bahr El Ghazal and Western Kapoeta Country in Eastern Equatoria. At that time ADRA had limited capacity to implement nutrition programmes and therefore passed on the majority of the donation to other NGOs. However, ADRA eventually set up several feeding centres in Twic county in Bahr El Ghazal. Although funded from different sources (and using the last of the DANIDA-funded food resources) it is the evaluation team's view that some of these centres had little capacity for the rehydration and care of severely malnourished children and were therapeutic facilities in name only. They were using inappropriate regimes, adhering to almost none of the international standards for such programmes, for example, THM-100 milk was being distributed dry. This reflects on ADRA-South Sudan's ability to implement nutrition programmes more generally.

There were concerns regarding the timeliness and quality of some of UNICEF's inputs during the famine. For example, a sizeable donation from ECHO intended to alleviate the 1998 famine was used to purchase DSM in Europe. The lengthy UNICEF procurement procedures led to such delays that the milk powder only arrived in the northern Kenyan logistic base in January 1999. By this time there was far less need for supplementary feeding programmes and UNICEF only implemented 1 of the 10 feeding

⁶⁸ SPHERE (1998) *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, Geneva. These guidelines are the result of a major collaboration between international NGOs involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

centres they proposed in June. As of April 1999 there are 150 MT of DSM (sufficient to feed over 25,000 severely malnourished children) in the UNICEF store, with 5 MT of this due to expire within the next few months. The majority of the therapeutic feeding programmes have now closed, and there is little scope for using all this DSM efficiently.⁶⁹ At present, agencies are giving out this DSM in a dry, unmixed form, to feeding centre beneficiaries - a potentially dangerous practice that goes against international guidelines.

Delays also occurred in UNICEF's provision of therapeutic feeding materials to Wau in 1998. In this case, although UNICEF ordered the more appropriate F100, there was a three month delay before they managed to fulfil their promise to supply this to MSF-H. Consequently, for the three months at the height of the famine, MSF-H were forced to use inappropriate foods. This resulted in a considerably increased mortality in the centre (source: MSF-Holland evaluation).

14.6 Policy implications of the international response to the 1998 famine

Primary responsibility for the widespread suffering and death during the 1998 famine lies with the warring parties, all of which have consistently violated the Geneva Conventions, targeting civilians and blocking the access of humanitarian agencies. In such an environment, the scope for humanitarian aid to prevent and mitigate famine was limited. But despite the difficulty of these conditions, the effectiveness of the international response, and that of DANIDA in particular, was limited by a number of key factors:

- Once again the international community waited until the final stage of famine – death by starvation and disease – had occurred on a significant scale before mounting a response. This indicates a persistent and fatal misunderstanding of the nature of famine and the role that timely assistance might play in its prevention and mitigation. It is also perhaps indicative of the pressures on international decision-makers in donor organisations and elsewhere when there are numerous emergencies unfolding. In order to merit attention, the situation needs to be increasingly desperate.
- Paradoxically, the association of famine with its end stage has been sustained despite (or perhaps because of) greater emphasis on relief-development linkages. In a context increasingly characterised as possessing developmental opportunities, the emergency “edge” of many agencies has been lost in terms of their analysis and response. In Sudan, it appears that an emergency operation had become bogged down by institutional inertia which made it difficult to scale up quickly and appropriately in the face of an acute emergency.
- International organisations, in particular the UN, failed to use available information to publicise the potential scale of the disaster early on. This is reflected in the downward revisions in the CAP, which did not correlate with need. Such tactics do not contribute to effective response or to maintaining international standards of response. DANIDA's lack of engagement with agencies on the ground meant that it lacked a timely and accurate analysis of the unfolding famine. DANIDA's partners failed to advocate sufficiently early and strongly to trigger an earlier and perhaps more generous response.

⁶⁹ DSM is usually mixed with oil and sugar to make High Energy Milk for the therapeutic feeding of people with severe malnutrition. A concentrated mineral mix should also be added.

- Finally, the lack of effective contingency planning, preparedness and funding meant that once access was secured, the pace at which this could be utilised was very slow. In part this is symptomatic of the chronic under-funding of the relief operation itself, which has left OLS in particular with insufficient capacity to respond to such a major crisis.

15. ANALYSIS OF DANIDA'S POLICY TOWARDS, AND MANAGEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN

15.1. Introduction

DANIDA's humanitarian assistance to Sudan has been described in chapter 5, and commented upon throughout this report. This chapter summarises key features of DANIDA's programming, and looks at the management and the policy framework for DANIDA's humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

15.2 Features of DANIDA's programming to Sudan

Strengths:

- DANIDA has remained a committed donor to Sudan throughout the 1990s, a period which has seen declining contributions overall, as 'donor fatigue' has set in, and Sudan has had to 'compete' for attention with more high-profile emergencies elsewhere in the world. (for example, in former Yugoslavia).
- DANIDA usually provides unearmarked funds, and is renowned for its flexibility and ability to respond fast - two characteristics which are generally welcomed by its partner agencies.
- DANIDA has generally not imposed political agendas or conditions on the use of funds for Sudan, during a period when humanitarian funding has become increasingly politicised.
- DANIDA has developed close working relationships with most (but not all) Danish NGOs responding to the crisis in Sudan, particularly at the Copenhagen level.

Weaknesses:

- DANIDA lacks some of the tools required to guarantee a quality programme, for example, ensuring that project proposals are subjected to a technical assessment requiring systematic monitoring and evaluation, and developing knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of its partner agencies, at field level.
- DANIDA has missed opportunities to pursue some of its global priorities, such as coordination of humanitarian assistance, in the case of Sudan because of a lack of engagement with policy and with the programme at all levels.
- The timeframe of some of DANIDA's grants is inappropriate, sometimes seriously so, requiring funds to be spent by the end of the financial year (even when the grant has been made late in the year). This is true even for longer-term activities such as capacity-building and the year-on-year provision of services to 'stable' IDP populations. Although extensions can be requested, it is time-consuming. In reality, many agencies try and spend the funds within the original time-frame.
- DANIDA lacks an overall strategy on the emergency in Sudan to guide its programme and project funding decisions (see also below).

15.3 Management of DANIDA's humanitarian assistance to Sudan

Humanitarian assistance to Sudan is entirely managed by S3 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. There is little engagement from S8, the geographical department, although they are copied in on all funding decisions.

Although investigation of DANIDA's internal organisation and management lay beyond the scope of this evaluation, the strong impression of the evaluation team is that S3 staff are over-stretched and under-resourced. Staffing levels are low in relation to the size of the budget and the responsibilities involved⁷⁰. As well as geographic responsibilities, most S3 staff have a range of other sectoral responsibilities. This limits the extent to which they are able to engage in policy and programme discussions with implementing partners and with OLS in Sudan.

The Danish missions in Geneva and New York are involved in some negotiations with the UN agencies based in those cities, and/or represent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in various humanitarian fora, for example the IAC on Sudan in Geneva.

DANIDA has an extremely limited field presence covering humanitarian issues in Sudan. Officially, the Danish Embassy in Cairo covers Sudan since the Khartoum Embassy was closed in the early '90s. In practice, humanitarian issues in the southern sector are partially covered by the Humanitarian Aid Officer in the Danish Embassy in Nairobi, who is responsible for Somalia. He currently spends approximately 10 to 15% of his time attending meetings and covering OLS southern sector issues.

The consequences of this management structure are:

- a) that DANIDA's exposure to conditions on the ground in Sudan, and to the programmes it is funding, is limited to occasional field trips by S3 staff (of which there have been two since 1997)
- b) DANIDA's engagement in policy and operational discussions about the humanitarian response in Sudan is limited to attending the IAC meetings in Geneva. It is not an active participant in the regional fora where most of the policy discussions take place.

From a brief survey of other donor agencies of a similar size, it appears that DANIDA is less engaged at both humanitarian and political levels in Sudan. (For example, the Norwegian government is not heavily engaged in operational humanitarian issues, but is a key player at a higher political level, for example, in the IGAD peace process. The Swedish government is engaged in humanitarian policy issues in Sudan).

Whilst this approach may be broadly consistent with DANIDA's policy of multilateralism, the reality is that other donor governments with strong political agendas have tended to exert disproportionate influence over OLS.

⁷⁰ Compared with development aid, it appears that the ratio of aid officials to DKK spent on humanitarian aid is very much lower. For example, in Nairobi there is a team of about six staff (including three assistants) working on development aid in Kenya, with an annual budget of approximately DKK80 million. Yet there is not even one full-time person in the region working on Sudan, with an annual humanitarian aid budget of DKK30 to 40 million.

15.4 Analysis of DANIDA's policy framework, as applied to Sudan

DANIDA's programme funding decisions on Sudan appear to be guided by its broad global policies, for example on active multilateralism, and the 'Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000'. Key policy statements on humanitarianism are mostly expounded in ministerial speeches, especially in a speech presented to the Council for Development Co-operation in November 1995, but also in a speech presented to a workshop on 'Programming Relief for Development' in Copenhagen in February 1995. These statements have given broad direction to DANIDA's humanitarian policy. But they are mostly at a very general level, with no accompanying guidelines about how they should be interpreted or implemented in practice, in the complex reality of a chronic political emergency such as Sudan's. As a result, the policies are open to wide interpretation, which has sometimes caused inconsistency and had disruptive consequences, for example in the case of 'development-oriented relief'. (See Chapter 10).

In practice, it appears that a number of de facto policies and priorities are unwritten, for example on de-mining⁷¹. Policy is also often made or interpreted orally and *in situ*, notably during the course of negotiations over funding allocations with implementing partners (especially Danish NGOs), and is not committed to paper. Danish NGOs in particular commented upon this. As the humanitarian aid budget grows, and the number of implementing partners working in complex political emergencies increases, the drawbacks of this approach become more evident.

DANIDA's approach to emergencies appears to be based on a linear model of relief-rehabilitation-development, for example, in its approach to 'development-oriented humanitarian assistance', and in some of the thinking behind the new Peace and Stability Fund. But in Sudan's complex political emergency this model, which is based on responses to natural disasters, is inappropriate and does not accommodate the realities of the situation. The emergency is chronic and long-term. Periodically it becomes particularly acute, for example during the Bahr El Ghazal famine in 1998. Such a situation is challenging for aid programming. There may be a need at times for relief, rehabilitation *and* development aid to be provided simultaneously, yet the modalities of each type of aid in a highly politicised environment must be fully understood; for example, in terms of working with rebel movements and providing rehabilitation/development support to a government at war. At all times a clear analysis of who is benefiting and whose interests are being served is necessary, and this is not always easily done.

DANIDA has identified a number of cross-cutting themes in Strategy 2000 which it prioritises in its development aid, specifically gender, environment, human rights and democratisation. It has been unclear from the Sudan case study how these relate to DANIDA's humanitarian aid, in theory or practice, and no evidence of their application.

Finally, DANIDA's response to Sudan's emergency has mostly been reactive, to project/programme proposals received from UN agencies and from Danish NGOs and the Red

⁷¹ In 1998, a proposal from DCA to fund a de-mining project implemented by Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), was rejected by DANIDA. The reasons appear sound – it was not the right time to fund de-mining whilst the conflict continued. There were also concerns about OSIL's neutrality, as it had a number of former SPLA soldiers working for it. But it is striking that there are no written guidelines to guide S3 officials, who often have limited experience and expertise of complex political emergencies.

Cross Movement. There is currently no overall strategic plan or framework to guide DANIDA's country-level humanitarian response. It is more a product of a series of separate agency negotiations, based on a high degree of trust. Whilst this has produced a wide-ranging and generally appropriate portfolio of programmes, and has made the considerable management challenges more bearable, the overall response could be strengthened. For example, coverage could be improved by a clearer analysis of vulnerable groups, and of gaps in the provision of assistance; DANIDA could make a more strategic contribution to the overall humanitarian response, for example, by prioritising coordination and constructively engaging in policy discussions.

ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE

19. january 1999

Terms of Reference for Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan

Background

The share of total aid budgets spent on humanitarian assistance has increased in recent years. During the five years 1992-1997 the Government of Denmark contributed an average of DKK 993 million (USD 145 mill.) per year to emergency relief and various other forms of humanitarian assistance. This constituted about 9 % of total development aid.

Danish official humanitarian assistance is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and channelled through a multitude of implementing organisations (percentages reflect 1997 distribution): 58% through 16 UN agencies; 30% through 17 Danish NGOs; 4% through international NGOs; and 8% through Danish Government institutions (the International Humanitarian Service (IHB) 4%, Embassies 3% and peacekeeping forces' humanitarian activities, 1%).

In view of the volume of humanitarian assistance, the complexity of the emergencies, the numerous actors involved and the dearth of systematic documentation of effects and impact it has been decided to carry out an overall evaluation of Danish humanitarian assistance during the period 1992-1998 in accordance with the attached overall terms of reference.

The focus of the evaluation will be on the empirical analysis of a sample of completed and ongoing emergency relief operations where several implementing agencies have been funded wholly or in part by the Government of Denmark. Cases have been selected to represent agencies' current policies and strategies and to be representative of the portfolio of each agency in terms of: (a) mode of operation; (b) type of assistance offered; (c) type of disaster: The Great Lakes, Angola, Former Yugoslavia, Sudan, the Caucasus and Afghanistan. These cases represent approximately 40% of total humanitarian aid during 1992-1997.

The case studies will have identical Terms of Reference, the priority of issues to be covered will, however, vary according to the specific case context and the scope of DANIDA funded activities. This does not imply that issues which have lower priority in the particular case study are not important for the humanitarian assistance as such, only that the issues have not been targeted by DANIDA funded assistance. Such issues should in the evaluation be treated as contextual rather than being subject to in-depth study.

The humanitarian assistance to Sudan is characterised by the long civil war combined with natural disasters, and by being "the forgotten disaster". During 1992-1997⁷²

⁷² Data for 1998 will be available shortly

DANIDA has provided 34 grants totalling DKK 248 mill. (app. USD 385 mill.) The grants have been provided to (see also the attached list).

UNHCR: refugees, repatriation

UNICEF: shelter, relief and survival

WFP: food aid, transport

DRC (Danish Red Cross): refugees and IDPs, food-aid, health, preparedness

DanChurchAid: repatriation and reconstruction, food aid

Save the Children: repatriation and reconstruction, health

MSF: health

In addition DANIDA is funding primary education in Upper Nile and Equatoria, 1997-1999, DKK 3.6 mill. and rural development in the Red Sea Mountains, 1994-1998, DKK 27.5.

Objectives

The major objective of the case study is to:

- Assess and document the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of Danish humanitarian assistance to Sudan.

Scope of work

- Assess and analyse coverage – does the humanitarian assistance reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous agendas (political, ethnic, religious, gender bias)?
- Assess and analyse coherence - are the humanitarian activities carried out with an effective division of labour among actors, maximising the comparative advantages of each and strengthening local capabilities?
- Assess and analyse connectedness – are activities of a short term emergency nature carried out in a context which takes longer term and interconnected problems into account such as e.g. refugees'/IDP's dependence and future possibilities, relief for development, the consequences of any emergency action for local communities (economic, environmental etc.)?
- Assess and analyse co-ordination – are there adequate mechanisms for, and are actors willing/able to engage actively in, co-ordination of relief operations. Is the need for visibility balanced with the need for co-ordination and co-operation?
- Assess and analyse disaster preparedness – what are agencies doing in practical terms to foresee emergencies and what do they do to be prepared, including building local capacities?
- Assess how security influences humanitarian action e.g. choice of area of intervention, mode of implementation and possible cessation of the assistance.

- Assess and analyse activities in conflict prevention and mitigation, both free standing activities and those integrated in humanitarian relief operations, including to what extent the assistance may affect the conflict.
- Assess and analyse advocacy: how are agencies contributing to informing the public about humanitarian issues and to fundraising?
- Assess the role of the media for humanitarian action: how are the media and the need for visibility influencing agencies' priorities and selection of operations and mode of implementation?
- Assess the development and use of performance measures and indicators for humanitarian assistance.

In this case study special emphasis should be placed on coverage (north/south), delivery of food during cease-fire, refugee camps, urban refugees (North Sudan) and man-made disaster in combination with natural disasters (drought).

Concurrent with the case study a separate team will prepare working papers on individual implementing agencies covering the following issues:

- Assess performance against the policies and code of conduct of the agency, such as the NGO Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief.
- Assess the contribution of the agency to the effectiveness of the “international humanitarian system”, in particular in terms of co-ordination of activities and complementarity of inputs (both at Danish, international and local level).
- Assess the potential gap between attention to inputs and concern for results. Do the agencies give adequate attention to effects and impacts of their humanitarian assistance on recipients and local (surrounding) communities?
- Assess the relationship to local partners. What are the most effective ways to work with local partners? How do agencies identify and support the existing capacities of local partners and, at the same time, help them develop new approaches and outlooks (e.g. programming relief for development, disaster prevention and preparedness, conflict resolution, gender analysis, etc.) and the capacities to pursue these?
- Assess the relationship to local communities (authorities and populations) in host areas. What measures are taken to protect or mitigate damage to local communities – economic and environmental?
- Assess and describe the strengths and weaknesses of the agency in order to identify comparative advantages and possible areas in need of improvement.

The case study team will be required to provide input to this analysis in the form of brief notes on the above issues and participation in one or two workshops.

Approach

The case study will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and perceptive manner with varied and balanced consideration of both positive and negative aspects. The report

should be presented in a solid, concise and readable form and be structured around the issues in the study in order to facilitate preparation of the overall evaluation report.

The case study will require extensive review of existing documentation with particular attention to evaluations and evaluative studies, consultations with senior and operational managers and field staff of involved agencies, as well as consultations/interviews with a sample of beneficiaries. Fieldwork will be planned and organised in close collaboration with the agencies concerned so as not to interfere with emergency relief activities and not duplicate existing or ongoing surveys and studies. Workshops will be organised by the consultants with participants from all agencies involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sudan during the early stage of preparation of the case study and again before drafting the case study report. These workshops will be held in Copenhagen. The purpose of these workshops is to ensure that stakeholders' knowledge and views are incorporated in the analysis.

The limited availability of impact data on which to base measurement of effectiveness place constraints on the extent to which a conventional impact analysis can be conducted. Where data exists, impact assessment will be undertaken, but emphasis will also be placed on identifying good practice in performance monitoring.

Work Plan

(Staff input in brackets are indicative)

February	Contracts
March	Preparatory Studies 25 th /26 th Workshop on Methodology (Copenhagen)
April	Preparatory workshops (Copenhagen)
April /May	Desk studies/document reviews (8 person weeks)
May/June	Field studies (10 person weeks)
June	Workshop – report back
July	Draft report (8 person weeks)
September	Synthesis draft available
October	Synthesis workshop, final reports + final synthesis (2 person weeks)

Composition of Team

A team of four consultants will be required with a broad mix of skills covering all aspects of humanitarian assistance: policy, strategy, planning and needs assessment, logistics, shelter, health, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, refugee protection, and advocacy. For all team members, experience of evaluation and/or operation in emergency programmes as well as knowledge of Sudan is highly desirable. As part of the documentation applications for funding, appropriation documents are written in Danish, at least one team member should be proficient in Danish. The team should include a nominated member from ETC who has responsibility for the synthesis report. The team leader should have good management and interpersonal skills and a strong evaluation background.

Danish NGOs:

ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency)
CARITAS Denmark
DACAAR (Danish Committee for Assistance to Afghan Refugees)
DANSK RØDE KORS (Danish Red Cross)
DANSK FLYGTNINGEHJÆLP (Danish Refugee Council)
DET DANSKE BAPTISTSAMFUND (Danish Baptist Union)
FOLKEKIRKENS NØDHJÆLP (DanChurchAid)
LÆGER UDEN GRÆNSER (Médecins sans frontières, Denmark))
MISSION ØST (Mission East)
RED BARNET (Save the Children)

FN Agencies

UN-OCHA (DHA)
UNOCHA (Afghanistan)
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNOHCHR
WFP
WHO

International Organisations

ICRC
IFRC
IOM

ANNEX II A: TEAM ITINERARY

DATE	TEAM MEMBER			
	S Collins	F Wekesa	M Buchanan-Smith	C Dammers
25-Mar-99				Copenhagen, Denmark
26-Mar				Copenhagen, Denmark
12-Apr	Copenhagen, Denmark		Copenhagen, Denmark	
13-Apr				
14-Apr				
15-Apr	Copenhagen, Denmark		Copenhagen, Denmark	
28-Apr-99		Nairobi, Kenya	Awaiting visas	Awaiting visas
29-Apr-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya		
30-Apr-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya		
1-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Loki, Kenya		
2-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Loki, Kenya		
3-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Loki, Kenya		
4-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Wulu, S Sudan		
5-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Wulu, S Sudan		
6-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Liil, S Sudan		
7-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Liil, S Sudan		
8-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Mapel, S Sudan		
9-May-99	Ajiep, S Sudan	Mapel, S Sudan		
10-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Yirol, S Sudan		
11-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Yirol, S Sudan		
12-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Loki, Kenya		
13-May-99	Loki, Kenya	Loki, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
14-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
15-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
16-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
17-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
18-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
19-May-99	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	Nairobi, Kenya	
25-May-99			Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
26-May-99			Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
27-May-99			Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
28-May-99			Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
01-Jun-99			Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
03-Jun-99			Geneva, Switzerland	Geneva, Switzerland
04-Jun-99			Geneva, Switzerland	Geneva, Switzerland

15-Jun-99		Khartoum, N Sudan		
16-Jun-99		Khartoum, N Sudan		
17-Jun-99		Khartoum, N Sudan		
18-Jun-99		Khartoum, N Sudan		
19-Jun-99		Khartoum, N Sudan		
20-Jun-99		Wau, N Sudan		
21-Jun-99	Copenhagen, Denmark	Wau, N Sudan	Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
22-Jun-99	Copenhagen, Denmark		Copenhagen, Denmark	Copenhagen, Denmark
28-Jun		London, UK		
20-Jun-99		London, UK		
30-Jun-99		London, UK		
		London, UK		
01-Jul-99		London, UK		

ANNEX II B: INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

DENMARK

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Andersen, G.A. Head of S3

Buch Hansen, E. Evaluation Secretariat

Camacho, K., S3

Dabelstein, N., Evaluation Secretariat

Dahl-Hansen, J., formerly Head of S3

Damkjer, D., S8

Jaspar, Mr., S8

Kierulf, J. Office for Peace and Stability

Lehmann Nielsen, U., S3

Meinecke, G. Office for Peace and Stability

Molesby, O., formerly Head of of S3

Nervil, C. S3

Thomsen, M., STS3

Thorup, L., formerly S3 Sudan desk officer

Zimmer-Johns, M., Head of Policy and Planning Department

DANCHURCH AID

Overgaard, L

Skov-Hansen, L Head of Relief Department

RED BARNET

Bøgh, C. Programme Manager

DANISH RED CROSS

Bjerre, R.

Hald, B Head of Relief Section

Juel Jepsen, P.

Laugetsen, N

Melchior Tellier, S. Director of International Department

ADRA

Birgit Philpsen

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DANISH MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Sloth Carlsen, AM. Deputy Permanent Representative

Torpegaard Hansen, O. Counsellor

ICRC

Harnisch, C. Deputy General Delegate, Africa

Moretti Carr, S. External Resources Department

Perrin, P. Chief Medical Officer

IFRC

Bracke, R. Team Leader, Eastern Africa and Great Lakes

Mohammed Omer Mukhier, formerly with Sudan Red Crescent Society

Müller, C. Director, Institutional and Resource Development Dept

UNOCHA

Delbreuve, T.

UNICEF

Medford-Mills, R.

DANISH RED CROSS

Jakobsen, A.

UK

CAFOD

Gunbie, L. CEAS project desk officer, CAFOD, London

OXFAM

Corbett, M. Nutritionist

SEOC

Young, H. SEOC Evaluator.

KENYA

ADRA

Omonda, S. Assistant Logistician, Loki

CEAS

Ashworth, J. CEAS co-ordinator.

Cwege, B. Logistician, Loki

CONCERN

Borrel, A. Concern nutritionist.

Nielsen, F. Field Co-ordinator, Loki

Salama, P. Concern medical coordinator.

DANCHURCHAID

Holmsgaard, B. DanChurchAid representative, Nairobi.

DANISH EMBASSY

Jespersen, H. First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy, Nairobi.

DFID

Ridout, B.

ICRC

Achermann, M. and Stocker, R. Head of ICRC Loki sub-delegation.

Coutau, O. and Austin, L. Head of ICRC Sudan office and ICRC Sudan reporting officer

Macaskill, J., formerly UN Administrator, Loki

OXFAM

Ippe, J. Oxfam nutritionist.

MSF - B

Fille, F. MSF-Belgium country manager.

UNICEF

Grellety, Y. UNICEF Emergency Nutrition Coordinator New York.

NETHERLANDS EMBASSY

Dorhout, A.

SCF (UK)

MacGillivray, R. SCF-UK Relief Programme Manager, Loki.
Southern, N., SCF-UK Country Manager, South Sudan

SRRA

Aguire, P. SRRA emergency relief and rehabilitation co-ordinator, Lokki

Deng, L. B. SRRA monitoring and evaluation officer.

SWEDISH EMBASSY

Johansson, E

TEAR FUND

Timmings, N. Tear Fund Country Manager.

UNICEF/OLS

Adwera, P. Household Food Security, Loki

Bungudu, M. UNICEF/OLS field co-ordinator.

Chaiban, T. Deputy Chief of operations OLS southern sector.

Cooke, G. UNICEF programme co-ordinator, Loki.

Di Guzman, D. OLS/UNICEF Humanitarian Principles field co-ordinator.

Franklin, T., member of UNICEF internal review team

Gikonyo, V. UNICEF health programme field co-ordinator.

Holworth, C. UNICEF logistic officer.

Jennifer ?? UNICEF health programme field co-ordinator.

Lindsey, J. UNICEF information officer.

Maynard, J. and Wright, B. OLS security.

Naleo, T. UNICEF Health Co-ordinator.

Nwosu, C. Household Food Security

Omol, S. UNICEF Loki camp manager.

Osodo, N. OLS UNICEF Capacity Building.

Wilcox, G. OLS information officer.

Young, H. OLS UNICEF Humanitarian Principles Co-ordinator.

UNHCU

Harborne, B (ex-UNHCU)

Raby, T

USAID

D'Silva, B.

Marks, J

WFP

Fletcher, D. Deputy WFP co-ordinator for Kenya and South Sudan, deputy OLS co-ordinator, southern sector.

Kamunke, J. FEA Trainer, Loki

Jaspers, S. Consultant nutritionist - author of WFP review 1998 (UK based)

Jibidar, C. WFP field co-ordinator.

Mathus, J. Head of WFP food economy unit.

Milisic, Z. WFP/OLS Emergency Officer.

Nanok, J. FEA Trainer, Loki

Sharpe, B. and Fielding, W. WFP food economy unit.

Vatnedalen, A. NPA Area Co-ordinator, Loki

SUDAN

ADRA

Akol Deng, A. ADRA/WFP Woman Beneficiary, L'il

Atiang, A. ADRA/WFP Woman Beneficiary, L'il

Garang, Angok, C. Medical Assistant, L'il

Kon, N. ADRA/WFP Woman Beneficiary, L'il

Otiend, P. Project Officer, L'il

CEAS

Dario, S. Field Officer, Wulu Programme

Kenyi, S. Logistician/Administrator, Wulu Programme

Stica, M. Programme Manager, Wulu

Yar, H. Non-CEAS Beneficiaries

Yom, D. CEAS Beneficiaries

DANCHURCH AID

Jensen, A.

EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF SUDAN (WULU)

Alul, R. Tailoring Group

Anet, M. Tailoring Group

Ayien, R. Tailoring Group

Thang Mangar, Rev. E. Arch Deacon

GLOBAL HEALTH FOUNDATION

Ibrahim Imam, EN. Medical Assistant, Mayo Displaced Camp, GHF

HARD

Garang, J. Hope Agency for Relief and Development (HARD) co-ordinator.

ICRC

Brudermann, M. Head of Delegation, Khartoum, ICRC

Canyok Bok, P. Medical Assistant, Genggeng Payam

Eglin, J. Deputy Head of Delegation, Khartoum, ICRC

Hanlon, E. Relief Administrator, Wau, ICRC

Hodgson, D. Health Delegate, Wau, ICRC

Lawrence Wal, Hellen. Medical Field Officer, Wau, ICRC

Picken, M. Midwife/Health Delegate, Yirol

Takana, E. Relief Field Officer, Wau, ICRC

Van Kruisbergen, H. Health Delegate, Yirol

IFRC

Cooper, E. Finance/Administration delegate, IFRC

MSF - B

Goetghebuer, S. MSF-B project co-ordinator, Ajiep.

Obari, F. MSF-B Project Co-ordinator, Mapel.

MSF – S

Shaban, M. Logistician/Administrator

SCC

Duku, K. Emergency Co-ordinator, SCC

Jospeh, A. General Medical Technician, Mayo Displaced Camp, SCC

SCF (UK)

Abdalla, A. Project Officer, Khartoum Displaced Rehabilitation Project, SCF (UK)

Jaferi, A. Assistant Field Director, SCF (UK)

Khalil, M. and Nyanut, M. SCF field and assistant officers Wau county.

Kiden, B. SCF-UK womens programme officer, Bahr El Ghazal.

Malual, M. SCF-UK livestock officer.

Southern, N. SCF-UK country manager South Sudan.

Yai, K. Area Manager, Khartoum, SCF (UK)

SRC

Abd El Rahim, I. Director, Research, Statistic and Training

Elnabhani, M. Director, Finance Department

SRRA/SPLM

Alier Mashinkok, I. Secretary, Yirol

Anyuon, M. Water Co-ordinator, Yirol

Franco and Wol. SRRA pyam supervisor and SPLM pyam administrator.

Karkor Alajabo, I. Field Supervisor, Wulu Payam

Mayol Tong, D. SRRA secretary, Gogrial country

SUB-SAHARAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION

Abdall, A. Medical Assistant, Mayo Displaced Camp

Ibrahim, M. Pharmacist, Mayo Displaced Camp

Hamza, B. Laboratory Technician, Mayo Displaced Camp

UNICEF/OLS

Abdel Hameed, M. Area based Programme Officer, UNICEF

Alsalam, W. Consultant in Health and Nutrition, UNICEF

Battal, FP. Acting Regional Project Officer, Wau, UNICEF

Ethangatta, L. Programme Nutritional Officer, OLS southern sector.

Gibreel, G. Logistic Officer, UNICEF

Hassan, O. Internal Displaced Population Project Assistant, UNICEF

Hussein, F. Planning Administration Assistant, UNICEF

Khidir, Dr T. Medical Co-ordinator, Wau, UNICEF

Majok, S. Assistant Programme Officer, Water and Environmental Sanitation, UNICEF

Musibi, P. UNICEF RPO Wau and Aweil West counties.

Yahya, A. Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances (CEDC) Officer, UNICEF

WFP

Cheuka, A. WFP assessment officer.

Onyango, B. WFP food monitor.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Ajuong, M. Civil Administrator

Kon, E. Wau County Commissioner.

Nyal Chon, N. Executive chief Gogrial county.

ANNEX II C: TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

ADRA, DENMARK, COPENHAGEN

Andersen, H.

CHRISTIAN AID, UK

Hayward, R. Sudan desk

DEC, UK

Corbett, M. DEC Evaluator, Northern Sector

ICRC, GENEVA

McDonald, W., Head of Evaluation Cell

S3, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COPENHAGEN

Munk, N.

SUDAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, KHARTOUM

Tombe, Rev Enock. Director

UNOCHA, GENEVA

Delbreuve, T.

Mountain, R.

UNICEF NEW YORK/KHARTOUM

Carr, R. New York

Kearney, A. Khartoum

ANNEX III: SUDAN TIMELINE

Year	Date	War	Humanitarian Impact and Response
1955			
1955		First Civil War starts with mutiny in Torit reflecting southern suspicions of Khartoum government.	
1972			
1972		First civil war ends	
1983			
1983		Introduction of <i>Sharia</i> law causes mutiny among soldiers from south Sudan. This mutiny starts the Second Civil War and launches the SPLM/A.	
1984			
1984			NGOs respond to famine and act as information systems.
1985			
1985		Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes a coalition leader and makes a ceasefire agreement with SPLM with suspension of <i>Sharia</i> law. NIF reject the suspension of <i>Sharia</i> and conflict continues. Government arms Messiriya and other Baggara to attack Dinka and to protect Chevron oil interests. Government also arms Rufa'a in Blue Nile and Nuer, Murle and Mundari to encourage attacks on SPLA	
1987			
1987		Escalation of conflict through Government arming northern tribal militias to fight traditional enemies, especially Dinka (main supporters of SPLM.) Start of raiding and killing in northern Uganda from southern Sudan by Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Army. These raids destabilise the border area. Later and up to the present day Joseph Koney (an Acholi) and his Lord's Resistance Army raid northern Uganda. Like Lakwena, he is supported by the Government of Sudan.	

1988			
1988		Omar al-Bashir, with Libyan backing and NIF support wins power in Khartoum. Hassan al-Turabi, strongly influences move towards fundamentalism. Government forms PDF, based partly on Messiriya supporting them through conscription. By early 1989 SPLA control all south apart from Juba town.	Famine-induced conflict kills an estimated 300,000 people. Operation Rainbow established after WFP threatens to leave after convoy attacked.
1988	April		ICRC agreement with GOS to start relief in south, including SPLA areas
1988	August		Severe floods in Khtm
1988	October		UN airlift to Juba
1988	November 17	DUP agreement with SPLA	LWF begins airlift to Juba
1988	December	DUP leave governing coalition; SPLA captures Torit	ICRC start operations in South
1989			
1989	January 26	NSCC established. SPLA captures Nasir	
1989	February	Bush administration in US offers to mediate in War	
1989	March		OLS announced
1989	April		OLS 1 operational, stations first UN personnel in SPLA areas. James Grant meets John Garang at Kongor
1989	June	Overthrow of civilian government of Sudan by armed coup on eve of peace talks between GOS and SPLA. Establishment of Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) ruling body of new military-Islamic government led by Brigadier, later General Omar al Bashir	
1989	August	Representatives of GOS and SPLA meet in Addis Ababa	
1989	September		GOS bomb ICRC barge on Nile in Bor
1989	Dec	GOS representatives meet SPLA in Nairobi under auspices of former US President Carter	
1990			
1990		IGADD peace initiative March and April attempted coups in Khartoum	
1990	April-July		OLS II
1990	August	GOS supports Iraq in Gulf War	

1990	Nov/Dec	SPLA capture major GOS garrisons in Western Equatoria, Tambura, Yambio, Nzara,	UN agreement with SPLA and GOS LWF/WS Emergency Working Group proposes to end Juba airlift in June 1991
1991			
1991	January	SPLA now control most of south Sudan	FAO report 8 millions at risk of famine in Sudan. Famine threatens to be worse than 1984-5. Government denies famine.
1991	February		Government claims that NGOs are defaming Sudan by claims of famine.
1991	March	Roken in Eastern Equatoria captured by SPLA. SPLA capture Maridi	Government request aircraft for famine relief delivery. Government starts to construct official camps with water and health-care provision in Khartoum. Indigenous NGOs created to try to encourage move from relief to development. OLS forced out of Bor leaving 6 000 children unfed.
1991	May	Fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia weakens support and bases for SPLA.	
1991	June	Government of Ethiopia demands withdrawal of SPLA. SPLA splits into two factions: the mainly Dinka SPLA mainstream or SPLA (Torit) led by John Garang, and the mainly Nuer SPLA (United) or SPLA (Nasir) led by Riek Machar,. These splits lead to internal fighting, further splits and weaken SPLA for several years allowing Government gains of territory. Peace initiative in Sudan by Herman Cohen, US Under Sec of State for Foreign Affairs	
1991	July		SEOC established
1991	August	Three of 13 SPLA commanders defect. Nasir section of SPLA Massacre 2 000 near Bor.	Floods along Nile in north Sudan; 80 per cent of Bor County flooded, Ajiep and Rumbek affected by floods.
1991	September	Torit Declaration by SPLA mainstream	
1991	October	SPLA-Nasir attack SPLA mainstream and kill civilians in Kongor-Bor area	

1991	December	Africa Watch draws attention to Government war of attrition in Nuba. Juba town shelled by SPLA - mainstream, government troops kill 13 in Khartoum shanty towns.	For more than one year, Nuba experiences a severe killing famine, widely seen as deliberately produced by the Government.
1992			
1992			Forcible movement of squatters (many of them southern Sudanese there since the 1980s) from Khartoum started in 1991, accelerates in 1992 and continues for many years. By 1997, ¾ million people removed and demolition of settlements continues to the present.
1992	February	GOS column moves south from Malakal Government austerity measures introduced. Government fails to break out of Wau	Bor Dinka displaced across Nile by Nuer attacks. Begin to arrive in Eastern Bahr el Ghazal, continue throughout year; some move south from there to Mundri and the Ugandan border on the West Bank; other Bor Dinka move south from Bor towards East-Bank Ugandan border
1992	March	Late February and early March Government advance from Juba and Malakal garrison towns Government attacks from Gambella in Ethiopia, recapturing Pachalla	400 000 IDPs moved from Khartoum shanty towns in last year. Some IDPs return to south, some go to "displaced locations", that is, camps.
1992	April	Government capture Bor ,Kongor, Yirol, Pibor, and Mongalla.	OLS forced out of Bor and 6 000 children left unfed. War displaced in Wau relocated to camps "peace villages" a few kms outside the town.
1992	May	Government take Liria and Kapoeta	12 500 boys displaced from Pochala area arrive in Kenya 45 000 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Kenya.
1992	June	Peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria between GOS and SPLA. Government refuses referendum on self-determination for south. SPLA mainstream attacks Juba and briefly occupies part of Twic	UN, EC, GTZ and USAID personnel and other civilians arrested and tortured in Juba. USAID employee executed
1992	July	Torit taken by Government New SPLA offensive. Juba shelled by SPLA	Near starvation in Juba town.

1992	Sept	Fighting round Juba Amnesty International claim that government has killed 300 in Juba town in last three months. SPLA mainstream detainees, including former Deputy CiC Kerubino escape; current SPLA mainstream deputy CiC William Nyoun defects	UN suspending humanitarian operations in Juba following murders of UN official and Norwegian journalist. Death of three expatriate relief workers and a journalist at the hands of SPLA forces near Pageri; temporary suspension of OLS activities in Eastern Equatoria
1992	October	Fighting around Malakal - SPLA-Nasir and other forces attack and briefly occupy the town	
1992	November	Malakal falls to SPLA	UN resumes relief flights to Juba
1992	December	UN General Assembly passes resolution condemning GOS human rights record	ICRC reaches agreement with GOS to resume relief operations in the South GOS/OLS/SPLA reach agreement on 'corridors of tranquility' rail, river, road crosslines routes for relief deliveries
1993			
1993	January	Amnesty International reports hundreds, possibly 6 000 executed by Government in Nuba Mountains. Government kills 100 in Juba town.	
1993	February	SPLA force abandonment of Jonglei Canal. First peace negotiations start between Baggara and Nuba. Pope visits Khartoum	Many refugees flee to Uganda because of famine. Possibly 60 000 (?) die of kala azar in Parajong area.
1993	March	Attack by SPLA mainstream on meeting of SPLA-Nasir and other dissident SPLA groups at Panyagor near Kongor. Veteran equatorian politician Joseph Oduho killed. Garang calls for safety zones in south and Nuba.	Humanitarian crisis in Nuba continues
1993	May	Abuja II: peace talks in Nigeria - GOS and 2 x SPLA Preliminary agreement in Nairobi between GOS and SPLA United	1.5 million needing food. 600 000 have virtually no food available. United States Committee for Refugees calculates 1.3 million avoidable deaths due to famine, war, disease since 1983
1993	June		SEOC begins airdropping in Kongor

1993	August	Government bombing in far south to cut supply lines. Government offensive.	WFP barges from Malakal reach Juba; GoS offensive in West Bank Equatoria cuts off relief route from Uganda 100 000 displaced Bor Dinka move to Uganda
1993	September	First IGADD peace initiative. Uganda breaks diplomatic ties because Government of Sudan harbours LPA	
1993	October	Formation of anti-GOS, non-SPLA aligned Patriotic Resistance Movement of Southern Sudan (PRMSS) led by Equatorian Politician (and former SPLA supporter, Alfred Lado Gore)	
1993	November	Leaders of two SPLAs attend IGADD meeting in Kampala; GOS bombs Thiet in BEG, Pageri and Loa	SPLA mainstream attacks on relief train in N Bahr el Ghazal
1993	December		SEOC begins Akot airlift. British Ambassador expelled from Khartoum
1994			
1994	January	Government offensive from Wau, Torit and Juba even bigger than August 1993 offensive. Ceasefire between Torit and Nasir factions GOS rail convoy to Wau ambushed by SPLA New division of Sudan into states decreed by GOS - South divided in to nine states	GOS bans relief flights to SPLA locations near Uganda border
1994	February	Government bomb Nimule. Bor Dinka displaced flee Ame Camp (E Equatoria) after attack by SPAL United Riek Machar, CiC of SPLA United dismisses Cdr Lam Akol establishes independent command in Shilluk areas of Upper Nile. Mundri occupied by GOS-backed militia then recaptured by SPLA; fighting in northern Uganda between GOS-backed LRA and NRA	
1994	March	Gasper Biro, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights castigates both Government and rebels. Biro also criticises application of <i>Sharia</i> law, such as crucifixion for armed robbery and stoning for adultery and also summary executions. SPLA-United declare unilateral ceasefire with SPLA mainstream	IGADD talks agree free passage of relief to Sudan.
1994	April	SPLA mainstream Convention held in Chukdum. SPLA mainstream announces new civil administration for SPLA areas	SEOC general assembly supports moves from greater control over FIO

1994	May	Second sound of IGADD sponsored peace talks in Nairobi	
1994	June	GOS recaptures Kajo-Kaji	SEOC Steering Committee requests first SEOC needs assessments
1994	July	Fighting on Northern Bahr el Ghazal/Western Upper Nile border between SPLA mainstream and SPLA United and Commander Kerubino Bol continues intermittently in following months Start of the fourth round of peace talks in Nairobi bet GOS and the two SPLAs sponsored by IGADD GOS announces unilateral ceasefire SPLA mainstream announces unilateral ceasefire SPLM establishes a civil administrative system.	WFP warns that four millions are displaced and at severe risk.
1994	September		SEOC review team arrives in Nairobi
1994	October	Government attempts to break supply lines from Uganda and Zaire. SPLA/M United renamed at Convention in Akobo - becomes the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM)	
1994	December	Eritrea severs relations. Fighting round Government-held Kapoeta. SPLA mainstream signs political cooperation agreement with Umma party	
1995			
1995	January	Government claims 100 rebels per day surrender in the south.	
1995	February	Government bomb Ugandan border village. Islamic hold on Government becomes stronger.	
1995	March	Two months ceasefire organised by Carter (quickly broken) Garang announces offensive in north with New Sudan Brigade. SPLA (United) split three ways: Machar, Bony and Kerubino.	
1995	April	Bombing by Antonovs in Equator Government intensify campaign in Nuba mountains during ceasefire in south (as in 1989 and 1991.) One billion \$US contract for pipeline from Unity State oilfield to transport 10 million tons per year to northern Sudan Machar declares ceasefire.	
1995	May	Government offensive in southern Upper Nile as they offer ceasefire. Further two months ceasefire declared and broken. Government attacking Pariang.	Kidnapping of 22 aid workers. Khartoum returnees in Wau starving.

1995	June	Government takes Pariang town north of Bentiu oilfield after 12 years of SPLM control. Assassination attempt in Addis Ababa on president Mubarak of Egypt implicates Sudan	
1995	July	SPLA kill 200 and displace thousands in late July and early August.	Government lifts ban on drops by the only C-130 Government bomb airstrip with relief plane on it
1995	September	Government stops all air drops by large planes to end of the year. By late 1995 conflict is intensifying. Anti government riots in Khartoum	
1995	October	Ugandan army with tanks and infantry attack Parajok and Magwe.	
1995	November	Huge SPLA advances. Take Pagere (White Nile Province) and advance (unsuccessfully) on Juba. Gasper Biro (UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reports big increase in Government violations (abduction, torture, rape, slavery)	
1996			
1996		Government of Sudan and six southern rebel groups including the SSIM and SPLA (United) propose Charter for Peace. Kerubino, Machar and Paulino, supported by the Government of Sudan, destabilise northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile for next two years creating disturbances, orchestrated violence and displacement of populations.	During 1996 there are 60 evacuation events at 35 different locations; five hostage takings and 37 bombing incidents involving civilians.
1996	March	Elections strengthen Bashir and Al Turabi (Sec. General of NIF)	
1996	April	"Charter for Peace" agreed by Government, SSIM, SPLA (United). Aim is unity of Sudan and referendum for south.	Severe food shortage in Juba town with 90 000 IDPs. Government forces stop exodus to countryside. 170 000 IDPs in 16 camps in southern Sudan. OLS review begins
1996	May	More factions sign Charter for Peace.	

1996	June		Floods on Akobo River in Pochalla district of Jonglei, caused by heavy local rains in Ethiopia, are worst for 50 years. All of crops and 30 per cent of houses destroyed. Malakal, Nasir and Tonga (Upper Nile) downstream from Pochalla, also affected by floods.
1996	August		Air drops by C-130 restarts.
1996	September		Local flooding in Khartoum as bad as 1988 floods. Squatter camps and official camps flooded with sewage related diseases. Next two months, prohibition on C-130 drops.
1996	November	SPLA join with NDA to create big threat to Government forces.	Hunger season extended by three months owing to flood.
1997			
1997		During 1997 SPLA starts to advance on Government territory.	Sharp rises in morbidity and malnutrition among young children in south Sudan during the year.
1997	January	SPLA/NDA offensives in north and north-eastern Sudan. Government towns are captured. By February 130 000 displaced people in difficult circumstances in rural (Fokar delta) and urban (Port Sudan) areas of north-eastern Sudan. Government declares <i>jihad</i> against Ethiopia.	2 000 refugees return to Western Equatoria from Zaire/Congo
1997	February	Government of Sudan troops attack Nuba displacing 6 000 people. Border with Eritrea closed. Conflict caused by Kerubino and SSIM Government lose several southern towns.	

1997	March	SPLA gains in Government areas of Equatoria and Blue Nile. SPLA capture Yei and Kajo Keji in Equatoria	Refugees start to return from Uganda in large numbers to Equatoria (possibly 50 000) Much of displaced population of Yei returns Government of Sudan bomb Yei four times in few weeks Ban on C-130 drops until June. Ban on all flights to Equatoria Ban on flights to 33 sites in Bahr El Ghazal. MSF(B) reports acute malnutrition rates of 30 per cent in northern Bahr el Ghazal, caused by conflict between Paulino Matiep (SSUM) and Riek Machar (SSDF) in oil-rich Bentiu area
1997	April	Peace agreement by Government of Sudan and five/six former SPLA groups including SSIM, SSUM and SSDF.	Drought starting. 130 000 refugees returned from Uganda during the last two months.
1997	May		Malnutrition rates (OLS) up to 24 per cent in Malakal, Wau, Juba and South Kordofan
1997	June		Government bans flights to 34 airstrips. Government mobilises against Eritrea UNICEF notes rising infant mortality in south
1997	July	Government bomb Labone on Ugandan border killing 14. Baggara attacks on Dinka restart in Bahr El Ghazal.	Uganda masses troops on border Sleeping sickness affects 19-24 per cent of population of WesternEquator. Further ban on C-130 drops. Government of Sudan, suffering military reverses, offers to accept previously rejected IGADD principles for negotiation, though not accepting as binding.
1997	September	More refugees return from northern Uganda to Equatoria, SPLA (United) ceasefire.	
1997	October	End of first peace talks for three years; Government proposes federal system. SPLA and NDA reject proposed ceasefire.	OLS Food Needs Assessment suggests 50-60 per cent food gap likely between March and November 1998 in parts of Bahr El Ghazal.

1997	November	Nuer/Dinka clashes in Gedaref.	Lord's Resistance Army attack Labone IDP camp and kill 35. Further ban on C-130 drops. Start of heavy rains in Lake Victoria basin, leading to El Nino flooding of Nile during 1998.
1997	December	SPLA now control most of Equator and Bahr El Ghazal.	FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission anticipate significantly smaller harvests next year.
1998			
1998	29 January	Wau town attacked by Kerubino Bol Gogrial and Aweil attacked by SPLA Fighting within Wau, comparable to events 10 years earlier Complete flight ban in Bahr El Ghazal Paulino in Maniken threat to north-eastern Bahr El Ghazal throughout 1998.	Some 150 000 into Bahr El Ghazal by late January. Some return to cause feeding problem in Aweil, Gogrial and Wau. During this month 27 separate evacuations, mainly in Bahr El Ghazal El Nino floods build up. Effect continues along Nile up to present with Lake Victoria as reservoir.
1998	3 February		Total flight ban from GOS. NGOs, UN and churches issue press releases against flight ban Wau: reports of massacres and big displacement of population fleeing the town (130,000)
1998	8 February	Adet, Lunyaker and Yei bombed by GOS	
1998	12 February		MSF-B in Mapel and Acumcum MUAC screening of children attending consultation: GAM 30-40%
1998	24 February		Following intervention of Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs Robert Van Schaik, total flight ban changed to partial flight: only 6 locations are authorised: Ajiep, Adet, Pakor and Akuem in SPLA-held areas and Wau, Aweil in GOS held areas.
1998	March		Some improvement in air access - 4 more locations available Malnutrition starting to rise quickly in B.E.G.
1998	7 March	Aweil recaptured by GOS	
1998	31 March		Full lifting of flight ban 180 locations - only one C130 permitted

1998	1 April		First European media appearance of South Sudan <i>Daily Telegraph</i> appeals for MSF funds
1998	6 April		Bob Geldoff appeal for help to avert wide scale famine in Sudan
1998	20 April	Attack on Aweil east	
1998	21 April		World Vision inform DEC secretariat of problem in B.E.G. and West Equatoria
1998	25 April		2 nd C130 permitted
1998	27 April		DEC Executive vote unanimously against appeal though agree a watching brief. Access problem for OLS agencies. Non-OLS agencies argue for appeal.
1998	May		Urgent WFP / UNICF appeals for funds from donors - only 20% of UN Appeal funded so far.
1998	1 May	Ceasefire between Paolino and Machar; Gogrial attacked by Kerubino	
1998	3 May		Three more C130s and one buffalo
1998	5 May		WFP received 40% of needs to date - has sufficient food in pipeline for 55 days only - another urgent appeal to donors
1998	12 May	PDF raid in Twic.	World Vision press conference publicise famine
1998	14/15 May		Random survey of children in Leer Town shows 32.5% global malnutrition and 6.5% severe malnutrition. WFP recognise famine will be worse than predicted in 1997.
1998	15 May		DEC agree to appeal

1998	18 May		<p>WFP food available insufficient to September by 1/3rd, severe transport under-capacity. Need extra C-130. Shortage of aviation fuel</p> <p>WFP admits huge difficulty in supplying basic ration</p> <p>WFP estimates 350 000 in need in B.E.G., doubles estimate 30 days later</p> <p>Access improves with relief corridors and GoS agrees ceasefire</p> <p>Ajicp 37% severe malnutrition in SFC</p>
1998	25 May	Raids in BeG and SPLA attacks in Blue Nile.	<p>WFP increase targeted population to 595,000 in B.E.G. and from 700,000 - 930,000 in Southern Sudan as a whole.</p> <p>UNICEF 10 site survey shows global malnutrition rate 52.7% in northern B.E.G.</p> <p>WFP recognises crisis as famine</p> <p>UDA do food assessment for MSF - famine situation in B.E.G. - catastrophic situation in Ajicp.</p>
1998	May 26		WFP admit under capacity
1998	May 29		International NGOs forum in Nairobi with donors' distribution of MSF document "Current nutritional needs and capacity". Beginning of MSF campaign to increase OLS transport capacity
1998	June 4		OLS, donor and NGO meeting in Nairobi -disappointing results. MSF decide to start heavy lobbying and press releases (MSF chrono)
1998	June	PDF raids in Twic.	WFP air drop 6000 Mt WFP start using El Obeid for flights
1998	8 June		WFP predict severe shortfall in food available. DEC agencies support logistics of WFP and UNICEF because insufficient food getting through.

1998	11 June		<p>WFP officially declares famine in Sudan (MSF chrono- NB ETC say that this happened in May)</p> <p>OLS estimate 1.2 millions in need 2/3 of these in B.E.G. Search for seeds for planting (delayed rains allow better access, time but more raiding) Feeding largely by agencies previously on the ground Sorghum prices in Wau County reach £S 4 400 / 90 Kg bag (1996 and 1997 = £S 400)</p>
1998	13 June		Di Mello makes urgent appeal: 800,000 people in danger, appeal for US\$20.2 million for WFP and \$4.5 million for UNICEF
1998	13 June		WFP allowed by GoS to expand the number of aircraft from 5 aircraft to 12 from WFP
1998	July		<p>Heavy rains arrive, but three months late; damage to crops and floods cause problems for road and air transport. Unusually heavy rains continue until November. WFP providing rations for 1.3 million people.</p>
1998	1 July	Fighting Paulino/Tito, Leer taken by Paolino	
1998	July 7		WFP states that 2.6 million people in need of emergency aid in Sudan
1998	13 July		First WFP/OLS airdrop of food, releasing smaller lanes for other items
1998	15 July		<p>SPLA agree three months' ceasefire and three land access corridors to Bahr el Ghazal. Famine escalating in view of commentators Some agencies stretched, unable to cope, search for scapegoats. Dysentery in Ajiep. Large scale diversions by SPLA claimed. Increasing floods in Bor.</p>
1998	20 July		60 per day dying in Wau
1998	end July		Massive press activity - MSF report that 150 journalists a week visiting BEG with them

1998	23 July		Carol Bellamy press conference, using figures from MSF-H emergency team, inefficiency of OLS, raises issue of diversion of aid by GoS and SPLA
1998	2 August	General ceasefire announced	
1998	August		Peak of famine? Heavy rains continue WFP drop 12 000 Mt (most ever in any emergency?) Malnutrition Ajiep 80%; Panthou 70% Crude mortality rate Ajiep 26 /1000 / day Crude mortality rate northern BeG MSF sites 22 /1000 / day. Leer invested possibility of becoming GoS town. FEWS reports improving conditions from August.
1998	September		WFP deliver 10.2 Mt to 1.2 million people. Acumcum TFS under 5s opens and adult TFS centre opens Ajiep adult SFC and TFC reach maximum numbers. FEWS argue that conditions are improving
1998	October	Heavy fighting among Nuer in Upper Nile	Global malnutrition UNICEF/OLS survey in northern B.E.G. 28.6%, but some centres over 30%. Rains decreasing but floods in Bor rising, leads to displacement further reducing scope for some famine foods and spear fishing.
1998	26 October		UN Security Council briefing MSF, SCF, Oxfam and CARE
1998	November		Signs of improvement recognised by commentators. But peak input of WFP food (over 12 000 Mt.) Adobe SFC maximum adult load. Nile floods serious (late effect of El Nino) Harvest poor. Ajiep crude mortality rate 2 / 10 000 / day. Average crude mortality rate MSF northern B.E.G. sites 2 / 10 00 / day (serious)
1998	December		Famine largely stabilised. Commentators disagree.


1999			
1999	January		Many feeding centres closing. WFP air drop 7 000 Mt.

ANNEX IV: STATISTICAL APPENDIX SHOWING KEY DATA ON THE 1998 FAMINE IN BAHR EL GHAZAL

Annex IV: Table 1: Prevalence of acute protein-energy malnutrition in selected famines 1986-1998 (shaded areas are locations in south Sudan)


Date	Country/region	Type of population	W/H < 80% or Z-score < -2	Severe <70% W/H < -3Zscores
1986	Ethiopia (Korem)	Displaced	70%	
1990	Eastern Ethiopia	Sudanese refugees	45%	
1992	Somalia (Merca)	Displaced	73% (MUAC)	
1992	Kenya (IFFO)	Somalian refugees	40%	
1993	Ethiopia/Ogden	Displaced	44%	
1996	Liberia/Tubmanburg	resident / displaced	38%	
May-98	Leer(MSF Holland, (1998a))	residents / displaced	42%	10%
Jul-98	Ajiep(EPICENTRE, (1999))	mainly displaced	80%	49%
Aug-98	Panthou(Brown et al., (1998))	displaced / resident	71%	37%
AUG-98	WAU(UNICEF, (1998E))	DISPLACED	72%	41%
AUG-98	WAU(UNICEF, (1998E))	RESIDENTS	25%	9%

Annex IV: Figure 1: Southern Sudan districts affected by dry spell in 1997⁷³



⁷³ Source FEWS July 1997


Annex IV: Figure 2 Districts in Southern Sudan with displaced populations 1997⁷⁴



⁷⁴ Source FEWS August 1997

Annex IV: Figure 3: Rough location of the famine in 1998

Source: Estimated by Evaluation Team



Annex IV: Table 2 Adherence by MSF to SPHERE criteria in its therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes.

category	SPHERE criteria	MSF programmes in Bahr El Ghazal
TFC	mortality rate < 10%	n
	recovery rate > 75%	n
	default rate < 15%	y
	mean rate of weight gain > 8 g kg ⁻¹ day ⁻¹	
	proven protocols used	y
	staff patient ratio < 1:10	
	discharge criteria include clinical indices	y
	staff able to care for patients	y
SFC	no increase in levels of severe malnutrition	n
	surveillance systems established	y
	target groups identified and causes established	y
	staff trained in the principle of infant and young child feeding	y
	programme closure criteria agreed	n
monitoring & evaluation	information that is collected is timely and useful	y
	ability to measure impact of programmes	+/-
	regular reporting on the impact of the intervention	y
	systems for information flow between different actors	y
	monitoring of the effectiveness of intervention on different beneficiary groups	+/-
	evaluation against stated objectives possible	y


Legend:

n = no, y = yes

TFC = Therapeutic Feeding Centre

SFC = Supplementary Feeding Centre

Annex IV: Figure 4: Mortality and cure rates in the 8 MSF-B Therapeutic feeding centres in Bahr El Ghazal during 1998 (EPICENTRE, 1998)



ANNEX V : SUMMARY INFORMATION ON DANISH NGOS

Information on Danish NGOs is widely distributed throughout the main body of the text and is presented here only in summary form in the format specified in Copenhagen on June 22nd 1999, with which the numbered paragraphs correlate.

A thorough study of each NGO, particularly at headquarters level, was beyond the scope of the study. Following the inability of the principal evaluators to visit the northern sector of Sudan, all UN and NGO agencies as well as principal partner agencies working there, were sent a questionnaire addressing policy issues, but, despite reminders, replies were only received from UNICEF, ICRC, SCF-UK and SCC. All responses were brief, with ICRC and SCF-UK only partially answering the questionnaire. Undoubtedly 'evaluation overload' - the pressures generated from the demands of several simultaneous evaluations, and for some people questioning about different countries involved in the DANIDA evaluation, were factors influencing such a limited response. This was something of a constraint but it was nevertheless possible to gain information relating to most of the issues assessed from interviews conducted and other documentation.

DanChurchAid

1. The policies of DanChurchAid are broadly in line with those of the Government of Denmark.
2. DCA is not an operational agency. As an intermediary its role is appropriate and supportive - more so than any other agency reviewed. DCA's partner agencies in Sudan - CEAS and SCC - are particularly well placed to provide effective humanitarian interventions, although their capacity is limited and performance is variable. This is particularly true for SCC, which has also had problems with management and accountability, although the situation is improving
3. DCA's contribution to the 'international humanitarian system' is primarily through church networks, where it takes an active role at an international and local level, especially in South Sudan from Nairobi. At a Danish level the impression is given that an agency of DCA's experience and expertise could take a more active role in widening the constituency in support of humanitarian and related issues through an expanded advocacy programme.
4. DCA has a good record of promoting improved monitoring and evaluation regimes amongst its partner agencies in Sudan, particularly in the southern sector. As with other agencies, however, this has been inadequate in relation to post-distribution monitoring of relief supplies.
5. Within the limitations of its field presence - DCA has an office in Nairobi which devotes more attention to the southern than the northern sector - the agency has a good record in supporting local partners. In the northern sector there have been difficulties due to weak management and accountability within SCC; DCA supported a much-needed evaluation and follow-up initiative, but its longer-term response appears to have been less appropriate; specific support for financial management was clearly needed and apparently requested. DCA has promoted a 'relief to

development' model, possibly to excess, and has supported some of the more promising initiatives in conflict resolution. Its partner agencies have not, however, taken the lead in disaster prevention or preparedness. DCA has active gender concerns but it is not clear how these have translated into practical programming.

6. DCA has a limited direct relationship with local communities. Its local partner agencies are well placed to mediate this relationship, with variable results. Despite some capacity limitations the interventions of these agencies are generally appropriate, and have improved during the course of the review period.
7. DCA's strengths comprise its longstanding commitment to Sudan and to its partner organizations, who are a key constituency for some of the most exploited and impoverished members of Sudanese society. It has a good record of practical support to its partners, particularly in the southern sector, where a monitoring and evaluation regime has been established which is exemplary by Sudanese standards. Weaknesses include its comparatively limited involvement with the northern sector, and failure adequately to utilize its good positioning for advocacy initiatives in Denmark.

Red Barnet

1. Red Barnet policies appear to be broadly in line with those of the Government of Denmark. Since Red Barnet is an intermediary agency, the policies of its partner agency in the Sudan, SCF-UK, are particularly relevant and can have distinctly different emphases from those of Red Barnet. SCF-UK policies too are generally compatible with those of the Danish government, although a significant feature is their preparedness to work quite closely with Government ministries and with Islamic NGOs in the northern sector. Both agencies have an interest in a rights-based approach to programming, although this is not the dominant paradigm.
2. During most of the review period Red Barnet did not add a great deal of value in its intermediary role, since SCF-UK is a larger agency with policies of its own. More recently Red Barnet with DANIDA encouragement has commissioned a series of studies and evaluations which have had a mixed but generally positive reception (more so in the northern than the southern sector). Both Red Barnet and SCF-UK have mission statements based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with Red Barnet generally pushing for more specifically child-focused interventions. The agencies supported rights-based programmes, particularly in relation to the abduction of women and children, which although limited in their impact to date, could be particularly appropriate in the Sudanese context. The emphasis of SCF-UK on retaining and developing the capacity of local staff is particularly appropriate. SCF-UK interventions would appear to be broadly appropriate and performance reasonable.
3. Red Barnet itself does not appear to have a high profile input to the 'international humanitarian system' at Danish, international or local level, compared with its sister agency SCF(UK).
4. In commissioning recent studies and evaluations Red Barnet has shown some concern with trying to narrow the characteristically large gap in the programme of

SCF-UK in Sudan between attention to inputs and concern with results. However, assessment of impact and post-distribution monitoring of relief supplies by SCF-UK remain weak.

5. Red Barnet's relationship with SCF-UK is variable. There are inherent problems with communication and coordination in what is predominantly an intermediary role, compounding the characteristically uneven relationships between funders and funded, and with no real mechanism for resolving policy differences. On the whole Red Barnet inputs have been better received in the northern than southern sectors. SCF-UK, although a substantially operational agency, also puts a high premium on respecting and working with local formal and informal institutions, possibly at the expense of more detailed analysis of the impact of their interventions. The impact of this relationship is difficult to assess. Work on disaster preparedness and the targeting of relief has, however, been a notable feature.
6. Red Barnet mostly acts at some remove from local communities and authorities. For SCF-UK, see above. SCF-UK puts a high premium on developing good relationships with local organizations and authorities, regardless of their political complexion.
7. Red Barnet's strengths include a willingness to raise and try to address policy issues, and to improve its analysis and that of its partner agency of the situation in Sudan. Its weaknesses in the Sudanese context derive from the fact that it is primarily in an intermediary role, with an unclear mandate over the legitimacy of its interventions in the programme of its partner agency.

Danish Red Cross

1. The policies of the Danish Red Cross are generally compatible with those of the Danish Government. It acts a channel to the ICRC and IFRC, who have differing approaches but who both work in different ways with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, which has yet another approach.
2. The DRC adds relatively little value to the ICRC and IFRC who have well-developed policies of their own. In liaison with the IFRC they have helped to develop the capacity of the SRC, primarily through developmental programmes not covered by this evaluation. ICRC performance is difficult to assess since relevant documentation is not generally available. Documentation on the grants made to the IFRC, right at the beginning and right at the end of the review period was also insufficient for serious assessment.
3. The Red Cross societies are key actors in the international humanitarian system. Both the ICRC and IFRC participate in co-ordination activities at an international and local level, although the ICRC considers local co-ordination activities to be excessively time-consuming. To some degree participation is also constrained by concerns with confidentiality. These concerns appear stricter than necessary in relation to most humanitarian interventions. At a Danish level the impact of the DRC proved difficult to assess.

4. Impact assessment of Red Cross programmes was difficult, in part because of limited documentation available. Inputs and programmes seemed generally appropriate. ICRC are believed to have good monitoring systems in place but this too is difficult to assess. Available SRC documentation, which related to developmental rather than emergency programmes, indicated very limited capacity to assess impact.
5. The DRC acts primarily as a funding channel for the ICRC but also provides delegates, especially health delegates. DRC has a more interactive working relationship with the IFRC. Input on policy appears however to be limited in both cases. If the SRC is considered to be the local partner the relationship is indirect but positive; the IFRC has long supported capacity building programmes within the SRC and during the latter part of the review period appears to have had some success in encouraging the SRC better to fulfil its mandate by taking a somewhat more independent stance vis à vis the government.
6. The DRC has developed relationships with local communities and authorities in Sudan, principally through its two development projects – in Derides and in Haiya. The ICRC has had very troubled relationships with Sudanese authorities, particularly the government but also the rebel movements, and has twice withdrawn completely from the country during the period under review. Its relationship with the SRC, with whom it works in government-controlled areas in the geographical south of Sudan, appears to be quite good at a local level though less easy at a national level. The IFRC has limited relationships with local authorities and communities; its relationship with the SRC has improved during the latter part of the review period.
7. The strengths of the DRC derive mainly from its status as a Danish representative of the Red Cross movement. Weaknesses revolve around its limited direct involvement with Sudan, particularly in relation to S3 funding, and the limited value it is able to add, especially in relation to its function as a funding channel for the ICRC.

ANNEX VI: EPI + COVERAGE MAPS

Figures 1.1 – 3: OLS EPI Sites 1992-1999

Figure 2.1a: Coverage of SEOC – southern sector

Figure 2.1b: Coverage of CEAS – southern sector

Figure 2.2: Coverage of ICRC

Figure 2.3: Coverage of MSF – southern sector

Figure 2.4: Coverage of SCF(UK) – southern sector

Insert maps to page 150

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