



The politics of gender and social protection in Indonesia

Opportunities and challenges for a transformative approach

Full Report

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May 2012

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Abbreviations and terms used

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIPMNH	Australian Indonesian Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)
ARG	Anggaran Responsif Gender (Gender-responsive Budgeting)
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
Baperjakat	Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan (Position and Rank Consideration Board)
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Agency)
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
BKKBN	Badan Kependudukan dan Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Planning Coordination Agency)
BLT	Bantuan Langsung Tunai (Unconditional Cash Transfer Programme)
BNP2TKI	Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers)
BOS	Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (School Operational Assistance)
BJPS	Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Security Implementing Agency)
BPS	Badan Pusat Statistik (Statistics Indonesia)
Bundo Kandung	Traditional Women Leaders
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
DAK	Dana Alokasi Khusus (Special Allocation Funds)
Dana Otonomi Khusus	Special Autonomy Funds
Dana Penyesuaian	Adjustment funds
Dana Perimbangan	Balancing Funds
DAU	Dana Alokasi Umum (General Allocation Funds)
DBH	Dana Bagi Hasil (Revenue Sharing Funds)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GAP	Gender Analysis Pathway
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)
GNI	Gross National Income
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IFLS	Indonesian Family Life Survey
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
Jamkesda	Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (Regional Health Insurance for the Poor)
Jamkesmas	Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Health Insurance for the Poor)
Jamsostek	Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Social Insurance for Formal Workers)
JPS	Jaring Pengaman Sosial (National Social Safety Net Programme)
JSLU	Jaminan Sosial Lanjut Usia (Social Welfare for Elderly)
JSPACA	Jaminan Sosial Penyandang Cacat (Social Welfare for Disabled)

Komnas Perempuan	Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan (National Commission on Violence against Women)
KPK	Komite Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (Committee for Poverty Reduction)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoWECP	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection
Musrenbang	Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Stakeholders' Forum)
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NTT	East Tenggara Timur
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PKH	Program Keluarga Harapan (Conditional Cash Transfer Programme)
PKSA	Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak (Child Social Welfare Programme)
PNPM Mandiri	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri Perdesaan (National Programme for Community Empowerment)
Propenas	Program Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Programme)
Raskin	Beras Miskin (Rice for the Poor)
RKP	Rencana Kerja Pemerintah (Annual Development Plan)
RPJM	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (Medium-term Development Plan)
RPJMN	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (National Medium-term Development Plan)
RPJP	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (Long-term Development Plan)
RPJPN	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional (National Long-term Development Plan)
Sakernas	Survei Tenaga Kerja Nasional (National Labour Force Survey)
SNPK	Strategi Nasional Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (National Strategy for Poverty Reduction)
SPKD	Strategi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah (Regional Strategy for Poverty Reduction)
SPM	Standar Pelayanan Minimum (Minimum Service Standard)
SPPN	Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning System)
Susenas	Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (National Socioeconomic Survey)
TNP2K	Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (National Team for Poverty Reduction Acceleration)
TTS	Timor Tengah Selatan
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	UN Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
WFP	World Food Programme
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

Executive summary

Background and report objectives

Indonesia experienced impressive economic growth from 1970 to the late 1990s. Prior to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, economic growth had fuelled the improvement of some welfare and social indicators, including the poverty rate, the infant mortality rate, primary school enrolment and life expectancy. This was accompanied by the provision of basic public infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, water supplies, roads and electricity.

However, the 1997/98 crisis reversed these positive trends and led to a large increase in the level of poverty in 1998 and 1999. The economic turmoil led to a political and economic reform which resulted in positive social and political changes, as well as re-energising the positive trend in poverty reduction. Yet, the pace of poverty reduction since the crisis has not achieved pre-crisis levels. This could be explained by slower levels of economic growth compared with pre-crisis rates, and the budgetary implications of the transition from centralisation to decentralisation, as well as the democratisation process. In addition, Indonesia's budgetary allocations to social and human development priorities as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) still remain among the lowest in Southeast Asia to date (Suryahadi et al., 2010).

To alleviate the impact of the 1997 crisis, the government initiated the National Social Safety Net Programme for the poor (Jaring Pengaman Social, or JPS), including food, education, health and employment components. Some of these have evolved into broader social protection programmes. The crisis was also an impetus for extensive decentralisation. The motivation for this had many sources, including strong pressures from (particularly the resource-rich) regional governments (both provincial and district) to ensure a large share of natural resource exploitation. Different stakeholders, including local politicians, students and businesspersons, also expressed their concerns about having a very powerful central government, as it had created very wide economic disparities between provinces and between districts within provinces. Donors (mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) also requested decentralisation as part of the government's reform agenda.

Although gender inequality is often identified as one of several determinants of poverty, and the government of Indonesia has acknowledged the importance of gender equality in broader development and poverty alleviation goals, it still plays an important role in perpetuating poverty and vulnerability. Despite numerous commitments to improving women's conditions since the beginning of the reform process, effectively promoting gender equality in Indonesia is still challenging.

This report examines the overlap of gender, social protection and decentralisation processes. It reviews the extent to which social protection strategies and programmes in Indonesia are effectively addressing gender inequities, with a particular focus on the political economy dynamics of implementation at the sub-national level. The report is based on findings from an Australian Development Research Award policy research project undertaken by the SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta, and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. This included a primary research component in Pasaman Barat district in West Sumatra and Timor Tengah Selatan (TTS) districts in East Tenggara Timur (NTT) province.

The politics of mainstreaming gender into social protection: a conceptual framework

Effectively mainstreaming gender into social protection requires careful consideration of the politics that underpin diverse social protection strategy and programme approaches across country contexts. Gender mainstreaming in any policy sector, however, is as much a political issue as it is a technical one. Discussions on social safety nets have been and remain underpinned by often highly polarised views on gender roles and responsibilities the world over. In the case of social protection in the developing world, there is a growing body of work looking at the politics of social protection, including the ways in which programme choices are

shaped in response to elite and public buy-in, as well as the reasons underlying variable implementation practices at the grassroots level. However, interest in the gender dynamics of social protection in general and in political economy dimensions in particular is more recent. In order to explore the political economy of gender and social protection in Indonesia, we employ a framework developed by Holmes and Jones (2012, forthcoming) that explores the effect of gender relations on shaping the institutions, interests and ideas (the 3 Is) behind social protection policy and programming in developing countries.

The three Is of gender and social protection in decentralising Indonesia

Although Indonesia's national social protection policies are relatively comprehensive, some important gaps remain, especially with regard to how these incorporate gender. The Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (Program Keluarga Harapan, or PKH) is one example of a social protection programme which has incorporated gender issues. Similar to conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, the PKH allowance is transferred specifically to women in the household on the condition that they send their children to school or the health centre or pregnant women attend health check-ups. In addition, the rural community empowerment programme (PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan) has a specific savings and loan component for women's groups. Other government-implemented social protection programmes can be considered gender neutral. Our research, based on 47 key informant interviews and 4 participatory workshops with sub-national officials, points to key challenges that need to be reflected and addressed in social protection frameworks and their effective implementation. They are discussed below, grouped according to the 3Is framework.

Institutional challenges

First, most social protection programmes, including the Raskin rice subsidy, are formed and financed by the central government, with regional governments responsible only for their rollout. The reality is that they are rarely structured according to local needs, and as a consequence can neglect gendered vulnerabilities at the local level. Typically, district governments execute them based on the given guidelines rather than adapting them to local needs. In addition, local governments with limited budgets struggle to develop their own social protection programmes.

A second institutional challenge that needs to be tackled relates to how gender is mainstreamed in the context of decentralisation. Gender requires action in multiple fields and needs to be integrated into policy and programme design and implementation. Therefore, there is a need to create mechanisms to ensure it permeates into local governance structures. In Indonesia, despite regulations and mandates to incorporate gender into policies and programmes at different levels of government, very little has been done on this in practice.

What further undermines gender policy capacity is that, despite recent progress, women in NTT and TTS as well as in West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat have limited space in decision-making processes in both the executive and the legislative branches. Thus, despite a 30% quota to guarantee women's representation, there are still very few women in local parliaments.

Challenges relating to actor interests and incentives

The second set of political economy challenges relates to actor interests and incentive structures. This is especially important given the context, with considerable power and authority having been transferred to regional governments in the process of decentralisation and with regional politicians often unwilling to cooperate with the central government unless they see a direct personal benefit. Moreover, key informants and workshops with government officials indicated that gender mainstreaming in local government policies had not been in the interests of relevant stakeholders. Gender mainstreaming is not considered politically attractive, so politicians competing for local office do not include gender issues on their agenda.

Limited interest in focusing on gender in policy and in programme design and implementation is further compounded by the lack of a specific budget allocated to this activity. Policymakers generally perceive gender mainstreaming as a programme rather than a development strategy, and this confusion is stalling the process. Lastly, numerous government regulations on gender-responsive budgeting, which are expected to guide gender mainstreaming in the regions, provide only punishment for regional governments that do not meet certain requirements. Incentives rather than disincentive mechanisms are needed to increase the participation of regional governments in mainstreaming gender.

Challenges in terms of ideas

The third set of challenges that needs to be addressed in order for social protection policies to more effectively tackle economic and social vulnerabilities and risks experienced by men and women concerns an understanding of and engagement with the ideas underlying policy debates about vulnerability, risk and social protection. Our research shows that knowledge on gender issues, as well as gender mainstreaming policy, remains very limited. As gender is generally understood to be synonymous with 'women', there is hardly any knowledge on issues around gender power dynamics, particularly in terms of differentiating impacts on men, women, boys and girls.

Given some of the existing misconceptions of gender values, which are based on traditional roles, people are convinced that women are already in a special position. This is the case particularly in West Sumatra, which has a matrilineal system and efforts to foster gender parity are no longer considered necessary. The research indicates that such an understanding exists not only among policymakers but also among community figures and in society in general. However, different views emerged from academics and non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists, as well as the media, who felt that arguments using the matrilineal system were an excuse for reluctance of the government to mainstream gender.

Conclusions and policy implications

- 1 In sum, this study suggests that social protection programmes in Indonesia have a limited role in addressing gendered risks and vulnerabilities. Despite the government's decentralisation policy implemented over the past decade in the country, regional governments' efforts to tackle poverty and gender vulnerabilities have not been optimal. Indeed, there is recognition of the complexities and challenges in mainstreaming gender in poverty reduction as well as social protection programming, but in practice the steps involved in embedding a gender-sensitive approach in social protection policy and programming are relatively straightforward. Thus, the political economy dynamics of decentralised policy and programme implementation need to be addressed urgently and systematically. Given poor understandings of gender at all levels, **make further investment in sensitisation and capacity building**. Support from central government and donors to capacity building should not be limited to government officials but extended to other stakeholders, in particular non-governmental actors, including NGOs and religious organisations, which are more likely to transfer lessons on a larger scale to society.
- 2 **Promote more incentives for regions which perform well in tackling poverty and gender vulnerabilities** rather than punishing those which fail to meet requirements (such as in incorporating gender-responsive budgeting into budget plans). Incentives could be in the form of tax incentives or extra funds in the central transfer. It may be necessary to complement such measures with performance assessment criteria to help hold actors at all levels accountable for delivering on gender mainstreaming goals and targets.
- 3 **Invest more in the generation of gender-disaggregated data and analysis to promote evidence-based policy and programme design and the development of gender-sensitive indicators for better targeting, monitoring and evaluation.** Activities in this regard should not end after the data are compiled: the analysis and use of disaggregated data are also critical.

- 4 Since most existing social protection programmes are under central government authority, with rigid guidelines and limited room for regional governments to incorporate gender (unless it is built in already), **improve awareness on gender equity starting from central level and reaching out to provincial and district governments.** Simultaneously, however, **promote more decentralised models of social protection programming and budgeting.**

1 Introduction

Indonesia experienced impressive economic growth from 1970 to the late 1990s, averaging 7% annually. Prior to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, economic growth had fuelled the improvement of some welfare and social indicators, including the poverty rate, which fell from 40.1% in 1976 to 11.3% in 1996. Other such indicators, such as the infant mortality rate, primary school enrolment and life expectancy, also improved significantly. This was accompanied by the provision of basic public infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, water supplies, roads and electricity.

However, the 1997/98 crisis reversed these positive trends and led to a large increase in the level of poverty in 1998 and 1999.¹ The economic turmoil led to political and economic reform which resulted in positive social and political changes, as well as re-energising the positive trend in poverty reduction,² but the pace of poverty reduction since the crisis has not achieved pre-crisis levels. Some possible explanations of this slower pace include the fact that the level of economic growth itself has been relatively low compared with the pre-crisis period. Other factors include the budgetary implications of the transition from centralisation to decentralisation and the democratisation process.³

A study by the World Bank (2006) identified several determinants of poverty in Indonesia, including education, occupation, gender inequality, access to basic services and infrastructure, as well as geographical location. Gendered patterns of poverty have specific characteristics. The level of poverty is marginally lower among female-headed households,⁴ but male-headed households still have significant advantages. For example, in 1999, holding other characteristics constant, urban male-headed households had expenditure levels 14.4% higher than those of urban female-headed households. This gender gap was even more striking in rural areas, with a 28.4% difference between male- and female-headed households in terms of expenditure levels. By 2002, the gender expenditure gap had widened to 15.8% for urban and 31.1% for rural households. Further, female-headed households experience different risks and vulnerabilities (see Table 1) which can hamper their welfare during shocks such as conflict, health and economic risks (ibid.).

The government of Indonesia has acknowledged the importance of gender to development and poverty alleviation, and has made efforts towards the advancement of women, through the ratification of international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1984; the passage of laws and regulations related to the mainstreaming of gender in development; and the establishment of institutional policies and programmes that address women's specific needs (UN Women, 2011). Examples include the 2000 Presidential Instruction on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) 2008 Guidelines on Implementing Gender Mainstreaming in the Regions and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 2009 Regulations on Gender-responsive Budgeting. Despite numerous commitments to improve women's conditions since the reform, however, effectively promoting gender equality in Indonesia is still challenging. Table 1 identifies some important gendered social and economic challenges.

1 The lowest ever rate of poverty before the crisis was 11.3 % in 1996. However, the calculation method was revised in 1998 and backdated to cover the 1996 data. Using the new method, the poverty rate in 1996 was 17.5%; by 1998 and 1999, the poverty rate had risen significantly, to 21.4% and 23.4%, respectively.

2 Indonesia achieved lower-middle-income status in 2004 when its per capita gross national income (GNI) (as a basis of classification) reached \$1,070. In 2010, GNI per capita was \$2,500. In 2010, Indonesia ranked 108 out of 169 on the Human Development Index and 100 out of 138 on the Gender Inequality Index.

3 Setting up new local government institutions and establishing new districts, sub-districts and village administration, as well as holding direct elections of district and provincial leaders, required a high level of budgetary allocation.

4 Note that the World Bank (2006) compares the correlates (which indicate that female-headed households are significantly worse off) and the simple descriptive analysis (which indicates that female-headed households are marginally less poor). We must also be cautious about the Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, or BPS) definition of female-headed households, which tends to exclude some single mothers who live with parents and couples where the wife acts as a *de facto* breadwinner.

Table 1: Overview of key gendered economic and social vulnerabilities in Indonesia

Gendered economic vulnerabilities	Gendered social vulnerabilities
<p>Monetary poverty: While the National Socioeconomic Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, or Susenas) 2007–9 indicated the same poverty incidence among male- and female-headed households, the definition of the latter tends to overlook single mothers living with their parents and couples with the wife as the main breadwinner.</p>	<p>Time poverty and gender distribution of unpaid work: There are double burdens for women who do market work as they are still responsible for all or most domestic work. 2009 National Labour Force Survey (Survei Tenaga Kerja Nasional, or Sakernas) data show that women’s participation in unpaid family labour is much higher than men’s (32.4% vs. 8.1%).</p>
<p>Wage rates: Female workers received only 71–6% of their male counterparts’ wages in 1999–2004 (Pirmana, 2006). However, the gender wage gap declined by 15% between 1996 and 2009 (Matsumoto, 2011).</p>	<p>Land certification: Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) data show a decreasing long-term trend in female ownership of household assets, from around 35% in 1997 to 32% in 2007.</p>
<p>Formal employment opportunities: According to <i>Sakernas</i> 2009, there is a gender gap in almost all employment indicators—the labour force participation rate (51% for female and 83.7% for male), unemployment rate (8.5% vs. 7.5%) and underemployment rate (36.6% vs. 22.3%). 64% of women are in the informal sectors against 60.1% of men. Around 75% of overseas migrant workers are women and in 2008 most of them worked as domestic helpers, based on data from the National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, or BNP2TKI).</p>	<p>Labour union and political participation: There is no affirmative action for women, as shown in low representation of women in labour unions. However, there has been slight progress in women’s political participation, from 11% in 2004 to 18% in 2009, in large part because of new election law quotas advocated by women’s groups (Bappenas, 2010).</p>
<p>Access to credit: In general, access to credit is a problem for the poor. There is no significant difference in indebtedness between women (28.1%) and men (27.3%). However, women prefer informal lending channels (World Bank, 2009).</p>	<p>Gender-based violence: This is an endemic problem. There has been uneven implementation of laws aimed at eliminating violence, particularly at the local level, where autonomous decision making does not recognise national legislation and priorities and women face obstacles accessing justice. Violence has been linked to women’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, as cause and consequence—in 1989, women made up 2.5% of people living with HIV/AIDS, but by 2009 the figure had jumped to 25%, with the majority married women infected by their partner (UN Women, 2011).</p>
	<p>Educational attainment: Gender disparity on most education indicators—including the literacy rate, the enrolment rate, the dropout rate and the completion rate —has narrowed since 2003.</p>
	<p>Maternal mortality: Progress towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on maternal mortality has been quite slow. The ratio declined only from 390 per 100,000 live births in 1991 to 228 in 2007 (Bappenas, 2010).</p>
	<p>Fertility rate and family planning: The total fertility rate decreased from 5.6 children per women in 1970 to 2.6 in 2003 and remained unchanged in 2007. Moreover, gender statistics for 2009 indicate that 97% of married couples aged 15–49 years that participate in family planning use contraceptives for women. This shows no improvement in terms of family planning participation in the past decade and that perceptions of family planning as a woman’s matter persist.</p>
	<p>Malnutrition: At 18.4%, the reduction in the malnutrition rate among children aged five years and below has surpassed the MDG target for both boys and girls (Bappenas, 2010).</p>

To alleviate the impact of the 1997 crisis, the government initiated the National Social Safety Net Programme for the poor (*Jaring Pengaman Sosial*, or JPS), including food, education, health and employment components. Some of these have evolved into broader social protection programmes. Table 2 provides details of selected social protection programmes currently implemented in Indonesia. The crisis was also an impetus for ‘big bang’

decentralisation.⁵ The motivation for this had many sources, including strong pressures from (particularly the resource-rich) regional governments (both provincial and district) to ensure a large share of natural resource exploitation. Different stakeholders, including local politicians, students and businesspersons, also wanted to address a historical legacy of a very powerful central government and limited attention to sub-national diversity. Donors (mainly the International Monetary Fund, IMF, and the World Bank) also requested decentralisation as part of the government's reform agenda.

However, decentralisation has created very wide economic disparities between provinces, as well as between districts within provinces. It has been difficult to implement decentralisation to so many provinces and districts, which together contain around 300 tribes with different languages/dialects, religions and cultures. Meanwhile, geographically speaking, these provinces and districts are spread out over five main islands—Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua—as well as the 17,508 islands that make the whole of Indonesia the largest archipelago in the world.

This paper analyses three important interrelated issues: gender, social protection and decentralisation. It reviews the extent to which social protection strategies and programmes are effectively addressing gender inequities, with a particular focus on the political economy dynamics of implementation at the sub-national level in the decentralisation era. It synthesises findings from an Australian Development Research Award policy research project undertaken by the SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta, and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. This included a primary research component in Pasaman Barat district in West Sumatra province and Timor Tengah Selatan (TTS) district in East Tenggara Timor (NTT) province.

Table 2: Overview of selected social protection programmes in Indonesia

Programme	Description	Target group
<i>Social assistance</i>		
Rice for the Poor food subsidy (Beras Miskin, or Raskin)	In-kind transfer (food subsidy). Includes 15kg of rice per month at subsidised price of Rp 1,600 per kg, a reduction of about 68% of the market price (currently Rp 5,000 per kg).	Since 2006, the programme has used poverty data (PSE05 module) provided by BPS, making those below the poverty line and vulnerable to poverty eligible. Before 2006, targeting was based on data from the National Family Planning Coordination Agency (Badan Kependudukan dan Keluarga Berencana Nasional, or BKKBN): those categorised as 'Pre-prosperous' and 'Prosperous I' were eligible. Beneficiaries: 17.5 million poor households.
Unconditional Cash Transfer Programme (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or BLT)	Cash transfer for poor households in times of economic shock.	Those categorised as poor (including chronic) and near poor. The programme covered only 15.5 million in the first round; complaints and BPS's updating of poverty data increased this number to 19.1 million poor households in 2008 (beneficiaries are different to those in Raskin as a different type of targeting is used).
Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (Program Keluarga Harapan, or PKH)	Cash to women classified as from chronically poor households. The allowance is given on the condition that households take care of their children's health and education.	Only those categorised as chronically poor with children under five or of primary and junior high school age and/or chronically poor pregnant mothers access the programme. Beneficiaries: 816,000 chronically poor households in 2010, scaled up to 1,116,000 in 2011.

⁵ The devolution of power from a very centralistic government to nearly 500 districts and 33 provinces was implemented within 2 years of the decentralisation law's enactment.

Programme	Description	Target group
<i>Social services</i>		
Health Insurance for the Poor (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, or Jamkesmas)	Provision of free basic medical services with referral system to public hospitals for the poor.	Individual targeting based on household welfare condition: chronically poor, poor and near poor. Beneficiaries: 76.4 million poor people.
School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, or BOS)	General subsidy for all students at elementary or secondary school.	All primary and secondary schools receive the grant conditional on their willingness to be audited. At the household level, all households with primary or secondary school-age children may be eligible regardless of their welfare status. The programme also provides specific allowances to support students from poor households. Beneficiaries: 27.6 million primary students and 9.6 million secondary students.
<i>Social insurance</i>		
Social Insurance for Formal Workers (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja, or Jamsostek)	Insurance and security to protect against social and economic risks and ensure an income for employees and their family members. The insurance covers work-related accidents, health care, old age and death.	Beneficiaries: 23.73 million employees in the formal sector.
<i>Social welfare services</i>		
Social Welfare for Elderly (Jaminan Sosial Lanjut Usia, or JSLU)	Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 (around \$33.30) per person per month.	Scaled up from 2,500 beneficiaries in 6 provinces in 2006 to 10,000 in 28 provinces in 2010 and targeted 13,250 beneficiaries in 2011.
Child Social Welfare Programme (Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak, or PKSA)	Provision of cash transfer to children in need.	Targets include street children; abandoned children; abandoned infants; disabled children; children with special needs; and children in trouble with the law (e.g. crime suspects, children in jail and children in court). Beneficiaries: 147,321 children in 33 provinces in 2010.
Social Welfare for Disabled (Jaminan Sosial Penyandang Cacat, or JSPACA)	Provision of cash transfer of Rp 300,000 (around \$33.30) per person per month.	Targeted 17,000 disabled people in 2010.
<i>Social equity measures</i>		
Gender quota	Quota in general elections and parliament, as well as in programmes such as the National Programme for Community Empowerment (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri Perdesaan, or PNPM Mandiri); development of the National Strategy on Gender Mainstreaming; the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and the National Strategy on HIV/AIDS.	

2 The politics of mainstreaming gender into social protection: a conceptual framework

The effective mainstreaming of gender into social protection requires careful consideration of the politics that underpin diverse social protection strategy and programme approaches across country contexts. The steps involved in embedding a gender-sensitive approach in social protection policy and programming are relatively straightforward (on Indonesia, see e.g. Arif et al., 2010). But mainstreaming gender into any policy sector is as much a political issue as it is a technical one. This is perhaps particularly the case with social protection, as discussions on social safety nets are very often underpinned by polarised views on gender roles and responsibilities the world over—as highlighted, for example, by debates about the ‘nanny state’, a ‘family wage’ and ‘the costs of care’ (Folbre, 2008).

When it comes to social protection in the developing world, there is a growing body of work that looks at the politics of social protection, including the ways in which programme choices are shaped in response to elite and public buy-in, as well as the reasons that underlie varying implementation practices at the grassroots level (de Britto, 2008; Hickey, 2007; Zucco, 2008). Interest in the gender dynamics of social protection in general (e.g. Kabeer, 2010; Molyneux, 2006) and in political economy dimensions in particular is more recent (Jones and Holmes, 2011). To explore the political economy of gender and social protection in Indonesia, we draw on a framework developed by Holmes and Jones (2012, forthcoming) that explores the effect of gender relations on shaping the institutions, interests and ideas behind social protection policy and programming in developing countries.

Although increasingly at risk of becoming a catch-all phrase adopted by a wide variety of actors and disciplines, the concept ‘political economy’ generally refers to an analytical approach whereby development policy and programme outcomes involve a process of bargaining between state and society actors, mediated by interactions between formal and informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Importantly, it differs markedly from an approach based on the external imposition of normative ideals about ‘good governance’ and instead seeks to assess and engage with existing power structures and ways of working (Booth, 2011; Grindle, 2011). Accordingly, our research focuses on what Rosendorff (2005) dubs the ‘3Is’ of political economy and their role in shaping social protection policies and programmes.

- 1 **Institutions:** institutional arenas (such as elections and party politics, the legislature, policy frameworks on decentralisation and informal politics) and the opportunities or constraints they present for negotiation on the development of social protection policies and programmes.
- 2 **Interests** of the key actors likely to win or lose as a result of policy shifts (e.g. political elites, bureaucratic agencies, donors and civil society champions) and the relative balance of power between them (e.g. power imbalances between ministries of finance/economics and those of social welfare).
- 3 **Ideas** held by political elites and the public on poverty, vulnerability, inequity and its causes, the nature of the social contract between state and citizens and the merits of particular forms of state support. This may include, for instance, notions of the ‘deserving poor’, concerns about ‘dependency’ and entrenched attitudes towards inequality.

Integrating a gender lens into this framework adds another layer of complexity. A gendered political economy approach explores how ‘households, markets and states as gendered institutions are created and regulated in part by socially constructed norms at local, national and international levels’ (Roberts and Waylen, 1998: 184). As such, a gendered political economy approach has important implications for understanding women’s participation in the formal economy and public sphere, in that it underscores the need to complement efforts to promote women’s individual human capital development with an acknowledgement and factoring in of women’s care and domestic work roles and responsibilities, and the effects

these have on, for instance, their time, capacity-strengthening opportunities and self-identity. It also necessitates a re-conceptualisation and re-valuing of the private–public divide whereby the domestic sector is recognised as playing,

'[...] a foundational role in the production of people who possess not only the capacity to work but also to acquire other more intangible social assets—a sense of ethical behaviour, a sense of citizenship, a sense of what it is to communicate—all of which permit the forming and sustaining of social norms' (Elson, 1998: 197).

3 Methodology

Our primary research consisted of 47 key informant interviews and 4 workshops conducted in late 2011/early 2012 in two districts in two provinces: Pasaman Barat district in West Sumatra province and TTS district in NTT province. Interviews aimed to explore issues around the effectiveness of institutions focusing on poverty and vulnerability reduction and the implementation of specific social protection programmes, as well as individual decision logics. In other words, they explored the interplay of institutional dynamics, actor interests and ideas over time in response to broader politico-economic change. Interviews were conducted at the central level, in each province and at the district level. Workshops were conducted once in each district and once at the level of each province. Appendix 1 provides further details of key informant interviews and workshop participants.

KI interview questions were structured around the following thematic areas:

- Type 1 (officials): formal institutions, informal power, civil participation, accountability, donor influence, capacity, coordination, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), linkages, gender provisions;
- Type 2 (district/provincial decision makers): social protection, sectors, traditional authorities/informal leaders, civil society, citizens and different categories of the poor;
- Type 3 (key informants with a macro-level viewpoint): how political leaders think about poverty and inequality, their underlying causes and the government's role in tackling them, including through social protection instruments.

Table 3 provides detail on sample areas.

Table 3: Key characteristics of the research sites

	NTT province	TTS district	West Sumatra province	Pasaman Barat district
Poverty level* (%)	21.8	28.7	9.4	9.6
Population**	4,683,827	441,155	4,846,909	365,129
Human Development Index***/Gender-related Development Index	66.6(2009)/63.1(2007)	65.3(2009)/53.3 (2007)	73.4(2009)/67.0 (2007)	69.9(2009)/64.5 (2007)
Ethnic background (majority)	Timorese	Timorese	Minangkabau	Minangkabau
Culture (as relevant to gender)	Patrilineal	Patrilineal, <i>belis</i> (marriage tradition)	Matrilineal	Matrilineal

Sources: * BPS (2010a); **BPS (2011); ***BPS (2010b).

The distinct feature of the two sample provinces and districts is the difference in their culture in terms of gender. Whereas in NTT and TTS, the culture is heavily patrilineal, West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat, which are inhabited predominantly by members of the Minangkabau ethnic group, are best known for their strong upholding of the Islamic religion, and are mostly patrilineal but also have Minangkabau traditional values based on a matrilineal system. Harmonising two different, even contradictory, values in daily life makes this a unique community.

In terms of data processing, key informant interviews were first recorded and then translated into English. Using MAXQDA,⁶ all the interviews were coded by a team of three researchers and later subjected to in-depth reading during which key issues and patterns were identified. Content analysis of all the recorded interviews followed a thematic analysis approach, involving identifying salient issues, key trends and patterns emerging from the data.

6 Software designed for systematic content analysis.

4 Context of decentralisation in Indonesia

Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia experienced a relatively vibrant and peaceful process of democratisation. However, there was strong demand from the regions, with support from a number of actors, to reform the relationship with the centre. Decentralisation laws (i.e. Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999) were created shortly afterwards to respond to this demand. As embodied in Law 22/1999 on Regional Governments and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions, Indonesia embarked on big bang-style devolution, including political, administrative, fiscal transfer and market decentralisation as one package, effectively starting in 2001. This is believed to be most ambitious decentralisation policy in any developing country to date (Asia Research Centre, 2001, Satriyo et al., 2003). In addition to the general laws on decentralisation, the government granted special autonomy status to two resource-rich provinces, Aceh and Papua, by issuing Law 18/2001 on Special Autonomy Status for Aceh and Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy Status for Papua.

The impetus for decentralisation came from many sources, including regional (province and district) governments, particularly resource-rich ones, which wanted to ensure a larger share of profits generated from natural resource exploitation. This exerting of pressure led to a fear of disintegration in some such provinces, such as Aceh, East Kalimantan, Papua and Riau. In addition, local politicians, students and businesspersons criticised the powerful interests of central government in the regions under Soeharto. Not least, main donors, namely the IMF and the World Bank, highlighted the need for decentralisation as part of the government's reforms process (Asian Research Centre, 2001; Green 2005).

4.1 Decentralisation laws


The new system as embodied in Law 22/1999 devolved authority to the district government, except in five areas: defence and security; monetary and fiscal policy; foreign affairs; the judiciary; and religion. The law also stipulated the elimination of the hierarchical relationship between provincial and district governments, with the former granted a mere coordination role. Meanwhile, Law 25/1999 regulated intergovernmental transfers from central to regional governments. The expectation was that the devolution of power, authority in fiscal management and the need to be accountable to the public would lead to improved public service delivery, ensure more accountable regional governments through the equitable division of labour among levels of government and, not least, prevent disintegration.

Shortly afterwards, several criticisms were made in relation to a lack of clarity in the law in terms of the authority and functions of all levels of government (World Bank, 2003). In 2004, the laws were amended to improve the local accountability system. Law 22/1999 was replaced by Law 32/2004 and Law 25/1999 was by Law 33/2004. Law 32/2004 introduced the direct election of the head of regions (first implemented in 2005), obligatory functions for regional governments and minimum service standards (Standar Pelayanan Minimum, or SPM). It also reaffirmed the main responsibilities of district governments in service delivery relating to 26 matters (so-called 'compulsory affairs') and in another 8 so-called 'affairs of choice'.⁷ The law prescribed that public policies be embodied in local government regulations, head of local government regulations, head of local government decisions or head of agency decisions (Sutmuller and Setiono, 2011).

⁷ The 26 compulsory affairs include main sectors such as education, health and public works, as well as housing; spatial planning; land management; development planning; environment; transportation; communication and information; investment; cooperatives and small/medium business; employment; social affairs; empowerment of people and villages; family planning and family welfare; women's empowerment and child protection; culture, youth and sport; food security; national unity and domestic politics; local autonomy; public administration; financial administration; personnel and coding; population and civil registration; and libraries. Affairs of choice include agriculture (including plantations and livestock); forestry; energy and mineral resources; marine and fisheries; trade; industry; tourism; and transmigration (migrant workers).

Meanwhile, Law 33/2004 on Fiscal Decentralisation mandated three kinds of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the regions: 1) balancing funds (*dana perimbangan*); 2) special autonomy funds (*dana otonomi khusus*); and 3) adjustment funds (*dana penyesuaian*). The first consist of three funds: 1) revenue sharing funds (*dana bagi hasil*, or DBH); 2) general allocation funds (*dana alokasi umum*, or DAU); and 3) special allocation funds (*dana alokasi khusus*, or DAK). Balancing funds are allocated to address vertical imbalances between central and regional governments as well as horizontal imbalances among regional governments.

Figure 1: Central government transfers to the regions in Indonesia, 2005-10



Source: Ministry of Finance,

Law No 25/1999 had determined that general allocation funds should be at least 25% of net domestic revenue; Law 33/2004 increased it to 26%. As shown in Figure 1, total transfers to the regions have increased continuously, and reached more than Rp 300 trillion in 2010. More than half of these funds have been made up of the DAU, followed by revenue sharing funds. Revenue sharing funds fluctuate depending on, among other factors, the price of oil and gas. As previously mentioned, as part of balancing funds, general allocation funds are allocated towards addressing horizontal imbalances among regional governments which arise as a result of differences in regional fiscal capacity owing to differences in local own-source revenue and shared revenue. Hence, general allocation funds have been used as an equalisation grant instrument, which comes in the form of a block grant.⁸ Despite its increasing size as a proportion of the total transfer and its block grant characteristic, however, many regional governments receive just enough to cover basic administrative costs, because of insufficient general allocation funds or overstaffing. As for the special allocation funds, these account for only a small fraction (less than 10%) of the total transfer and are used mainly for infrastructure, education and health. Given such limited transfers from the central government, for district governments with low levels of fiscal capacity decentralisation has not increased their capacity to design and implement local social protection programmes, let alone incorporate gender into these. Most social protection programmes are still designed and planned by the central government.

⁸ In a block grant/un-earmarked fund, the regional government has full authority to manage the fund.

With regard to laws on gender and social protection in the era of decentralisation, the government of Indonesia has acknowledged the importance of gender equality to development and poverty alleviation. Efforts have been made towards the advancement of women, through the passage of laws and regulations related to the mainstreaming of gender in development and the establishment of institutional policies and programmes that address women's specific needs (UN Women, 2011). Examples include the 2000 Presidential Instruction on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development, the MoHA 2008 Guidelines on Implementing Gender Mainstreaming in the Regions and the MoF 2009 Regulations on Gender-responsive Budgeting. The government has also passed Law 40/2004 on a National Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional, or SJSN), which stipulates a more comprehensive social protection and security system for all citizens, and recently passed Law 24/2011 on a Social Security Implementing Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial, or BPJS) which regulates the institutionalisation of a social security system as mandated in Law 40/2004.

4.2 Challenges

After the implementation of these laws, some challenges emerged. Despite the new system of fiscal decentralisation as mandated in Law 25/1999, and later in Law 33/2004, only one-third of the total government budget goes to the regional governments, with central government ministries still controlling the remainder (Booth, 2005). The central government through its ministries and agencies still manages a considerable share of total development expenditure on projects in many sectors which should have been turned over to the districts under the decentralisation legislation. This suggests that an unwillingness in central government to devolve fiscal power to the regions. Green (2005) argues that decentralisation in Indonesia is considered to be much more administrative than fiscal in nature. His claims as follows: local governments receive 85–90% on average of their revenue from the fiscal balance fund and the remaining 10–15% comes from their own local revenue, with large variations among regions. Meanwhile, there may be a mismatch between revenues received by local governments and the expenditure decisions that are assigned to them.

Moreover, another challenge to true fiscal decentralisation is a lack of local government capacity to generate own revenue and manage finance. Law 28/2009 on Regional Tax and Regional Retribution adopts a closed-list approach, which puts limitations on local tax and levies. Province governments are allowed to collect only five types of taxes, and district governments only eleven. Efforts to increase local revenue also suffer from inefficient local tax administration. Even worse, local officials (both executive and legislative) have used greater decision-making authority to practise corruption widely in the regions (Green, 2005).

4.3 Winners and losers in decentralisation

Resource-rich regions gain most of the benefits of decentralisation; others view decentralisation with caution and often implement it with reluctance (Asian Research Centre, 2001). The obvious winner is the district/municipality government. By applying the natural resource revenue sharing scheme between central and resource districts, resource-rich regions receive a big share of the fiscal transfer from the centre, whereas poor regions tend to suffer from weak financial capacity, as most of the DAU fund goes towards paying the salaries of their public servants.

Provincial governments, meanwhile, lose control over the districts, although the de-concentration fund could increase their bargaining power to some extent. The central government (including sectoral ministries) could also be viewed as something of a loser, as most of its authority is transferred to the regions, although, as previously mentioned, it still controls the budget and is reluctant to devolve fiscal power to the regions. Moreover, Law 32/2004 assigns more power to the central government, through MoHA, to review and in certain cases reject or seek changes in the annual budgets, tax regulations and other matters of provincial governments; provincial governments, through the governor, to the same for district governments (Niazi, 2012).

Meanwhile, sub-district and village governments still have the same role and authority. Civil society institutions and donors see decentralisation as a great opportunity to elevate people's participation, and there have indeed been positive impacts in this regard. Last but not least, the business community is trying to determine whether decentralisation is having an impact on the business climate in local areas. Regulations issued by regional governments often impede the local business climate, rather than facilitating and creating a local business climate conducive to attracting investment to the regions (SMERU, 2009).

As decentralisation aims to bring the government closer to the people, hopes have been raised in relation to poverty alleviation efforts in the decentralised era. Theoretically speaking, regional governments are supposed to have better ideas and knowledge on the needs of their people, ensuring that poverty strategies meet local needs and conditions (Manning and Sumarto, 2011). However, to date, the impacts of decentralisation on poverty have been inconsistent. The tendency to create new provinces and districts has the potential to hamper existing inequalities, while the success of initiatives to tackle poverty and create good public service provision depend largely on the quality of individual political leaders (von Luebke, 2009; Perdana and Maxwell, 2011).

5 Overview of the decision-making process in social protection programmes

Social protection programmes in Indonesia are a relatively new concept, having emerged following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis to mitigate its adverse social impacts. The government at that time introduced the social safety net programmes (Jaring Pengaman Sosial, or JPS) to prevent the chronically poor from falling more deeply into poverty and reduce the exposure of vulnerable households to risk. The government under Soeharto had concentrated more on boosting economic growth, providing a general subsidy programme in order to alleviate poverty in the country. However, Indonesia's budgetary allocations to social and human development priorities as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) still remain among the lowest in Southeast Asia to date (Suryahadi et al., 2010).

The following administration carried on with these post-crisis initiatives. From the onset of the crisis, the social protection system was characterised by a mixture of universal subsidies and targeted safety net programmes. Social protection has now become a key driver in Indonesia's poverty reduction programming, as emphasised in its Blue Book of Development Planning. Meanwhile, mainstreaming poverty into national development planning has required a big endeavour involving a wide range of stakeholders. The government, coordinated by the Committee for Poverty Reduction (Komite Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, or KPK), finished the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (Strategi Nasional Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, or SNPK) in 2004. This is considered the first official document to view poverty as a multifaceted problem, one which includes gender inequality, and as the main guidance in terms of mainstreaming poverty alleviation policy and programming (Suryahadi et al., 2010).

The new government, which came to power in late 2004, placed poverty alleviation among its main priorities on the development agenda. Thus, the SNPK was integrated into the National Medium-term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional, or RPJMN) 2004–9, and has a specific chapter in it. This explicit inclusion of poverty—including social protection—policy and programmes in formal decision-making processes in the country was something that never happened in the New Order era under Soeharto.

The decision-making process in Indonesia in the era of decentralisation is different to that under the New Order regime. Formal policy processes are of two types: 1) regular development planning and budgeting; and 2) the development of more *ad hoc* laws and regulations. The former processes include long-term, medium-term and annual planning (which includes development of the budget, which requires parliamentary approval) at national and regional level. The latter include the development of laws, which require parliamentary approval, and the development of regulations, which do not (Datta et al., 2011). In this section, we focus in more detail on regular policymaking in general and the integration of social protection and gender mainstreaming into development policy in particular.

5.1 Poverty reduction and social protection in the policymaking process

The latest mechanism for formal policy processes was mandated by Law 25/2004 on the National Development Planning System (Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, or SPPN).⁹ The law prescribes for the production of 20-year, long-term development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang, or RPJPs); 5-year, medium-term development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah, or RPJMs); and annual development plans (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah, or RKPs) at national and regional levels. At ministerial level, it mandated national long-term development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional, or RPJPNs), strategic plans and work plans. The law suggests that development planning follow five procedures—political, technocratic, participatory, top-down and bottom-

⁹ This was ratified at the end of the Megawati presidency. Before this, the five-year plan was called the National Development Programme (Program Pembangunan Nasional, or Propenas) and ran from 2000 to 2004.


up—at both national and regional level. This point also distinguishes development planning today from that in the Soeharto era, which comprised mainly technocratic and exclusively top-down process (Booth, 2005; Datta et al., 2011).

The formulation of regional RPJMs mostly follows the same procedures as at national level. However, Sutmuller and Setiono (2011) provide anecdotal evidence that, although these plans are prepared in strict compliance with national guidelines, most regional governments hire consultants. The standard process is that the consultant prepares the draft policy document based on data collected from PBS at central and local levels as well as sector agencies. It is discussed internally in Bappeda and also presented in a province/district *musrenbang*. The regional RPJM is a source for sector agencies to use to prepare their own five-year strategic plans. However, according to Sutmuller and Setiono (2011), national-level plans influence regional strategic plans far more than do regional RPJMs, which incorporate newly elected regional leaders' priorities. What happens when both documents come into conflict is unclear.

Booth (2005), however, points out that, given the considerable power and authority given to regional governments since decentralisation, it would not be surprising if regional politicians were unlikely to cooperate with the centre in implementing reforms unless they saw a direct personal benefit. As such, line ministries now have to negotiate and bargain with local governments in the design and implementation of new programmes (Datta et al., 2011). This might not be the case for resource-rich regional governments which have more fiscal dependency than the average regional government. Data from MoF show that local own revenues in resource-rich regions account for a maximum of 46% of the total budget.

With regard to the decision-making process on poverty—including social protection—programmes, the chapter on the SNPK in the RPJMN 2004–9 articulates poverty as a multifaceted problem, including the need to fulfil basic needs, address the population burden and deal with gender inequality. In the RPJMN, 2010–14, the government will attempt to sharpen the focus on poverty alleviation, taking advantage of the massive shift from universal to targeted social protection programming during 2005–9. Figure 2 provides details on how the poverty reduction strategy is integrated in the RPJMN 2004–9 in particular.

Figure 2: Poverty reduction in the framework of the National Development Plan



Source: Bappenas (2006).

However, as a practical guide to implementing poverty reduction policies in diverse conditions such as those present in Indonesia, the SNPK will not capture local needs perfectly. In addition, many duties and responsibilities have been devolved to regional governments and/or are shared between the central and regional governments; regional governments therefore need regional poverty reduction strategies (Strategi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, or SPKD). These SPKDs are then integrated into the regional RPJMs.

The latest data from MoHA show 316 districts/municipalities have these documents out of a total of 497 districts/municipalities in Indonesia in 2007 (Suryahadi et al., 2010). Meanwhile, the National Team for Poverty Reduction Acceleration (Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, or TNP2K) reported recently that more rapid implementation of regional poverty reduction strategies was occurring at the provincial level as compared with the district level. Most provinces (30 out of 33) already had regional poverty reduction papers in 2010. Regional poverty reduction strategies are also integrated into regional medium-term development planning, which has implications for annual planning and budgeting. Planning discussions go through technical agencies in the regional government, then through the executive budgeting team before approval is obtained from the local parliament (ibid.).

5.2 Inclusion of gender in development planning

We can see that the RPJMN is very much integrated with the SNPK. In addition, the SNPK is linked to the MDGs (as shown in Figure 2 above), which have specific goals on gender equality. This means that poverty and gender mainstreaming are already incorporated into current government development planning. A closer look at gender mainstreaming in development policy and programme formulation shows that this began in 1998, when Bappenas, in coordination with the State Ministry for Women's Empowerment, developed the Gender Analysis Pathway (GAP), a specific gender analysis tool for planners to use in the analysis and formulation of gender-responsive development policies, programmes and activities. The enactment of Presidential Instruction 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development gave a stronger impetus to all ministries/agencies and local governments to implement gender mainstreaming and then integrate a gender perspective into planning. In addition, gender was also included officially in the National Development Plan 2000–4.

However, progress on mainstreaming gender widely in development policy has been quite slow. Only in 2007 did Bappenas evaluate the implementation of gender mainstreaming in 18 ministries/agencies, 7 provinces and 7 elected districts/municipalities, finding that strategies had not been well implemented in most development sectors. The recommendation of this evaluation was to integrate gender mainstreaming not only in the planning system but also in the budgeting process, which later came to be known as gender-responsive budgeting (anggaran responsif gender, or ARG). Bappenas issued Decree 30/M.PPN/HK/03/2009 on the Steering Committee and Technical Team of Gender-responsive Planning and Budgeting, which act as a coordinator of the implementation of gender-responsive planning and budgeting across sectors and ministries. Gender-responsive budgeting was finally piloted in seven line ministries and agencies in 2010.

The RPJMN 2010–14 for the first time mandates the integration of gender mainstreaming policies in the planning and budgeting process, including gender-disaggregated policies, indicators and targets from various ministries and agencies. Other regulations include MoF Regulation 119/PMK.02/2009 on Guidelines for the Preparation and Review of Ministry/Agency Work Plans and Budgets and the Preparation, Review, Approval and Implementation of Budget Implementation for Fiscal Year 2010, and MoF Regulation 104/PMK.02/2010 on the same subject for Fiscal Year 2011, which help to accelerate the implementation of gender-responsive budgeting (Bappenas, 2010). Meanwhile, gender mainstreaming has also been implemented by regional governments, albeit at a slower pace than at national level.

The role of the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (MoWECP) is limited in terms of monitoring the implementation of gender mainstreaming as mandated by a number of regulations. Some key informants argued that limited capacity in the ministry is a key

constraint. Gender focal points are supposed to be in every line ministry and agency, and their duties include ensuring cross-institutional coordination and the integration of gender with other ministerial priorities, but they lack institutional clout and have not demonstrated the capacity to influence planning to achieve their goals. In addition, the MoWECP stimulation fund to regional governments is too small to run gender mainstreaming initiatives at local level; some regions do not even receive the fund (Holmes et al., 2011).

5.3 Have social protection programmes incorporated a gender lens?

It is important now to explore whether local social protection programme formulation has taken up lessons learnt from national programming in order to better integrate a gender perspective. Arif et al. (2010) explain that inclusion of gender mainstreaming has varied across development programmes, and in social protection in particular. Obligations of donors, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have helped gender analysis to be taken into account in the design of certain social protection programmes, but it has been neglected in others. The inclusion of gender components in programme design can be seen in the social safety nets in the health and education sectors in 1997/98, in the sub-district empowerment programme which later became PNPM Mandiri and in the latest conditional cash transfer, the PKH. All these programmes give specific attention to gender risks and vulnerabilities. For instance, the former programme provided food supplements for children and pregnant/lactating mothers and scholarships for female students during the period of crisis. Although these programmes in their design have quite a narrow lens (e.g. focusing on women's traditional roles), the empowerment programme goes further in terms of involving women in decision making and developing financial capacities through microfinance (affirmative action to allocate a 25% fund targeted at women's groups). Yet other social protection programmes, mostly those initiated by central government, have ignored gender perspectives.

Although regional governments are given space to formulate their own poverty alleviation agenda and therefore can initiate local social protection programmes, efforts to create such initiatives are limited, as they do not have sufficient fiscal capacity to run them. In most discussions with key informants and in the workshops in our research sites, one reason given for social protection programmes, such as Raskin, neglecting gender issues was that the design comes from the centre, with regional governments involved only in implementation.

Sutmuller and Setiono (2011), looking at how local policies, including on social protection, are formulated found that local policies deal mostly taxes and levies, although they also found instance of regions trying to translate national policies into local ones. One example relates to Jamkesmas, which has been modified into local health insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah, or Jamkesda) in some regional governments. This modification in some cases has entailed extending coverage and the benefit package, as well as improving the implementing institutions. Other local programmes translated from national ones include PNPM Mandiri and 'education for free' or 'education for all' policies.

Whether local social protection programmes are in place seems to depend on the impetus at local level. Von Luebke (2009) finds that, under decentralisation, good public service provision has derived mostly from good local leadership rather than from demand driven by societal pressure. Sutmuller and Setiono (2011) confirm that local leaders are the champions in good local policies, initiating ideas for local policies which derive from their vision and mission or campaign promises, rather than following up on emerging local issues brought by communities or ideas suggested by their staff in office.

However, Sutmuller and Setiono (2011) also reveal anecdotal evidence that regional governments' response to central government's requests for local policies on poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDS prevention, disaster prevention, elimination of domestic violence, food crop security, anti-corruption and gender mainstreaming has been poor. The majority of respondents in this research stated that such policy documents are basically copy and pasted from national policy documents, although no evidence of this (actual documents) was

made available. Lack of capacity in regional government is likely to be a main constraint in this regard.

5.4 Coordination in decentralised Indonesia

Formal policy processes in decentralised Indonesia are still quite top-down in nature, even though decentralisation law prescribes the rights and duties of regional governments in delivering public services and effective social protection programmes. This results in a big challenge in terms of coordinating not only programmes themselves but also the institutions responsible for running the programmes.

The fact that most existing social protection programmes are central government initiatives and are scattered across different institutions raises a problem of competing vested interests, with overlapping or conflicting responsibilities between institutions (Perdana and Maxwell, 2011). Meanwhile, greater power for local governments, in particular district governments, to deliver their own public services has not necessarily led to better performance. There are at least three issues to consider in this regard (Widianto, 2011). The first is the capacity of district governments: many districts are concerned only about the transfer of funds from the central level, without considering how to increase the capacity of their personnel to carry out more difficult tasks. Given the size of the country, it is difficult for the government, even at more decentralised levels, to reach remote service providers and people in remote villages and areas. The second issue relates to local politics: many local leaders tend to give out populist promise merely to gain more voters, and do not necessarily follow up on these. The third issue is that decentralisation, to some extent, leads to a moral hazard in terms of the relationship between the district, the province and the central government. District governments do not really consider central or provincial government as their superior, since local leaders are not appointed by central government any more, but rather are elected by the people. This has resulted in difficulties in conducting monitoring and supervision, in particular that which is related to national social protection programmes.

6 Ideas, interests and institutions

Although gender has been mainstreamed within development policies over the past decade around the globe, numerous social protection programmes in Indonesia still lack a gender-sensitive approach in their design and implementation. To understand the politics underpinning social protection programme effectiveness in order to be able to better tackle poverty and gender risks and vulnerabilities in decentralised Indonesia, we employ the political economy framework of the so-called 'three I's' for our site-level analysis, focusing on 1) ideas—the role of ideas about social protection and gender in shaping policy debates both in policy circles and among the general public; 2) the interests of local decision makers involved in social protection programming; and 3) institutions—the forums in which policy decisions are negotiated.

As mentioned in the methodology section, our site study was conducted in two districts and two provinces, namely Pasaman Barat district in West Sumatra and TTS district in NTT province. Most issues discussed below draw on in-depth interviews with key informants as well as workshops with local governments conducted both provinces and districts.

6.1 Ideas

Ideas and knowledge on gender issues as well as on gender mainstreaming policy remain lacking in our research areas. Often, understandings of gender are very women biased, with even the word 'gender' understood as meaning the same as 'women'. For most informants, discussing gender issues meant discussing the status of women in many aspects of life. Hardly any knowledge exists on the impact of gender inequality on men, with such perceptions found not only among government officials but also among parliamentarians:

'I think this [prioritising gender mainstreaming] is about the extent to which it has impacts. Because of our [budgetary] limitation, sectors that see significant impacts will be prioritised. In Minangkabau, I think the gender issue is not high risk, or at least nobody is dying yet because of gender problems. Since poverty and unemployment are more important, these are prioritised. Gender is important, but not more important than current government priorities' (male provincial government official, West Sumatra).

In such understandings, a gender-sensitive approach and gender mainstreaming are perceived as being an effort to put woman in a position of top priority within specific development programmes. Workshop participants mostly felt that, to achieve this, what they needed to do was to mainstream gender in individual programme, such as programmes aimed specifically at empowering women and labelled as 'women's empowerment' programmes. However, since they have limited budgets, only limited programmes can be implemented.

There has been progress on gender in NTT and TTS, however. Both the provincial- and district-level RPJMs 2009–14 incorporate gender mainstreaming. In the TTS RPJM, for instance, one of the of thirteen government agenda items is to improve gender equality and justice, with a focus on improving the participation of women and protection for women and children, including strengthening institutions dealing with gender mainstreaming and child protection. A number of stakeholders, such as local NGOs and academics, were invited to be involved in the plan's formulation, meaning its content is fairly comprehensive. However, most development planning does not reflect the gender component mentioned in the RPJM.

Meanwhile, most local government officials in NTT and TTS still see gender as relating to differences between men and women. Some officials with more understanding, who see gender as involving women in various activities, argue that the issue is already mainstreamed. A few local officials with advanced understanding of gender are still having difficulties making the incorporation of gender in their policy and programmes possible. Materials provided in gender capacity-building programmes are too general and there is still a lack of practical

examples on how to incorporate gender in different government agencies, particularly for those which manage very technical affairs such as public works.

'Gender is already incorporated, because fathers, mothers and children are all poor. In my opinion, gender is an issue within the whole family [...] Imagine if there are 18,000 poor households, the gender aspect is huge' (male district government official, TTS).

'People do think that gender is important, but sometimes they don't know how to start and what to do' (female NGO activist, NTT).

One good example of improving technical capacity in terms of incorporating gender into policy and programmes is the Australian Indonesian Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health (AIPMNH), funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). As part of this, a gender specialist, who is also an expert on health issues, trained local officials in partner agencies (the Planning Bureau and the Health Office) on how to use gender as a tool in analysing problems related to health and how to design programmes to solve such problems. After the training, participants were asked to develop other analyses on different health problems using the same tools and instruments provided in the training.

'For example, for lung disease, most patients who seek care at primary health centres are men, even though many women also suffer from lung disease. Women tend to think the money used to pay for transport to the clinic is better used to buy vegetables. So, house visit activities are needed, and also we cannot rely only on data provided from the clinic' (female, Health Office, NTT).

'In certain areas, women suffer from malaria because they have to go to the river early in the morning to do the laundry. Another example is more boys suffer from worm infestations because they frequently play in the river' (female, Health Office, NTT).

Understandings on gender issues in West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat are limited, for a number of reasons. First, there are no adequate sensitisation activities on gender-related issues in general and gender mainstreaming in the government in particular. There is no clear-cut information on socialisation at provincial level, and in Pasaman Barat, sensitisation has been carried out for high-ranking district officials once only. Even though various officials from relevant district and provincial offices attend gender-related trainings, these staff are usually low ranking, have no influence over gender mainstreaming in policymaking and seldom share their new knowledge and skills with other office members. In addition, local government offices often suffer high staff turnover which leads to a shortage of office staff with a good understanding of this and other issues.

Second, there has been no serious study of the condition of gender relations in the area. The regulations cited earlier stipulate that local governments must conduct gender analyses, and the central government even provides technical guidance on how to do this. However, as of the time of fieldwork for this study, none of the local offices had conducted such a study:

'But I haven't found out about [cases of gender inequality] from a gender analysis. Almost no provincial offices have conducted such a study. They just make it up. If there is one, it's by accident rather than design' (male coordinator of gender working group, West Sumatra).

No evidence-based study has been carried out to determine which sectors see persistent gender inequality, with what impacts, and what kind of policy response is required to overcome this. This absence of strong evidence is part of the reason why policymakers do not prioritise the issue in local development policy. A few agencies at the district and provincial level, such as Education and Health Offices, have carried out gender-segregated data collection as a preliminary effort, but most have not. Since gender mainstreaming is perceived as being a programme instead of a development strategy, it is not included in the government's vision and priorities for local development. Out of 10 priority sectors in the provincial RPJM, none

touches gender issues. Lack of data also means the government cannot draft budgets which include gender-related programming. If they insist on doing this, local parliamentarians may question them and even reject their budget proposals. For all actors, gender is not as important as poverty, disaster recovery local infrastructure development or agriculture, or they do not see gender as part of these issues.

'The difference is related to the inequality that affects women. I see the problem, but unfortunately others do not. This results in different mindsets which later affects the programmes. An example is the policy of one cow for each farmer. There should be data on the number of male farmers and female farmers. Can you imagine giving a cow to a female farmer? Female farmers should be given other animals, such as chicken or fish. Since what we give is a cow, those who get them will be male farmers. Our problems are mostly to do with dealing with data to formulate policy. Our universal data, let alone our specific data, are erratic. We might get different data each day' (female member of parliament, West Sumatra).

Third, given the common perception of gender as a concept that promotes an increased role for women in all sectors, West Sumatra's majority Minangkabau people assume their traditional values, based on the matrilineal system, are sufficient. As this system puts women in positions deemed noble, efforts to promote gender equality are considered unnecessary. Such understandings exist not only among policymakers but also among community figures and society in general. Aspirations to return to local values have driven West Sumatra to revive traditional models of government based on its cultural values in the post-reform era. Although many people perceive such aspirations as nostalgia, many of these beliefs are being reflected in government policy. For example, in the provincial RPJM, the number one development priority is to practise customary values based on religion. There is also a provincial training programme for Minangkabau housewives on cooking *rendang*, a traditional food. Other examples are programme in Pasaman Barat to build traditional houses for all villages and a policy to re-establish the royal palace of Pasaman Kingdom, once believed to be victorious.

'If in the future lots of problems caused by gender inequality appear, gender mainstreaming must be prioritised. However, appreciation of women [here] is already high, so such cases will not happen here. That's why gender mainstreaming is not necessary. Here, we have traditional leaders, traditional women figures [bundo kanduang]. Maybe in Minangkabau gender mainstreaming is not required' (male provincial government official, West Sumatra).

However, different views emerged from academics and NGO activists as well as the media, who felt the arguments put forward on the basis of the matrilineal system were just an excuse for the government to avoid mainstreaming gender. Although macro indicators such as the Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure suggest that gender inequality is not prominent in this area, gender-related issues are actually quite significant. According to a women's NGO in Padang, West Sumatra, incidence of domestic violence against women is quite high in the province, and had increased over the years. The 2011 report of the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan, or Komnas Perempuan) shows that incidence of domestic violence in West Sumatra is quite high compared with in other provinces (the province comes second on Sumatra and sixth at national level).¹⁰

'In terms of definition, and based on my knowledge regarding gender, this is not the case [that local tradition has mainstreamed gender]. Many leaders are unaware of gender concepts [...] and also Bundo Kanduang Council experts [...] do not know the concept. So your question regarding gender is a bit difficult to answer' (male, academic, West Sumatra).

10 Note that the data cover reported incidents only. For more information, see www.komnasperempuan.or.id.

Very limited understandings of gender, compounded by the belief that traditional values have promoted gender equality in the region, there is no special attention to the gender-related impacts of government programmes. The only issue many informants in the study area raised was unequal opportunities for boys and girls to access school, particularly at junior and senior high school levels. The nine years' compulsory education programme has meant that girls can access education more easily now. Meanwhile, though, according to provincial and district Education Offices, economic and other external influences mean that boys are now tending to drop out at high school level, so their net enrolment rate is lower than that of girls.

Other social protection programmes which cover basic services are considered not to have a gendered effect, even in the current era of decentralisation, in which local governments have room to design and implement their own programmes. Programmes such as health insurance, whether funded by the central, provincial or district budget, are gender neutral, not differentiating men and women. This is because, according to informants in Pasaman Barat, both men and woman get sick in the same way, so they are given equal opportunities to seek treatment. Most informants felt birth delivery insurance had had a major impact in terms of decreasing maternal mortality rates, so this was considered to have gendered impact. However, this is a national programme, with the district government only the implementer. Other programmes, such as scholarships, Raskin, etc., are also considered gender neutral: they benefit the whole family and men and women participate equally.

In the case of NTT and TTS, even though the local government has higher understanding of gender issues, there is not much space for it to influence social protection programming implemented at the district level. This is because most programmes are financed and designed by central government, with very limited consultation held with district governments. Programmes come to the district with rigid implementation guidelines, leaving only limited room for them to be creative. Local governments also have a limited budget to develop their own social protection programmes. For instance, about 80% of the NTT Social Affairs Office's development budget comes from the central budget and the remainder from the province.

'All designs came from the centre. The district's authority is small. Why do I say that the district's authority is small? Because there is nothing we can do with that amount of money, because it is a grant' (male district government official, TTS).

'Regarding design or planning, we can give yellow [small authority]. The central government does more' (female provincial government official, NTT).

'Usually, programmes come from the centre and all we do is implement them on the ground' (female district government official, TTS).

Almost all local staff interviewed in NTT felt national social assistance programmes (i.e. Raskin and the BLT) were ineffective. They argued that Raskin spoiled people and made them lazy, and assistance programmes should be given only to the elderly or sick. In contrast, they supported programmes such as health insurance, scholarships and other programmes with empowerment aspects, such as PNPM Mandiri.

'Raskin rice is only Rp 1,600 per kilogram, so people just have to find a bucket of water and wait for it. I think it is important for us to design an appropriate programme which will not make the poor lazy' (male, Social Affairs Office, NTT).

'I agree with Jamkesmas because sick people cannot work, but I disagree with Raskin because they can work—and they are given rice' (female, Bappeda, NTT).

Such understandings, of course, should inform central government to ensure better sensitisation on the aim of social assistance programmes. Indeed, our key informants at the national level admitted that such understandings existed, but argued that divergences related more to the details of some poverty reduction programme instruments.

Q: 'is there a perception that social assistance makes people become dependent?'

A: 'When it comes to the detail, there are some divergent ideas in some specific

programmes. For instance, some people do not agree with the BLT, but it is related to more to the way it is rolled out—whether we give the cash transfer or a voucher. In terms of the big picture, I think everyone converges, you know, they buy into the idea about how to make Indonesia prosperous, etc.’ (male, TNP2K, Jakarta).

This section has revealed that gender has not yet become an important discourse for either the government or society, which means that gender mainstreaming programmes are not running. There is a huge knowledge disparity between central and local government, with local governments not having a sufficient understanding of even basic concepts related to gender. This is a challenge for gender activists at both the central and the local level, in terms of increasing knowledge and understandings of policymakers on gender and its significance, and how to apply the concept in the context of development policy in a decentralised era.

6.2 Interests

Interviews with various informants and a workshop with government officials indicated that gender mainstreaming in government policies had not been in the interests of stakeholders in either research area. Some points raised are worth noting here, particularly several factors that may be affecting the attractiveness of gender mainstreaming for such officials.

First, gender mainstreaming is not politically palatable, so no politician who competes for a certain position (regent, governor or local parliament member) uses such issues in their campaign materials. This status is greatly influenced by public perceptions of gender, namely, the extent to which people think gender is important. Above, we saw that the public in the two research sites sees gender as unimportant, but for different reasons. West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat feel their cultural values already place women in an honourable position; in NTT and TTS gender is not yet a hot issue for voters as the culture is still highly patriarchal.

Second, there is a lack of interest in gender because no specific budget is allocated to it. As previously described, informants misunderstand gender mainstreaming, seeing it as a programme rather than a development strategy. This means it is supposed to have its own specific budget; without it, it is left aside. Meanwhile, central government understands gender mainstreaming as a development strategy, making it a dimension in any development activity. This again means it is not allocated a specific budget.

However, visibility of gender on the policy agenda is still possible. One way to ensure this is by working on gender mainstreaming in a project with a special funding allocation, which will encourage government staff to focus more on the issue. This system is much employed by donors in their various areas of interest. The drawbacks of this mechanism are its lack of sustainability and its limited effect in terms of changing staff mindsets. Once the project is over and the funding stops, staff may no longer be committed to the issue, let alone implement it into other policy or programmes. Some donor programmes try to minimise these drawbacks, as has been experienced in NTT, by making dedicated efforts to building the capacity of local government, including in gender mainstreaming, and requesting local government commitment, such as in the form of funding contributions or staff time.

Although non-governmental groups have the opportunity to influence policy, it seems no NGOs really pay attention to gender in West Sumatra. According to one informant, there is actually an association of civil society, comprising various actors, but so far this has not raised the issue of gender. Most focus is put on poverty, and gender is not considered part of this.

Third, in West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat, gender ideas do not come into conflict with local values upheld by the community. If the idea of gender challenges existing values in society, efforts made to raise gender awareness might be more significant. In a similar way, West Sumatra’s culture, based on a matrilineal system, has a moderate religious tradition, and the community’s religious understandings for the most part do not come into conflict with the gender discourse. Based on the observations of the provincial Women’s Empowerment Office, so far there has been no proselytising by Muslim figures against efforts to raise gender awareness. In fact, West Sumatra was one of the bases for the development of moderate

Islam in the past. It was the birthplace of the Muhammadiyah organisation and even now is still the base for this organisation, which is known for its moderate understanding of Islam and has no misogynistic doctrine. Although lately some districts and cities in West Sumatra have been said to have developed local laws that discriminate against women, this is a new development and not a general trend in the region.

Fourth, in NTT and TTS, local governments incorporate gender in their policy and programmes only to fulfil requirements under regulations or project guidelines. For example, PNPM Mandiri guidelines state that revolving funds are specifically for women with small businesses. It is very unlikely that local government staff will be creative and set up initiatives outside what is stated in such guidelines. As such, gender-sensitive indicators are necessary in developing a policy or designing a programme.

6.3 Institutions

Institutions, theoretically speaking, are both formal and informal spaces in which policy decisions are discussed. They can be governmental, non-governmental or community based. For governmental institutions, a set of regulations stipulate that line ministries, bodies and agencies from national to provincial and district/municipality level must establish special offices, working groups or posts which have specific tasks related to gender mainstreaming. The highest regulation is Presidential Instruction 9/2000, which has become a basis for all technical implementation rules to adopt gender mainstreaming strategies in the design, implementation and monitoring of development policies and programmes. The latest regulation is MoHA Circular Letter 67/2001 revising a previous circular letter on the same subject, namely, General Guidance on Implementing Gender Mainstreaming at Local Level.

These regulations stipulate the establishment of several formal institutions at the national, provincial and district/municipality level, as well as the putting in place of officers to lead or coordinate the office and its activities. At the national level, there must be a Ministry of Women's Empowerment, a working group of gender mainstreaming in seven line ministries/agencies piloting gender-responsive budgeting until 2014¹¹ and gender focal points in each ministry/agency. Another national-level institution which shares the same goal is Komnas Perempuan,¹² a semi-independent organisation which focuses on women rights. All institutions at the national level, except for the last, must also be present at provincial and district/municipality level. In fact, the organisational structure varies across regions, with some agencies autonomous and others part of or merged with other functional organisations.

In West Sumatra, there is a province Women's Empowerment Office, gender mainstreaming working groups and gender focal points in several province offices. The province Women's Empowerment Office is relatively new independent body. Before being an autonomous office in 2008, it was a bureau at the province Secretariat Office led by middle-rank official (Echelon 2). Based on Province Regulation 3/2008 on the New Governance Organisation Structure, the office was made autonomous and was led by a higher-rank officer. If strengthening the status of the Women's Empowerment Office is an indicator of government support to gender issues, the same situation is unrolling in Pasaman Barat. Before early 2012, women's empowerment came under the district Office of Community Empowerment, Women's Empowerment and Family Planning; the office became autonomous based on the same regulation as in West Sumatra. However, according to some informants, a concern that cannot be ignored is that the regent's wife became the head of the office after it was made independent, although it is still unclear whether this special circumstance has led to an improvement in gender mainstreaming in the district or not.

11 Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Agriculture, Mof and Bappenas.

12 Komnas Perempuan was established on 15 October 1998, based on Presidential Decree 181/1998, to respond to civil society demand, particularly that of women activists, that the government realise its responsibility to overcome the many cases of violence against women. The main context for this demand was the mass rape in the May 1998 riot. We categorise this institution as semi-independent as it is funded by the state through the state budget.

With regard to governmental institutions, the situation is more or less the same in NTT and TTS district. At provincial and district level, responsibility for implementing gender mainstreaming strategy is located in the Women's Empowerment Office, but these offices are still seen as powerless. For example, in 2010, the Women's Empowerment Office in TTS invited all the heads of district agencies for a gender budgeting meeting, but attendees were mostly low level. They received materials but did not do any follow-up afterwards. There is also a perspective among local government staff that only women are supposed to work in the office:

'For example, all my staff members are female, comprising the head of section and the head of subsections. What can I say? In fact I prefer involving male members. If I were asked, I would prefer having male staff members involved in this section. It is recommended that men say something about gender issues since people tend to look down on women. If we say something, people tend to say "they are just a bunch of housewives"' (female, Women's Empowerment Office, TTS).

'My colleagues at other agencies were making fun of me for working at the Women's Empowerment Office; "Why are you at that office? You are not female, are you?"' (male, Women's Empowerment Office, TTS).

One reason for gender segregation in work assignments, as argued by Women's Empowerment Office staff, is that there is no female staff member on the Position and Rank Consideration Board (Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan, or Baperjakat). Baperjakat is responsible for promoting and rotating all civil servants, and its members are high-rank bureaucrats, which positions female staff still do not have the chance to achieve very frequently. The situation is chicken and egg: women are not in Baperjakat because they have lower rank, yet they cannot attain higher positions because all Baperjakat members are male.

In January 2012, the Women's Empowerment Office in TTS was merged with the Family Planning Office. The former head of the Women's Empowerment Office became the deputy of the new office. This merging has complicated budgeting, since both issues are aligned with a different ministry at the national level, and after the merger women's empowerment received less of a budget from the district government than it had before.

'In the year 2011, we received approximately Rp 500 million, now we get only around Rp 300 million' (female, Women's Empowerment Office, TTS).

In general, women in NTT and TTS as well as in West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat still have limited space in the decision-making process, in both the executive and the legislative arenas. There has been some progress on several years ago in this regard, but this has been very slow. The most obvious evidence of this is that, out of 25 Echelon 2 (head of office) positions, there is only 1 woman; out of 12 sub-district heads only 1 is a woman; and only 5 villages are headed by a woman out of 240 in TTS. In Pasaman Barat, there are only 2 women out of 35 Echelon 2 positions.

There is a similar situation in the local parliament, where women's representation remains very low. For example, out of 55 NTT province parliamentarians, only 4 are female; there are 5 women out of 40 parliamentarians in TTS district. In West Sumatra, there are only 7 female parliamentarians. Even though the 30% women quota exists, its implementation is still far lower than it should be, for several reasons. First, the rule itself is considered vague, and no penalty is imposed, meaning parties mostly ignore the quota and rarely put women candidates in winning positions. Second, not many women are involved in the political structure, so the recruitment of legislative members is still dominated by men. Third, the patriarchal culture makes women reluctant to seek active participation in politics. And fourth, politics is seen as tough, and this means it is an arena with which women are seen as unfamiliar.

Other government institutions include gender mainstreaming working groups at provincial level, including those working on gender mainstreaming in education, health, agriculture, etc. Each of these groups comprises representatives of relevant divisions with the same goal. Meanwhile, to ensure each office mainstreams gender perspectives, regulations also stipulate the appointment of an officer with relevant capability as a gender focal point. In West Sumatra

province, some government offices have officially appointed gender focal points, although these are limited in number. According to an informant in the provincial Women's Empowerment Office, gender focal points are present in only the Education, Health, Agriculture and Social Welfare Offices. No offices in Pasaman Barat district have functioning gender focal points.

Both NTT provincial and TTS district governments already have a decree on the assignment of gender focal points, and as we have seen they exist in some offices, but in practice the position is not yet functioning. This is because some gender focal points are not decision makers in their institution (some are only female regular staff); some have been relocated to other institutions not working on planning issues; and, not least, gender focal points have insufficient capacity to increase understandings on the importance of gender in planning, even though, prior to the formation of the gender focal point position, there was a two-day capacity building training on gender mainstreaming in the development planning process.

An academic concerned with gender in NTT said that the establishment of gender focal points was like a firework: it burnt for a short time and then it died. As long as activities were funded, the position worked; after that nothing happened:

'Gender focal points are not functioning maximally yet. There has been some training but sometimes their understanding, care and drive in doing planning is not really focused on gender issues' (female academic, NTT).

'One of the obstacles for us is that people who participate in meetings and trainings and understand gender are often transferred to other positions, and we have to start anew' (female NGO activist, NTT).

'Yes, there is gender focal point, but none of them has actually influenced policy made by the government' (female NGO activist, NTT).

Regarding the officer in charge, the latest regulation stipulates that the deputy governor at provincial level and the deputy regent/mayor at district or municipality level are in charge of gender mainstreaming in each authority. The head of the provincial or district/municipality Bappeda coordinates all gender mainstreaming working groups in each authority. The provincial and district/municipality Offices of women's Empowerment act as secretariat for all gender mainstreaming-related policies and activities.

Non-governmental institutions also deal with gender issues. In West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat, however, such institutions are very limited and exist only at provincial level; there are none at district level. The most important institution is a gender working group on post-disaster recovery established at the end of 2009 in West Sumatra.¹³ This comprises different organisations, including government representatives, local NGOs and the mass media. The aim of this working group was to ensure post-disaster recovery projects incorporated a gender-sensitive approach. According to one of its members, it did not function:

'The gender working group was established based on the Governor's Stipulation Letter. It aimed to ensure post-disaster recovery projects were gender sensitive. However, it was not well functioning. It was only for the sake of fulfilling the administrative conditions of the project' (female NGO activist, West Sumatra).

Another non-governmental institution in West Sumatra is the women journalists division in the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, or AJI). According to the head of West Sumatra AJI, this newly established division aims to ensure the specific needs of women journalists are taken into account in news reporting standard procedures and that news published by the newspapers which are members of AJI is gender sensitive. However, since the division is new, it is not yet influencing general policy surrounding news publication in

¹³ West Sumatra was hit by a big earthquake, ranking 7.6 on the Richter Scale. The most devastated area was the west coast of West Sumatra, including Pasaman Barat district.

the region significantly. Another NGO is Nurani Perempuan, which focuses mainly on domestic violence but was also involved in the gender working group on post-disaster recovery.

There are many international agencies (donors and NGOs) and local NGOs assisting local governments as well as working with the community at the grassroots level in all districts in NTT province.¹⁴ Issues covered include good governance, poverty, maternal and child health, food security, child protection and domestic violence, water and sanitation and education. Although most international NGOs do not work directly on gender issues, all of them incorporate gender in their activities, at different levels of intensity. For example, AIPMNH provides training to the staff of local agencies' partners, which include Bappeda, the Women's Empowerment Office, the Health Office, the Family Planning Agency and the Village Community Empowerment Agency on how to develop gender-based policy. They discuss the pro-gender process and how to enable planning to address problems related to gender issues. As for local NGOs, in TTS district, there is an NGO which focuses mainly on gender issues (particularly protecting women from domestic violence). This NGO has some influence on decision makers since the founder is the wife of the district regent.

Donor agencies in NTT are quite powerful in terms of influencing local governments' mindsets on gender issues, because they are consistent with their programmes supported by sufficient budget. Local governments in NTT also perceive donors' existence and their programmes as good for development. Ideas from donors are more readily accepted compared with those from NGOs, even if NGOs have already communicated similar ideas to and trained government.

'I see that there is a good partnership between donors and local governments. Government officials usually attend meetings conducted by donors, but only a few of them are committed enough to attend ones conducted by NGOs. Probably, it has to do with the location of the meetings. Donors usually hold meetings in big, reputable hotels, whereas NGOs do this in small training rooms with community members present' (female NGO activist, NTT).

'Donors have positive influences on participation, gender, democracy and good governance' (female NGO activist, NTT).

The last type of institution is local community organisations. The most important institution in this category in West Sumatra and Pasaman Barat is Bundo Kanduang.¹⁵ This institution was established after Reformasi as a medium for Minangkabau women to express their concern at village level based on their cultural values. The establishment of this institution goes along the trend of reviving old traditions in the region, part of which involves adjusting the nomenclature and structure of the village government in lines with the old structure of the Nagari government.¹⁶ Bundo Kanduang is incorporated into the village government as a complementary structure. Unfortunately, its function is limited to reviving and sensitising on old values on standards of behaviour for women in the village. Latterly, the organisation has transformed into a new form of New Order-like women's organisation which has led to the continued presence of traditional gender roles in the community. Its structure, just like that of formal governmental organisations, goes from village up to sub-district, district and provincial

14 International donors include the World Food Programme (WFP), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, or GIZ), AusAID, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) and the International Organization for Migration IOM. International NGOs include Save the Children, Plan International, the Nature Conservancy, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Handicap International, Swiss Contact, World Vision, Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), Wetlands International, Action Contre la Faim, VECO Indonesia and Instituto Marques de Vallle Flor.

15 Bundo Kanduang literally means 'biological mother', but the term refers to female leaders in Minangkabau, either as 'queens' or 'queen mothers'.

16 This is a traditional form of village government in West Sumatra, maintained after Indonesian independence until 1979, when the New Order government issued Law 5/1979 on village government to introduce a uniform function and structure of village government nationwide.

level. At the provincial level, it is now led by a woman who is the last offspring of an Minangkabau aristocrat family.

'Bundo Kanduang is a new domestication institution. It even could be said to be a new instrument to suppress women's participation. It promotes gender-biased policies, such as policies on what women must wear, and stipulates that women have to be able to recite the Quran, etc. In total, there are 17 discriminatory policies in West Sumatra' (female NGO activist, West Sumatra).

In addition, there is some role for the local university in mainstreaming gender in local government in NTT. Nusa Cendana Public University, which is located in the provincial capital of NTT, has a Centre for Women and Children's Study. In 2008, the university conducted an evaluation on gender mainstreaming in NTT provincial and Kupang municipality governments. The result found a lack of gender mainstreaming in most major agencies/offices, with some only in the Women's Empowerment Office, the Health Office, the Education Office and the Family Planning Office. Other agencies, particularly those related to infrastructure, argued that that they did not manage gender but rather the whole community.

To sum up, with respect to institutional concerns in West Sumatra and NTT, particularly in terms of the government, organisations and agencies exist and then seem to be assumed to be able to perform the task of gender mainstreaming: there are regulations, structures and high-rank officers in charge. However, the system is in fact not functioning. Informants from various offices in West Sumatra pointed to issues related to commitment to gender mainstreaming of the governor or regent as a cause of this. Other informants said finance was the main barrier; still others highlighted a lack of incentives.

'Actually, it is just commitment. They do not lack understanding; they know what gender mainstreaming is and they accept it. They know what gender mainstreaming is, where it is heading, but again it depends on the policymakers. If the top has decided the priorities, then the section heads have to carry them out' (female, government official, West Sumatra).

'We lack a budget to perform gender mainstreaming activities' (male district government official, Pasaman Barat).

Given this situation, the main issues related to gender mainstreaming in this region seem to be a lack of an adequate understanding of gender issues and how these could have a major impact on people's lives. This is closely linked to a lack of knowledge production on gender relations in the region and how gender inequality has led to problems. Even government offices have performed no adequate studies on gender inequality and its impact on policy. Therefore, increased availability of information and results of gender-related studies would play an important role in influencing decision makers in the region. In one provincial workshop, a high-ranking Bappeda officer stated that, if anyone could show that gender was a very important issue based on credible data, he would surely fight for policies and budgets for gender mainstreaming in the region.

One potential mechanism to promote gender equity involves supplying an evidence base for policymakers on the close relationship between poverty and gender inequality and on the potential consequences of ignoring gender inequality. Disaggregated data are needed to be able to inform policymakers of gender inequality in development. The most common mechanism, direct advocacy, may encounter some resistance, particularly if women are seen as 'shouting'.

'If we keep on giving real evidence on this, their mind must be opened somehow. Do not just come and shout that women should be given chances, do not dictate, since it is going to make them resistant. Instead, give them evidence and best practices as well' (female academic, NTT).

'When sensitisation was taking place, it was given along with concrete examples, the kinds of consequences we might suffer as a result of gender inequality. For

example, statistics on education show that women are far behind. During discussions, gender inequality was revealed and it was realised that the negative consequences of this condition would continue to exist if no action was taken' (male, Bappeda, TTS).

'if anyone can show that gender issues are very important based on reliable data, then surely I would fight for policies and budgets of gender mainstreaming in the region' (male provincial government official, West Sumatra).

Another potential mechanism to promote gender equality is through continuous sensitisation on the importance of gender in development. This can use many instruments, including the media, particularly as officials usually read the local newspapers. At present, sensitisation on gender mainstreaming is considered the task of the Women's Empowerment Office, which admits that lack of funding and weak coordination between government agencies constrains the process.

'Just like TV commercials, sensitisation should be done repeatedly and cost a lot of money, but eventually we hope this will change people's mindset' (female, academic, NTT).

'Understanding is still lacking and sensitisation on government policy on the matter of gender is not yet optimum. It's not even optimum, not to mention maximum' (male district government official, TTS).

Local governments in NTT also consider the existence of regulations on gender mainstreaming important in promoting gender equality. Regulations should state clearly that it is mandatory for each programme to pay attention to gender aspects, starting at national level and going down to provincial and district levels. Penalties should be attached to this condition, such as no budget being allocated for programmes without a consideration of gender. In addition, all central government social protection programme guidelines should articulate what gender aspect should be implemented by district governments in executing programming, such as that poor female-headed households will must receive priority in the beneficiary selection process. A good example of a national regulation related to gender is the affirmative action on a 30% quota of women in parliament. Although this quota has not yet been achieved, the existence of a law on it has opened up people's minds on the importance of women's role in politics and parliament.

'Relating to regulations, in the district Education Office, for example, there are more than 500 schoolmasters, only very few of them women. If there were a regulation on it, no one would dare to go against it, so there would be room for women' (male district government official, TTS).

'If there is a rule about gender aspects in technical guidance, then everyone would certainly follow it' (male district government official, TTS).

'I will give an example: people thought that women were less intelligent for quite a long time, but since there has been a rule in politics to accommodate a 30% [women] quota [...] this has affected everyone; we now have female candidates here, although it has not reached 30% yet' (male district government official, TTS).

7 Conclusions and policy recommendations

This study suggests that understandings of gender among governmental officials as well as the general public in Indonesia are still poor. There are three different stages for local officials in understanding gender (mainstreamed). Most officials understand 'gender' as meaning the same as 'women', resulting in programmes targeted at women as the only steps in gender mainstreaming. Some other officials have more understanding and see gender as involving women in various activities (quantitatively), but with little attention to the quality of such participation. A few local officials with an advanced understanding of gender are still having difficulties incorporating gender into their policy and programmes.

This contributes to a limited role for social protection programmes in addressing gendered risks and vulnerabilities. Despite the government's decentralisation policy implemented over the past decade in the country, regional governments' efforts to tackle poverty and gender vulnerabilities have not been optimal. Indeed, there is recognition of the complexities and challenges in mainstreaming gender in poverty reduction as well as social protection programming, but in practice the steps involved in embedding a gender-sensitive approach in social protection policy and programming are relatively straightforward. Thus, the political economy dynamics of decentralised policy and programme implementation need to be addressed urgently and systematically.

The above findings lead us to the following recommendations:

- 1 Given poor understandings of gender at all levels, **make further investment in sensitisation and capacity building**. Support from central government and donors to capacity building should not be limited to government officials but extended to other stakeholders, in particular non-governmental actors, including NGOs and religious organisations, which are more likely to transfer lessons on a larger scale to society.
- 2 **Promote more incentives for regions which perform well in tackling poverty and gender vulnerabilities** rather than punishing those which fail to meet requirements (such as in incorporating gender-responsive budgeting into budget plans). Incentives could be in the form of tax incentives or extra funds in the central transfer. It may be necessary to complement such measures with performance assessment criteria to help hold actors at all levels accountable for delivering on gender mainstreaming goals and targets.
- 3 **Invest more in the generation of gender-disaggregated data and analysis to promote evidence-based policy and programme design and the development of gender-sensitive indicators for better targeting, monitoring and evaluation**. Activities in this regard should not end after the data are compiled: the analysis and use of disaggregated data are also critical.
- 4 Since most existing social protection programmes are under central government authority, with rigid guidelines and limited room for regional governments to incorporate gender (unless it is built in already), **improve awareness on gender equity starting from central level and reaching out to provincial and district governments**. Simultaneously, however, **promote more decentralised models of social protection programming and budgeting**.

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Appendix 1: Key informants and workshop participants


List of key informants

		Name of informant	Position and office
1	Central level	Mr Sudarno Sumarto	Policy Advisor, TNP2K
2		Mr Pungky Sumadi	Director, Social Protection and People's Welfare, Bappenas
3		Mr Harapan Lumban Gaol	Deputy Task Manager, CCT Programme, Ministry of Social Affairs
4		Ms Johanna Knoess	Policy Advisor, Social Protection Programme, GIZ
	West Sumatra		
5	Provincial level	Mr Bahtarudin	Head, Health Insurance Division, Health Office
6		Mr Yolius Honest	Head, Social Affairs Division, Bappeda
7		Ms Latifah	Head, Research and Development Division, Bappeda
8		Mr Khairul Fahmi	Director, West Sumatra Office of PBHI, and Lecturer, Law Faculty, Andalas University, Padang
9		Ms Yefri Heriani	Director, Women's NGO Nurani Perempuan
10		Mr Irdiansyah	Member of Provincial Parliament
11		Ms Siti Izzati	Member of Provincial Parliament
12		Mr Rinto	Member of Provincial Parliament
13		Mr Jony	Head, Agriculture Office
14		Ms Ely Ditra	Head, Gender Mainstreaming Division, Women's Empowerment Office
15		Mr Nusyirwan	Academic, Andalas University
16		Mr Ratmil	Head, Programme Division, Education Office
17		Mr Hendra Makmur	Head, West Sumatra Journalist Association
18	Pasaman Barat district	Mr Fausi	Head, Programme Division, Education Office
19		Mr Bry K. Nanda	Head, Health Office
20		Mr Yasri Urripsah	Head, Community and Women Empowerment, and Family Planning Office
21		Mr Mukhlis	Head, Bappeda
22		Mr Yulizar Baharin	District Secretary
23		Ms Deswati	Member of District Parliament
24		Mr Jendri	Member of District Parliament
25		Ms Harlinda Syahputri	Head, Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Office
26		Mr Jhony	Head, Agriculture Office
27	NTT province	Prof. Mien Ratu Oedju	Director, Research Centre, Cendana University and Gender Expert
28		Mr Fritz Lake	Bappeda
29		Mr Tota Oceanna Zonneveld	Head, Poverty Alleviation Acceleration Programme, Bappeda
30		Ms Erna Erka	Coordinator, Planning, Data Planning and Evaluation Division, Health Office
31		Ana Djukana	Editor in Chief, Kursor Newspaper
32		Ms Sofie	Director, NGO Alfa Omega
33		Ms Emilia Nomleni	Member of Provincial Parliament
34		Mr Gabriel Beri Bina	Member of Provincial Parliament
35		Mr Okto Tabelak	Head, Social Affairs and Disaster Control Division, Social Affairs Office
36		Ms Elis M. Adonis	Head, Gender Mainstreaming, Women's Empowerment Bureau
37	TTS district	Mr Musa Nara Hepe	Subsection Head, Planning Programme, Evaluation and Reporting, Agriculture Office
38		Ms Grace Fallo	Social Affairs Division Staff, Bappeda
39		Mr Hendrik Banamtuan	Head, Bappeda
40		Ms YULiana RK Atajama	Head, Women's Empowerment Office
41		Ms Aleta Ninu	Section Head, Community Health Service, Health Office
42		Mr Silvester	Planning Section Staff, Health Office
43		Mr Filipin	Director, Women's NGO Sanggar Suara Perempuan
44		Mr Kudrat Marianan	Member of District Parliament
45		Mr Christian J Pa'Y	Member of District Parliament
46		Mr Okto Dida	Deputy Head, Social Office
47		Wellen R. Dadu	Section Head, Empowerment and Social Service, Social Office

List of workshop participants

	Name of informant	Office
West Sumatra province		
1	Indarefis	Social Affairs Office
2	Kalterina	Agriculture Office
3	Rosnita	Health Office
4	Syafruddin Abbas	Education Office
5	Ratmil	Education Office
6	Rahmat Syahni	Bappeda
Pasaman Barat district		
1	Al Jufri	District Secretariat
2	Armayanti	Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Office
3	Yuli Asmar	Social Office
4	Muhammad Taher	Agriculture Office
5	Pramana Yose	Education Office
6	Maiboni	Bappeda
7	Gusti	Health Office
8	Soni Ermida	Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Office
9	Elda Refriyenti	Social Office
10	Zandra Y	District Secretariat
11	Delni	Bappeda
12	Gusmiarsi	Community Empowerment and Family Planning Bureau
13	Nellyarnisma	Community Empowerment and Family Planning Bureau
14	Asmayulis	Bappeda
15	Rasyed	Community Empowerment and Family Planning Bureau
NTT province		
1	Yasni Saudila	Family Planning Office
2	K Here Wika	People Welfare Bureau
3	Frits I. Lake	Bappeda
4	Charles K. Sabara	Bappeda
5	Alexia Dina	Health Office
6	Katarina Mau	Agriculture Office
7	Deasy S. Palebagan	Agriculture Office
8	Donald Izaac	Agriculture Office
9	Matheus Neno	Education Office
TTS district		
1	Maxi D. Missa	Social Office
2	Stefanus R. Tupen	Health Office
3	I. Made Sara	Economic and Development Affairs, District Secretariat
4	Paten Soibala	Bappeda
5	Hermanus Jeila	Food Security Agency
6	Eta Abanat	Bappeda
7	Emmy Lussy	Women's Empowerment and Family Planning Office
8	Helda Tanebet	Women's Empowerment and Family Planning Office
9	Vera Bengu	Food Security Agency
10	Ever Detan	Bappeda
11	Jufra Babys	Bappeda

Appendix 2: Workshop instruments



Gender-sensitive SWOT analysis on social protection programme implementation


STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
OPPORTUNITIES	CHALLENGES

Problem tree approach

- Problem tree – to explore political economy dynamics behind programme decision making and implementation
- Scenario exercise



Problem tree analysis



Scenario exercises to identify key barriers to and opportunities for change

Three scenarios:

1. Sub-national-level attitudes to gender in social protection
2. Sectoral patterning improvements as a result of movements in the field of social protection
3. A logjam but possibility for space through third-party interventions



Scenario exercise

- a) 'If funding for social protection for vulnerable people in your locality were to double, would this improve the ability to ensure that men, women, girls and boys benefit equitably? How?'
- b) 'If gender equality legislation provisions to report on gender-specific benefits of all policies and programmes were compulsory and monitored by the president/ Prime Minister, what if anything would you do differently regarding programme implementation?'
- c) 'If performance incentives (e.g. pay, promotions) for government officials were linked to demonstrating improvements in gender-specific vulnerabilities (e.g. women's time poverty, women's access to vocational training, literacy, safety from inter-personal violence) would this make a difference in how programming is implemented? If so what?'



Appendix 3: Key informant questions

Questions for officials

	Questions	Who?
	<i>Institutions focusing on poverty and vulnerability reduction:</i>	<i>Who?</i>
Formal institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How are policy decisions made at the provincial/district level? (Probe: at the provincial level who makes decisions about policy change?) Which branch (e.g. legislative/executive) or government/ agency/ies make(s) decisions about what programmes are funded and implemented? Which agency sets the policy agenda? If there are different views among agencies, which agency has greater influence and why? Is this the same in all provinces/districts or unique to your province and why? 	Bappeda
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What mechanisms are in place to promote gender equality within the policymaking and implementing process? (Probe: mechanisms to ensure representation in governance, reflection in content.) For example, is there any gender focal point at the district/province level? Is there a gender quota? How effective are these mechanisms in ensuring gender is mainstreamed into social protection programming at the local level? (Are these measures tokenistic or meaningful? Why?) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do sub-national agencies have any opportunity to shape central government social protection policy/programming? Under what circumstances is there space for negotiation? (e.g. attention to specific challenges and vulnerabilities). 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are different social groups represented equally within the policymaking and implementation process? (women and men, majority and minority ethnic groups, majority and minority religious groups, civil society groups, etc.)? Is there a consideration in the decision-making process about how the characteristics of these groups? Why/why not? 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the most influential agencies, which officers have the greatest influence? What is the source of their influence (e.g. networks, mandate, personal motivation, access to funding, etc.). 	
Informal power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do informal factors also influence decision-making processes? (e.g. money politics, party politics, religion, nepotism/ progressive activists or leaders). Would it be difficult to change any process you are not in agreement with? (e.g. lack of support from superiors or colleagues; internal politics). 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is there an interest in promoting gender equality? Are you aware of decision makers who actively promote gender issues? (provide examples). Is there overt opposition to considering gender issues in decision-making processes? Are you aware of decision makers who actively oppose gender issues (provide examples). 	
Civic participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there mechanisms for strengthening poor people’s participation in and influence on decision making? Are people aware of them? Are they used? Are the channels for participation effective? 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do these mechanisms generate spaces for a variety of groups to participate (women/men/ethnic minority groups, etc.)? (e.g. time of day meetings are organised, etc.). 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If there are no mechanisms or if these don’t work, what do people do to express their opinions? (media, complaint mechanisms). 	
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do officials/decision makers follow the rules in delivering programmes? Why/why not? (cultural hierarchies, adequate information flows, dialogue mechanisms, monitoring systems, reward/incentive mechanisms). 	
Donor influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what degree are provincial governments financially (and politically) influenced by donors? Has this influence changed over time? Has this influence been positive, negative or neutral? 	

	Questions	
Implementation efficiency:		
Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you receive any type of capacity building to implement social protection? If yes, did it have any module on gender? Was it useful? Why? If not, do you think it would be valuable? How would it help you? Is there a funding pot available for capacity building that could be used for this purpose? 	•
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you discuss social protection programme implementation, impacts, etc. with departments (MOH, MOA, MOWECP etc.), etc.) or local officials? Is this through a regular reporting mechanism or sporadic? Do you receive programme data? Why/why not? 	•
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there gender experts in your office or do you have access to gender expertise? Do they coordinate with others in the bureaucracy and other departments, particularly implementers? 	•
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the biggest problems related to coordination? How might you improve the situation? 	•
M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you gather administrative data/information about the social protection programme in your sectoral area? (e.g. number of beneficiaries). Are the data you gather disaggregated by gender/age? Do you use them for improving programme design? How? What type of data would need to improve programme design/implementation? 	•
Linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is the programme designed with links to complementary services and programmes (e.g. if it is a cash transfer programme, are there links to subsidized health insurance? Or referrals to an NGO-run domestic violence programme?) If so, please provide details. If not, do you think it would be useful to promote such linkages? 	•
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are complementary programmes run by NGOs or government agencies? If there are no linkages with other programmes, how do you think it might be possible? What might make it hard? 	•
Gender provisions, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What impacts have programmes had on poor women? (e.g. human capital development, economic empowerment, intra-household dynamics, social capital). What impacts have been most significant and why? What areas need the most attention still? 	•

Questions for implementers/service providers

	Questions	
Implementation efficiency:		Who?
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How do you make decisions on the implementation of the programme—what is the process (e.g. individual decision, decision-making meetings, etc.?) Once made, are decisions implemented? Why/why not? (obstacles). Do you/your superiors discuss the programme, implementation, impacts, etc. with other departments (MOH, MOA, MOWECP, etc.) or local representatives? Are you required to collect data on the programme? If so, do you give programme data to people working in other departments, or with the local bureaucracy? What about civil society groups or international agencies? Are there gender experts among programme staff? If so, do they coordinate with other programme implementers and local officials in other departments? If not, do you have access to other sources of gender expertise? (e.g. NGOs, academics, women activists, etc.). Given that poverty and vulnerability are complex issues that require attention across a number of sector areas, how do you work with your colleagues in other relevant departments to ensure targeted men and women benefit from the programme? Could this interaction be strengthened? How? 	Service provider (village) and district coordinator
Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there budget provisions for capacity training of implementers or others on how to make programme implementation gender sensitive? Who has received this type of training? By whom? Have you been trained? What were the main issues that the training discussed? What other training has been done? (implementation, etc.). Were participants actively involved in this training? Was the training useful? If so, how have you implemented lessons from training into practice? If not, please explain. (Probe: what type of method do you think works best for training local implementers/government officials?) 	

Questions		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What types of incentives are to ensure relevant participants attend trainings? 	
M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How much time and energy do you dedicate to M&E in relation to other aspects of your job? Why? • Do you gather administrative data/information about the social protection programme in your sectoral area? (e.g. number of beneficiaries). Are the data you gather disaggregated by gender/age? • Do you know what the data/information is used for? 	
Linkages to complementary services and programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have men, women, girls or boys involved in the programme accessed complementary services or programmes? (e.g. if it is a cash transfer programme, are there links to subsidised health insurance? Or referrals to an NGO-run domestic violence programme?) • Have women participants gained knowledge about their entitlements to other poverty reduction and social protection programmes? • Have there been any awareness-raising initiatives about how gender differences can contribute to poverty/vulnerability/food insecurity? Please give an example. • If complementary programmes are available, are they run by NGOs or government agencies? If there are no linkages with other programmes, how do you think it might be possible—and why might it be a good idea? 	
Programme impact:		
Gender provisions etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What proportion of participants are men/women? How many female-headed households? • Are there budget provisions for community awareness raising about gender issues? • How do you address language barriers with ethnic minority women? • What impacts have programmes had on poor women? (e.g. human capital development, economic empowerment, intra-household dynamics, social capital). What impacts have been most significant and why? What areas need the most attention still? 	

Questions for provincial/district-level decision makers

Theme	Decision logics: interplay of interests and ideas over time in response to change	Who?
Social protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are your views/attitudes about the drivers of poverty and vulnerability? How do you think the government can help poor people exit poverty and/or vulnerability? Are your views similar or different from those of others? • Should all the poor benefit equally or some more than others? Why? • What role do you think different social protection programmes can play in people exiting poverty? Please provide examples (probe providing one or two examples of relevant social protection programmes). Have these thoughts changed over time? If so, what do you think has triggered this change? • As part of social protection, do you consider it important to look at community and intra-household relationships that might affect men and women differently? What about looking at the specific vulnerabilities of women and girls? (please explain). How do you think these gender dynamics issues can be addressed through the implementation of social protection programmes? • To what degree are policy recommendations based on research evidence? What type of evidence? (academic research, NGO research, local data collection). 	
Sectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How have interactions and communication patterns between departments involved in social protection programming changed over the past 10 years and why? • Are there any gender champions within the different sectors? What role have these champions played? 	

Theme	Decision logics: interplay of interests and ideas over time in response to change	Who?
Traditional authorities/ informal leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do traditional authorities view poverty and vulnerability? • Are local traditional authorities aware of differences between men and women in relation to poverty and vulnerability? • How much influence do traditional authorities have over the implementation of local-level programmes? 	
Political leaders (elected/ appointed officials/ leaders of political party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do (different) political leaders think about poverty and inequality and the government's role in tackling them? (e.g. is there a perception that assistance create dependency or negative incentives?) • is there a perception that everyone should benefit from assistance equally or some more than others? • What is the balance between central/local authorities in service provision? Is there coordination? Do departments interact with parties, bureaucracy, legislature, etc.? 	National level: academia/ political scientists complemented by local-level views
Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent does the media shape popular views on poverty and vulnerability and the role of social protection programmes? 	
Civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do different interest groups (private sector, NGOs, the media) seek to influence policy at the local level? What are the main interest lobbies? Has this changed over time? In response to what? • Are there gender equality organisations/activists who are prominent in the public arena and in social protection more particularly? Has this changed over time? In response to what? 	
Citizens and different categories of the poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What channels could facilitate the more effective reflection of poor men and women's interests in social protection programming? (e.g. participation in public forums, analysis of complaints mechanisms to improve programme performance, etc.). 	